No Third-Party Dissemination and Self-Imposed Decisions Do Not Create Article III Standing in FCRA Disputes

Introduction

In Lashonda Peeples v. National Data Research, Inc. (d.b.a. Integrascan), No. 24-10956 (11th Cir. Sept. 19, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit dismissed an appeal and directed the district court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The case arises from a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) challenge to a background report that initially listed a South Carolina criminal offense later expunged and subsequently noted as expunged. The plaintiff argued the continued inclusion of the expungement notation rendered the report inaccurate and unlawful, particularly in light of South Carolina law deeming expunged records nonpublic.

The central issues on appeal were not the merits of FCRA’s accuracy and reinvestigation duties under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i, but whether the plaintiff had Article III standing to bring those claims at all. Guided by its recent decision in Nelson v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 144 F.4th 1350 (11th Cir. 2025), the court held the plaintiff alleged only self-imposed harms and speculative future injury, neither of which sufficed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact.

Judges Jordan, Jill Pryor, and Hull issued a per curiam decision. Although the opinion is unpublished and therefore nonprecedential in the Eleventh Circuit, it applies and illustrates a published standing rule from Nelson that will shape FCRA litigation across the circuit.

Summary of the Opinion

The plaintiff, Ms. Peeples, applied to a pre-med program at AICASA. The school required a background report prepared by National Data Research (NDR). NDR’s initial report noted a criminal offense that had been expunged in South Carolina. After Ms. Peeples disputed, NDR updated the report to state the offense had been expunged, but refused to remove the expungement notation entirely. Believing the notation would prevent her full-time enrollment, Ms. Peeples chose not to submit the report and eventually left the program.

She sued NDR under FCRA §§ 1681e(b) (reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy) and 1681i (reasonable reinvestigation and correction of disputed information). The district court granted summary judgment to NDR, reasoning that (1) the report had been communicated only to the plaintiff, not to any third party, and (2) the modified report accurately reflected both the conviction and its expungement.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit did not reach those merits. Relying on its recent decision in Nelson, the court concluded the plaintiff lacked Article III standing:

Her alleged harms were self-imposed—she elected not to submit the report.
Any feared adverse action by AICASA was speculative; the school had not made any decision and had given no indication how it would treat the report.
Time and money spent disputing a report not disseminated to third parties, and emotional distress stemming from one’s own decision, do not constitute a concrete injury-in-fact.

The Eleventh Circuit therefore dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court’s merits judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The opinion turns on two key authorities:

Nelson v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 144 F.4th 1350 (11th Cir. 2025): The Eleventh Circuit recently held that a plaintiff cannot establish Article III standing in an FCRA case merely by spending time and money to fix purported errors on a credit report that has not been published to third parties or otherwise affected the plaintiff. Nelson also rejected standing based on a speculative chain of future injury (there, the hypothesized risk of identity theft) that depended on multiple uncertain steps and third-party actions. The Peeples panel applied Nelson’s core teaching: absent dissemination or a concrete adverse effect, self-incurred costs and speculative future harms are insufficient to establish injury-in-fact.
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013): Clapper provides the Supreme Court’s framework for “imminence” in future-harm cases and cautions that plaintiffs cannot “manufacture standing” by incurring costs to avoid a speculative harm. The Peeples opinion uses Clapper’s “speculative chain of possibilities” and “certainly impending” language to emphasize that a feared adverse enrollment decision by AICASA was not imminent or concrete.

The panel also acknowledges South Carolina’s expungement law, S.C. Code § 22-5-910(D), which deems expunged records nonpublic and accessible only to authorized officials. That state-law framework informed the plaintiff’s merits theory but did not affect the standing analysis, which turns on federal injury-in-fact requirements.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

No concrete injury from self-imposed decisions. The plaintiff’s central allegation of harm was her loss of enrollment opportunity and related emotional distress after choosing not to submit the revised report to AICASA. Under Nelson (and consistent with Clapper), self-inflicted harms—costs or losses that result from a plaintiff’s unilateral choice to avoid a speculative risk—do not count as a concrete injury-in-fact. Here, the plaintiff’s enrollment consequences and emotional distress flowed from her decision not to provide the report, not from any third-party action caused by NDR’s reporting.
Speculative chain of future harm is insufficient. The plaintiff feared that, if she submitted the report with the expungement notation, AICASA might deny further enrollment. But AICASA had not received the report, had not made any adverse decision, and had not indicated how it would react. This “speculative series of events” did not rise to a “certainly impending” harm as required by Clapper and echoed in Nelson. Simply put, the claimed injury was conjectural, not actual or imminent.
No third-party dissemination or adverse effect. The report at issue was sent only to the plaintiff. The absence of third-party dissemination mirrors the context in Nelson and aligns with the broader principle that FCRA claims premised on reputational or analogous harms generally require publication to third parties or a concrete adverse consequence. Without dissemination or an adverse action by a decisionmaker, there is no concrete injury to support Article III standing.

