McMahon v. McMahon: Delaware Supreme Court Reinforces Specificity in Defamation Pleadings—“Filing a False Police Report” Is Not, By Itself, a Statutory Crime

Introduction

In McMahon v. McMahon, No. 218, 2024 (Del. Mar. 24, 2025), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of defamation claims arising from an intra-family dispute between Sean McMahon (Plaintiff–Appellant) and his sister-in-law, Tiffany McMahon (Defendant–Appellee). The case centered on two speech-based tort theories: slander per se (imputation of a crime) and libel grounded in text messages. The Court also upheld the trial court’s refusal to allow a second amendment to the complaint.

The decision clarifies two practical pleading imperatives for defamation litigants in Delaware:

For slander per se predicated on imputing a crime, the complaint must identify the recipients of the statement and the substance of the words, and must tie the accusation to a specific, cognizable offense—not merely a colloquial description like “filing a false police report.”
For libel, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that the defendant published a statement “of and concerning” the plaintiff that a reasonable third party would understand as defamatory; ambiguous text messages and non-defendant publications will not suffice.

The opinion, authored per curiam, reinforces Delaware’s existing defamation framework and underscores the trial court’s discretion to deny late, non-specific requests to amend pleadings.

Summary of the Opinion

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of:

Count III (Slander per se—imputing a crime): The complaint did not identify who heard the statement, quote or describe the specific words used, or connect the accusation to a statutorily defined crime. The Court expressly noted that “filing a false police report” is not itself an offense in the Delaware Criminal Code; the relevant crime would be “falsely reporting an incident,” 11 Del. C. § 1245, which was neither invoked nor adequately linked to any statement attributable to the defendant.
Count IV (Libel): One text message on which the claim relied came from a coworker—i.e., not published by the defendant—and therefore could not ground liability. The defendant’s own text (“reason for it? Or should we just deny this?”) accompanied an image of a truck, did not identify the plaintiff, and could not reasonably be understood by a third party as defamatory.

The Court also held that the Superior Court acted within its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s oral, generalized request at argument to file a second amended complaint, given the case’s duration and the lack of a concrete proffer of curative allegations.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967 (Del. 1978): Provided foundational definitions and doctrines distinguishing libel and slander, and identifying the four categories of slander per se: (1) business/trade disparagement; (2) imputation of a crime; (3) loathsome disease; and (4) imputing unchastity to a woman. McMahon applies the “imputation of a crime” category and Spence’s recognition that libel, if defamatory on its face, can be actionable without special damages.
Page v. Oath, Inc., 270 A.3d 833 (Del. 2022): Restated the core elements of defamation in Delaware: a defamatory statement, concerning the plaintiff, published by the defendant, and understood by a third party as defamatory. McMahon leans on Page to dismiss the libel claim for lack of publication by the defendant (regarding the coworker’s text), failure of the “of and concerning” element, and failure to show a reasonable third party would understand the communication as defamatory.
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005): Cited indirectly through Page for the elements of defamation, reinforcing the pleading burden especially in speech cases.
Valley Joist BD Hldgs., LLC v. EBSCO Indus., Inc., 269 A.3d 984 (Del. 2021): Confirmed the de novo standard of review on Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and the requirement to accept well-pled allegations and reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.
Clinton v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892 (Del. 2009): Quoted for the familiar “light most favorable to the non-moving party” lens in reviewing dismissal decisions.
Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., 625 A.2d 258 (Del. 1993): Articulated the abuse-of-discretion standard for leave-to-amend decisions, framing the appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a second amendment.
TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Pincus, 278 A.3d 630 (Del. 2022), quoting State v. Wright, 131 A.3d 310 (Del. 2016): Provided the definition of “abuse of discretion” as exceeding the bounds of reason or ignoring recognized rules so as to produce injustice—standards the Court found unmet here.

Legal Reasoning

Standards of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal: Reviewed de novo. The complaint is read favorably to the plaintiff, accepting well-pled facts and reasonable inferences.
Leave to Amend: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reversal is warranted only if the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason or ignored applicable rules producing injustice.

Slander Per Se (Imputation of a Crime)

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant told coworkers he had “filed a false police report,” asserting this amounted to imputing a crime and therefore actionable as slander per se without special damages. The Court found the pleading deficient for three independent reasons:

Failure to identify the audience: The complaint alleged publication to “multiple individuals,” without naming recipients. Identifying the recipients helps to establish publication and context—crucial in slander cases that hinge on spoken words and their audience.
Failure to plead the substance of the words: The complaint provided no examples or quotations of the purportedly slanderous statements beyond a generalized characterization. Delaware law requires enough specificity to allow the court to assess whether the words are actionable.
Failure to tie the accusation to a recognized crime: The Court noted “filing a false police report” is not itself an offense in the Delaware Criminal Code. Although the misdemeanor “falsely reporting an incident” (11 Del. C. § 1245) might be implicated, the complaint did not cite the statute or otherwise connect the allegation to a defined criminal offense, weakening the per se theory.

Collectively, these gaps meant the claim did not plausibly allege the elements of slander per se under Delaware law. The Court emphasized that specificity matters at the pleading stage when a claim depends on imputing criminality.

