Refusal to Participate in Internal Investigation Is Not Protected Activity Absent a Contemporaneous, Good‑Faith Belief of Opposing Discrimination

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Case: Maurice Franklin v. Maximus, Inc., et al., No. 25-1038

Date: November 13, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed (Nonprecedential; may be cited only under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1)

Introduction

This appeal arises from a workplace dispute culminating in the termination of a senior Black executive, Maurice Franklin, at Maximus, Inc., a company that provides support services for government programs. Franklin alleged race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The case centers on three clusters of events: (1) Franklin’s refusal to participate in an internal HR investigation concerning a subordinate’s allegation of race discrimination against a higher-ranking executive; (2) subsequent organizational restructuring and pay disparities; and (3) the negotiation, execution, and revocation of a separation agreement during Franklin’s FMLA leave.

The key issues on appeal were whether Franklin engaged in statutorily protected activity when he declined to participate in the internal investigation; whether his termination and other adverse actions were discriminatory or retaliatory; whether alleged pay disparities created a triable inference of discrimination; and whether his FMLA and contract-based contentions were preserved and supported.

Summary of the Opinion

Reviewing summary judgment de novo and construing facts and inferences in Franklin’s favor, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in full. The court held:

Franklin’s refusal to participate in an HR investigation was not protected activity under Title VII/§ 1981 because, at the time, he did not have a good‑faith and reasonable belief that he was opposing race discrimination, nor did Maximus have reason to understand his refusal as such.
Temporal proximity between his refusal and later reorganization was immaterial because the refusal was not protected activity.
Franklin failed to show that statements by executives or Maximus’s reasons for eliminating his role were pretextual.
His pay discrimination claim failed because he did not identify comparators directly comparable to him in all material respects, and he abandoned several comparator arguments at summary judgment.
He forfeited FMLA and contract-based arguments by not adequately raising or developing them at summary judgment.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing local rules and striking an overlength, uncited summary judgment response; Franklin was allowed to refile and failed to show prejudice.
New arguments raised for the first time on appeal were not preserved.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Ferrill v. Oak Creek-Franklin Joint Sch. Dist., 860 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2017), and O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2011): The panel relied on these cases for the core rule that retaliation protection requires the employee to engage in activity based on a “good‑faith and reasonable belief” that he is opposing unlawful discrimination. The “opposition clause” does not shield conduct that is indifferent to or disconnected from opposing discrimination.
Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2019), and Owens v. Old Wisconsin Sausage Co., Inc., 870 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2017): These decisions reinforce that the employee’s belief must be contemporaneous and that the employer must have sufficient reason to understand the activity as opposition to discrimination. The court invoked them to show that Franklin’s shifting explanations and admitted lack of knowledge at the time defeated any inference that he opposed discrimination or that Maximus perceived his refusal as such.
Johnson v. Accenture LLP, 142 F.4th 536 (7th Cir. 2025), and Parker v. Brooks Life Sciences, Inc., 39 F.4th 931 (7th Cir. 2022): For the pretext standard, the court quoted Johnson (drawing from Parker): an employee must show the proffered reason is “a lie,” which can be demonstrated by implausibility, inconsistency, or contradiction. Franklin provided no such evidence to undermine Maximus’s stated reason that his position was no longer necessary.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016): The court confirmed that pay discrimination can be assessed under the burden-shifting framework or Ortiz’s holistic approach, but either way the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of discrimination.
Gamble v. County of Cook, 106 F.4th 622 (7th Cir. 2024); Downing v. Abbott Laboratories, 48 F.4th 793 (7th Cir. 2022); Williams v. Office of Chief Judge of Cook County, 839 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2016): These cases articulate the rigorous comparator standard: higher-paid coworkers must be directly comparable “in all material respects.” Where meaningful nonracial differences exist (experience, role criticality, organizational context), they supply alternative explanations defeating an inference of discrimination. The panel applied this to each proposed comparator.
Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., 142 F.4th 460 (7th Cir. 2025) and Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan University, 36 F.4th 755 (7th Cir. 2022): These decisions underscore forfeiture and waiver principles: arguments not properly raised or developed at summary judgment cannot be pursued on appeal. The court used them to reject Franklin’s breach-of-contract and FMLA-restoration theories and comparator arguments he did not join at summary judgment.
Rongere v. City of Rockford, 99 F.4th 1095 (7th Cir. 2024), and Johnson, 142 F.4th at 542: The panel cited these in upholding the district court’s enforcement of local rules, including striking a noncompliant filing, as a permissible exercise of discretion.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in discrete steps tied to each claim:

