Initial Arraignment Is the Sole Trigger for Automatic Judicial Substitution in Montana Criminal Cases

Introduction

In Caye v. Twentieth Judicial District Court (2025 MT 246), the Supreme Court of Montana resolved a recurring timing question under Montana’s automatic judicial substitution rule in criminal cases, § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA. The petitioner, Gaige Alexander Caye, sought supervisory control after the Lake County District Court denied his motion to substitute the presiding judge as untimely. The wrinkle: Caye filed within ten days of being arraigned on an Amended Information that added three new felony distribution charges. The district court held—and the Supreme Court has now confirmed—that the ten-day substitution window is triggered by the defendant’s initial arraignment and does not reopen if the State later amends the information and the defendant is re-arraigned on added charges.

This decision provides a clear, bright-line rule for litigants and trial courts: the ten-day period to exercise the one-time, automatic substitution right under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, begins at the initial arraignment (as defined in Title 46) and is not restarted by subsequent arraignments on amended or superseding charging documents.

Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Gaige Alexander Caye (criminal defendant in Lake County Cause No. DC-24-128)
Respondent: Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, Hon. Molly Owen presiding

Issues Presented:

Is the petition suitable for a writ of supervisory control?
Is a motion for automatic substitution timely if filed within ten days of arraignment on an Amended Information adding new charges, even though the initial arraignment occurred much earlier?

Summary of the Opinion

Supervisory Control: The Court exercised its discretionary authority to consider the petition because substitution timing presents a pure question of law, postures as a threshold question about a judge’s authority to proceed, and because denial of a substitution motion is a category expressly recognized under M. R. App. P. 14(3).
Holding on the Merits: The ten-day period for automatic substitution of a district judge in a criminal case under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, is triggered by the defendant’s initial arraignment. A later arraignment on an Amended Information that adds new charges does not restart that period.
Disposition: Petition for supervisory control denied; the district court correctly denied Caye’s motion as untimely.

Factual and Procedural Background

On July 12, 2024, the State charged Caye by Information with three felonies: assault with a weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted person, and tampering with or fabricating evidence (alleged events on or about July 8, 2024). The case was assigned to Judge Molly Owen, and Caye was arraigned on July 24, 2024. Caye did not seek substitution then.

On June 9, 2025, the State filed an Amended Information adding three felony counts of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs (alleged fentanyl distributions to two people on July 8, 2024, and to a third person on July 13, 2024). Caye was arraigned on the Amended Information on June 18, 2025, and moved to substitute Judge Owen two days later, on June 20, 2025, invoking the ten-day clock in § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA.

The district court denied the motion as untimely, reasoning that the substitution window runs from the initial arraignment only. It expressed concern that linking substitution to any later arraignment on amended charges would invite gamesmanship and disruption, particularly because the prosecution can amend as late as five days before trial under § 46-11-205(1), MCA. Caye sought supervisory control.

Standard of Review and Supervisory Control

Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy reserved for purely legal questions and urgent or emergency circumstances making the normal appeal inadequate, and requires meeting one of the criteria in M. R. App. P. 14(3)(a)-(c). The Court noted:

The timing of a substitution motion is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
A timely motion to substitute removes the judge’s power to act on the merits; thus, erroneous denial would render subsequent actions void for lack of authority under § 3-1-804(5), MCA.
Given the threshold nature and statewide procedural significance, review by supervisory control was appropriate.

Analysis

The Rule, Its Status, and Its History

Section 3-1-804, MCA, is a court-adopted procedural rule published in the Montana Code Annotated for user convenience; it is not a legislative enactment. It grants each adverse party one automatic substitution of a district judge in both civil and criminal matters, subject to specific timing requirements. In criminal cases, the relevant provision (§ 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA) requires the defense to file the motion within ten calendar days “after the defendant’s arraignment.”

The Court recounts the rule’s evolution: the one-time automatic substitution originated in the 1903 “Fair Trial Bill,” and through successive Supreme Court orders has been refined into § 3-1-804. Of particular note, in 2015 the Court amended the triggering event in criminal cases from “initial appearance” to “arraignment,” after the Montana Judges Association (MJA) petitioned for revisions to curb perceived abuses. Although the public record shows no specific explanation for this particular change, the broader history reflects a consistent intent to place the substitution decision point near the beginning of the criminal case.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Collins v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2015 MT 125):
Collins established that an arraignment triggering the substitution timeline must be an arraignment within the meaning of Title 46: a formal act in open court, where the defendant is called to plead after being informed of the charges and provided the charging document. The Court emphasized that § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, sets a “definitive moment” that is the valid arraignment under standard criminal procedure. Collins ensures the clock does not run until an actual arraignment occurs (e.g., not a missed date), but it does not suggest that a later arraignment resets the clock.
Warner v. Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court (No. OP 17-0628, 2017):
In a supervisory control proceeding, the Court declined to treat the filing of an Amended Information adding a new count as restarting the substitution period. Although Warner focused on the filing event rather than the subsequent arraignment, the procedural posture included an arraignment on the amended charge; the Court did not grant relief and thus lent weight to the principle that the process does not begin anew with amendment.
Mattson v. Montana Power Co. (2002 MT 113):
In the civil context, Mattson held that joined parties and intervenors cannot exercise automatic substitution after the original parties’ window closes, emphasizing responsible judicial administration, avoidance of disruption, and conservation of resources. The Court draws on Mattson’s policy rationale to underscore that substitution is intended to occur at, or very near, the outset of the case.
Swan v. State (2006 MT 39):
The Court reaffirmed that the automatic substitution right is not of constitutional dimension; it is a procedural right governed by court rule. This frames the analysis as one of rule construction and institutional policy, not constitutional entitlement.
Cushman v. Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court (2015 MT 311):
Recognizes § 3-1-804 as a court rule (though printed in MCA) and confirms the Court’s role in interpreting and applying it.
City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co. (2021 MT 122):
Confirms that substitution decisions present questions of law reviewed for correctness.
Innovative Contracting, LLC v. Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court (No. OP 23-0153, 2023):
Addresses the standards and burdens for obtaining supervisory control.
Patrick v. State (2011 MT 169):
Provides historical background on the development of judicial substitution rules in Montana.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds from three interlocking premises:

