Introduction

In a consolidated capital postconviction decision arising under a death warrant, the Supreme Court of Florida in Bryan Fredrick Jennings v. State of Florida; Bryan Fredrick Jennings v. State of Florida; and Bryan Fredrick Jennings v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Nov. 6, 2025) affirmed the summary denial of a fifth successive postconviction motion, denied a stay of execution and other warrant-related relief, and denied a state habeas petition. The case involves a 1979 murder of six-year-old Rebecca Kunash for which Jennings, then age 20, was convicted in 1986 after two earlier reversals and sentenced to death on an 11–1 jury recommendation. Governor Ron DeSantis signed a death warrant on October 10, 2025, setting execution for November 13, 2025.

The key issues presented were:

• Whether executive clemency denied in 1989 is constitutionally inadequate or “stale” due to the decades-long lapse and thus violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (and Florida counterparts).
• Whether the Governor’s signing of the warrant while Jennings had no current state collateral counsel (after his longtime lawyer’s 2022 death) violated due process, Sixth Amendment counsel guarantees, Eighth Amendment protections, or access-to-courts rights.
• Whether Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is facially unconstitutional because it lacks a unanimity requirement for the jury’s recommendation and no longer includes comparative proportionality review, and whether warrant selection and clemency practices render the system arbitrary and capricious.
• Whether state habeas relief lies for alleged deprivation of “life, liberty, or property” interests in continuous state collateral representation under chapter 27, Florida Statutes.

The Court exercised jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) and (9) of the Florida Constitution. Per curiam, the Court (Chief Justice Muñiz and Justices Couriel, Grosshans, Francis, and Sasso; Justice Labarga concurring in result; Justice Canady recused) rejected all claims and directed immediate issuance of the mandate with no rehearing entertained—a standard practice in warrant litigation.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying the de novo standard for summary denial of successive capital postconviction motions (rule 3.851), the Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Jennings’s fifth successive motion without an evidentiary hearing. It also denied:

• Jennings’s motion to vacate the death warrant or stay the execution.
• His petition seeking review of the circuit court’s nonfinal order denying warrant-related relief.
• His original habeas petition challenging the lack of continuous state court representation since 2022.

Key holdings:

• Clemency challenge: Untimely and procedurally barred under rule 3.851(d) and (e); meritless on the law. Florida’s clemency power is vested solely in the executive; long lapses do not require a second clemency proceeding; pre–postconviction clemency can still function as the system’s “fail-safe.”
• Representation and warrant schedule: Neither rule 3.851 nor chapter 27 creates a right to continuous state postconviction counsel between proceedings. No due process or Sixth Amendment violation occurred; Florida law provides no right to effective assistance of collateral counsel; expedited warrant schedules are constitutional. The Eighth Amendment claim was waived for lack of argument.
• Facial attack on Florida’s capital scheme: Rejected. Neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Florida Constitution requires jury sentencing, a unanimous jury recommendation, or proportionality review; the scheme remains constitutionally narrowing.
• Governor’s selection of warrant cases: The Governor enjoys broad, nonjusticiable discretion in choosing which warrants to sign and when; no constitutional violation in selecting Jennings over other warrant-eligible prisoners.
• Habeas petition: Procedurally barred as a relitigation of issues available (and raised) in the postconviction appeal; chapter 27 creates no life, liberty, or property interest in continuous state collateral representation; meaningful access to courts was not denied.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

The Court anchored its ruling in a dense line of Florida and federal precedent:

• Successive postconviction standards: Zakrzewski v. State, 415 So. 3d 203 (Fla. 2025), quoting Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385 (Fla. 2025), for de novo review of summary denial and the principle that relief may be denied when the record conclusively refutes entitlement.
• Timeliness and procedural bars: Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 362 (Fla. 2012) (untimely clemency-related claims); rule 3.851(d)(1)-(2) and (e)(2) govern timeliness and exceptions. The Court also highlighted the State’s 2016 “notice of finality” under rule 3.851(j), rendering Jennings “warrant-eligible” (see Jones v. State, No. SC2025-1422, 2025 WL 2717027 (Fla. 2025), citing Silvia v. State, 228 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 2013)).
• Clemency as executive and nonjusticiable: Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 2013) (sole, unrestricted executive discretion); Zakrzewski, 415 So. 3d at 211; Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 998 (Fla. 2009) (Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) affords, at most, minimal procedural protections without mandating specific procedures); Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 568 (Fla. 2012), and Bundy v. State, 497 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 1986) (long lapse does not require a second clemency proceeding).
• “Fail-safe” concept and timing of clemency vs. postconviction: Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 192 (2009) (clemency as “fail-safe”); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993); Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 24 (Fla. 2010), and Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 551 (Fla. 2011) (pre–postconviction clemency can still satisfy the fail-safe role).
• No entitlement to present “all mitigation” in clemency or to a second clemency proceeding: Pardo, 108 So. 3d at 568; Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782, 788 (Fla. 2019).
• Limits on appellate review and the record: Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701, 708 n.5 (Fla. 2025) (appellate courts do not consider materials not presented below).
• No constitutional right to effective collateral counsel; scope of chapter 27: Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 790–91 (Fla. 2023); Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1203 (Fla. 2005); Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 778 (Fla. 2012); Darling v. State, 45 So. 3d 444, 455 (Fla. 2010); § 27.7002(1), Fla. Stat. (no right to challenge adequacy of collateral representation); §§ 27.710–.711, Fla. Stat. (appointment pertains to postconviction proceedings only).
• Due process and gaps in state collateral representation: Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 27–29 (Fla. 2016) (a lengthy period without appointed counsel did not violate due process where the defendant had counsel at every postconviction stage; no duty of counsel to continuously investigate between proceedings).
• Expedited warrant schedules are constitutional: Windom v. State, 416 So. 3d 1140, 1150 (Fla. 2025); Zakrzewski, 415 So. 3d at 211; Bell v. State, 415 So. 3d 85, 106–07 (Fla. 2025); Tanzi, 407 So. 3d at 393; Hall v. State, 420 So. 2d 872, 874 (Fla. 1982) (denial of continuance proper even where counsel had 14 days).
• Facial constitutionality of Florida’s capital scheme post-Poole: Herard v. State, 390 So. 3d 610, 622–23 (Fla. 2024) (neither Eighth Amendment nor Florida Constitution requires jury sentencing or a unanimous recommendation); State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020); Loyd v. State, 379 So. 3d 1080, 1097–98 (Fla. 2023) (no Eighth Amendment narrowing defect from removal of proportionality review); Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 2023); Fletcher v. State, 415 So. 3d 147, 162–63 (Fla. 2025) (no facial defect from lack of proportionality review).
• Governor’s warrant discretion: Zakrzewski, 415 So. 3d at 210; Hutchinson v. State, 416 So. 3d 273, 280 (Fla. 2025); Gore, 91 So. 3d at 780 (broad, nonreviewable discretion; no fixed formula for order of executions).
• Habeas procedural bar: Gaskin v. State, 361 So. 3d 300, 309 (Fla. 2023) (habeas not for claims that could have been or were raised elsewhere).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds claim-by-claim, applying settled doctrinal filters before addressing the merits.

a) Clemency “staleness” and due process: The Court first found the challenge untimely under rule 3.851(d) and barred under (e)(2), noting Jennings waited 36 years after denial of clemency and decades after finality to raise the claim, despite acknowledging he could have reapplied for clemency “seven times.” On the merits, the Court reaffirmed that Florida’s clemency is an act of executive grace vested solely in the Governor and Cabinet. No specific procedures are mandated by the federal Constitution (Woodard), and courts do not second-guess clemency judgments, the timing of warrants, or require second clemency hearings based on the passage of time (Pardo; Bundy). The “fail-safe” function of clemency remains satisfied even if clemency precedes postconviction litigation (Johnston; Valle). Moreover, a defendant has no entitlement to present a “full accounting” of mitigation in clemency or to a second clemency proceeding to present new mitigation (Pardo; Dailey). Materials not in the postconviction record (e.g., clemency letters appended to the initial brief) were not considered (Gudinas).