Retaliation—no protected activity: Franklin refused to participate in HR interviews regarding allegations that a senior executive (Rosenak) discriminated against a subordinate (Stith). But Franklin admitted he did not know at the time that the investigation concerned race discrimination; he thought Rosenak was complaining about Stith (e.g., insubordination) and believed participating would harm his career. His later explanations were inconsistent and ultimately recanted. Without a contemporaneous, good‑faith, reasonable belief that he was opposing discrimination, and without evidence that Maximus understood his refusal as such, the refusal was not protected activity. Consequently, temporal proximity between that refusal and later organizational moves could not support a retaliation claim.
Statements by executives—no inference of retaliation or discrimination: Phrases like “best for both parties to part ways,” observations that Franklin was dissatisfied, or displeasure at revocation of a separation agreement, were contextually linked to Franklin’s own initiation of severance discussions and dissatisfaction. They did not suggest unlawful motive.
Pretext—insufficient evidence: To defeat summary judgment, Franklin needed evidence that Maximus’s explanation (his position was unnecessary and had functioned without him during leave) was a lie. He offered none showing inconsistency, contradiction, or implausibility, particularly given that the termination followed a negotiated separation agreement that he, with counsel, signed.
Timing—non-suspicious in context: Although termination followed his lawsuit by roughly two months, the sequence occurred during a separation process that Franklin initiated; the employer terminated only after the agreement was executed. The timing did not support a causal inference.
Contract and revocation clause—unpreserved: Franklin argued on appeal that revoking the separation agreement required reinstatement. He did not assert a breach-of-contract claim in his summary judgment papers, so the issue was forfeited. The court thus did not reach the merits (including whether revocation undoes termination as opposed to only revoking the release of claims).
FMLA—unpreserved and undeveloped: Franklin did not develop or defend his FMLA theory at summary judgment. He could not revive it on appeal to argue that the employer should have restored him to his role after revocation.
Pay discrimination—no viable comparators: Under either McDonnell Douglas or Ortiz, Franklin needed comparators similarly situated in all material respects. The record showed meaningful differences:
- Vice President Baylinson had five additional years of director-level experience.
- Arguments about Boerner’s title/experience were not made below and thus waived.
- Three subordinates (Graettinger, Reiber, Duke) were addressed by Maximus at summary judgment; Franklin failed to reply, abandoning the issue.
- DiLollo’s higher pay was justified by 19 years of experience with a critical subcontractor—an independent, nonracial variable.
Assertions about “dotted line” reporting and unofficial charts did not identify dishonesty or explain how Maximus concealed information.
Procedural rulings—no abuse of discretion: The district court permissibly enforced local rules when it struck Franklin’s overlength, insufficiently cited response under Local Rules 56.1 and 7.1. He was allowed to refile and identified no content he could not have included the second time.
New theories on appeal—unpreserved: Claims of exclusion from meetings, differential treatment, and constructive discharge were not raised at summary judgment and thus could not be considered on appeal.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although designated nonprecedential, the order has several important, practical implications for employment litigation and workplace investigations within the Seventh Circuit:

