1. Introduction

In In re: Corey Hargrove, decided December 18, 2025, the Supreme Court of Virginia denied a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence brought under Code §§ 19.2‑327.2 to ‑327.5. More than three decades after his 1991 convictions for rape, aggravated sexual battery, and abduction, Hargrove sought to overturn his convictions by relying primarily on modern DNA testing that:

• Did not detect any male DNA on the victim’s vaginal, vulva, thigh, or saliva swabs or on the crotch stain of her underwear; and
• Found a weak, incomplete mixed DNA profile from three contributors (including the victim, but excluding Hargrove) on other portions of the underwear using M‑Vac “touch DNA” collection.

Hargrove coupled this biological evidence with a declaration from the victim’s former husband about her health and credibility, and with general scientific literature about diabetes and the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. He argued that, taken together, this material showed that no rational factfinder would have convicted him.

The Court disagreed. Applying the amended “preponderance of the evidence” standard in the biological actual innocence statute—but preserving the demanding “no rational trier of fact” requirement—the Court held that:

• The new DNA results had given chain‑of‑custody concerns, the age and degradation of the samples, the weakness and incompleteness of the DNA mixture, and the uncertain nexus between the DNA and the rape itself.
• The victim’s eyewitness testimony—central to the original conviction—was not undermined to the point that every rational factfinder would have to acquit.
• The non‑biological evidence (the ex‑husband’s declaration and generalized studies) was collateral and speculative, not tied concretely to the victim’s condition or memory at the relevant times.

Doctrinally, Hargrove is significant because it:

• Clarifies how the lowered burden of proof (from clear and convincing to preponderance) in Code § 19.2‑327.5 interacts with the unchanged requirement that no rational trier of fact could convict.
• Significantly limits the exculpatory force of weak “touch DNA” mixtures on clothing, especially when the connection to the criminal act and the chain of custody are uncertain.
• Signals skepticism toward using post‑hoc collateral attacks on a deceased victim’s credibility and generic social‑science literature to satisfy the actual‑innocence standard.
• Reaffirms that in Virginia, a rape victim’s testimony, if not inherently incredible, can sustain a conviction even in the face of inconclusive or absent physical evidence.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The 1990 Assault and Initial Investigation

On June 17, 1990, 22‑year‑old Saphonia Woolridge was attacked while walking near a middle school in Richmond. A teenage boy followed her, struck her with a stick, grabbed her around the neck, dragged her across a football field and track into the woods, digitally penetrated her vagina, then penetrated her vaginally with his penis. She was unsure whether he ejaculated. The attack lasted roughly 45 minutes in daylight. She immediately went to Stuart Circle Hospital.

A male physician, Dr. Dale Slagel, and nurse Denise Kern performed a Physical Evidence Recovery Kit (PERK), collecting:

• Vaginal and thigh/vulva swabs and slides
• Pubic combings
• Her underwear

The Division of Forensic Science (DFS) Northern Laboratory tested the kit in January 1991 and reported:

• No spermatozoa on the smears
• No seminal fluid on the swabs or underwear
• Hairs and/or fibers in the pubic combings and underwear (with a note that hair comparison could be done if a suspect sample was provided)
• Blood present (with other records indicating Woolridge was menstruating)

2.2 Identification, Trial, and Convictions

Woolridge did not know her assailant. Months later, she twice saw the same teenage boy in her neighborhood. The second time, in 1991, she was with her fiancé at his apartment building. She recognized the attacker, told her fiancé, and the police arrested 16‑year‑old Corey Jermaine Hargrove.

DFS later compared:

• Hairs and blood from Hargrove
• To Woolridge’s PERK materials

The DFS Western Laboratory reported no “apparent foreign hairs” in the pubic combings or underpants—interpreted at trial to mean no hairs from anyone other than Woolridge.

At trial:

• The Commonwealth called only Woolridge, Nurse Kern, and Detective Larson.
• The defense called no witnesses and focused on attacking Woolridge’s identification (including her initial suspicion about another man and the emphasis on the assailant’s big poppy eyes).
• Both sides stipulated that the absence of spermatozoa, seminal fluid, and foreign hair meant no further testing could identify the perpetrator.

Despite the lack of physical linkage, the jury convicted Hargrove of rape, aggravated sexual battery, and abduction. One juror initially answered “with reservation” when polled, citing concern over misidentification cases, but ultimately affirmed guilt after further deliberation. The court imposed 50 years for rape, consecutive to a separate 50‑year sentence in an unrelated rape/burglary case.

