“Stay in Your Lane”: The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Confirms that a Limited Remand Precludes Post-Remand Withdrawal of a Guilty Plea
(Commentary on State of West Virginia v. Christopher McDonald, No. 23-455, 26 June 2025)

1. Introduction

State v. Christopher McDonald marks the second appellate appearance of a 2020 Nicholas County armed-robbery prosecution. After the Supreme Court’s 2023 opinion (McDonald I) vacated Mr. McDonald’s 80-year sentence for procedural error and remanded “for resentencing consistent with Rule 32,” the defendant sought to leverage the remand into something far broader: he moved to withdraw his 2020 guilty plea, arguing that wielding a BB gun could not, as a matter of law, support first-degree robbery under W. Va. Code § 61-2-12(a)(2).

The Circuit Court rejected that motion and re-imposed the same 80-year term. On further appeal, Mr. McDonald raised two issues:

1. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea.
2. Whether an 80-year robbery sentence is constitutionally disproportionate.

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, anchoring its holding to the “mandate rule” — a specialized facet of the “law-of-the-case” doctrine — and reiterating West Virginia’s two-step disproportionality review. Chief Justice Wooton dissented, contending that the majority misclassified the remand as “limited” and applied the mandate rule too rigidly.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Mandate Rule. Because McDonald I expressly remanded only for resentencing after a presentence report (“PSR”) was prepared, the circuit court lacked authority to entertain a plea-withdrawal motion. Denial of that motion was therefore proper.
• Sentence Proportionality. Applying both the subjective “shock-the-conscience” test and the objective four-factor test from State v. Cooper, the Court held that 80 years for a gun-point Subway robbery does not violate art. III, § 5 of the West Virginia Constitution.
• Result. Order of June 23 2023 resentencing Mr. McDonald to 80 years affirmed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. State v. McDonald (McDonald I), 250 W. Va. 532 (2023).
   – Established new Syllabus Pt. 4 requiring a PSR unless Rule 32(b)(1)(A)-(C) are met.
   – Provided the “limited remand.” The majority treats that remand as the linchpin restricting the circuit court’s power.
2. Frazier & Oxley, L.C. v. Cummings, 214 W. Va. 802 (2003).
   – Leading West Virginia articulation of the “mandate rule.” Quoted in the decision for the proposition that a trial court may not decide matters beyond the appellate mandate.
3. Duncil v. Kaufman, 183 W. Va. 175 (1990).
   – Supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard for pre-sentence plea withdrawal.
4. State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271 (1997); State v. Patrick C., 243 W. Va. 258 (2020).
   – Establish deferential review of sentencing decisions (abuse of discretion) and de-novo review of constitutional issues.
5. Proportionality Quartet:
   – State v. Vance, 164 W. Va. 216 (1980) (art. III, § 5 “Penalties shall be proportioned …”);
   – Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523 (1981) (subjective/objective framework);
   – State v. Cooper, 172 W. Va. 266 (1983) (two-test method);
   – State v. Williams, 205 W. Va. 552 (1999) (robbery sentences across jurisdictions).
6. Smoot v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 790 (1981).
   – Supports disparate sentences for dissimilar co-defendants.
7. Federal Analogue. United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64 (4th Cir. 1993) — an out-of-state articulation of the mandate rule, showing horizontal consistency.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Scope of Remand & Mandate Rule

The majority parsed its prior opinion and concluded it had issued a “limited remand” — i.e., a remand that explicitly delineates the issues for the lower court. Under Cummings, a trial court acts “erroneously” if it goes beyond that narrower mission. Because plea validity was neither challenged nor mentioned in McDonald I, the panel found that the circuit court would have violated the mandate by reaching it. Consequently, refusing to consider the plea-withdrawal motion was not an abuse of discretion but a jurisdictional imperative.

3.2.2 Plea Withdrawal Standard

Rule 32(e) permits a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing for “any fair and just reason.” Mr. McDonald argued that incorrect advice (that a BB gun suffices for first-degree robbery) satisfied that standard. However, the majority never reached the adequacy of the reason because the mandate rule foreclosed the motion altogether.

