Maurice Franklin v. Maximus, Inc.

Reviewing the summary judgment de novo and construing all facts and reasonable inferences in Franklin's favor, we affirm.

Maximus provides support services for government programs. Franklin, who is black, was employed there from 2001 to 2003, then rehired in 2008 as a supervisor in the Child Support division. He became a Vice President a decade later, in 2018. Conflict came with an internal investigation the next year, when Project Manager Clyde Stith accused Senior Vice President Laura Rosenak of race discrimination. An executive told Franklin he would be interviewed by Human Resources and must "go along" with Rosenak. Franklin admits in his summary judgment response that he did not yet know that Stith had accused Rosenak of race discrimination; he thought Rosenak had filed some kind of complaint against Stith and wanted Franklin to take her side. When Human Resources staff interviewed Franklin that month, he asked to be left out of the process because he believed that participating would hurt his career. The summary judgment record does not reflect how the investigation was resolved. The next year, Rosenak proposed reorganizing the Child Support division. Her plan would eliminate Franklin's position and require him to compete for a different one. Franklin complained that the proposals were unfair; his summary judgment papers assert that he saw them as retaliation for refusing to cooperate with the Stith investigation. At this point, Franklin's internal complaints did not address race. In any event, Rosenak's proposed reorganization did not happen.

Instead, a different restructuring proposed by other executives in 2021 led to the creation of three Lead Vice President positions. Franklin applied but was not chosen. The successful applicants—at least one of whom was white—had more experience than him. But Franklin filed an internal ethics complaint alleging that the hiring process was biased, retaliatory, and racially discriminatory. Maximus hired outside counsel who investigated the claims and reported that they were meritless. Franklin then complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Shortly after that, he retained counsel and announced that he was taking six months of FMLA leave. During that leave, Franklin filed this lawsuit in August 2021. (He ultimately amended the complaint to include later events.) Meanwhile, Franklin and his counsel requested a separation agreement, negotiated its terms with Maximus, and signed it on October 8, 2021. This meant Franklin's job would end without him taking a full six months of leave. The agreement awarded Franklin severance pay but released any legal claims. Maximus formally terminated Franklin the next day. The company deemed his

2

former position unnecessary and eliminated it on October 11, assertedly because his team had been functioning without him for months.

Yet the agreement did not last. On October 12 (four days after signing), Franklin timely invoked its revocation clause. He insisted that revoking the agreement undid his termination. But Maximus read that clause as undoing only the exchange of severance pay for the release of claims, not the underlying termination. Eventually, in the federal lawsuit, the district judge granted Maximus's motion for summary judgment and denied Franklin's: refusal to participate in the Stith investigation was not a statutorily protected activity because it was not based on a belief that he was opposing discrimination; the reorganization thus was not forbidden retaliation; no reasonable juror could otherwise link any other adverse action to race discrimination or Franklin's attempt to oppose it; Franklin's summary judgment papers made no attempt to flesh out his FMLA theory; and no reasonable jury could find that higher-paid white coworkers were so similarly situated to Franklin that discrimination could be inferred.

Franklin appeals, arguing that his refusal to participate in the Stith investigation counts as protected activity because Stith had accused Rosenak of race discrimination. But protected activity under the antidiscrimination statutes requires a "good-faith and reasonable belief" that the plaintiff was trying to oppose discrimination. See Ferrill v. Oak Creek-Franklin Joint Sch. Dist., 860 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2011)). And the summary judgment record does not permit a reasonable inference that Franklin sought to oppose race discrimination or that Maximus officers thought he was doing so. See Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 542-43 (7th Cir. 2019); Owens v. Old Wis. Sausage Co., Inc., 870 F.3d 662, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2017).

Franklin has offered shifting reasons for refusing to participate. In a deposition, he said that he had thought Rosenak was accusing Stith (not the other way around) of insubordination and that he feared participating would hurt his career. Later, in his own unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, Franklin sought to clarify that he had believed that charges against Stith were pursued in retaliation for Stith's complaining about race discrimination. But then Franklin recanted this version in response to Maximus's proposed statement of facts; he now asserted that he did not learn that Stith had complained about race discrimination until after declining to participate. So, although the Stith investigation involved a claim of racial discrimination, there is no

3

record evidence that Franklin thought so at the time. See Scheidler, 914 F.3d at 543. No reasonable juror could infer that Franklin's refusal to participate was an attempt to oppose race discrimination, or that Maximus saw it that way. To be sure, Franklin emphasizes that the reorganization proposals began soon after his refusal to participate in the investigation. But that timing is irrelevant because refusal to participate in the investigation was not a protected activity.

