Trial Courts Cannot Reserve Property Valuations After Judgment; Adjusted Valuation Dates Demand Specific Findings; Spousal Support Must Be Counted in Child Support — Commentary on Jones v. Jones, 2025 ND 61

Introduction

Jones v. Jones, 2025 ND 61, is a significant North Dakota Supreme Court decision clarifying three recurring problem areas in domestic relations litigation: (1) the finality of property distributions and the lack of continuing jurisdiction to “reserve” valuation questions after entry of judgment; (2) the strict requirements for changing the valuation date under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1); and (3) the mandatory inclusion of spousal support as income when calculating child support under the North Dakota Child Support Guidelines.

Benjamin Jones (husband) and Melanie Jones (wife) married in 2003 and have two minor children. The parties lived on a Glenburn, North Dakota property acquired via a contract for deed from Melanie’s parents. After Benjamin commenced divorce in March 2023, the seller (Melanie’s father) issued a notice of intent to cancel the contract for deed shortly before the February 2024 trial. The district court awarded Benjamin primary residential responsibility, found “zero equity” in the marital home because of the impending cancellation, awarded Melanie $900/month spousal support for 10 years, and ordered Melanie to pay child support of $590/month. It also purported to “reserve” the final valuation of the marital home, the corresponding debt, and a separate debt consolidation loan for six months to allow related litigation to proceed.

Benjamin appealed the property division, spousal support, and child support; Melanie cross-appealed the residential responsibility decision.

Summary of the Opinion

• Primary Residential Responsibility: Affirmed. The district court did not clearly err in awarding Benjamin primary residential responsibility, giving weight to the mature child’s preference and to the factor assessing each parent’s willingness to foster the other parent’s relationship.
• Property Valuation and “Reservation”: Reversed in part. A trial court cannot reserve the valuation of marital assets and debts after entry of judgment. Valuations and distribution become final upon judgment, absent proper post-judgment proceedings. The court also erred by effectively changing the valuation date based on a pre-trial default notice without making the specific statutory findings required by N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1).
• Debt Consolidation Loan: The court likewise could not reserve the “final value” of this debt post-judgment. Because both parties agreed on its value and the division was even, only the improper reservation was reversed.
• Spousal Support: Remanded. Because property division and spousal support are interrelated, the spousal support award must be reconsidered if property valuations change on remand.
• Child Support: Reversed in part and remanded. The district court erred as a matter of law by failing to include Melanie’s spousal support as part of her gross income. Other child support arguments (in-kind income and imputing summer income) were unpreserved and/or lacked evidentiary support.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Role

• Saastad v. Saastad, 2019 ND 279, 935 N.W.2d 776: Confirms the clearly erroneous standard for reviewing primary residential responsibility and deference to the trial court’s best interests findings under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1).
• Lee v. Lee, 2019 ND 142, 927 N.W.2d 104: Appellate courts will not overturn property valuation findings unless clearly erroneous.
• Bies v. Obregon, 1997 ND 18, 558 N.W.2d 855: Addresses ripeness. Here, the Supreme Court holds valuations became final upon entry of judgment, making them ripe notwithstanding the trial court’s attempt to reserve them.
• Kopp v. Kopp, 2001 ND 41, 622 N.W.2d 726: A district court has no continuing jurisdiction to modify a final property distribution. Jones reaffirms and applies this rule to strike down “reservation” language purporting to hold asset/debt valuations open post-judgment.
• N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1): Governs valuation dates. If no agreed date, the default is 60 days before the initially scheduled trial. A court may adjust an asset/debt’s valuation if there is a substantial change between the valuation date and trial, but it must make specific findings that another valuation date is fair and equitable.
• Berdahl v. Berdahl, 2022 ND 136, 977 N.W.2d 294; Senger v. Senger, 2022 ND 229, 983 N.W.2d 160; Messmer v. Messmer, 2020 ND 62, 940 N.W.2d 622: Property division and spousal support are interrelated and must be considered together; changes in one can warrant reconsideration of the other.
• Gooss v. Gooss, 2020 ND 233, 951 N.W.2d 247: Establishes the standard of review for child support (mixed law, fact, and limited discretion) and that noncompliance with guidelines is legal error.
• N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-01(4)-(5), § 75-02-04.1-07: Defines gross income broadly (including spousal support and in-kind income) and underemployment standards for imputation.
• Knudson v. Knudson, 2018 ND 199, 916 N.W.2d 793: Reinforces the expansive definition of “income from any source.”
• Schiele v. Schiele, 2015 ND 169, 865 N.W.2d 433; Wilson v. Wilson, 2014 ND 199, 855 N.W.2d 105: Preservation doctrine: issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• Schiff v. Schiff, 2000 ND 113, 611 N.W.2d 191: Trial court needs evidence of value before including in-kind income in gross income.
• Heinz v. Heinz, 2001 ND 147, 632 N.W.2d 443; Corbett v. Corbett, 2001 ND 113, 628 N.W.2d 312; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 1997 ND 149, 567 N.W.2d 206: Spousal support received is part of gross income for child support. Jones emphasizes courts must include it whether or not a party specifically argued it, because the guidelines require it.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) Residential Responsibility: Best Interests Analysis Was Supported