Libel

The libel claim rested on two text-message exchanges involving images of trucks:

The coworker’s text to the defendant: Because the defendant did not make or republish this message, it could not satisfy the “publication by the defendant” element. A defendant cannot be liable for libel based on a third party’s statements that the defendant did not publish.
The defendant’s text to her husband: The message—“reason for it? Or should we just deny this?”—with an image of a blue truck, did not identify the plaintiff by name, did not refer to him by other identifying characteristics, and would not be understood by a reasonable third party as defamatory. The complaint’s conclusory assertion that the text falsely implied the plaintiff was “stalking” the defendant could not fill the gap where the communication itself lacked an “of and concerning” connection to the plaintiff and a defamatory meaning apparent to a reasonable reader.

The Court also reiterated that libel can be actionable without special damages where the publication is defamatory “on its face.” Here, the words and image were not facially defamatory and lacked the necessary nexus to the plaintiff.

Leave to Amend

At oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended complaint “to clarify” allegations, if the court were inclined to dismiss. The Superior Court denied the request, noting the case had been pending for years and remained at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, underscoring:

Timing and posture: A generalized, oral, conditional request at argument, without a proposed amended pleading or a concrete proffer, did not obligate the trial court to grant further amendment.
Case duration and management: The trial court could reasonably conclude that further amendment, after an amendment had already been filed, was unwarranted absent a specific showing that the defects could be cured.

Impact and Implications

McMahon’s practical influence will be felt most acutely at the pleading stage of defamation cases in Delaware.

Heightened attention to specificity: Plaintiffs alleging slander per se via imputation of a crime must do more than assert a lay descriptor of wrongdoing. They should identify the audience, the time frame, and the substance of the words, and connect the accusation to a recognized criminal offense (e.g., “falsely reporting an incident,” 11 Del. C. § 1245), rather than relying on colloquial phrasing like “filed a false police report.”
Ambiguity defeats libel claims: Texts that ask questions, use ambiguous phrasing, or include images without identifying the plaintiff are unlikely to meet the “of and concerning” and “defamatory meaning to a reasonable third party” elements. Plaintiffs contemplating “defamation by implication” should plead detailed context and extrinsic facts showing how a reasonable reader would draw a defamatory inference and that the inference is “about” the plaintiff.
Publication by the defendant remains essential: Messages originated by third parties (e.g., a coworker’s text) cannot ground liability absent defendant publication or republication.
Case management and amendments: Trial courts retain broad discretion to deny late or non-specific amendment requests, especially after earlier opportunities to amend. Practitioners should file a written motion attaching a proposed amended complaint that concretely cures identified deficiencies, rather than relying on a contingent oral request.

More broadly, McMahon signals that Delaware courts will enforce the plausibility and particularity contours of defamation pleading without prematurely reaching merits issues like opinion/fact distinctions, privileges, or actual malice—issues the Court did not need to reach here because the claims failed on the pleadings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Defamation: A false statement that harms someone’s reputation. It includes slander (spoken) and libel (written, including digital texts).
Slander per se: Certain especially harmful spoken statements are actionable without proving special damages, including those imputing a crime. But the statement must actually accuse the plaintiff of a criminal offense recognized by law and be pled with enough detail to assess its content and audience.
Libel on its face: Written statements that are plainly defamatory without needing additional context can be actionable without special damages. If the defamatory meaning depends on extrinsic facts, plaintiffs often must plead those facts and, typically, special damages.
Publication: The defendant must have communicated the statement to at least one person other than the plaintiff. A third party’s statements, not made or republished by the defendant, cannot support a claim against the defendant.
“Of and concerning” the plaintiff: The statement must be about the plaintiff. It must identify the plaintiff explicitly or by clear implication so that a reasonable reader understands it refers to that person.
Reasonable third-party understanding: Courts ask whether an ordinary, reasonable reader or listener would grasp the statement as defamatory—not whether the plaintiff or the speaker harbored a defamatory implication.
Rule 12(b)(6): A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court accepts well-pled facts as true and asks if the complaint states a plausible claim.
Abuse of discretion (leave to amend): Appellate courts defer to trial judges’ case management decisions unless they stray beyond the bounds of reason or ignore governing rules in a way that causes injustice.

Conclusion

McMahon v. McMahon reinforces that in Delaware defamation actions, precision at the pleading stage is not optional. For slander per se based on imputing a crime, plaintiffs must allege who heard the statement, what was said, and which specific crime was imputed. For libel, plaintiffs must show the defendant published words “of and concerning” the plaintiff that a reasonable third party would view as defamatory; ambiguous messages and non-defendant publications will not do.

The Court’s affirmance of the denial of leave to amend underscores the importance of timely, concrete amendment efforts accompanied by proposed pleadings that cure identified deficiencies. Taken together, the decision provides a clear roadmap for both plaintiffs and defendants: plead defamation claims with particularity tied to the recognized elements—or expect dismissal at the threshold.

Key Citations

Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967 (Del. 1978)
Page v. Oath, Inc., 270 A.3d 833 (Del. 2022)
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005)
Valley Joist BD Hldgs., LLC v. EBSCO Indus., Inc., 269 A.3d 984 (Del. 2021)
Clinton v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892 (Del. 2009)
Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., 625 A.2d 258 (Del. 1993)
TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Pincus, 278 A.3d 630 (Del. 2022)
State v. Wright, 131 A.3d 310 (Del. 2016)
11 Del. C. § 1245 (Falsely reporting an incident)