Franklin next argues that the district judge overlooked statements by Maximus executives that, in his view, reveal an intent to retaliate: that "it was best for both parties to part ways," Franklin resigned because he was unhappy and given too few opportunities, and Maximus did not want him to revoke the separation agreement. But context does not permit an inference that these statements point to discrimination or retaliation for protected activity. Maximus entered severance negotiations at Franklin's urging; Franklin's dissatisfaction was apparent to all; and there is nothing suspicious about a company's regret that a negotiated agreement has been undone. None of this ties the breakdown between the parties to discrimination or suggests retaliation for opposing discrimination.

Franklin also contends that Maximus's reasons for eliminating his role and not reinstating him were a pretext for race discrimination or retaliation. To reach a jury on the pretext question, Franklin needed evidence that Maximus's "proffered reason" was

"a lie," which can be demonstrated by implausibility, inconsistency, or contradiction in the reason for termination. Johnson v. Accenture LLP, 142 F.4th 536, 545 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Parker v. Brooks Life Sci., Inc., 39 F.4th 931, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2022)). But Franklin offered no evidence that would permit reasonable jurors to infer that the proffered reason for eliminating his role—that it was no longer necessary—was a lie. See Parker,

39 F.4th at 937-38. Franklin also asserts that the timeline between his August 2021 lawsuit and October 2021 termination is evidence of retaliation. But this timing is not suspicious. Franklin filed suit during severance negotiations that he himself had initiated months earlier. Maximus ended Franklin's employment only after he signed the agreement. Franklin next contends that Maximus breached the agreement's revocation clause by refusing to reinstate him. But he did not assert a breach-of-contract claim in his summary judgment papers and thus cannot pursue one on appeal. See Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., 142 F.4th 460, 474-45 (7th Cir. 2025); Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ.,

36 F.4th 755, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2022). He also says that once he revoked the agreement,

4

Maximus violated his FMLA rights when it eliminated his position instead of restoring him to it and letting him use remaining leave. But Franklin did not develop or defend his FMLA claim at summary judgment, so, again, he cannot pursue it here. Franklin also contests the district judge's ruling that the summary judgment record showed no pay discrimination during his employment. To reach a jury under either the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), or the holistic framework of Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016), Franklin needed evidence that higher-paid white coworkers were

"directly comparable" to him "in all material respects." Gamble v. County of Cook,

106 F.4th 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Downing v. Abbott Lab'y, 48 F.4th 793, 805 (7th Cir. 2022)).

But non-racial differences between Franklin and his coworkers present "other possible explanatory variables" that would not permit jurors to infer that Franklin's lower salary was based on race. Downing, 48 F.4th at 805 (quoting Williams v. Off. of Chief Judge of Cook Cnty., 839 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2016)). Peter Baylinson, another Vice President, had five more years of director-level experience when he took that title. Franklin says Kelly Boerner had an inflated title and relatively less experience in the Child Support division, but he did not make this argument at summary judgment, so it is waived. See Lewis, 36 F.4th at 760-61. Four white subordinates—James Graettinger, Daryl Reiber, Colleen Duke, and Rick DiLollo—apparently were paid more than Franklin. But Franklin did not reply to Maximus's summary judgment arguments for why Graettinger, Reiber, and Duke were not sufficient comparators, and the district judge correctly ruled that he had abandoned that issue. See id. Franklin asserts that this was wrong but does not identify where he made these arguments at summary judgment. DiLollo, meanwhile, received higher pay because Maximus valued his 19 years' experience with a subcontractor whose business was critical to the company. Franklin adds that Maximus used unofficial reporting and "dotted line" organizational charts (with employees reporting to multiple managers at once), which he says permitted the company to conceal salary discrepancies. But as the district judge concluded, Franklin's citations to the record did not reveal dishonesty or explain how Maximus tried to hide any information.

Franklin next maintains that the district judge abused her discretion when she struck his initial summary judgment response under Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 for lacking record citations and Local Rule 7.1 for being too long. (He was permitted to file a second response, which he did.) But the district judge acted within

5

her discretion to enforce the rules. See Johnson, 142 F.4th at 542; see also Rongere v. City of Rockford, 99 F.4th 1095, 1101 (7th Cir. 2024). And Franklin does not identify any detail in his first response that he could not have included in the second one. Last, Franklin makes several additional arguments not raised at summary judgment. For example, he contends that he was excluded from meetings and subjected to a wide variety of differential treatment that led to his constructive discharge. Because Franklin did not raise these arguments below, he has failed to preserve them for appellate review. See Lewis, 36 F.4th at 760-61.

AFFRIMED

6