The district court evaluated all statutory best-interest factors, finding factor (d) favored Melanie, factor (e) (willingness to foster the other parent’s relationship) favored Benjamin, factor (i) (mature child’s preference) “strongly” favored Benjamin, and factor (m) (other relevant considerations) also favored Benjamin based on keeping the siblings together and the older child’s clear preference. The court found Melanie’s public discussions of the divorce (and of Benjamin’s alleged “brainwashing”) with other parents were harming the children’s social supports—particularly the older child, E.J.—and undermined Melanie’s ability to foster a healthy relationship with Benjamin. The court further found E.J., then 15, had the maturity to express an independent, sound judgment preferring to primarily reside with Benjamin, and that her preference was not the product of improper inducement or influence.

On appeal, applying the clearly erroneous standard, the Supreme Court refused to reweigh credibility and affirmed, emphasizing that evidence supported the trial court’s factor (e) and (i) findings and that this was a classic case of choosing between two fit parents where appellate deference is at its zenith.

2) Property: No Post-Judgment “Reservation” and Strict Valuation-Date Findings Required

The district court purported to reserve for six months the “final value” of the marital home, its associated debt under a contract for deed with Melanie’s parents, and a separate debt consolidation loan, “to allow litigation, if any, to proceed.” The Supreme Court held this is impermissible. Once the court entered its decree, the property distribution was final; the district court lacked continuing jurisdiction to revisit it absent a post-judgment motion. The attempted reservation was therefore error, and the valuations were ripe for appellate review despite the trial court’s contrary intent.

On substance, the court found the trial court effectively changed the valuation date from December 2023 to February 14, 2024 (the date of the seller’s notice of intent to cancel the contract for deed) by assigning zero equity based on anticipated foreclosure. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1), a court may use a valuation date other than the default only if it finds:

• a substantial change in the value of the asset or debt between the valuation date and the trial, and
• specific findings that another valuation date is fair and equitable.

The Supreme Court held the district court made neither finding. It also directed the trial court to clarify on remand whether the parties had, in fact, agreed to a valuation date (December 10, 2023, as suggested by the Rule 8.3 listing), or whether the statutory default applied (60 days before trial — December 24, 2023). If a different valuation date is chosen for the marital home and corresponding debt, the court must articulate the substantial change and why the adjusted date is fair and equitable. Any changed valuations require equitable redistribution of the marital estate.

As to the separate debt consolidation loan, the Supreme Court reversed only the improper reservation; because both parties agreed on the amount and the trial court divided it evenly, the valuation itself stood unchallenged.

3) Spousal Support: Interdependence with Property Division Requires Reconsideration

North Dakota law treats property division and spousal support as interrelated. Because the property valuation/distribution may change on remand, the Supreme Court directed the district court to reconsider spousal support in light of any redistribution. This preserves the holistic balance between asset allocation and support obligations.

4) Child Support: Include Spousal Support as Income; Other Challenges Unpreserved or Unsupported

The district court erred as a matter of law by omitting Melanie’s spousal support from her gross income when calculating her child support obligation. Under the Child Support Guidelines, spousal support received counts as gross income. The Supreme Court made an important procedural point: because the guidelines mandate inclusion, a party need not separately argue it below; trial courts must apply the law once spousal support is awarded.

Benjamin’s remaining child support complaints—(i) failure to include in-kind income (free rent and fuel allegedly provided by Melanie’s parent) and (ii) failure to impute summer income for underemployment—were rejected for two reasons. First, they were not preserved by argument in the district court. Second, there was no record evidence of the value of any in-kind benefits, which is necessary before such amounts can be included as income.