b) Continuous collateral counsel and due process/Sixth/Eighth rights: The Court held that rule 3.851 and chapter 27 obligate the State to appoint counsel “during postconviction proceedings,” not in perpetuity during gaps when no state matter is pending. Jennings had counsel throughout all five prior state postconviction proceedings, and federal counsel continued to represent him even after his state attorney’s death in 2022. Florida law does not require postconviction counsel to continuously monitor or investigate between proceedings (Asay). Further, Florida law provides no constitutional right to effective collateral counsel (Barwick; Zack; Gore), and statutes preclude claims based on counsel’s collateral performance (§ 27.7002(1), Fla. Stat.). Expedited warrant schedules are permissible and do not violate due process (Windom; Bell; Tanzi; Hall). The opinion treats the Eighth Amendment argument as waived for lack of developed argument or authority.

Relying on Herard and Poole, the Court reiterated that the Constitution does not require jury sentencing, a unanimous recommendation for death, or even any jury recommendation. Citing Loyd, Wells, and Fletcher, the Court held that the elimination of comparative proportionality review does not render the scheme non-narrowing or facially invalid under the Eighth Amendment. On the Governor’s choice to sign Jennings’s warrant “while dozens of represented, warrant-eligible prisoners remained,” the Court emphasized the executive’s broad, nonjusticiable discretion in selecting which warrants to sign and when (Zakrzewski; Hutchinson; Gore). The Court declined to intrude on that prerogative.

d) State habeas: The habeas petition repackaged the “continuous counsel” theory as a deprivation of life, liberty, and property interests under chapter 27. The Court found the claim procedurally barred (Gaskin) and substantively meritless: appointment obligations and monitoring under chapter 27 exist only during postconviction proceedings; no constitutional right to effective collateral counsel exists (Barwick; Zack); and the statutes expressly foreclose adequacy challenges (§ 27.7002). Jennings had meaningful access to the courts across decades of state and federal litigation; equal protection arguments premised on warrant-selection timing were rejected for the same reasons as in the postconviction appeal.

3) Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Jennings consolidates and clarifies several important strands of Florida capital jurisprudence:

• Continuous state collateral counsel: The Court’s explicit statement that rule 3.851 and chapter 27 require representation “during postconviction proceedings” and are silent about periods when no matter is pending is a clear, operational rule. Practically, it forecloses arguments that a hiatus in state appointment after counsel’s death, withdrawal, or closure independently violates due process, so long as the inmate had counsel during each postconviction proceeding and is appointed counsel upon the advent of warrant litigation.
• Warrant-era litigation tempo: The Court’s unqualified reliance on recent cases (Windom, Bell, Tanzi, Zakrzewski) reinforces that compressed warrant schedules will ordinarily be upheld. Counsel’s pleas that voluminous records preclude meaningful investigation within the warrant window are unlikely to produce stays absent a concrete, record-based showing tied to a cognizable claim.
• Clemency challenges: The decision reiterates that the judicial branch will not police the age of a clemency decision, require second clemency reviews, or scrutinize the executive’s criteria or timing. Petitioners must reapply for clemency through executive processes rather than seek judicial intervention.
• Facial attacks on the capital scheme: Jennings underscores that Florida’s current capital sentencing regime—without proportionality review and without a unanimity requirement for the jury’s recommendation—remains facially valid under current Florida Supreme Court precedent (Herard, Poole, Loyd, Fletcher). Absent an intervening United States Supreme Court decision, such facial challenges will continue to be rejected.
• Record discipline on appeal: The Court’s refusal to consider materials not presented below (Gudinas) is a stern reminder that warrant-era appeals must be grounded in a developed record; extra-record exhibits or appendices will not be considered.