Direct appeals failed. A later procedural challenge regarding juvenile transfer notification was denied. A 2004 pro se actual innocence petition was dismissed for failure to state a claim.

2.3 Modern DNA Testing: DLI and SERI Results

After earlier unsuccessful efforts to obtain testing, in 2023 Hargrove secured an unopposed order under Code § 19.2‑327.1 for scientific analysis of previously untested evidence. The Richmond Police Department had retained the PERK, which was sent to DNA Labs International (DLI), a private lab in Florida, as part of Virginia’s Sexual Assault Kit Initiative.

DLI (2023)

Using PowerQuant (a real‑time PCR quantitation kit), DLI found:

• No detectable male DNA on:
  • Vaginal, vulva, thigh, or saliva swabs
  • The underwear’s interior crotch staining
• No further analysis on those items
• An “apparent hair” on the thigh/vulva swab, on which no analysis was performed

Hargrove then sought state funding for testing at a different lab using M‑Vac technology, arguing DLI’s methods largely mirrored DFS’s and would not likely be more informative.

SERI (2024)

The parties agreed to use the Serological Research Institute (SERI) in California, which uses M‑Vac, a “wet vacuum” collection tool often used for touch DNA collection.

SERI:

• Confirmed no male DNA from new swabs of the thigh, vulva, and vagina.
• Used M‑Vac on the inside and outside surfaces of the underwear (excluding the crotch) and recovered a:
  • Weak and incomplete DNA mixture from at least three contributors, with at least one male and one female.
  • Statistically, at least 29 million times more likely to include Woolridge plus two unrelated contributors than three unrelated contributors (strong support for her inclusion).
  • Exclusion of Hargrove as a contributor to that mixture.

SERI’s analyst, Gary Harmor, emailed defense counsel explaining:

• The crotch was not sampled because it was very bloody, with likely heavy vaginal secretions that would “overwhelm” PCR with the victim’s DNA.
• To analyze that area, they would have had to use Y‑STRs (male‑specific) rather than autosomal STRs.

2.4 The 2024 Petition for a Writ of Actual Innocence

In April 2024, Hargrove filed his petition in the Supreme Court of Virginia under Code §§ 19.2‑327.2 and ‑327.3, arguing:

• The absence of his DNA and presence of other male DNA on the underwear exonerated him.
• Non‑biological evidence undermined Woolridge’s credibility:
  • A declaration from her ex‑husband, Jesse Humphrey, describing diabetes, hospitalizations, memory difficulties, and emotional instability.
  • Scientific literature linking uncontrolled diabetes to cognitive impairment.
  • Research on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications under stress and over time.

The Commonwealth moved to dismiss, arguing:

• Statutory pleading deficiencies under Code § 19.2‑327.3.
• The “weak and incomplete” touch DNA sample did not meaningfully undercut the victim’s testimony and might be contaminated.
• Non‑biological evidence could not properly be considered in a petition grounded in biological evidence.
• Even if considered, the non‑biological evidence was speculative and collateral.

3. Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Mann:

1. Found that Hargrove satisfied the threshold pleading elements of Code § 19.2‑327.3(A)(i)–(vi): he identified the crimes, asserted actual innocence, described the biological evidence and tests, explained why the modern testing had not been done earlier (because the technologies—especially M‑Vac and modern STR/Y‑STR—were not then available or believed fruitful), and filed within 60 days of receiving the SERI results.
2. Expressed serious chain‑of‑custody and contamination concerns about decades‑old evidence that had passed through multiple institutions, including:
   • The emergence of a previously unreported “apparent hair” on thigh/vulva swabs in the DLI report.
   • A three‑person DNA mixture on the underwear despite only one known attacker.
   The Court assumed, without finally resolving, that the DNA results would be admissible, but stressed these issues would greatly diminish their weight.
3. Concluded that the DNA results did not meet the “no rational trier of fact” standard in § 19.2‑327.3(A)(vii) and § 19.2‑327.5:
   • It was unclear whether the assailant ever touched the underwear at all.
   • Even if he did, DNA is not always transferred or detectable (“touch DNA” is variable).
   • Multiple other plausible male contributors (father, fiancé, doctor, unknown handlers) had not been excluded.
   • The crotch area—most probative of the sexual assault—was not tested by SERI.
   • The “weak and incomplete” nature of the mixture, combined with degradation and potential for secondary transfer, made the results weakly probative at best.
   • Crucially, the original conviction had already been secured in the absence of any physical link to Hargrove; the jury had relied on Woolridge’s identification.
4. Assumed, without deciding, that it could consider non‑biological evidence within this biological petition, but held that:
   • The ex‑husband’s declaration lacked a temporal nexus to the time of the crime, identification, or trial and was therefore collateral.
   • General medical and eyewitness‑science literature did not show that this victim suffered cognitive impairment or misidentified Hargrove.
   • This evidence did not satisfy the statutory requirement (borrowed by analogy from § 19.2‑327.11(A)(vii)) that new evidence not be merely cumulative, corroborative, or collateral.
5. Rejected efforts to relitigate Woolridge’s credibility based on trial‑era inconsistencies or tactical critiques of cross‑examination, emphasizing that actual innocence petitions are not vehicles to re‑try credibility issues that were available at trial.