Contemporaneous belief controls retaliation protection: Employees asserting retaliation based on an “opposition” theory must marshal evidence that, at the time of the conduct, they held a good‑faith, reasonable belief they were opposing unlawful discrimination and that the employer understood it that way. Refusals to participate in internal processes, without that connection, will not be protected.
Consistency matters: Shifting explanations—particularly when clarified and then recanted—can be fatal at summary judgment. Deposition testimony, statements of fact, and briefing must be aligned.
Severance negotiations reframe timing inferences: Temporal proximity to protected activity is diminished when the separation occurred in the context of employee-initiated severance negotiations. Executing a separation agreement provides an alternative, legitimate explanation for termination timing.
Comparator rigor and abandonment: Plaintiffs must carefully select and defend comparators. Differences in experience, critical skills, and role context are “other explanatory variables” that defeat inferences of discrimination. Failure to respond to comparator arguments at summary judgment constitutes abandonment.
Local rule compliance is outcome-determinative: Courts will enforce page limits and citation requirements; failure to comply may lead to striking filings. Even when refiling is permitted, the burden remains on the party to show resulting prejudice.
Preservation of FMLA and contract claims: FMLA restoration and contract-revocation theories must be properly pleaded and developed at summary judgment. Raising them for the first time on appeal will forfeit them. The opinion hints—but does not decide—that revoking a separation agreement’s release does not necessarily rescind termination absent a contractual basis, reinforcing the need for precise drafting and pleading.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Protected activity (opposition v. participation): Title VII/§ 1981 protects employees who oppose unlawful discrimination (opposition) or participate in proceedings like an EEOC investigation (participation). Declining to participate in an internal HR interview is not “participation” in a Title VII proceeding. It can be “opposition” only if, at that moment, the employee reasonably believes he is resisting unlawful discrimination and the employer would understand it that way.
Good‑faith, reasonable belief: Two components: the employee honestly believed the conduct opposed was discriminatory (subjective good faith), and a reasonable person would share that belief (objective reasonableness). The belief must exist when the employee acts, not retroactively.
Pretext: A plaintiff must show the employer’s stated reason is false—a cover for discrimination or retaliation. Evidence can include contradictions, shifting justifications, or implausibility. Demonstrating mere disagreement with the business decision or showing the decision was harsh is insufficient.
Comparators “in all material respects”: A comparator must be sufficiently similar to the plaintiff (e.g., job duties, seniority, experience, qualifications, performance, and decision-maker context) so that differences in treatment reasonably indicate discrimination rather than legitimate differences.
Temporal proximity: Close timing between protected activity and adverse action can support an inference of causation, but only if the activity is protected and the context does not provide an independent explanation (such as an ongoing, employee-initiated severance process).
Forfeiture and waiver at summary judgment: Arguments not raised or developed at summary judgment are typically forfeited and cannot be revived on appeal. Responding to the other side’s arguments—especially on comparators and pretext—is essential to preserve issues.
Local Rule enforcement: District courts may strike filings that exceed page limits or lack record citations. Compliance ensures the court can evaluate the record; noncompliance risks losing key arguments.
Severance agreements and revocation: Revocation clauses typically undo the exchange of consideration (like a release of claims) but do not automatically reinstate employment unless the contract says so. Courts will not read reinstatement into the revocation clause without clear pleading and proof.
FMLA restoration: The FMLA generally provides a right to restoration to the same or an equivalent position after leave, but the right can be limited where the position would have been eliminated regardless, and the claim must be timely raised and argued with record support.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential affirmance in Franklin v. Maximus reinforces several settled but frequently litigated principles. First, an employee’s refusal to participate in an internal investigation is not protected activity absent a contemporaneous, good‑faith, and reasonable belief that he is opposing unlawful discrimination—and an evidentiary basis that the employer understood it that way. Second, pretext requires proof that the employer’s reason is a lie, not merely debatable. Third, comparator-based pay claims demand rigorous similarity, with plaintiffs obligated to rebut employer explanations and avoid abandoning arguments. Fourth, the opinion underscores strict adherence to procedural rules: claims and theories not developed at summary judgment, including FMLA and breach-of-contract arguments, are forfeited; noncompliant filings can be stricken.

While nonprecedential, the decision provides practical guidance for employees, employers, and counsel: document contemporaneous beliefs and communications when opposing discrimination; ensure consistency across testimony and filings; draft and litigate severance and revocation provisions with precision; and meticulously comply with local rules and preservation requirements. In short, the case illustrates how factual gaps, shifting narratives, and procedural missteps can defeat discrimination and retaliation claims at summary judgment.