Pennsylvania Supreme Court Confirms Home Inspection Law’s One‑Year Period Is a Statute of Repose Triggered by Report Delivery

Case: Gidor v. Mangus (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Western District, No. 21 WAP 2024)

Opinion Date: October 23, 2025

Author of Concurring Opinion: Justice Wecht

Introduction

This case addresses a pivotal timing question under Pennsylvania’s Home Inspection Law (HIL), 68 Pa.C.S. §§ 7501–7513: whether the statute labeled “Statute of Limitations” in Section 7512 actually operates as a statute of limitations—typically tied to claim accrual and the discovery rule—or as a statute of repose—tied to a fixed event and largely immune to equitable tolling. The parties are homebuyer Mary Joan Gidor (Appellant) and home inspector Benjamin E. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections (Appellee). The dispute turns on whether Gidor’s lawsuit, brought more than one year after the inspection report was delivered, is time-barred.

The Supreme Court’s majority holds that Section 7512 is, in substance, a statute of repose that begins and ends by reference to a specific external event: the delivery of the home inspection report. Justice Wecht concurs in that outcome and the core reasoning, but writes separately to:

• Clarify the analytical distinction between statutes of limitations (accrual-based) and statutes of repose (event-certain, defendant-centric), and
• Express reservations about the Court’s earlier treatment of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE) Section 513(d) in DuBose v. Quinlan, 173 A.3d 634 (Pa. 2017), which had characterized that subsection as a statute of limitations.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court concludes that HIL Section 7512’s one-year filing period is triggered by the delivery of the home inspection report and admits no discovery-rule tolling or implied equitable exceptions. The statutory text states: “An action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report must be commenced within one year after the date the report is delivered.” 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512. Because the trigger is a discrete, certain event external to a plaintiff’s knowledge, the provision operates as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations.

Justice Wecht agrees entirely with that conclusion. He emphasizes that:

• Section 7512 includes its own explicit trigger (delivery) and a firm outer limit (one year),
• It contains no textual exceptions, and
• It is defendant-centric in the sense that it provides a clear end-point to the inspector’s exposure, independent of a plaintiff’s discovery or accrual concepts.

However, Justice Wecht questions the majority’s reliance on DuBose as a contrasting example and suggests that DuBose may have drawn an unstable distinction when it treated MCARE § 513(d) as a statute of limitations due to its express equitable exceptions. In his view, the presence of exceptions is not categorically incompatible with a statute of repose, and the better dividing line is whether the statute provides a certain, defendant-centric end to exposure rather than whether it includes equitable tolling.

Analysis

Precedents and Statutory Framework Cited

1) Accrual and Chapter 55 of the Judicial Code

Pennsylvania’s general timing rules appear in Chapter 55 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5501–5574. Section 5502(a) provides the default rule: “the time within which a matter must be commenced under this chapter shall be computed…from the time the cause of action accrued….” “Accrue” is a term of art—“[t]o come into existence as an enforceable claim or right; to arise”—and, with it, the discovery rule is effectively “baked in” because the claim accrues when the injury occurs and is reasonably knowable. See Black’s Law Dictionary; Rice v. Diocese of Altoona–Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 247 (Pa. 2021) (discovery rule ensures those unaware of non-obvious injuries have essentially the same rights as those whose injuries are immediately ascertainable).

Justice Wecht underscores that the accrual framework and discovery rule pertain to statutes of limitations operating under Chapter 55’s default unless a statute provides an alternative, event-certain trigger.

2) Construction-Project Statute of Repose: 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536

Section 5536 is part of Chapter 55 yet expressly sets a repose period: actions against those involved in designing, planning, supervising, or constructing improvements to real property “must be commenced within 12 years after completion of construction.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a). It also contains a narrow extension: if injury or death occurs within the final two years of that 12-year period, suit may be commenced up to 14 years after completion. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(b).

The Court has consistently treated § 5536 as a statute of repose. It provides a fixed, event-certain trigger (completion of construction) and a defined outer boundary, thereby granting defendants certainty about when exposure ends. The limited extension does not convert the statute into a limitations period because it preserves a fixed end-date. Justice Wecht notes that, functionally, the extension makes the repose potentially 14 years, yet it still provides defendants certainty and does not depend on the plaintiff’s discovery.