The Court therefore granted the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the petition. It held that, even under the lower “preponderance of the evidence” burden, Hargrove had not shown that no rational factfinder would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when all evidence—old and new—is considered together.

4. Legal Framework

4.1 Virginia’s Biological Actual Innocence Statute

The Supreme Court of Virginia has original jurisdiction to entertain petitions for writs of actual innocence based on biological evidence under Article VI, § 1 of the Virginia Constitution and Code §§ 19.2‑327.2 to ‑327.5.

Code § 19.2‑327.3(A) sets eight core pleading and proof requirements. Key among them in Hargrove are:

• (ii) A claim of actual innocence of the crime(s).
• (iii) An exact description of the biological evidence and scientific testing.
• (iv) An explanation why the evidence was not previously known, available, or tested.
• (vi) Timely filing within 60 days of receiving test results under § 19.2‑327.1.
• (vii) Reasons the evidence proves that no rational trier of fact would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under § 19.2‑327.5, the Court may grant relief only upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has proven the relevant elements (including (iv)–(vii)) and that:

no rational trier of fact would have found proof of guilt or delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt.

4.2 Change in Burden: From Clear and Convincing to Preponderance

In 2020, the General Assembly amended § 19.2‑327.5 to lower the petitioner’s burden from “clear and convincing evidence” to “a preponderance of the evidence.” The Court explains:

• Preponderance of the evidence means the evidence makes a fact more likely than not, or that it carries the “greater weight” in the mind of the factfinder, even if some doubt remains.
• Clear and convincing evidence is considerably higher—it must create a “firm belief or conviction” about the truth of the allegations.

However, Hargrove emphasizes that the core substantive standard did not change: the petitioner must still establish that no rational trier of fact would convict when all evidence is considered. Citing the Court of Appeals’ decision in Tyler v. Commonwealth, the Court reaffirms that:

the petitioner must prove that every rational factfinder—when presented with the totality of the evidence—would have acquitted the petitioner.

Thus, even under a preponderance standard, the actual innocence writ remains a narrow, demanding remedy, not simply a second chance at a trial or a mechanism to introduce some reasonable doubt.

4.3 “Totality of the Evidence” and the Hypothetical New Trial

Building on In re Watford and In re Scott, the Court again adopts the analytic lens of a hypothetical new trial:

the statute effectively requires us to draw our conclusion from a hypothetical new trial in which a rational factfinder hears all of the evidence in the aggregate, including: any records from the original case, the evidence presented at the original trial, the newly discovered biological evidence, any additional factual proffers made by the petitioner or the Commonwealth, and the evidence adduced at [any] evidentiary hearing[.]

When sitting as a court of original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court “has the same authority to weigh and evaluate documentary and physical evidence as a trial court would have.”

5. Analysis of the Biological Evidence

5.1 Chain of Custody and Presumptions of Regularity

In In re Brown, the Court underscored that when scientific analysis of a sample is offered, the proponent must establish each vital link in the chain of custody, showing who possessed and handled the evidence and when, in order to demonstrate that it has not been altered, tampered with, or substituted. At the same time, speculative concerns about contamination typically go to the weight, not admissibility, of the evidence.

In Hargrove, the biological evidence:

• Was collected at a hospital in 1990;
• Handled by the Richmond Police Department and DFS (Northern and Western Labs);
• Stored for decades by the police;
• Sent to DLI in Florida as part of an Attorney General‑driven initiative; and
• Later sent to SERI in California.

The record showed where the evidence traveled, but had very limited detail about how it was stored and handled over three decades. Hargrove invoked:

• The common‑law “presumption of regularity” for public officials (Smith v. Commonwealth; Gilmore v. Landsidle; Branham v. Commonwealth), and
• The statutory presumption (Code § 19.2‑187.01) that DFS and certain federal labs maintain a proper chain of custody once they receive materials.

