Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel to withdraw when an appeal is deemed frivolous. The panel applied Anders by reviewing only the issues flagged in counsel’s brief after finding the brief thorough and noting Harris’s non-response under Circuit Rule 51(b).
• United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014): Confirms the Seventh Circuit’s practice of limiting review in Anders cases to the issues presented in counsel’s brief when the brief is adequate.
• United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987): Santiago permits admission of co-conspirator statements upon a sufficient evidentiary showing, often via a pretrial proffer. Bourjaily clarified the evidentiary standard (preponderance) and permitted consideration of the statements themselves in determining admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The panel endorsed deferring final admissibility decisions until trial, consistent with circuit practice.
• United States v. Davis, 845 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 2016): Supports the conditional admission of co-conspirator statements, with final determination at or by the close of the government’s case, thereby validating the district court’s defer-until-trial approach.
• United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252 (7th Cir. 2018): Addresses risks and handling of “dual-role” law-enforcement witnesses who testify as both lay and expert witnesses. Here, the government disclaimed such witnesses, rendering the issue moot—a conclusion the panel upheld.
• United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915 (7th Cir. 2022): Reinforces that venue in conspiracy cases is proper in any district where an overt act or the agreement itself occurred. The panel applied this to uphold venue in the Central District of Illinois, where Harris allegedly agreed with Perez to traffic drugs.
• United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2000) and Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964): Establish standards for discretionary transfer of venue for convenience under Rule 21(b), guided by the Platt factors (e.g., location of parties, witnesses, events, documents, counsel, expenses, and docket conditions). The district court weighed these factors and denied transfer, which the panel deemed a valid exercise of discretion.
• United States v. Edwards, 34 F.4th 570 (7th Cir. 2022): Articulates the reliability analysis for eyewitness identifications, even if procedures are suggestive. The court emphasized the witness’s opportunities to observe Harris during multiple in-person meetings, supporting admissibility based on independent reliability.
• United States v. Richardson, 780 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2015): Confirms that the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right attaches only upon arrest or indictment; it does not protect against pre-indictment delay. This foreclosed Harris’s pre-indictment theory.
• Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870 (7th Cir. 2013) (n.16): Notes an intra-circuit split on whether an eight-month post-indictment delay is presumptively prejudicial, illustrating that the law is unsettled—an uncertainty that defeats plain-error claims for shorter delays, such as six months.
• United States v. Pemberton, 85 F.4th 862 (7th Cir. 2023): Explains that where the law is unsettled, an error cannot be “plain.” Applied here, any claim that a six-month post-indictment delay is presumptively prejudicial could not be plain error.
• United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2002) and United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020 (7th Cir. 2024): Address counsel’s obligations regarding pleas in Anders cases; when the defendant does not seek to withdraw the plea after consultation, counsel may properly omit a plea-validity challenge.
• United States v. Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2017): Recognizes waiver of Guidelines-calculation challenges where the defendant affirmatively agrees the calculations are correct.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Provides the framework for reviewing procedural and substantive reasonableness of sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) with abuse-of-discretion review.
• United States v. Oregon, 58 F.4th 298 (7th Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that a below-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, a presumption Harris could not plausibly overcome given the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis.

Legal Reasoning

Anders Framework and Scope of Review

The court followed Anders and circuit practice (Bey) by assessing the issues identified by counsel and limiting review accordingly, particularly as Harris did not respond per Cir. R. 51(b). Finding the Anders submission thorough, the court examined each preserved issue and concluded none presented a nonfrivolous appellate claim.

Santiago Proffer: Timing and Conditional Admission

Harris moved to compel disclosure of co-conspirator statements. The district court partially granted the motion by requesting a proposed deadline, but final resolution was delayed—due in part to Harris’s own continuance requests. Seventh Circuit law permits district courts to admit co-conspirator statements conditionally and to make the final admissibility determination at trial (Davis), consistent with Santiago’s framework and the post-Bourjaily standard. Because admissibility decisions are inherently conditional and trial-dependent, the panel deemed any complaint about pretrial timing or deferral frivolous.

“Dual-Role” Witnesses: Mootness When Disclaimed

Harris sought to compel disclosure of any law-enforcement witness who would offer both lay and expert testimony. The government disclaimed any such witness, and the district court denied the motion as moot. The panel affirmed; without an intention to call dual-role witnesses, no live controversy existed. This aligns with Jett’s cautionary approach: problems arise only when such testimony is actually presented.