Impact and Practical Significance

• Finality of Property Division: Trial courts cannot “hold open” asset or debt valuations post-judgment to see how related third-party disputes unfold. Once judgment enters, the distribution is final absent proper post-judgment relief. Practitioners should ensure that all valuation issues are resolved within the decree—or pursue timely post-judgment motions if new developments arise.
• Valuation Date Discipline: Jones tightens compliance with § 14-05-24(1). If the parties do not clearly and expressly agree to a valuation date, the statute’s default controls. Any deviation requires explicit findings of substantial change and fairness. Trial courts should identify the valuation date on the record, specify the evidence of change, and explain why an alternative date is equitable.
• Contract-for-Deed Properties: Where default/acceleration or cancellation is in play, Jones suggests courts must still make the required valuation-date findings rather than collapsing equity to zero based on impending foreclosure without analysis. Counsel should marshal evidence about the timing, legal effect, market value, payoff balance, accrued equity (if any), and the probability of cancellation to meet the “substantial change” and fairness requirements.
• Spousal Support and Child Support Interlock: Spousal support received must be included in the recipient’s gross income for child support calculations. Courts must apply this rule even absent party argument. Counsel should nonetheless provide updated child support worksheets reflecting any spousal support award to facilitate immediate compliance.
• Preservation and Proof for In-Kind/Imputed Income: To add in-kind benefits (e.g., free housing, fuel) to gross income, the proponent must raise the issue below and prove a reasonable value. Likewise, imputation for underemployment requires record support under the guidelines. Without preservation and proof, such claims will fail on appeal.
• Mature Child’s Preference and Parental Conduct: Jones underscores that a mature child’s preference can carry substantial weight when shown by clear and convincing evidence to be independent and not the product of improper influence. The decision also shows courts may treat parental gossip or disparagement—particularly when it harms a child’s social supports—as bearing on factor (e) (willingness to foster the other parent’s relationship).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Valuation Date (Divorce Property): The point in time at which marital assets and debts are valued. If the parties agree, that date controls; otherwise, it is by statute 60 days before the initially scheduled trial. Courts can move from that date only by making specific findings of (a) a substantial change in value between the valuation date and trial, and (b) why another date is fair and equitable.
• Reservation of Jurisdiction (Property): In North Dakota, a trial court cannot reserve jurisdiction to alter a final property distribution after entry of judgment. Any change requires proper post-judgment procedures; courts cannot build “flex time” into the decree to await future events.
• Contract for Deed and Cancellation: A financing structure where the seller keeps title until full payment. On default, the seller can accelerate remaining payments and cancel the contract after notice, potentially extinguishing the buyer’s equity. But for divorce valuation purposes, the effect must be analyzed through the statutory valuation-date lens.
• In-Kind Income (Child Support): Non-cash benefits received from employment or income-producing activity—like free housing, utilities, or fuel—may count as income if regularly received and if their value is proven.
• Underemployment (Child Support): An obligor is underemployed if earnings are significantly less than the statewide average for similar work and qualifications. If so, courts may impute income, but only with adequate record evidence.
• Standards of Review: Parenting findings are reviewed for clear error (high deference to the trial court). Property valuations are also reviewed for clear error. Compliance with child support guidelines is a legal question reviewed de novo; some aspects allow limited discretion when supported by findings.

Conclusion

Jones v. Jones is an important procedural and doctrinal reaffirmation with practical edge. The North Dakota Supreme Court firmly disallows post-judgment reservations of asset and debt valuations, insists on explicit valuation-date findings under § 14-05-24(1) whenever trial courts deviate from the agreed/default date, and mandates that spousal support received be included in a child support obligor’s gross income. At the same time, it exemplifies appellate deference to trial courts on nuanced best-interests determinations supported by the record, including the weight given to a mature child’s reasoned preference and parental conduct affecting inter-parental relationships.

Going forward, trial courts should identify the valuation date on the record, support any adjustment with the statutory findings, finalize property distributions without “reservations,” and ensure child support calculations incorporate all guideline-required income components, including spousal support. Practitioners should preserve valuation and income issues with evidence and argument at trial. Jones offers a clear roadmap for avoiding reversible error in complex divorce cases with moving financial targets and intertwined support obligations.