United States v. Christopher Harris

In January 2017, Harris conspired with others to transport drugs from Arizona to Illinois. As part of the planning, he twice met in central Illinois with the intended driver, Angelica Perez. He then flew to Arizona, where he met Perez and provided her with methamphetamine and cocaine. On her return to Illinois, Perez was stopped by police, who located the drugs in her car.

Perez later identified Harris as a member of the conspiracy. Perez, who had since been indicted on drug trafficking charges, made the identification in September 2017 from a single photo. In May 2018, Harris was indicted in the Central District of Illinois for conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), 846. He was arrested six months later.

After the district court denied a series of pretrial motions, Harris entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved his right to appeal those rulings. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). The district court adopted the presentence investigation report's recommended guidelines range of 262 to 327 months' imprisonment. The court then weighed the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced Harris to a below-guidelines sentence of 180 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release.

1. Pretrial Motions a. Santiago Proffer

In his Anders brief, counsel first considers challenging the rulings on certain pretrial motions Harris had filed. Counsel begins with Harris's motion to compel disclosure of co-conspirator statements that the government intended to introduce (a

"Santiago proffer," see United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)). The court granted the motion in part, directing the parties to propose a deadline for the Santiago proffer, but resolution of the matter was delayed by continuances that Harris requested. Counsel correctly concludes that any challenge to the court's ruling would be frivolous. A decision to admit co-conspirator statements is conditional and may be revisited as late as the trial, see United States v. Davis, 845 F.3d 282, 286-87 (7th Cir. 2016), so we would not find any error in the court delaying its decision before trial.

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b. Dual Role Witnesses

Counsel is likewise correct that there is no basis to challenge the denial of Harris's motion to compel disclosure of any "dual-role" witnesses—for instance, a law enforcement officer who offered both lay and expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 267 (7th Cir. 2018). Because the government said that it did not intend to call such witnesses, the district court denied the motion as moot, a conclusion we would uphold.

c. Venue Motions

Counsel next concludes, correctly, that Harris could not challenge the court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment based on improper venue. Harris had argued that he should be tried in the District of Arizona because most of the acts involved in the alleged conspiracy occurred there. The court denied the motion on grounds that significant acts allegedly occurred in the Central District of Illinois. We would agree that venue was proper in that district because the government alleged that Harris was in Quincy, Illinois—in the Central District of Illinois—when he agreed with Perez to traffic drugs. See United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915, 928 (7th Cir.

2022).

Counsel is likewise correct that it would be frivolous for Harris to appeal the denial of his motion to transfer venue for reasons of convenience, F ED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b). Even though Harris lived in Arizona, the district court denied this motion because most of the witnesses lived in or near the Central District of Illinois. This was a determination well within the court's discretion, see United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676, 685-86 (7th Cir. 2000), since the court took into account the relevant factors set forth in Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1964).

d. Motion to Suppress

Counsel also considers whether Harris could plausibly challenge the court's denial of his motion to suppress Perez's statement of identification. Harris had argued that the identification was unduly suggestive because police obtained it by showing Perez a single photograph rather than a photo lineup. But as the district court noted, regardless of whether the procedure was unduly suggestive, an identification is admissible if it was otherwise reliable—a determination a court makes after considering factors that include "the witness's opportunity to view the defendant during the crime."

United States v. Edwards, 34 F.4th 570, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2022). Because Perez had met

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Harris on several occasions for significant periods of time, we would uphold the court's conclusion that the identification was sufficiently reliable.

e. Speedy Trial Motion

Counsel next considers challenging the court's denial of Harris's motion to dismiss based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Harris argued that the government did not indict him until a year after it had indicted his co-conspirators—at which point it did not arrest him for another six months. The court denied the motion because Harris had no right to a speedy trial before being charged, and the delay after the indictment was not prejudicial. But counsel is correct that a challenge based on the pre-indictment delay would be frivolous because the Sixth Amendment does not require the government to wrap up its investigation quickly and bring charges. United States v. Richardson, 780 F.3d 812, 813 (7th Cir. 2015). As for the six-month delay between Harris's indictment and arrest, no case establishes that a six-month delay is presumptively prejudicial, see, e.g., Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 887 n.16 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting intra-circuit split on whether eight-month delay is presumptively prejudicial). And because the law is unsettled, any error could not be plain. See United States v. Pemberton, 85 F.4th 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2023).

2. Guilty Plea

Counsel next informs us that he advised Harris about the risks and benefits of challenging the guilty plea and determined that Harris does not seek to withdraw the plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel therefore properly omits discussion of whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).

3. Sentencing

Counsel then concludes, correctly, that any procedural challenges to the sentence would be frivolous. By agreeing that the guidelines calculations were accurate, Harris waived his right to challenge them. See United States v. Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 2017). Further, the sentence does not exceed the maximum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). And when imposing the sentence, the court adequately considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007).

Finally, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous for Harris to challenge the substantive reasonableness of his below-guidelines, 180 months' sentence. A

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below-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, see United States v. Oregon,

58 F.4th 298, 302 (7th Cir. 2023), and Harris could not plausibly rebut that presumption. The district court reasonably weighed the sentencing factors under § 3553(a), balancing the need to deter a repeat offender against Harris's non-violent criminal record, traumatic childhood, and desire for rehabilitation.

Therefore, we GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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