“No Live Case, No Power to Hear”:
Hawkins v. State, 2025 MT 134 — Cementing the Rule that District Court Interlocutory Jurisdiction under § 15-2-305, MCA, Requires an Active MTAB Proceeding

Introduction

Hawkins v. State (2025 MT 134) presented the Supreme Court of Montana with a deceptively simple yet procedurally tangled question: Can a district court entertain an interlocutory petition when the underlying controversy before the Montana Tax Appeal Board (MTAB) has already been dismissed?

Appellant Kris Hawkins, acting pro se and claiming to be trustee of the Olson Trust, attempted to challenge MTAB’s valuation of real property in Ravalli County. After repeatedly refusing to verify her trustee status, Hawkins filed (1) a defective affidavit alleging MTAB bias and (2) a petition in district court for “interlocutory adjudication” under § 15-2-304, MCA. MTAB eventually dismissed the valuation appeal for non-compliance, and the district court, facing a matter that was no longer “pending” before MTAB, dismissed the interlocutory petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hawkins appealed.

Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson affirmed the district court, holding:

1. Subject-matter jurisdiction under § 15-2-305, MCA, is limited to issues “pending before” MTAB.
2. Because MTAB dismissed Hawkins’s valuation appeal before the district court acted, no issue remained pending; consequently, the prerequisite for interlocutory review did not exist.
3. Hawkins’s affidavit of bias was facially insufficient under § 2-4-611(4), MCA (Montana Administrative Procedure Act), and therefore did not divest MTAB of jurisdiction.
4. Statutes and rules governing judicial disqualification of courts (§ 3-1-805, MCA) do not apply to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial authority.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• In re Estate of Scott, 2023 MT 97 – Confirmed de novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction questions; supplied the standard used by the Court.
• In re Sorini, 220 Mont. 459 (1986) – Construed § 2-4-611(4), MCA, as the exclusive statutory procedure for alleging agency-level bias; guided the Court in finding Hawkins’s affidavit inadequate.
• Labair v. Carey, 2017 MT 286 – Discussed the ebb and flow of jurisdiction between courts and tribunals; implied that jurisdiction can revert to MTAB after court dismissal.
• Orcutt v. 7th Judicial Dist. Court, 381 Mont. 544 (2015) – Cited for the principle that notices of appeal normally strip lower courts of jurisdiction, supporting the broader point that only one tribunal at a time may possess authority.
• District-court decisions (Bechtel Group, Roosevelt) – Provided persuasive (though non-binding) authority on when district courts have discretion to accept or deny interlocutory petitions.

These authorities furnish two doctrinal pillars: (a) a district court’s power is constrained by explicit legislative grants, and (b) jurisdictional exclusivity guards against simultaneous control by multiple fora.

2. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Statutory Text Controls. Section 15-2-305, MCA, authorizes district courts to hear “issues pending before the board” (MTAB). The Court read pending in its plain sense: still alive, undecided, and within MTAB’s docket. Dismissal extinguishes pendency, therefore extinguishing interlocutory jurisdiction.
2. Insufficiency of the Bias Affidavit. Under § 2-4-611(4), MCA, an affidavit must allege specific, factual indications of bias. The Court characterised Hawkins’s filing as “conclusory and self-serving,” hence legally insufficient. Because sufficiency is a condition precedent to any transfer of the case to another agency or to the courts, MTAB retained jurisdiction up to — and including — its dismissal.
3. Inapplicability of Judicial Disqualification Rules. Hawkins invoked § 3-1-805, MCA, but that rule, promulgated for judges of courts, has “no bearing on administrative agencies.” The Court emphasised that statutory schemes must be read in context; borrowing a rule from another domain cannot expand jurisdiction where the legislature has not done so.
4. Sequential Jurisdiction Doctrine. Relying on Labair and basic jurisdictional principles, the Court noted that even if the district court had momentarily acquired jurisdiction when Hawkins first petitioned, that power dissolved once the petition was dismissed, allowing MTAB to continue — and ultimately conclude — its proceedings.

3. Anticipated Impact on Montana Administrative & Tax Litigation

• Clear Jurisdictional Boundary. Litigants must ensure the MTAB dispute is still active before seeking interlocutory relief; dismissal by MTAB is fatal.
• Tactical Timing. Lawyers (and pro se parties) will need to move swiftly—before MTAB enters a dismissal order—should they wish to invoke § 15-2-304.
• Agency Affidavits of Bias. The Court’s emphasis on “sufficient” affidavits will likely raise the bar for parties asserting MTAB bias. Mere allegations will not suffice; detailed factual assertions are required.
• Administrative Finality. MTAB can confidently dismiss non-compliant appeals without fear of losing control to the district court via hollow bias claims, promoting procedural efficiency.
• Precedential Weight. Although the ruling is targeted at tax-valuation disputes, the reasoning is anchored in general administrative-law principles and will likely influence other quasi-judicial boards in Montana.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Subject-Matter Jurisdiction – A court’s legal power to decide a particular kind of case. If the legislature has not granted that power, the court cannot act.
• Interlocutory Adjudication – A procedural device allowing a court to decide certain questions in the middle of (rather than after) an administrative proceeding, but only while that proceeding is still ongoing.
• Pendency Requirement – The statutory need for an issue to be currently before MTAB; once the board dismisses, nothing is left to be reviewed.
• Sufficient Affidavit of Bias – A sworn statement alleging specific facts demonstrating that an administrative decision-maker cannot be impartial; conclusory statements are inadequate.
• MAPA (Montana Administrative Procedure Act) – The primary set of rules governing how agencies conduct contested-case hearings, including procedures for claiming bias.

Conclusion

Hawkins v. State sends an unambiguous message: Interlocutory jurisdiction is conditional on a live, undecided controversy before MTAB. By tethering district-court power tightly to the “pendency” requirement of § 15-2-305, MCA, the Supreme Court restores clarity to a statutory pathway that had become vulnerable to procedural gamesmanship. Equally important, the Court reinforced rigorous standards for alleging administrative bias, safeguarding agencies from baseless challenges that could derail orderly adjudication. For tax practitioners and administrative-law litigators alike, the decision is both a cautionary tale and a lodestar for future procedural strategy.