No State Appeal From Single‑Justice Bail Decisions: Vermont Supreme Court Limits § 7556(c) to Trial-Court Orders

Case: State v. Nicolae Beldiman, 2025 VT 55 (Vt. Sept. 12, 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of Vermont

Opinion by: Eaton, J.

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Beldiman, which resolves a critical procedural question in Vermont bail practice: whether the State may appeal a single-Justice de novo bail determination that results in a defendant’s release. The Court holds the State has no statutory right to such an appeal. The decision clarifies the scope of 13 V.S.A. § 7556(c) and its relationship to § 7556(d) and the Vermont Constitution’s bail provision (ch. II, § 40(2)).

The case arose after the criminal division held the defendant without bail on an aggravated-stalking charge under 13 V.S.A. § 1063(a)(1). A single Justice of the Supreme Court, on de novo review under § 7556(d), reversed, concluding aggravated stalking does not contain “an element … [that] involves an act of violence,” as required for no-bail detention under the Constitution and § 7553a. The State then attempted to appeal that single-Justice ruling. The full Court dismissed the State’s appeal for lack of statutory authorization, thereby cementing the limited and asymmetric appellate pathways in bail matters: defendants denied release have further review; the State does not when a single Justice orders release.

Summary of the Opinion

• Disposition: Appeal dismissed. The State lacks a statutory right to appeal from a single-Justice decision issued under 13 V.S.A. § 7556(d).
• Core holding: Section 7556(c) authorizes State appeals only from criminal-division orders “releasing” a defendant (with or without conditions). Its language—especially the references to the “proceedings below” and to “remand”—shows it contemplates appeals from an inferior court, not from a single Justice of the same Court.
• Structural reasoning: The Legislature expressly provided further review for detained defendants (to a three-Justice panel) after a single-Justice denial of release, but did not provide a parallel right for the State after a single-Justice grant of release. This asymmetry is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the narrow construction of pretrial detention under § 7553a.
• Issues not reached: The Court did not decide whether aggravated stalking is a “felony, an element of which involves an act of violence” for constitutional no-bail purposes, nor whether the State could have appealed the trial court’s post-remand conditions-of-release order under § 7556(c).

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant was charged with violating an abuse-prevention order, violating conditions of release, and aggravated stalking (13 V.S.A. § 1063(a)(1)). The affidavit alleged that, despite no-contact conditions and a relief-from-abuse order stemming from an earlier assault, the defendant approached the complainant in a Walmart parking lot, maintained eye contact while circling, and parked directly behind her.

The criminal division granted the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail, treating aggravated stalking as a qualifying “felony [with] an element of which involves an act of violence” under Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40(2) and 13 V.S.A. § 7553a. The court relied in part on 13 V.S.A. § 1063(c), which states that “[c]onduct constituting the offense of aggravated stalking shall be considered a violent act for the purposes of determining bail.”

The defendant appealed. A specially assigned single Justice conducted a de novo hearing under § 7556(d) and reversed, reasoning that the aggravated-stalking statute can be satisfied without conduct amounting to “violence”—for example, by causing “substantial emotional distress” or by property interference expected to cause such distress—and does not require intent to cause bodily injury. The single Justice rejected § 1063(c) as controlling the constitutional analysis, explaining that the constitutional allocation reserves that determination to the judiciary, not the Legislature. The single Justice set interim conditions and remanded for the criminal division to impose conditions of release, which it did.

The State noticed an appeal from the single-Justice order. A single Justice referred the matter to the full Court, which dismissed the appeal.

