Introduction

This memorandum opinion arises from a two‑mile pursuit during the highly trafficked “Highway 127 Yard Sale” in Owen County, Kentucky. After running a stop sign and refusing to stop for law enforcement, James Steven Coyle was arrested; officers recovered a straw from his person and a wallet containing methamphetamine residue from his vehicle’s trunk. A jury convicted Coyle of first‑degree fleeing or evading, first‑degree possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and first‑degree persistent felony offender (PFO I), and recommended 23 years’ imprisonment on consecutive terms. The circuit court imposed the recommended sentence and assessed jail fees.

On appeal, Coyle challenged: (1) the denial of his directed verdict motion on the first‑degree fleeing or evading charge; (2) the legality of the 23‑year aggregate sentence under Kentucky’s consecutive‑sentencing cap, KRS 532.110(1)(c); and (3) the imposition of jail fees absent record evidence of a county jail reimbursement policy compliant with KRS 441.265(2)(a).

Although unpublished, the opinion is significant for three reasons: it reaffirms the fact‑intensive “substantial risk” element in first‑degree fleeing; it enforces the KRS 532.110(1)(c) cap keyed to the PFO‑enhanced maximum for the highest‑class offense; and it clarifies that sentencing courts still have authority to order jail fees post‑2022 amendments to KRS 441.265, but only if the Commonwealth puts into the record proof of a duly adopted and approved jail reimbursement policy—and the Commonwealth may not salvage that omission on remand solely because resentencing is otherwise required.

Summary of the Opinion

• Directed verdict: Affirmed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational juror could find that Coyle’s flight created a “substantial risk of serious physical injury or death,” given the curvy two‑lane roadway, limited sight lines, and unusually heavy pedestrian and vehicular traffic during the 127 Yard Sale, as well as the risk posed to an oncoming officer during a “box” maneuver.
• Sentencing cap: Vacated in part. The 23‑year aggregate sentence exceeded KRS 532.110(1)(c)’s cap. Because the highest offense at the time (first‑degree fleeing or evading, a Class D felony) was enhanced by PFO I to a maximum of 20 years under KRS 532.080, the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms could not exceed 20 years. The case is remanded to impose the highest lawful sentence of 20 years.
• Jail fees: Vacated. The sentencing court lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis to impose jail fees because the record contained no proof of a jail reimbursement policy adopted by the jailer and approved by the county’s governing body as required by KRS 441.265(2)(a) and Capstraw/Ford. The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s request to introduce that proof on remand in this case. The Court also clarified that the 2022 amendment to KRS 441.265 did not strip sentencing courts of authority to order jail fees; it clarified accrual from booking.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) and Commonwealth v. Woods, 657 S.W.3d 902 (Ky. 2022): Provide the directed‑verdict standard. Trial courts must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth; appellate courts ask whether any rational juror could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. This framework underpinned the Court’s refusal to direct a verdict for Coyle on first‑degree fleeing.
• Bell v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 490 (Ky. 2003): Distinguishes the “act of fleeing” from the separate “substantial risk” element and defines “substantial” as ample, considerable, and real, not imaginary. The Court relied on Bell’s conceptual separation to assess risk independently of mere flight.
• Culver v. Commonwealth, 590 S.W.3d 810 (Ky. 2019): Emphasizes the case‑specific nature of the substantial‑risk inquiry. The Court used Culver to justify a holistic look at the pursuit context (curves, sight lines, event‑related congestion, officer’s box maneuver).
• Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62 (Ky. 2007): Labels sentences exceeding the statutory maximum as “true sentencing error” reviewable for the first time on appeal. This allowed the Court to vacate the illegal 23‑year aggregate despite no preservation.
• Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. 2018); Goldsmith v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 330 (Ky. 2012); Miller v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 857 (Ky. 2013): Support vacatur of illegal sentences and entry of the highest lawful sentence on remand. These cases guided the remedy: reduce to a 20‑year aggregate.
• Capstraw v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2022): Holds that a sentencing court cannot impose jail fees without record evidence of a jail reimbursement policy adopted by the jailer and approved by the county’s governing body under KRS 441.265(2)(a). The Court applied Capstraw to vacate Coyle’s jail‑fee assessment.
• Ford v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.3d 203 (Ky. 2025): Reaffirms Capstraw and bluntly states that without proof of the adopted and approved policy, the evidentiary burden is unmet and fees cannot be imposed. Ford also urges the Commonwealth to routinely file written policy and approval proof. The Court quoted Ford’s admonitions and used it to deny a “second bite” to cure the record on remand here.
• Jones v. Clark County, 635 S.W.3d 54 (Ky. 2021): Holds a jail cannot bill inmates for incarceration costs absent an order of a sentencing court; a prisoner only owes fees if convicted. The Court cited Jones to explain the statutory scheme and to reject the notion that the 2022 KRS 441.265 amendment divested sentencing courts of authority.