Having found no injury-in-fact, the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits. The proper remedy, consistent with jurisdictional principles, was to vacate the district court’s merits judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

Impact

Although unpublished, this decision has several important practical and doctrinal implications because it applies the published rule from Nelson:

FCRA plaintiffs must show concrete harm beyond self-help costs. Time and money spent disputing a consumer report, standing alone, will not establish Article III injury if the report has not been disseminated to third parties and has not concretely affected the plaintiff.
Fear-based, speculative consequences are not enough. Plaintiffs cannot ground standing in predicted actions that a third party might take upon seeing a report; there must be an actual adverse action or an imminent, not conjectural, risk of harm.
Emotional distress tied to self-imposed choices is insufficient. Emotional harms must be causally linked to a concrete, non-speculative injury attributable to the defendant’s conduct, not solely to the plaintiff’s own preventive decisions.
Remedial posture matters. When standing is absent, courts must vacate merits judgments and dismiss without prejudice, preserving plaintiffs’ ability to refile if a concrete injury later materializes (e.g., dissemination to a third party followed by an adverse action).
Educational and licensing contexts are affected. Applicants in programs that require background checks should appreciate that preemptive withdrawal or non-submission, based on speculation about a school’s future decision, will not typically establish standing for FCRA damages suits. Concrete adverse actions by the institution, or actual dissemination of the report to the institution, are key.
Consumer reporting agencies are not immunized on the merits. This disposition does not resolve whether it is “accurate” or lawful under the FCRA to include an expunged offense with an “expunged” notation, nor does it decide the effect of state expungement laws on report content. It simply holds that, on these facts, the plaintiff lacked standing to litigate those questions.

Finally, the case underscores the convergence between Eleventh Circuit standing doctrine and the Supreme Court’s approach to intangible harms: dissemination or adverse consequences are often necessary to transform a statutory violation into a concrete injury sufficient for federal jurisdiction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Standing: To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show (1) a concrete, particularized injury-in-fact that is actual or imminent; (2) a causal link between the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and (3) redressability—likelihood that a favorable court decision will remedy the injury.
Self-Inflicted Injury: Harms that result from a plaintiff’s own choices, made to avoid speculative risks, generally do not qualify as injuries-in-fact (e.g., voluntarily withdrawing from a program or incurring costs to prevent a hypothetical harm).
Speculative Future Harm: Predictions about what a third party might do, without concrete indications or imminent action, are insufficient. Courts require that future harm be “certainly impending,” not a chain of “what ifs.”
Dissemination: In FCRA cases, a key consideration for standing is whether a consumer report was shared with a third party (e.g., an employer, school, or lender). Non-dissemination typically undercuts claims of reputational or decision-impact harms.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b): Requires consumer reporting agencies to follow reasonable procedures to ensure “maximum possible accuracy” in consumer reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1681i: Requires a reasonable reinvestigation upon notice of dispute, correction of inaccuracies, and maintenance of procedures to prevent reappearance of disputed information.
Expungement vs. Sealing: Expungement typically removes a record from public access; sealing restricts access but may not erase the record. The precise legal effect depends on state law. Here, South Carolina law designates expunged records as “nonpublic” and accessible only to authorized officials.
Unpublished Opinion: In the Eleventh Circuit, unpublished decisions are not binding precedent, though they may be persuasive. This opinion derives its force from, and faithfully applies, the published Nelson decision.
Vacatur and Dismissal Without Prejudice: When a court lacks jurisdiction, it may not resolve the merits. The correct approach is to vacate any merits judgment and dismiss the action without prejudice, allowing refiling if a concrete injury later arises.

Conclusion

Peeples v. National Data Research reinforces a clear jurisdictional boundary in FCRA litigation within the Eleventh Circuit: where a consumer report is not disseminated to third parties and a plaintiff’s alleged harms consist of self-imposed decisions and speculative fears about future consequences, Article III standing is lacking. Applying Nelson v. Experian Information Solutions, the court held that neither the plaintiff’s avoidance costs nor her emotional distress—both tied to her own decision not to submit the report—constituted a concrete injury-in-fact. The panel therefore vacated the district court’s merits ruling and remanded for dismissal without prejudice.

The opinion leaves unresolved significant merits questions about whether and when including an expunged offense—with an explicit “expunged” notation—violates FCRA accuracy and reinvestigation duties, or how state expungement confidentiality rules intersect with federal reporting obligations. But as a jurisdictional matter, the message is unmistakable: in FCRA suits seeking damages, plaintiffs must tether their claims to concrete, non-speculative harms—often demonstrated by third-party dissemination or actual adverse actions—to open the courthouse doors.