3) MCARE Act § 513 and DuBose v. Quinlan

MCARE § 513 is divided sub silentio between repose and limitations:

• § 513(a) (labeled “Statute of repose”) bars actions commenced more than seven years from the alleged tort or breach, subject to narrow exceptions (foreign objects; minors).
• § 513(d) states that wrongful death and survival actions “must be commenced within two years after the death” except in cases of “affirmative misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment of the cause of death,” which can toll the period. 40 P.S. § 1303.513(d).

In DuBose, the Court held that § 513(a) is a statute of repose but § 513(d) is a statute of limitations, reasoning that subsection (d)’s equitable tolling exceptions evidenced an accrual-sensitive, plaintiff-focused timing regime.

Justice Wecht questions that logic. He emphasizes that exceptions can coexist with repose, as § 5536 demonstrates. He proposes a more coherent dividing line: if the timing rule assures the defendant of a fixed end to exposure by anchoring the period to a certain event or to matters within the defendant’s control (e.g., ceasing concealment), it functions as repose; if it pivots on what the plaintiff knows and when, it functions as a limitations rule. He thus finds no “material distinction” between HIL § 7512’s language and MCARE § 513(d)’s primary direction (“must be commenced within [x] years after [event]”).

4) Statutory Headings as Aids, Not Controllers

The Statutory Construction Act provides that headings “shall not be considered to control but may be used to aid” construction. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1924. The concurrence acknowledges this baseline and notes recent discussions (see Commonwealth v. Linton, 337 A.3d 467, 478 (Pa. 2025)) that treat headings as potentially informative. Still, the operative command is the text. Here, the operative text of § 7512 fixes the trigger at delivery of the report and contains no exceptions—pointing strongly toward repose despite the heading “Statute of Limitations.”

Legal Reasoning

A. The Governing Text and the Repose/Limitations Divide

HIL § 7512 states: “An action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report must be commenced within one year after the date the report is delivered.” 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512. Three features are decisive:

• Event-certain trigger: The clock starts upon a concrete, external event—delivery of the report—not the plaintiff’s discovery or accrual of the cause of action.
• No textual exceptions: The statute includes no discovery-rule or equitable tolling language and no cross-reference importing Chapter 55’s accrual default.
• Defendant-centric certainty: By fixing an outer boundary keyed to delivery, the statute signals to inspectors the precise duration of their exposure, independent of whether or when a buyer discovers a defect.

These are hallmarks of a statute of repose: the claim is extinguished by the passage of time measured from a defined event, not from accrual. In Justice Wecht’s framing, the distinguishing feature is not the mere presence or absence of exceptions but whether the statute’s operation reliably assures the defendant of when exposure ends.

B. Why Accrual Concepts and the Discovery Rule Do Not Apply

Accrual and the discovery rule are intertwined. Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5502, a limitations period tied to “accrual” typically permits discovery-rule tolling where injuries are not reasonably knowable. But when a statute supplies its own triggering event and timetable—especially one external to the plaintiff’s knowledge—there is no role for accrual-based doctrines unless the statute expressly allows them. Section 7512 does not. Just as § 5536 sets its own trigger (completion) and fixed end-date (12 years, sometimes up to 14), § 7512 sets its own trigger (delivery) and fixed end-date (one year), with no textual space for discovery or equitable tolling.

C. The DuBose Question: Are Exceptions Incompatible with Repose?

Justice Wecht critiques DuBose’s inference that equitable exceptions (e.g., misrepresentation or concealment) transform an otherwise event-certain timing rule into a statute of limitations. He argues:

• Statutes of repose can contain exceptions, provided they retain defendant-centric certainty about when exposure ends. Section 5536’s late-emerging injury extension is a prime example.
• Even equitable exceptions need not be plaintiff-centric; misrepresentation and concealment are defendant-controlled conditions. The defendant can cease the conduct, which restores certainty.
• Therefore, the presence of defendant-centric exceptions should not automatically shift a repose statute into the limitations category.

Applying that lens, Justice Wecht sees no material difference between MCARE § 513(d)’s core command (“two years after the death”) and HIL § 7512 (“one year after the report is delivered”). Both fix the clock to a certain event. While he concurs in the outcome here, he would reach it without relying on DuBose and flags that DuBose may warrant reconsideration or, at minimum, can be read as ambiguous in light of its own title (“Statute of Repose”) and applicable interpretive canons (1 Pa.C.S. § 1924).