But the Court identified several unresolved issues:

• Whether the presumption of regularity extends to private laboratories like DLI and SERI, particularly when Code § 19.2‑187.01 expressly covers DFS and labs it authorizes by contract.
• Whether DLI, contracted through the Attorney General rather than DFS, is within the statutory presumption.

Notably, the Court declined to definitively resolve these questions, but assumed, for argument’s sake, that relevant presumptions applied. Even so, the record raised concrete red flags that undercut the weight of the DNA evidence:

• New hair on thigh/vulva swabs: DFS’s 1991 reports identified hairs/fibers only in pubic combings and underwear. DLI’s 2023 report referenced an “apparent hair” on the thigh/vulva swabs that had never been noted previously, suggesting possible contamination.
• Three‑person DNA mixture on the underwear: SERI’s finding of at least three contributors is difficult to reconcile with Woolridge’s testimony that she was attacked by a single assailant, again raising the possibility that at least one contributor is unrelated to the assault.

The Court concluded that, even if admissible, these issues would significantly reduce the weight a rational factfinder would assign to the DNA results in the hypothetical new trial.

5.2 Weak Touch DNA and the Underwear Mixture

The lynchpin of Hargrove’s biological argument is SERI’s M‑Vac analysis showing:

• A weak, incomplete, three‑person DNA mixture on non‑crotch portions of the underwear.
• Strong statistical support that Woolridge is one contributor.
• Exclusion of Hargrove as a contributor to that mixture.

Hargrove reasoned that, because the attacker had pulled down her shorts and underwear and digitally penetrated her vagina, it was very likely he would have deposited DNA on the underwear; his exclusion from the mixture therefore proved his innocence.

The Court rejected this inference as too speculative and made several key points:

1. Uncertain contact with underwear. Woolridge testified that the assailant pulled down her pants, shorts, and underwear until they were about halfway to her knees while she lay on her back, then assaulted her digitally and with his penis. But she did not specify whether he touched the underwear directly. It is equally plausible he grasped her outer clothing, indirectly pulling the underwear down.
   Without clear testimony that he touched the underwear, the inference that his DNA should be on it is tenuous.
2. DNA transfer is not guaranteed. Even if the attacker had touched the underwear, the Court notes that forensic scholarship recognizes that people can handle items without leaving detectable DNA, and that various factors (skin condition, sex, “shedder” status, duration and nature of contact) control DNA transfer. Thus, absence of DNA does not reliably prove absence of contact or guilt.
3. Plausible alternative contributors. The three‑person mixture could reflect contact by:
   • The victim’s father, with whom she lived (e.g., laundry, household contact);
   • Her fiancé, whom she saw often and who was present when she later identified Hargrove;
   • The male physician who conducted the exam; or
   • Any number of later handlers of the evidence over decades.
   None of these potential contributors was excluded by testing.
4. Crotch not tested by SERI. Critically, SERI did not test the crotch area due to the dominance of the victim’s blood and vaginal secretions; DLI had tested it earlier and found no male DNA, but with less sensitive collection than M‑Vac. The Court notes the record was silent on:
   • Why SERI and DLI approached the crotch differently; and
   • Whether further Y‑STR testing could have been attempted on the crotch area despite the predominance of the victim’s DNA.
5. Weak, incomplete, degraded mixture. The Court relies on Brown to emphasize that:
   • DNA degrades over time, especially under non‑ideal storage conditions.
   • Low‑quantity DNA and highly sensitive methods (like M‑Vac touch DNA) increase the risk of contamination or secondary/tertiary transfer.
   • Weak, partial profiles—especially on old evidence—can have very limited probative weight without expert explanation of their significance.
   Hargrove provided no expert affidavit to contextualize what “weak and incomplete” really meant here in terms of transfer mechanisms, stochastic effects, or interpretive limitations.

5.3 Comparison with Prior Exonerating DNA Cases

The Court contrasts Hargrove with cases where DNA evidence was tightly tied to the crime and conclusively exculpatory:

• In re Scott (2019): DNA testing showed that the petitioner was not the source of sperm found on the rape victim’s jeans or of male DNA on the vaginal swab. These samples were directly connected to the rape itself, leaving little room for alternative contributors or contamination consistent with guilt. The Court granted a writ of actual innocence.
• Grimm v. Commonwealth (Ct. App. 2024): New DNA evidence showed that hairs previously believed to link the petitioner to the victim did not come from the victim, and DNA on autopsy swabs did not match the petitioner. Again, the biological evidence was closely linked to the offense and contradicted the prosecution theory.