Legal Reasoning

1) First-degree fleeing or evading: “Substantial risk” in a fact-rich context

Under KRS 520.095(1)(a)(4), the Commonwealth had to prove that, while operating a motor vehicle with intent to elude police, Coyle knowingly or wantonly disobeyed a direction to stop and, by fleeing, caused or created a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death. The Court emphasized that “fleeing” and “substantial risk” are distinct elements (Bell) and that whether risk is “substantial” is fact‑dependent (Culver).

Applying Benham/Woods, the Court credited evidence that the pursuit occurred on a curvy two‑lane stretch of Highway 127 with limited sightlines and abnormally high traffic and pedestrian activity during a multi‑state event, the “127 Yard Sale.” Officers observed increased congestion and pedestrian crossings that day. The risk was two‑fold: (a) to the public—especially pedestrians—given conditions and Coyle’s refusal to stop; and (b) to an oncoming officer who maneuvered into Coyle’s lane to induce a stop. Even though both vehicles ultimately swerved and avoided collision, the risk remained “ample, considerable, and real,” satisfying Bell’s gloss on “substantial.”

The Court also noted that the jury had the option to convict on second‑degree fleeing or evading—which omits the substantial‑risk element—and nevertheless chose first degree. On this record, denying a directed verdict was proper.

2) Aggregate sentencing cap: The PFO‑enhanced maximum controls under KRS 532.110(1)(c)

KRS 532.110(1)(c) limits the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms to “the longest extended term” authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any sentence is imposed, subject to narrow exceptions not applicable here. Because Coyle’s highest offense at the time—first‑degree fleeing or evading—was a Class D felony and was enhanced by a PFO I finding, the maximum extended term under KRS 532.080 was 20 years. The jury’s recommendation of 23 years on consecutive terms exceeded the cap. The Commonwealth conceded the error. The Supreme Court vacated the illegal portion and remanded for imposition of the highest lawful aggregate: 20 years.

The Court flagged that first‑degree fleeing or evading became a Class C felony effective July 15, 2024, but it evaluated Coyle’s sentence under the law in effect at the time of the offense. Importantly, under KRS 532.080, PFO I enhancements for Class C and D offenses typically carry the same 10–20‑year range, meaning the cap will often remain 20 years in cases where the highest offense is a Class C or D PFO I. If the highest offense is Class B or A, however, the cap may be correspondingly higher.

3) Jail fees: Authority survives the 2022 amendment, but proof of an approved policy is mandatory—and no “do‑over” on remand in this case

Coyle argued that the 2022 amendment to KRS 441.265—which removed the phrase “by the sentencing court” and added “beginning from the prisoner’s booking date”—deprived sentencing courts of authority to impose jail fees. The Supreme Court rejected that view as an overreading. In its analysis, the Court reconciled KRS 441.265 with KRS 532.352 and 532.358, both of which expressly empower sentencing courts to order reimbursement of incarceration costs and set terms of payment. Jones v. Clark County confirms that a prisoner owes fees only if convicted and ordered to pay by the sentencing court. The amendment clarified accrual timing; it did not shift fee‑imposition authority away from sentencing courts.

Nonetheless, Capstraw and Ford require that, before a court may impose jail fees, the record must contain evidence that the jailer has adopted—and the county’s governing body has approved—a jail reimbursement policy under KRS 441.265(2)(a). No such evidence appeared in Coyle’s record. The Court deemed the error palpable and vacated the jail‑fee portion of the judgment. It further rejected the Commonwealth’s request to submit the missing policy evidence on remand simply because resentencing was already necessary for the unlawful aggregate term. The burden to build the record lies with the Commonwealth at sentencing; it is not entitled to a second chance on this record.