Text and structure: Section 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, sets a singular, definitive trigger—“after the defendant’s arraignment.” Following Collins, that trigger is the first valid arraignment under Title 46. The defense argued that “after the defendant’s arraignment” could encompass any later arraignment, but the Court read the provision in context—as part of a rule designed to prompt early, efficient substitutions—and aligned it with Collins’s “definitive moment” concept.
History and design: The Court reviewed the rule’s evolution, noting that while the trigger shifted from “initial appearance” to “arraignment” in 2015, every version keeps the decision point near the start of the case. Nothing in the history supports repeatedly reopening the substitution window as new counts are added.
Policy and administration: Drawing on Mattson, the Court emphasized judicial economy, continuity, and the avoidance of disruption. Allowing later, amendment-driven resets would invite strategic timing and could force substitution on the eve of trial given § 46-11-205(1), MCA, which permits amendments until five days before trial. Although the defendant argued that barring resets could let prosecutors “hold back” charges until after the initial substitution period lapses, the Court chose the bright-line rule tethered to the initial arraignment as the better fit for responsible judicial administration.

Applying these principles, the Court held that Caye’s substitution period began at his July 24, 2024 initial arraignment and expired ten calendar days later. His June 20, 2025 motion—filed within ten days of the June 18, 2025 arraignment on the Amended Information—was untimely because the window does not reopen. The district court’s denial was therefore correct, and the petition for supervisory control was denied.

Impact and Practical Implications

This opinion consolidates and clarifies Montana’s approach to automatic judicial substitution in criminal cases:

Bright-line timing rule: The ten-day clock for automatic substitution runs from the defendant’s initial Title 46-compliant arraignment in district court. It does not reset with later arraignments on amended or superseding informations that add new charges.
Early, global assessment required: Defense counsel must evaluate the desirability of automatic substitution at the very start of the case, anticipating that later amendments will not reopen the opportunity. Strategic hesitation risks forfeiture.
Prosecutorial amendments: The State may amend charges without reopening the substitution window. This reduces the risk of last-minute, amendment-driven substitutions but heightens the importance of fair charging practices and timely disclosures to avoid claims of unfairness or gamesmanship.
Judicial administration: Trial courts gain certainty and continuity. The decision diminishes the risk of late-stage judge changes that could delay trials, duplicate judicial effort, or void subsequent rulings if the timing question were misapplied.
Residual safeguards: Although automatic substitution is time-limited, parties retain the separate avenue of disqualification for cause under Montana law when facts warrant, which serves as a backstop for impartiality concerns that emerge later in the case.

Unresolved or Edge Questions

Defective or noncompliant initial arraignment: Under Collins, the clock does not start until there is a Title 46-compliant arraignment (open court, advising of charges, opportunity to plead, charging document provided). If the initial event was defective, counsel may contest whether the clock ever began to run.
Dismissal and refiling: The opinion addresses amendments within the same case. If charges are dismissed and refiled under a new cause number, timing may be assessed anew in the new case. The Court does not address this scenario here.
Severed or later-added co-defendants: Mattson’s administrative-efficiency rationale suggests that late-appearing parties generally do not get an automatic substitution after the window closes for original parties, but criminal co-defendant dynamics may raise case-specific complexities not resolved in this opinion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Automatic judicial substitution: A one-time, no-questions-asked right to change the presiding district judge, granted by § 3-1-804, MCA. It is procedural, not constitutional. In criminal cases, the defense must invoke it within ten calendar days after the defendant’s initial arraignment.
Arraignment: The formal court proceeding where the defendant is called upon to enter a plea to the charges after being informed of them and given a copy of the charging document. It must occur in open court. Only such a valid arraignment starts the substitution clock.
Amended Information: The prosecution’s formal revision of the charging document, which can add, modify, or drop charges. In Montana, amendments may be made up to five days before trial, subject to statutory constraints. This opinion holds that arraignment on an amended information does not restart the substitution clock.
Writ of supervisory control: An extraordinary remedy the Montana Supreme Court may use to correct purely legal errors in ongoing proceedings when normal appeal is inadequate. It is discretionary and requires meeting criteria under M. R. App. P. 14(3).

Conclusion

Caye definitively establishes that the ten-day window for automatic judicial substitution in Montana criminal cases opens at the defendant’s initial, Title 46-compliant arraignment and does not reopen upon later arraignments on amended informations, even when new charges are added. Grounded in the text and structure of § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, informed by the rule’s history, and reinforced by policy concerns articulated in Mattson and related authorities, the Court’s bright-line ruling promotes certainty, efficiency, and continuity in criminal adjudication.

Key takeaways:

The initial arraignment is the singular “definitive moment” that triggers the ten-day substitution period.
Later amendments and arraignments do not reset the automatic substitution right.
Parties must make substitution decisions early; later-arising impartiality concerns must be pursued via cause-based mechanisms rather than automatic substitution.

By denying supervisory control and upholding the district court’s timeliness ruling, the Supreme Court provides needed clarity for criminal practitioners and trial judges statewide, ensuring that the automatic substitution mechanism serves its intended function without disrupting case management or inviting late-stage gamesmanship.

Citation

Caye v. Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, 2025 MT 246, OP 25-0515 (Mont. Oct. 28, 2025) (Bidegaray, J., for a unanimous Court).