By contrast, the Court likens the underwear mixture to the mattress DNA in Watford:

we explained that DNA profiles taken from a mattress in a rape case could not be conclusively associated with the offense because other consensual sexual encounters may have occurred on the mattress, which was in a vacant house; thus, “any conclusions derived from these DNA profiles would be entirely speculative and, as such, deserve no weight.”

The lesson is that context is everything: DNA on an item tangentially related to a crime scene, with multiple plausible non‑guilty explanations, may carry little or no exculpatory force.

5.4 Biological Evidence and the “No Rational Trier of Fact” Standard

Ultimately, the Court holds that—even crediting the DNA testing and its exclusion of Hargrove from the weak, mixed profile—the evidence does not show that every rational factfinder would have to acquit. A rational factfinder could reasonably conclude:

• The mixture reflects contamination or unrelated contacts before or after the assault.
• The true perpetrator did not leave recoverable DNA on the tested portions of the underwear.
• The crotch area—the most likely locus of the attacker’s biological material—does not show male DNA (on DLI’s testing), or is simply too dominated by victim DNA to test reliably.
• The victim’s unequivocal, enduring identification, based on a 45‑minute daylight encounter, remains highly probative of guilt.

The critical point: the original jury convicted without any forensic link to Hargrove. Thus, adding further evidence that there is still no detectable forensic link does not fundamentally change the evidentiary landscape in a way that compels acquittal by all rational jurors.

6. Treatment of the Non‑Biological Evidence

6.1 May the Court Consider Non‑Biological Evidence in a Biological Petition?

Virginia has separate statutory schemes for:

• Biological evidence writs (Supreme Court of Virginia): Code §§ 19.2‑327.2 to ‑327.5.
• Non‑biological evidence writs (Court of Appeals of Virginia): Code §§ 19.2‑327.10 to ‑327.14.

The non‑biological statute expressly provides that Human biological evidence may not be used as the sole basis for seeking relief under this writ but may be used in conjunction with other evidence. Code § 19.2‑327.11.

The biological statute does not directly address whether non‑biological evidence can be considered within a biological petition. In Watford, the Supreme Court considered trial records and evidence from a remand evidentiary hearing under § 19.2‑327.4 (including non‑biological victim testimony) as part of the § 19.2‑327.5 “totality of evidence” analysis.

In Hargrove, the Court:

• Acknowledges that its earlier references to “additional proffers” do not mean all conceivable non‑biological material is properly considered.
• Notes that Watford involved statutorily authorized circuit‑court factual findings, which § 19.2‑327.5 explicitly lists among materials the Supreme Court must review.
• Finds it unnecessary to resolve the full scope of what non‑biological evidence a biological petition can encompass.

The Court therefore proceeds “assuming without deciding” that it can consider Hargrove’s non‑biological evidence, and holds that even if considered it does not satisfy the statutory standard.

6.2 The Ex‑Husband’s Declaration

Jesse Humphrey, married to Woolridge from shortly after the trial until their divorce about three years later, executed a declaration alleging that:

• Woolridge had uncontrolled diabetes and frequent hospitalizations.
• She often had trouble remembering things.
• She was emotionally unstable, quick to anger, erratic, and not always honest in his view.

Hargrove argued that this showed her “physical and mental condition were unstable during the relevant time period,” and, combined with scientific literature on diabetes and cognition, undermined her reliability as an eyewitness.

The Court finds:

• No temporal nexus: Humphrey largely describes his experiences during the marriage, which began after the trial; he does not tie specific episodes of health or cognitive issues to June 1990 (the assault), May 1991 (arrest/identification), or July 1991 (trial).
• No demonstrated causal link between diabetes and any actual memory or perception problem at the time of the crime or testimony.
• The declaration thus does not make it more or less likely that she correctly identified Hargrove, rendering it collateral under the definition in Seilheimer v. Melville (a collateral fact is one from which no fair inferences can be drawn on the fact in issue).

The Court pointedly notes, in a cautionary tone, that such a declaration by a divorced ex‑husband, posthumously attacking a rape victim’s integrity, is “paltry” as evidence and more illustrative of the legal limitations of the petition than probative of actual innocence.

