Strict Construction Excludes Occupational Diseases from Preexisting Disabilities under Section 287.220.3(2)(a)(ii)

Introduction

In Treasurer of the State of Missouri – Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Diana Penney, the Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc, addressed whether preexisting occupational diseases can qualify as “preexisting disabilities” under subsection 3(2)(a)(ii) of Section 287.220, RSMo. 2016. Appellant, the Treasurer as custodian of Missouri’s Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”), challenged an award of permanent total disability (“PTD”) benefits to Diana Penney, a former pharmacy technician. Penney had three compensable occupational diseases—two predating and one primary—that, in her view, collectively rendered her permanently and totally disabled. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (“the Commission”) had affirmed an administrative law judge’s grant of benefits. The Fund appealed, arguing that category (ii) requires preexisting disabilities to be “direct results of compensable injuries as defined in Section 287.020,” which expressly excludes occupational diseases.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the Commission. The Court held that:

“Compensable injuries as defined in Section 287.020” encompass only injuries by accident, not occupational diseases.
Section 287.020.3(5) expressly excludes occupational diseases from the definition of “injury” except “as specifically provided in this chapter,” but Section 287.220.3(2)(a)(ii) references only Section 287.020, not Section 287.067 (the occupational disease statute).
Because the legislature omitted any reference to Section 287.067 in category (ii), preexisting occupational diseases cannot qualify under that subsection to support a PTD award from the Fund.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

State ex rel. KCP & L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook (353 S.W.3d 14, Mo. App. 2011) – Held that post-2005 amendments require strict construction and that occupational diseases are no longer subsumed under the broad definition of “injury by accident.”
Staples v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co. (307 S.W.2d 457, Mo. 1957) – An earlier case reflecting the pre-2005 liberal construction era that had sometimes included occupational diseases within “accidental injury.”
Treasurer of Mo. v. Parker (622 S.W.3d 178, Mo. banc 2021) – Interpreted the 2013 amendments to Section 287.220.3, clarifying the requirement of a qualifying preexisting disability for Fund liability post-2014 work injuries.
Cosby v. Treasurer of Mo. (579 S.W.3d 202, Mo. banc 2019) – Reinforced that workers’ compensation statutes must be strictly construed under Section 287.800.
Bachtel v. Miller County Nursing Home Dist. (110 S.W.3d 799, Mo. banc 2003) – Highlighted the method of statutory interpretation by examining legislative intent and historical context.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court engaged in a de novo review of statutory interpretation. It emphasized that:

Strict Construction Mandate: Section 287.800 requires strict, not liberal, construction of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Dual Schemes for Compensability: Since 2005, the Act differentiates injuries by accident (Section 287.020) from occupational diseases (Section 287.067).
Statutory Text of Section 287.020.3(5): Defines “injury” as “violence to the physical structure of the body,” excludes occupational diseases except “as specifically provided in this chapter.”
Section 287.220.3(2)(a)(ii) Reference: Limits qualifying preexisting disabilities to those “direct result[s] of a compensable injury as defined in Section 287.020,” without cross-reference to Section 287.067.
Presumption Against Superfluity: The legislature’s omission of Section 287.067 from category (ii) cannot be ignored or rewritten by the Court.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that pre-2005 decisions liberalizing the definition of “injury” no longer controlled. The plain wording of category (ii) confines qualifying preexisting disabilities to accidental injuries as defined in Section 287.020. Occupational diseases remain compensable for primary-injury purposes under Section 287.067, but they are excluded from the category (ii) preexisting-disability framework.

3. Impact

This decision has several important implications:

Future PTD Claims: Claimants seeking PTD benefits from the Second Injury Fund must ensure preexisting disabilities are injuries by accident under Section 287.020; occupational diseases alone will not suffice under category (ii).
Fund Solvency and Eligibility: Strict adherence to category (ii) may limit Fund exposure and preserve solvency by narrowing the pool of qualifying preexisting conditions.
Employers and Insurers: Must reassess risk and coverage strategies, as occupational-disease claims now offer no “double-dip” avenue through preexisting-disability enhancement.
Legislative Clarification: The legislature, if it disagrees, may choose to amend Section 287.220.3 to explicitly include occupational diseases as qualifying preexisting disabilities.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Primary Injury vs. Preexisting Disability: The primary injury is the most recent compensable workplace harm triggering eligibility; preexisting disabilities are earlier impairments that must meet specific statutory criteria to augment the primary injury in a PTD calculation.
Compensable Injuries by Accident (Section 287.020): Physical trauma arising from an identifiable accident, where the “prevailing factor” test determines causation.
Occupational Diseases (Section 287.067): Illnesses from repetitive motion or exposure over time—separately compensated under an independent statutory scheme.
Strict Construction: Courts give workers’ compensation statutes no broader scope than their plain, unambiguous terms allow, confining relief to what the legislature explicitly provided.

Conclusion

Treasurer v. Penney clarifies that, under Missouri’s workers’ compensation framework, preexisting occupational diseases cannot qualify as preexisting disabilities under Section 287.220.3(2)(a)(ii). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the 2005 and 2013 legislative distinctions between accidental injuries and occupational diseases, strictly interpreted statutory cross-references, and reversed the Commission’s award of PTD benefits to Diana Penney. The decision underscores the necessity for claimants to rely on accidental-injury histories if they wish to leverage preexisting disabilities in Second Injury Fund claims, and it preserves the statutory integrity of separate compensability schemes for accidents and occupational diseases.