Analysis

Statutory and Constitutional Framework

• Vermont Constitution, ch. II, § 40(2): Allows pretrial detention without bail in limited circumstances, including when a person is “accused of a felony, an element of which involves an act of violence against another person.”
• 13 V.S.A. § 7553a: Statutory counterpart to § 40(2), using near-identical language. Both provisions are construed narrowly due to the liberty interests at stake and the presumption of innocence.
• 13 V.S.A. § 7556: Sets the routes for review of pretrial release/detention decisions:
  • Subsections (a), (b), (d), (e): avenues for defendants (detained or released) to seek review.
  • Subsection (c): authorizes the State to appeal when “a person is released” by the criminal division. A single Justice may hear the appeal or refer it to the full Court. It provides for affirmance if “supported by the proceedings below” and authorizes “remand.” It also states “No further appeal may lie from the ruling of a single Justice in matters to which this subsection applies.”
• V.R.A.P. 9(b) and Reporter’s Notes (1994 Emergency Amendment): Provide a mechanism for three‑Justice panel review when a single Justice denies release following a § 7556(d) de novo review, underscoring a deliberate asymmetry favoring additional review for detained defendants.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• State v. Roy, 2018 VT 67A, ¶ 12, 209 Vt. 133, 203 A.3d 1177: The State has no common-law right to appeal in criminal cases; any right must be grounded in statute. The Court uses Roy to frame the threshold inquiry: absent a clear statutory grant, there is no State appeal.
• State v. Wainwright, 2013 VT 120, ¶ 6, 195 Vt. 370, 88 A.3d 423: Articulates Vermont’s ordinary-meaning approach to statutory interpretation. The Court invokes this baseline methodology to analyze § 7556(c)’s text.
• State v. Lohr, 2020 VT 41, ¶¶ 6–7, 212 Vt. 289, 236 A.3d 1277: Emphasizes that statutes must be read as a whole, with attention to context, purpose, and coherence. This supports reading § 7556 as an integrated scheme with distinct, complementary subsections.
• State v. Downing, 2020 VT 101, ¶¶ 6, 26, 213 Vt. 468, 247 A.3d 150: Confirms the availability of three‑Justice panel review for detained defendants and reiterates that § 7553a detention should be narrowly construed due to its tension with the presumption of innocence. Downing helps explain why the Legislature provided additional appellate layers for detainees and not for the State.
• Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024): The Court cites definitions of “below” (a lower court) and “remand” (sending back for further action) to demonstrate that § 7556(c)’s language contemplates vertical appeals from the criminal division, not horizontal review of a Supreme Court single-Justice decision.
• Reporter’s Notes—1994 Emergency Amendment, V.R.A.P. 9: The Notes illuminate that Rule 9(b) provides review from single‑Justice orders for detained defendants, reinforcing the asymmetric appellate design.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three principal steps.

1) Text and structure of § 7556(c) confine State appeals to trial‑court releases. The subsection applies “[w]hen a person is released, with or without bail or other conditions of release,” and authorizes a single Justice to affirm if “supported by the proceedings below,” or to “remand” if not supported. Those terms—“below” and “remand”—signal an appeal from a lower tribunal to a higher one. They make no sense in the context of a State attempt to appeal from one Supreme Court Justice to another or to the full Court. The Court presumes the Legislature chose its words advisedly and follows their ordinary and contextual meaning. Thus, § 7556(c) does not authorize a State appeal from a single‑Justice order; it authorizes State review of criminal‑division release orders.

2) The absence of a “finality clause” in § 7556(d) is explained by defendants’ additional review right, not by a latent State right. Subsections (b) and (c) explicitly say “No further appeal may lie from the ruling of a single Justice.” Subsection (d) (de novo bail review by a single Justice) lacks such language. The State argued this omission implied a further State appeal. The Court rejects that inference, explaining that detained defendants have a defined path to further review: a panel of three Justices under § 7556(e) and V.R.A.P. 9(b)(2) when release is denied. The Legislature’s explicit extension of additional review to detained individuals, coupled with silence as to the State, underscores the asymmetric design and does not create a hidden State right to appeal a single‑Justice order granting release.

3) Policy coherence: asymmetry is deliberate and consistent with the Constitution. The Court notes that pretrial detention “undermines the presumption of innocence” by depriving liberty before an adjudication of guilt, and therefore must be “narrowly construed” (citing Downing). It is sensible that the statutory scheme affords more robust appellate protections to detained defendants than to the State. That policy backdrop reinforces the textual conclusion that § 7556(c) does not authorize the State’s appeal from a single‑Justice decision.

What the Court Did—and Did Not—Decide About “Violent” Felonies

Not decided by the full Court: Whether aggravated stalking (13 V.S.A. § 1063(a)(1)) is a “felony, an element of which involves an act of violence” for purposes of no-bail detention under Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40(2) and § 7553a. The single Justice concluded it is not, because the statute can be violated by nonviolent conduct (e.g., causing substantial emotional distress or certain property interferences) and does not require intent to cause bodily injury. The single Justice also reasoned that the Legislature’s designation in § 1063(c) that aggravated stalking “shall be considered a violent act for the purposes of determining bail” cannot control the constitutional analysis, which is entrusted to the judiciary. However, that merits determination by a single Justice does not constitute binding precedent from the full Court in this opinion; the Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds and did not resolve the constitutional question.

Open Questions Left by Beldiman

• Appeal from post‑remand conditions order: The Court expressly did not decide whether the State could appeal the criminal division’s conditions-of-release order that issued after the single-Justice remand. Any such appeal would arise under § 7556(c) from a trial-court order, not from the single-Justice decision. The Court left that pathway unresolved.
• Broader effect of § 1063(c): Because the Court did not reach the merits, the weight of § 1063(c)’s declaration that aggravated stalking “shall be considered a violent act for the purposes of determining bail” remains an open constitutional question for the full Court in a case properly before it.

Impact and Implications

Immediate procedural impact: Single‑Justice de novo bail decisions that result in release are effectively final as to the State. There is no statutory path for the State to seek further appellate review from that single‑Justice order. By contrast, a detained defendant may seek three‑Justice panel review when a single Justice denies release.