6.3 General Scientific Studies on Diabetes and Eyewitness Reliability

Hargrove also cited:

• Medical research indicating that poorly controlled diabetes can affect memory and attention and increase risk of cognitive complications.
• Social‑science research on mistaken eyewitness identifications, especially in high‑stress situations and with delay between event and identification.

The Court holds that such material:

• Is general in nature and does not establish that this specific witness suffered cognitive impairment or misremembered this event.
• Is therefore collateral and speculative, akin to suggesting that because a group is generally at risk, any individual in that group is likely affected at the relevant time.

6.4 Attempt to Relitigate Trial‑Era Credibility Issues

Hargrove also highlighted:

• Woolridge’s early suspicion that someone else (an acquaintance’s brother) was the attacker, a suspicion she later abandoned after seeing a photograph.
• Minor differences between her initial description to police and her later emphasis at trial on the assailant’s “big poppy eyes.”

The Court emphasizes that:

• These issues were fully known at trial and used by defense counsel to impeach her.
• Actual innocence statutes focus on (previously) unknown/untested/unavailable evidence; they are not a mechanism to simply re‑argue or optimize cross‑examination strategies decades later.
• A reasonable jury might view her initial private suspicion as conscientious rather than damaging—she attempted to confirm before accusing.

Since the new non‑biological material is collateral and the old material was already before the jury, the Court assigns the non‑biological evidence no weight in its actual innocence calculus.

7. Precedents and Their Influence in Hargrove

7.1 In re Watford (295 Va. 114 (2018))

Watford established two key principles:

• The “hypothetical new trial” framework and “totality of evidence” requirement under § 19.2‑327.5.
• Caution in assigning weight to DNA not clearly tied to the crime (e.g., DNA on a mattress that might reflect unrelated consensual contacts).

In Watford, the Court ultimately granted relief largely because, at a § 19.2‑327.4 evidentiary hearing, the victim testified that she had never seen the petitioner on the day of the attack—powerful non‑biological evidence properly before the Court under the statute.

Hargrove draws on:

• The totality‑of‑evidence approach.
• Watford’s mattress footnote as an analogy: like the mattress DNA, the underwear mixture is only tenuously connected to the crime and thus is entitled to little weight.

7.2 In re Brown (295 Va. 202 (2018))

Brown addressed:

• The chain‑of‑custody burden for proponents of scientific evidence.
• The difference between clear‑and‑convincing and preponderance standards.
• The limitations and risks of low‑quantity, degraded DNA and highly sensitive testing, including heightened contamination and secondary transfer concerns.

Hargrove leans heavily on Brown to:

• Frame the chain‑of‑custody discussion and presumptions of regularity.
• Underscore that weak, partial samples from decades‑old evidence must be treated with great caution.
• Emphasize that without expert explanation of probative weight, such results can be of “scant value.”

7.3 In re Scott (297 Va. 166 (2019))

In Scott, the Court granted a writ where:

• Sperm on the victim’s jeans and male DNA in her vaginal swab came from someone other than the petitioner.
• The DNA evidence was highly probative of the identity of the rapist.

Scott illustrates the type of strong, crime‑specific biological evidence that can satisfy the actual‑innocence standard. Hargrove uses Scott as a foil to show how far short the underwear mixture falls: it is not sperm from the rape; it is a weak, mixed, non‑crotch profile with multiple potential innocent sources.

7.4 Tyler v. Commonwealth (73 Va. App. 445 (2021)) and Schlup v. Delo (513 U.S. 298 (1995))

The Court cites Tyler (interpreting the parallel “no rational trier” language in the non‑biological statute) to clarify that:

the petitioner must prove that “every rational factfinder”—when presented with the totality of the evidence—would have acquitted the petitioner. (emphasis in original).

Hargrove also quotes Schlup for the idea that the inquiry looks at whether, in light of new evidence, any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt, but with the added statutory gloss that no rational juror may still convict.

