Removal Proceedings Priority Precludes Judicial Determination of Naturalization Applications

Introduction

In Joseph Ebu v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was asked to resolve whether a district court may “determine” or remand a delayed naturalization application under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) while the applicant remains subject to parallel removal proceedings. Plaintiff‐appellant Joseph Ebu, a lawful permanent resident convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, faced removal proceedings initiated by DHS. He nonetheless sat for his USCIS naturalization interview, passed the civics and English tests, and waited over 120 days for an administrative decision. When USCIS took no action, Ebu sued under § 1447(b), seeking a declaratory judgment of prima facie eligibility and an order “determining” his application. The district court dismissed, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1429’s prohibition on the Attorney General (now USCIS) considering naturalization applications during removal proceedings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that § 1429 precludes district courts from acting under § 1447(b) while removal is pending.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Griffin, affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. It held:

8 U.S.C. § 1429 (“priority provision”) bars all adjudicators—administrative or judicial—from determining or even considering a naturalization application when removal proceedings are pending.
Although § 1447(b) authorizes district courts to step in when USCIS delays more than 120 days after the applicant’s examination, that authority is subject to § 1429’s prerequisite that no removal proceedings be pending.
Because removal proceedings against Ebu were ongoing, the district court lacked power to enter any substantive § 1447(b) relief or a declaratory judgment of eligibility.
Circuit authority—including an unpublished Sixth Circuit decision (Rahman v. Napolitano)—supports this “harmonious reading” of §§ 1429 and 1447(b) and places this case on the majority side of the inter‐circuit split.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Rahman v. Napolitano, 385 F. App’x 540 (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) – held that § 1429 precludes district courts from granting § 1447(b) relief during removal proceedings.
Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2004) – discussed the INA’s history and the shift of naturalization authority from the courts to the Attorney General.
Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008) – held that § 1429’s bar on the Attorney General extends to judicial orders under § 1447(b).
Saba–Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2007) – reached the same conclusion, reinforcing the “priority” scheme.
Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 2010) – applied a harmonized reading of §§ 1421(c) and 1429 to limit judicial naturalization when removal is pending.
Yith v. Nielsen, 881 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2018) – the lone circuit outlier, concluding § 1429 applies only to the Attorney General and does not bar judicial determinations under § 1447(b).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three stages:

Statutory Text: Section 1429 provides that “no application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding.” Section 1447(b) empowers district courts to “determine the matter or remand the matter” when USCIS delays beyond 120 days. A “harmonious reading” gives § 1429 priority over § 1447(b).
INA History & Purpose: In 1952, Congress added § 1429 to stop the “race” between removal and judicial naturalization. In 1990, Congress transferred primary naturalization authority to USCIS but maintained narrow judicial review avenues (denial review § 1421(c) and delayed‐decision review § 1447(b)). Congress never intended to restore full court‐based naturalizations in the midst of removal proceedings.
Canons of Construction: The court invoked the canons against surplusage and “elephants in mouseholes” to reject any implicit expansion of judicial naturalization power not explicitly granted by Congress.

Impact

This decision cements the majority view that removal proceedings take procedural priority over naturalization applications—even in district court under § 1447(b). Its key effects include:

Confirming that district courts have no § 1447(b) jurisdiction over naturalization applications when removal proceedings are ongoing.
Reinforcing the split with the Ninth Circuit (Yith), leaving unresolved the broader inter‐circuit conflict.
Guiding lower courts and practitioners on the limits of judicial review in the naturalization context.
Potentially prompting legislative amendment or clarification if Congress wishes to restore judicial naturalization avenues during removal proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Removal Proceedings: Administrative process by which DHS seeks to deport a noncitizen alleged removable under INA § 237.
Naturalization Examination: Interview and test (English language + civics) required under INA § 1446 before USCIS decides a citizenship application.
Prima Facie Eligibility: A showing that the applicant meets all statutory requirements for naturalization (e.g., continuous residence, good moral character).
8 U.S.C. § 1429 (“Priority Provision”): Provides that USCIS may not consider naturalization applications while removal proceedings are pending.
8 U.S.C. § 1447(b): Grants district courts jurisdiction to step in if USCIS fails to decide an application within 120 days of the applicant’s examination.

Conclusion

Joseph Ebu v. USCIS reaffirms that Congress intended removal proceedings to have procedural priority over naturalization, even in federal court. By harmonizing §§ 1429 and 1447(b), the Sixth Circuit reinforced its earlier unpublished ruling and lined up with the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits—leaving the Ninth Circuit’s contrary approach in isolation. For applicants and practitioners, the message is clear: no matter how long USCIS delays, a district court cannot grant § 1447(b) relief if removal is pending. In the broader context, this case underscores the limited judicial role in the naturalization process as set by Congress and signals potential grounds for legislative reform if additional judicial oversight is desired.