Impact

• Fleeing or evading prosecutions: The opinion underscores that “substantial risk” does not require high speeds or traffic violations beyond the refusal to stop. Context matters: road geometry, sight lines, pedestrian density, special events, and officer maneuvers (such as a box tactic) may cumulatively satisfy the risk element. Defendants cannot defeat the risk element merely by pointing to non‑reckless speeds or to officer‑initiated interventions when the danger “flows from” the refusal to stop.
• Consecutive‑sentencing practice: Trial courts and counsel must vigilantly apply the KRS 532.110(1)(c) cap by identifying the highest class offense and then locating the “longest extended term” under KRS 532.080 as enhanced (e.g., by PFO I). For Class C/D offenses enhanced under PFO I, the cap is generally 20 years. Illegal aggregate sentences are “true sentencing errors” and will be corrected on appeal.
• Jail‑fee litigation: The Court sends a clear procedural message: no record proof, no jail fees. Prosecutors should routinely file the written jail reimbursement policy and the county approval order at sentencing. Defense counsel should scrutinize the record; absent proof, fees are vacatable on direct appeal—even without objection—under palpable‑error review. The opinion also clarifies that the 2022 amendment to KRS 441.265 did not remove sentencing‑court authority; it clarified when fees start accruing (from booking).
• Remand scope and evidentiary “do‑overs”: While not framed as a broad rule, the Court’s refusal to allow the Commonwealth to supplement the record on remand to support jail fees cautions against expecting a second bite at the apple when the initial sentencing record was deficient.
• Classification change for fleeing or evading: The statutory reclassification of first‑degree fleeing or evading from Class D to Class C (effective July 15, 2024) does not retroactively increase punishment for earlier crimes. For future offenses, the aggregate cap analysis remains the same in many Class C/D PFO I scenarios (often still 20 years), but practitioners should always compute the exact cap under current KRS 532.080.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Directed verdict: A defense request to end the case (or a count) because no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
• First‑degree fleeing or evading (KRS 520.095(1)(a)(4)): Requires proof of intentional eluding and that, by fleeing, the defendant caused or created a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death. “Substantial” means ample, considerable, and real.
• Serious physical injury: A statutory term generally referring to injuries creating substantial risk of death or causing serious and prolonged disfigurement or impairment. The opinion focuses on the risk of such harm, not the occurrence.
• Persistent felony offender, first degree (PFO I): A status enhancement that increases the penalty range for a new felony based on prior qualifying felony convictions. For Class C/D felonies, PFO I often raises the range to 10–20 years.
• Aggregate consecutive cap (KRS 532.110(1)(c)): When multiple sentences are stacked, the total cannot exceed the “longest extended term” authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime among the convictions (as enhanced), with limited exceptions.
• Jail reimbursement policy (KRS 441.265(2)(a)): Counties may adopt written policies allowing reimbursement from prisoners for certain incarceration costs, but the policy must be formally adopted by the jailer and approved by the county’s governing body. Courts cannot impose fees without record proof of both adoption and approval.
• Palpable error (RCr 10.26): A clear error affecting substantial rights that an appellate court may correct even if the defendant did not object below, where failing to correct would seriously affect the fairness of proceedings.
• Unpublished opinion (RAP 40(D)): Not binding precedent. It may be cited for consideration only if no published case adequately addresses the issue and the full opinion is provided.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s unpublished decision in Coyle delivers three practical holdings. First, it reinforces a nuanced, context‑sensitive understanding of “substantial risk” in first‑degree fleeing or evading prosecutions: even at or near the speed limit, refusal to stop on a curvy, congested highway during a large public event may suffice. Second, it polices the aggregate sentencing cap in KRS 532.110(1)(c), reminding courts that the maximum total of consecutive terms cannot exceed the PFO‑enhanced maximum for the highest‑class offense—20 years here. Third, it both preserves and constrains jail‑fee imposition: sentencing courts still have authority to order reimbursement post‑2022, but only upon record proof of a duly adopted and approved jail reimbursement policy; absent that proof, jail fees must be vacated, and the Commonwealth is not entitled in this case to repair the omission on remand.

For practitioners, the opinion underscores the importance of building a complete sentencing record, carefully calculating aggregate caps, and litigating “substantial risk” with full attention to roadway and event‑specific realities. While non‑precedential, the Court’s analysis will likely be persuasive in future cases that present similar issues without clear published guidance.