7.5 Other Authorities

• Spencer v. Commonwealth (238 Va. 275 (1989)): Recognized early DNA testing’s reliability. The Commonwealth argued Hargrove should have pursued some form of DNA testing pre‑trial. The Court distinguishes Spencer because there, semen stains provided a clear basis for early DNA testing; here, there was no semen or foreign hair. Counsel’s failure to test is understandable given 1991 technology.
• Nobrega v. Commonwealth (271 Va. 508 (2006)) and Fisher v. Commonwealth (228 Va. 296 (1984)): Reiterate that a rape victim’s testimony alone, if not inherently incredible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. This principle is central in evaluating whether the new evidence compels acquittal.
• Herndon, Vinson, Smith, Branham, Anderson, Dunn: Address chain‑of‑custody requirements and evidentiary presumptions, all shaping the Court’s cautious stance toward the decades‑old evidence here.
• District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne (557 U.S. 52 (2009)) (Alito, J., concurring): Cited to emphasize that modern DNA testing’s power also increases the risks associated with mishandling evidence.
• Wakeman v. Commonwealth (69 Va. App. 528 (2018)): A Court of Appeals decision noting touch DNA can be transferred by very light or sequential contact (e.g., shared bathrooms, same surface touched sequentially), supporting the Supreme Court’s skepticism about strong inferences from touch DNA alone.

8. Simplifying Key Legal and Scientific Concepts

8.1 What Is a Writ of Actual Innocence?

A writ of actual innocence in Virginia is a special, statutory remedy that allows a convicted person to ask an appellate court to overturn a conviction based on new evidence—not merely legal error—but evidence that shows they did not commit the crime at all.

It is distinct from:

• Direct appeal: challenges legal mistakes in the original trial.
• Habeas corpus: challenges the legality of detention, often based on constitutional violations (e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel).

Actual innocence requires showing that, if a new trial were held today with all the old and new evidence, no rational juror could vote to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.

8.2 Standards of Proof

• Beyond a reasonable doubt: The highest standard, used at criminal trial. The evidence must leave the jurors firmly convinced of guilt, with no reasonable doubt.
• Clear and convincing evidence: A mid‑level civil standard. The evidence must create a firm belief or conviction in the factfinder’s mind.
• Preponderance of the evidence: A lower civil standard. The fact is more likely true than not (51% vs 49%). This is now the standard for actual‑innocence petitions in Virginia, but the petitioner must still meet the demanding no rational trier of fact statutory test.

8.3 Biological vs Non‑Biological Evidence Petitions

Virginia separates actual‑innocence claims into:

• Biological evidence writs (Supreme Court): DNA, blood, semen, hair, etc.
• Non‑biological evidence writs (Court of Appeals): Recantations, alibis, eyewitness misidentification evidence, documentary proof, etc.

The statutes differ in some details, but both require a showing that no rational factfinder would convict. Hargrove raises, but does not resolve, the question whether and how non‑biological evidence can be considered in a biological petition.

8.4 DNA Basics: STR, Y‑STR, and Touch DNA

• STR (Short Tandem Repeat): Modern forensic DNA profiling looks at specific locations (loci) in the genome where short sequences of DNA repeat. The number of repeats varies among individuals, creating a genetic profile.
• Y‑STR: A male‑specific test focusing on the Y chromosome. It can detect male DNA even when mixed with a large amount of female DNA (useful in sexual assault cases with heavy victim DNA).
• Touch DNA: DNA recovered from skin cells left when a person touches an object. It often yields low quantities of DNA, is highly sensitive to contamination, and is more variable in whether any DNA is left at all.
• M‑Vac: A “wet vacuum” device that rinses and vacuums surfaces to collect trace DNA. It is powerful but can also collect DNA from multiple contributors and is sensitive to contamination.

8.5 Chain of Custody

The “chain of custody” is the documented history of who had possession of an item of evidence, when, and under what conditions. Courts require a credible chain of custody to ensure:

• The item presented in court is the same as what was collected at the scene.
• It has not been tampered with, altered, or contaminated.

Suspicions about the chain of custody usually go to how much weight to give the evidence, rather than outright exclusion, unless there is evidence of serious mishandling.

8.6 Collateral vs Material Evidence

Evidence is:

• Material if it directly tends to prove or disprove a key fact in dispute (e.g., whether the defendant was at the scene).
• Collateral if it does not meaningfully bear on the main issues—e.g., general character attacks, or speculative testimony that does not show what happened in the case.

The actual‑innocence statutes require that new evidence not be merely cumulative, corroborative, or collateral. In Hargrove, the Court deemed the ex‑husband’s declaration and the generic studies collateral because they did not show, in any concrete way, that Woolridge misidentified her attacker or was cognitively impaired at the relevant times.

9. Impact and Future Implications

9.1 Limited Exculpatory Power of Weak Touch DNA in Old Cases

Hargrove sends a clear signal: weak, mixed touch DNA profiles on peripheral items, with uncertain chain of custody and multiple innocent contributors, will rarely suffice for actual innocence.