Venue and Transfer of Venue

Harris argued that most acts occurred in Arizona and sought dismissal for improper venue or transfer to Arizona for convenience. Venue in conspiracy prosecutions is proper in any district where an agreement is formed or an overt act occurs (Hidalgo-Sanchez). The government alleged Harris agreed with Angelica Perez in Quincy, Illinois, within the Central District of Illinois. That allegation supported venue. As to Rule 21(b) transfer, the district court weighed the Platt factors and found most witnesses were in or near the Central District of Illinois. Under Jordan, that discretionary decision stands absent a clear abuse—which the panel did not find.

Single-Photo Identification: Suggestiveness vs. Reliability

Harris moved to suppress Perez’s identification, arguing undue suggestiveness because police used a single photograph rather than a lineup. The Seventh Circuit, following Edwards, accepts that even if a procedure is suggestive, the key question is whether the identification is independently reliable in light of factors such as the witness’s opportunity to view the suspect, attention level, accuracy of prior descriptions, certainty, and timing. Perez had met Harris several times for significant periods, supporting reliability. The panel therefore deemed a suppression challenge futile.

Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial: Pre- and Post-Indictment Periods

Harris asserted a violation based on the government’s one-year gap between charging his co-conspirators and charging him, followed by a six-month arrest delay after his own indictment. Under Richardson, the Sixth Amendment right does not apply before indictment or arrest; thus, pre-indictment delay is not cognizable under that Amendment. Regarding the six-month post-indictment delay, the court noted no Seventh Circuit case establishes a presumption of prejudice at six months, and even at eight months there is intra-circuit uncertainty (Blake, n.16). Given the unsettled law, any error could not be plain (Pemberton). The court also observed a lack of demonstrated prejudice. Together, these points made further appellate pursuit frivolous.

Guilty Plea: No Challenge Sought

Counsel consulted Harris, who did not wish to withdraw his plea. Under Knox and Larry, counsel properly omitted any plea-validity challenge.

Sentencing: Waiver, Procedure, and Substantive Reasonableness

Harris affirmatively agreed to the Guidelines calculations, thereby waiving any challenge (Fuentes). The sentence fell under the statutory maximum for 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The district court addressed the § 3553(a) factors, satisfying procedural reasonableness (Gall). Substantively, the panel invoked the Seventh Circuit’s presumption that below-Guidelines sentences are reasonable (Oregon) and found Harris could not overcome it given the court’s balancing of deterrence needs, his non-violent history, traumatic background, and rehabilitation goals.

Likely Impact and Practical Implications

Although nonprecedential, the order carries persuasive weight for future cases and offers clear signals to practitioners:

• Santiago Proffers: District courts may defer final admissibility rulings on co-conspirator statements until trial without committing reversible error. Defense requests that hinge on pretrial timing alone are unlikely to succeed.
• Dual-Role Witnesses: Absent the government’s intent to call such witnesses, motions to compel disclosure are properly denied as moot. Defense counsel should renew objections only if the government’s stance changes.
• Venue in Conspiracies: Allegations that the conspiratorial agreement occurred within the charging district suffice for venue. Defendants seeking transfer under Rule 21(b) must marshal strong, factor-specific showings; witness location can be decisive.
• Identification Evidence: Even a single-photo identification may be admissible where prior interactions render the identification reliable. Defense suppression strategies should focus on undermining reliability (opportunity to view, attention, timing) rather than procedure alone.
• Sixth Amendment Timing: Pre-indictment delay generally cannot support a Sixth Amendment claim; post-indictment delays of six months, without concrete prejudice and in the face of unsettled law about presumptions, are unlikely to yield relief—especially on plain-error review.
• Sentencing Appeals: Affirmative agreement with Guidelines calculations waives challenge; below-Guidelines sentences face a steep hill on substantive reasonableness review under the Seventh Circuit’s presumption cited in Oregon.
• Anders Practice: Thorough Anders briefs that canvass conceivable issues and explain their futility will be given deference, particularly where the defendant does not respond under Cir. R. 51(b).

Net effect: The decision reinforces the prudential value of narrowing issues pre-appeal, documenting reliability attacks for identification challenges, building concrete prejudice records for speedy-trial claims, and avoiding guideline “agreements” if a later challenge is contemplated.