For prosecutors:

• Recognize the de novo hearing before the single Justice under § 7556(d) may be the State’s last opportunity to defend a hold‑without‑bail order on the asserted legal and factual grounds. Build a complete record on the “element of violence” issue and any evidentiary showings required by § 7553a.
• If the single Justice reverses and remands, consider whether a narrow appeal from the trial court’s post‑remand conditions order is available under § 7556(c). Beldiman leaves that question open. Any such appeal would need to focus on the lawfulness or adequacy of the conditions imposed by the criminal division, not on relitigating the single‑Justice’s constitutional analysis.
• Legislative avenue: If broader State appellate rights from single‑Justice bail orders are seen as necessary, the remedy is legislative. Any amendment would need to account for constitutional constraints and the separation of powers.

For defense counsel:

• When challenging hold‑without‑bail on a “violent felony” theory, the de novo single‑Justice forum offers a decisive opportunity. The State cannot appeal a resulting release order up the ladder.
• While persuasive, single‑Justice characterizations of offense elements (e.g., whether an offense necessarily includes an “act of violence”) are not binding full‑Court precedent. Future cases may revisit those issues if they arrive through a posture the Supreme Court can review.

Substantive bail law effects: Though not binding on the merits, the single Justice’s reasoning in this case signals that offenses like aggravated stalking—whose elements can be satisfied without physical force or bodily injury intent—may face heightened scrutiny when invoked to justify no-bail detention under § 40(2)/§ 7553a. Prosecutors may respond by:

• Emphasizing charges whose elements clearly involve an “act of violence,” where supported by the evidence, or
• Demonstrating that any ancillary offense meets the constitutional threshold based on its statutory elements, not merely the facts of a particular case.

Systemic design reaffirmed: The decision underscores Vermont’s deliberate, asymmetric bail‑review architecture: expedited, final (as to the State) single‑Justice relief for defendants seeking liberty; limited State appellate intervention to trial‑court release orders; and an extra layer of review only for those detained. This design aligns with the presumption of innocence and the narrow construction of pretrial detention.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hold without bail: Pretrial detention authorized in narrow circumstances, including when a person is accused of a felony whose elements necessarily include an “act of violence” (Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40(2); 13 V.S.A. § 7553a). It is exceptional and strictly construed.
• Element of the offense vs. facts of the case: An “element” is a fact the State must prove to convict. For bail purposes, if an offense can be committed without violence, then “an element of which involves an act of violence” is not satisfied—even if the alleged facts in a particular case were violent.
• De novo review: A fresh, independent hearing in which the reviewing tribunal (here, a single Justice) makes its own determinations without deferring to the prior ruling.
• Single‑Justice review: Vermont allocates certain urgent matters (including bail) to a single Supreme Court Justice for fast resolution. The Justice may refer a matter to the full Court.
• “Below” and “remand”: “Below” means a lower court; “remand” means sending a case back for further proceedings. Their presence in § 7556(c) signals appeals from the criminal division, not from single‑Justice orders.
• Violent act designation in a statute (e.g., § 1063(c)) vs. constitutional standard: A statute may label conduct as “violent” for bail purposes, but the constitutional question—whether an offense’s elements involve an act of violence for no‑bail detention—ultimately lies with the judiciary.
• Asymmetric review: The statutory scheme affords more layers of review to detained defendants (including a three‑Justice panel after a single‑Justice denial of release) than to the State. This asymmetry reflects the presumption of innocence and the gravity of pretrial detention.

Conclusion

State v. Beldiman establishes a clear procedural rule: the State has no statutory right to appeal a single‑Justice de novo bail decision under § 7556(d). Section 7556(c) permits State appeals only from criminal‑division orders releasing a person, as shown by its textual and structural references to the “proceedings below” and to “remand.” This reading coheres with Vermont’s bail architecture, which prioritizes speedy, final relief for defendants seeking liberty and provides additional review only for those who remain detained.

The full Court did not resolve the important substantive question whether aggravated stalking fits the constitutional “act of violence” category for no‑bail detention or whether the State may appeal a post‑remand conditions order from the trial court. Nonetheless, Beldiman will have immediate practical effects: for prosecutors, it underscores the need to fully litigate the “violent‑felony” question at the single‑Justice stage; for defense counsel, it highlights the strategic centrality of de novo review; and for policymakers, it signals that any change in State appellate rights must come from the Legislature, consistent with constitutional limits and the presumption of innocence.

In short, Beldiman clarifies that single‑Justice bail orders granting release are, as to the State, the last word under current law. That finality is not a drafting anomaly; it is a deliberate feature of Vermont’s bail system, grounded in constitutional values and reaffirmed by the Court’s careful textual analysis.