Future petitioners relying on such evidence will likely need:

• Stronger nexus between the tested item and the criminal act (e.g., semen or direct body‑fluid transfer).
• Robust expert testimony explaining why the DNA profile, despite low quantity or mixture, is powerfully probative of a particular theory (e.g., exclusive of the petitioner, inclusive of a known alternative suspect) and not plausibly explained by contamination or casual contact.
• Careful documentation of chain of custody, especially when multiple private and public entities are involved.

9.2 The Effect of the Lowered Burden of Proof

Although the statute now uses a preponderance standard, Hargrove illustrates that:

• The substantive bar remains very high; showing that some jurors might now have reasonable doubt is insufficient.
• Only when the new evidence is so powerful that no rational juror could convict—because the biological evidence negates key elements of the prosecution’s case—will relief be granted.

In borderline cases where the new evidence merely “raises some doubt,” the lower burden will not change the outcome.

9.3 Constraints on Post‑Conviction Credibility Attacks

The Court draws a firm line between:

• Genuinely new, material credibility evidence (for example, a credible recantation, proven suggestive identification procedures, or medical/expert proof that the witness could not have perceived what they described), and
• Collateral or speculative credibility attacks based on ex‑spouse opinion, general medical risk factors, or social‑science literature not tied specifically to the case.

Petitioners attempting to use non‑biological evidence in biological writs must show that:

• The evidence is case‑specific (e.g., medical records or expert opinions about the witness’s cognitive state at the relevant times).
• It was previously unknown or unavailable.
• It is not merely impeachment on side issues but directly undermines the core of the prosecution’s case.

9.4 Sexual Assault Cases: Reaffirmation of Eyewitness Centrality

Hargrove reaffirms Virginia’s long‑standing position that:

“the victim’s testimony alone, if not inherently incredible, is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.”

Even in the modern DNA era, this case underscores that:

• Absence of physical evidence does not preclude conviction.
• Inconclusive or missing perpetrator DNA decades later may not undercut a contemporaneous, detailed victim identification.

At the same time, earlier cases like Scott and Brown show the Court remains fully willing to overturn convictions when biological evidence conclusively contradicts guilt.

9.5 Unresolved Questions for Future Litigation

Hargrove deliberately leaves several knotty legal questions open:

• Scope of non‑biological evidence in biological writs: To what extent can a petitioner package both types of evidence in a single biological petition to the Supreme Court, versus filing separate petitions in the respective courts?
• Application of presumptions of regularity to private labs: Does Code § 19.2‑187.01’s presumption extend beyond DFS‑authorized labs to those contracted by the Attorney General or other entities? Does the common‑law presumption for public officers reach private employees handling evidence for the Commonwealth?
• Standards for when weak/partial DNA may be exculpatory: Future cases may flesh out more precise thresholds in terms of mixture composition, quantity, and contextual factors.
• Use of Y‑STR testing on victim‑dominated samples: The record hints at possible further male‑specific testing of heavily victim‑dominated areas (like the crotch), but the Court does not address whether failure to seek such testing affects the actual‑innocence calculus.

10. Conclusion

In re Hargrove confirms that Virginia’s writ of actual innocence based on biological evidence remains a rare and exacting remedy. The statutory burden has been eased from clear and convincing to preponderance, but the core requirement—that no rational factfinder could convict in light of the new evidence—still sharply limits relief to cases where the new biological evidence is both:

• Forensically robust (uncontaminated, well‑contextualized by expert analysis, closely tied to the crime), and
• Substantively transformative (fundamentally altering the evidentiary picture on which guilt rests).

Weak, mixed touch DNA profiles from decades‑old clothing, even if they exclude the petitioner, will not ordinarily meet this standard—particularly where the original conviction did not rely on biological evidence to begin with and rested instead on strong, consistent eyewitness testimony.

On the non‑biological side, Hargrove underscores that collateral credibility attacks and generalized social‑science literature cannot substitute for case‑specific, material proof that a key witness was actually wrong or impaired at the time of the crime or trial.

In the broader legal landscape, Hargrove refines Virginia’s post‑conviction DNA jurisprudence by:

• Clarifying the interaction between the reduced burden of proof and the unchanged “no rational trier” test;
• Defining the limited probative value of weak touch DNA in old, contamination‑prone evidence; and
• Signaling the Court’s insistence on concrete, non‑collateral evidence in any serious challenge to a rape victim’s identification.

The decision thus stands as an important precedent for both defense counsel and prosecutors in evaluating the potential and limits of modern forensic advances in seeking (or resisting) post‑conviction exoneration.