Systemically, Jennings further cements the separation-of-powers boundary lines around clemency and warrant selection, and it harmonizes statutory provisions in chapter 27 with due process and access-to-courts jurisprudence to reject a right to perpetual collateral representation. The decision thus reduces the viability of a cluster of recurrent warrant-era claims that previously sought stays.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Successive postconviction motion (rule 3.851): A later-in-time collateral attack filed after an initial postconviction motion. Such motions must be timely under rule 3.851(d) or fall under narrow exceptions; otherwise, they are barred as untimely or successive under 3.851(e).
• Summary denial: The trial court may deny a postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing if the files and records conclusively show the movant is entitled to no relief; appellate review is de novo.
• Procedural bar: A doctrine preventing litigation of claims that were or could have been raised previously, including via habeas.
• Clemency: An executive branch power—separate from the courts—to grant mercy (e.g., commutation, pardon). In Florida, it is vested in the Governor and Cabinet and is “sole, unrestricted, [and] unlimited” in their discretion absent constitutional or statutory constraints.
• “Fail-safe”: The idea that clemency serves as a final backstop against miscarriages of justice. Courts recognize this function but do not supervise how the executive performs it.
• Warrant-eligible: After direct review and initial state and federal postconviction proceedings conclude, the Attorney General can file a “notice of finality,” signifying that a condemned prisoner is eligible for a death warrant.
• Comparative proportionality review: A judicial practice (since eliminated in Florida) of comparing a death sentence with other capital cases to assess relative proportionality. Florida’s high court holds that its elimination does not make the scheme unconstitutional.
• Narrowing requirement (Eighth Amendment): Capital punishment must apply only to a narrowed class of murderers. Florida’s Court holds the statutory aggravators and statutory structure still provide sufficient narrowing without unanimity or proportionality review.
• Collateral counsel vs. trial/appellate counsel: The Constitution guarantees effective assistance at trial and first appeal of right; it does not guarantee effective assistance in collateral (postconviction) proceedings. Florida’s chapter 27 provides a statutory right to counsel during postconviction proceedings but disclaims a right to challenge the adequacy of that representation.
• Executive warrant discretion: The Governor decides which executions to schedule and when; courts do not impose a formula or sequence.

Conclusion

Jennings is a comprehensive reaffirmation—and modest clarification—of Florida’s modern capital jurisprudence in the warrant context. The Court makes clear that:

• There is no right to continuous state collateral counsel between proceedings; chapter 27’s obligations attach during postconviction litigation, not in the interim.
• Clemency determinations—even if decades old and pre-dating postconviction—are quintessentially executive and will not be judicially re-opened absent a cognizable constitutional defect; long lapses do not require second clemency proceedings.
• Expedited warrant schedules and the Governor’s discretionary selection of warrant cases are constitutionally sound and nonjusticiable.
• Florida’s capital sentencing framework remains facially valid notwithstanding the absence of a unanimity requirement for the jury’s recommendation and the elimination of proportionality review.
• Habeas corpus is not a vehicle to relitigate or repackage postconviction claims, and chapter 27 creates no protected interest in perpetual collateral representation.

In practical terms, the decision narrows the lanes available for warrant-era litigation and underscores the judiciary’s deference to the executive in clemency and warrant administration. For future cases, Jennings signals that only record-based, timely, and legally cognizable claims tethered to pending proceedings will be entertained; global or structural attacks on Florida’s capital machinery, and pleas for second clemency, will continue to be rejected under binding precedent.

Note: The opinion quotes the Governor’s warrant as referencing “Article VI, Section 8(a)” of the Florida Constitution; Florida’s clemency power is set forth in Article IV, Section 8(a).