“Same Time, New Package” – Eleventh Circuit Confirms Broad Discretion to Re-impose an Identical Aggregate Sentence After § 2255 Partial Vacatur

Introduction

In United States v. Michael Chance, No. 24-12575 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025) (non-published), the Eleventh Circuit confronted a familiar—but increasingly litigated—question: When one count of conviction is vacated on collateral review and the advisory Guideline range drops, how much latitude does a resentencing court retain to recreate the original “sentencing package”?

Michael Chance, a career bank robber now in his seventies, succeeded under United States v. Davis and United States v. Taylor in vacating a § 924(c) firearm count tied to an attempted Hobbs Act robbery. At resentencing, however, a different district judge re-imposed the very same aggregate 660-month term that Chance had originally received in 2007—even though the low end of the revised Guideline range plummeted from 646 months to 360 months. Chance appealed, calling the sentence “substantively unreasonable.”

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a district court acts within its discretion when—after duly considering the § 3553(a) factors—it chooses to re-package the sentence in identical form, notwithstanding a lower advisory Guideline range and the defendant’s advanced age and prison mitigation evidence.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Newsom, Branch & Grant, JJ.) applied deferential abuse-of-discretion review.
It concluded that the district court explicitly considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors, adequately weighed Chance’s mitigation, and permissibly placed heavy emphasis on his extensive, violent criminal history and prison misconduct.
Because the 660-month sentence sits within the recalculated Guideline range (360 months–life) and far below the life statutory maximum, the court deemed it “well within the range of reasonable sentences.”
The decision relies heavily on earlier Eleventh Circuit precedent—Stinson, Fowler, Rosales-Bruno, and Irey—to reaffirm that resentencing after vacatur is a blank slate and that no special presumption favors the new, lower Guideline range.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996)
Key point: a sentence vacated in part becomes void “in its entirety.” Upon resentencing, the court may reconstruct the sentence on surviving counts.
United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010 (11th Cir. 2014)
Introduced the “sentencing package” metaphor—courts may re-align sentences to maintain proportionality after a conviction is set aside.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)
Provided the abuse-of-discretion framework for substantive reasonableness review.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015)
Clarified that courts need not give equal weight to each § 3553(a) factor; discussed circumstances justifying sentences above or below the range.
United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2008) & United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021)
Allowed heavy reliance on criminal history even if already reflected in the Guideline score.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
Sets the “definite and firm conviction” threshold for overturning a sentence.
United States v. Mosquera, 886 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2018)
Holds that a de facto life sentence owing to age is not presumptively unreasonable.
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019) & United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022)
Vacated Chance’s § 924(c) conviction but did not dictate the ultimate sentence on remaining counts.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

“Placing substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely consistent with § 3553(a)… five of the factors deal with criminal history.” – Slip op. at 10-11.

Blank-Slate Repackaging. Citing Stinson and Fowler, the panel underscored that once Count 4 was vacated, the district court could restructure the entire package to ensure that the punishment fits both the criminal and the crime.
Guideline Range as Merely Advisory. The drop to 360-life did not entitle Chance to a lower sentence. Under Rosales-Bruno, the court must weigh all § 3553(a) factors, and may decide the other factors outweigh the new range.
Emphasis on History & Risk. The district court highlighted decades-long recidivism, prison infractions (24 incidents), and the rapidity with which Chance historically re-offended after prior releases.
Mitigation Considered but Discounted. Age, health problems, educational courses, trustee status, and low PATTERN recidivism score were acknowledged but found insufficient to override public-protection and deterrence goals.
Within-Range & Below Statutory Max. The sentence fell inside the advisory range and below the max of life, strengthening the presumption of reasonableness (Hunt; Gonzalez).

C. Potential Impact

Reinforces Judicial Discretion Post-Davis/Taylor. Many defendants are securing § 2255 relief on § 924(c) counts. This opinion signals that success on the legal front does not guarantee a lower total sentence.
Guideline Range “Drop” Not a Trump Card. Defense counsel must be prepared to supply powerful mitigation because the new lower range carries no special presumption.
Encourages Holistic Sentencing Records. The decision validates wide-ranging consideration of prison disciplinary history, even when infractions appear minor, and underscores the importance of contextualizing those records.
Forecast on Elder-Incarceration Arguments. Advanced age and medical issues, without more, will rarely compel a court of appeals to interfere with a sentence fashioned to protect the public from a life-long recidivist.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 924(c) “Crime of Violence”: Federal law adds mandatory consecutive time when a firearm is used during a “crime of violence.” The Supreme Court struck down one definitional clause as vague (Davis) and held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify (Taylor).
Sentencing Package Doctrine: Think of a sentence as a set of interlocking parts. Remove one part (a vacated count) and the whole package may be rebuilt so that the overall punishment still reflects the court’s original intentions and statutory goals.
Substantive Reasonableness: A sentence passes this test if, considering all circumstances and § 3553(a) factors, the district court did not make a clear error of judgment. Appellate courts grant “substantial deference.”
Career Offender Enhancement: Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, defendants with certain prior violent or drug felonies face higher offense levels and criminal-history categories, inflating the Guideline range.
PATTERN Recidivism Score: A Bureau of Prisons tool estimating re-offense risk; here, Chance scored “minimal,” but the district court still found high risk based on his long-term patterns.

Conclusion

United States v. Michael Chance adds important gloss to Eleventh Circuit sentencing jurisprudence. It clarifies that when a conviction is vacated on collateral review, the resentencing court’s discretion to recreate the original term remains vast—even to the point of re-imposing the identical aggregate sentence. The decision underscores three practical lessons:

The advisory Guideline range, though indispensable, is never dispositive.
Decades-long criminal histories can, standing alone, justify very lengthy sentences—even for aging defendants with mitigation evidence.
The appellate standard of review for substantive reasonableness is extraordinarily deferential; defendants must show a “definite and firm conviction” of error, a high bar rarely cleared.

Going forward, counsel in § 2255 resentencings should marshal persuasive, individualized mitigation and confront head-on the specter of “repackaging.” The Eleventh Circuit has signaled that district courts remain free—within broad limits—to say, in effect, “same time, new package.”