Impact and Implications

1) Immediate Effects on Home Inspection Litigation

• Strict one-year bar: Claims “arising from a home inspection report” must be filed within one year of the report’s delivery. Later discovery of defects does not extend the period.
• No discovery rule: Plaintiffs cannot invoke accrual-based doctrines to delay the start or extend the end of the one-year window.
• Pleading and strategy: Plaintiffs must evaluate potential claims immediately upon receiving the report. Protective filings, early expert review, and prompt notice to insurers may become the norm.
• Scope of “arising from”: Litigants should expect disputes over whether a claim “arises from” the report (and is thus barred after one year) or derives from some independent duty (e.g., seller disclosure obligations) that may carry a different period.

2) Effects on the Home Inspection Industry and Real Estate Transactions

• Liability certainty: Inspectors gain pronounced certainty and potentially reduced long-tail risk. Insurance markets may adjust accordingly.
• Consumer risk: Buyers face a compressed window that can expire before latent defects are discoverable. This may shift risk back to buyers and encourage pre- or post-closing arrangements (e.g., contractual warranties or negotiated tolling agreements).
• Market behavior: Parties may alter inspection scopes, seek supplemental inspections, or adjust transaction timelines to preserve the ability to investigate and, if needed, file within one year.

3) Doctrinal Guidance Beyond HIL

• Text over labels: Headings such as “Statute of Limitations” are not controlling; courts will look to operative text and structure to determine repose versus limitations.
• Accrual default displaced: When a statute supplies its own event-certain trigger and timetable, accrual-based doctrines like the discovery rule do not apply unless expressly incorporated.
• Defendant-centricity as a lens: The concurrence offers a coherent analytic tool—if the statute assures defendants a fixed end to exposure tied to a certain event or to matters under defendants’ control, it functions like repose; if it turns on plaintiff knowledge or accrual, it functions like limitations.
• Potential reexamination of DuBose: Justice Wecht’s critique signals that the Court may, in a suitable case, revisit the classification of MCARE § 513(d) or clarify the compatibility of exceptions with repose.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Statute of Limitations: A deadline to sue that generally starts when a claim “accrues”—i.e., when the injury occurs and is reasonably knowable. It is often subject to the discovery rule and equitable tolling.
• Statute of Repose: A firm cut-off tied to a specific event, regardless of when the injury is discovered. It extinguishes the claim after a fixed period and typically is not tolled by discovery or most equitable doctrines.
• Accrual: The moment a claim comes into legal existence as an enforceable right. In many contexts, accrual and the discovery rule work together to ensure fairness where injuries are not immediately apparent.
• Discovery Rule: A doctrine that delays a limitations clock until an injury or its cause is reasonably knowable to the plaintiff. It does not apply to a statute of repose unless the statute says so.
• Defendant-Centricity: A way to identify repose; the statute provides a predictable end to the defendant’s exposure keyed to a certain event or to conduct under the defendant’s control, not to what the plaintiff learns or when.
• Event-Certain Trigger: A specific, objective milestone (e.g., report delivery, completion of construction, death) that starts the clock without regard to the plaintiff’s awareness.
• Headings and Labels: Statutory titles and headings can aid interpretation but do not control when the operative text is clear (1 Pa.C.S. § 1924).

Key Takeaways and Practitioner Notes

• HIL Section 7512 is a statute of repose: Suit must be filed within one year of the report’s delivery, period.
• No discovery rule under HIL: Courts will not import accrual-based tolling into § 7512’s event-certain design.
• Plan early: Buyers and counsel should evaluate potential claims promptly upon report delivery and consider protective measures to avoid forfeiture.
• Mind the “arising from” scope: Assess whether claims truly arise from the report (barred after one year) or stem from independent duties (potentially different timelines).
• Watch DuBose’s shadow: The Court’s skepticism about DuBose’s reasoning may shape future litigation over statutes with event-certain triggers plus exceptions, including in healthcare liability contexts.

Conclusion

Gidor v. Mangus establishes a clear and consequential rule in Pennsylvania’s home inspection arena: the HIL’s one-year period is a statute of repose that begins at report delivery and is not subject to the discovery rule or implied equitable tolling. Justice Wecht’s concurrence strengthens the doctrinal foundation for that conclusion by distinguishing accrual-based limitations from event-certain repose and by urging a reorientation around defendant-centric certainty rather than the mere presence or absence of exceptions. The decision provides strong predictability for home inspectors but imposes a strict timetable on consumers, likely prompting earlier investigations, filings, and contractual risk-sharing. Beyond home inspections, the Court’s analysis offers a blueprint for reading timing provisions across Pennsylvania statutes: look to the text, the trigger, and the certainty afforded to defendants, not to labels or assumptions about accrual.