3.2.3 Proportionality Analysis

1. Subjective Test: The Court deemed the 80-year term not shocking given the threat of lethal force, psychological trauma, and planning involved.
2. Objective Test:
   • Nature of Offense: Armed robbery is “violent with high potential for injury.”
   • Legislative Purpose: Deterrence and incapacitation; statute intentionally leaves the maximum open-ended.
   • Inter-Jurisdictional Comparison: Cases cited in Williams tolerate stiff robbery sentences nationwide.
   • Intra-Jurisdictional Comparison: The legislature gives West Virginia judges wide discretion for robbery sentences beyond ten years.

Hence, the sentence survived both prongs of the proportionality inquiry.

3.2.4 Treatment of Co-Defendant Sentences

Rejecting an “equalization” argument, the majority invoked Smoot: different roles and criminal histories justify divergent outcomes. The co-defendants pled only to conspiracy and never entered the restaurant.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Narrower Post-Remand Litigation. The ruling signals that litigants must raise every plausible challenge in the first appeal; otherwise, a limited remand will wall off new issues. Defense counsel must read mandates cautiously and move promptly for plea withdrawal before appealing.
• Resentencing Practice. Trial judges on limited remand need not (indeed, may not) revisit convictions unless the mandate allows it. This may streamline resentencing hearings but can also curtail defendants’ strategic flexibility.
• Robbery Sentencing Jurisprudence. By upholding an 80-year term, the Court confirms that very lengthy sentences for a single count of first-degree robbery can still fall within constitutional bounds, provided the record evidences aggravating factors.
• BB Guns and “Firearms.” Importantly, the Court declined to reach whether a BB gun qualifies as a “firearm or other deadly weapon” under § 61-2-12(a)(2). That substantive statutory question remains open for a future case squarely presenting it.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Limited vs. General Remand

• Limited Remand: Appellate court instructs the lower court to deal with specific, enumerated tasks (e.g., “resentence after PSR”). Going beyond is forbidden.
• General Remand: Lower court may address any matter not inconsistent with the higher court’s opinion.

Mandate Rule

The trial court must implement — and cannot deviate from — the appellate court’s instructions. Think of it as “follow the blueprint, no add-ons.”

Rule 32(b)(1) PSR Requirement

A presentence report is mandatory unless (A) the court has enough info; (B) no party requests a PSR; and (C) the court explains why it is unnecessary. McDonald I turned this into binding precedent.

Plea Withdrawal (Rule 32(e))

Before sentencing, a defendant may retract a plea by showing a “fair and just reason.” After sentencing, relief is drastically narrower (via habeas or Rule 35 motions).

Proportionality Tests

• Subjective: Does the punishment “shock the conscience” of society and the judiciary?
• Objective: Four-factor comparison: (1) nature of offense, (2) legislative intent, (3) sentences in other states, (4) sentences for other crimes in West Virginia.

5. Conclusion

State v. Christopher McDonald provides a textbook illustration of the mandate rule at work. When an appellate court remands for a discrete purpose, all other potential issues — even constitutional ones — remain outside the sandbox unless the mandate says otherwise. The decision therefore stands as a cautionary tale: appellate briefs must be comprehensive, and post-remand strategies must fit within the mandate’s contours.

On the sentencing front, the Court reaffirmed its long-standing view that West Virginia’s open-ended robbery statute confers vast discretion on trial judges and that very lengthy terms can withstand proportionality scrutiny when aggravating facts abound.

Finally, the case leaves unresolved the intriguing statutory question of whether a BB gun is a “firearm or other deadly weapon” for first-degree robbery. Future defendants who timely raise that issue — perhaps on direct appeal before sentencing is complete — may yet secure an answer. Until then, McDonald II teaches litigants and courts alike: when the Supreme Court sends a case back with a specific mission, “stay in your lane.”