Illinois Supreme Court Requires Midtrial Directed‑Verdict Rulings Before the Defense Presents Evidence: People v. Johnson, 2025 IL 130447

Introduction

In People v. Johnson, 2025 IL 130447, the Supreme Court of Illinois resolved a long-standing split among the appellate districts and clarified a recurring point of criminal trial procedure: whether a trial judge may defer ruling on a defendant’s midtrial motion for a directed verdict (judgment of acquittal) until after the defense has elected whether to present evidence. The court held that section 115‑4(k) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 requires trial courts to decide a midtrial directed‑verdict motion before the defense case proceeds. Although the trial court erred by reserving its ruling in Devin Johnson’s jury trial, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction because the error was forfeited and did not qualify for relief under either prong of the plain‑error doctrine.

The case arose from a shooting on January 24, 2021, in which Kelvin Bell was shot in the head while seated in the front passenger seat of a Cadillac outside the defendant’s residence. The State charged Johnson with attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. After the State rested at trial, Johnson moved for a directed verdict; the judge took the motion under advisement and proceeded toward the defense case without ruling. The defense ultimately rested without presenting evidence, the jury convicted, and the court later issued a written order denying the motion. On appeal, Johnson argued that the failure to rule midtrial prejudiced his decision whether to testify. The appellate court found forfeiture and affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review on the directed‑verdict issue only.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the court, Justice O’Brien held that under section 115‑4(k) (725 ILCS 5/115‑4(k)), a trial court must decide a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the State’s evidence before allowing the defense case to proceed. The court reasoned that the statute’s purpose—guarding against convictions based on constitutionally insufficient evidence—coupled with the defendant’s trial rights (including the right to testify or remain silent), requires a midtrial ruling. While acknowledging that the statute is silent on timing, the court interpreted that silence in light of legislative purpose and trial rights.

Nevertheless, the court affirmed Johnson’s conviction. It held:

• Johnson forfeited the procedural claim by failing to object when the trial court reserved ruling and by not requesting a ruling before resting.
• Plain‑error review was available (the court declined to extend People v. Patrick and People v. Averett to foreclose review), and the court first found a clear and obvious error in deferring the ruling.
• But the error was not reversible: the evidence was not closely balanced (first prong fails), and the defendant did not carry his burden to show a second‑prong (structural) error undermining the integrity of the process.

Justice Cunningham, joined by Justices Theis and Rochford, specially concurred in the judgment only. The concurrence disagreed that section 115‑4(k) mandates a midtrial ruling; in its view, the statute’s text does not address timing, and the trial court did not err by deferring its decision.

Detailed Analysis

I. The New Rule Announced

The court establishes a new, statewide directive: when a defendant moves for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court must decide that motion before proceeding to the defense’s evidence. If the court needs time, it may recess to consider, but it cannot continue to the defense case without a ruling. This rule resolves conflicting appellate decisions and aligns Illinois practice with the statutory purpose of section 115‑4(k).

II. Precedents and Authorities Considered

The court’s reasoning is anchored in several strands of law:

• Preservation and forfeiture:
  • People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988), and People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272 (1992): both an objection at trial and inclusion in a written posttrial motion are required to preserve ordinary trial errors.
  • People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256: preservation prevents sandbagging and gives trial courts a chance to correct errors.
• Plain‑error framework:
  • People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005), People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (2007), People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598 (2010), People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, and People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011: two-prong plain‑error test (closely balanced evidence or error so serious that it undermines fairness and integrity), with defendant bearing the burden after showing a clear and obvious error.
• The midtrial ruling split in the appellate courts:
  • People v. Trump, 62 Ill. App. 3d 747 (1978), and People v. Rascher, 223 Ill. App. 3d 847 (1992): emphasized that a defendant should not be forced to decide whether to present a defense without knowing if the State’s proof is legally sufficient; suggested that reserving a midtrial ruling is error.
  • People v. Watkins, 206 Ill. App. 3d 228 (1990): read section 115‑4(k) as allowing trial courts to reserve ruling; other cases (People v. Ramirez, 244 Ill. App. 3d 136 (1993); People v. Faulkner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 453 (1978)) tolerated deferred rulings or reopening.
• Distinction from Patrick/Averett line:
  • People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62 (2009), and People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1 (2010): condemned blanket policies deferring rulings on motions in limine regarding impeachment with prior convictions until after the defendant testifies; held such claims unreviewable if defendant does not testify, due to speculation about testimony.
  • Johnson refuses to extend Patrick/Averett: directed‑verdict motions test the sufficiency of evidence already presented and do not depend on the content of the defense testimony; thus, a defendant is not foreclosed from plain‑error review by choosing not to testify.
• Substantive sufficiency standards and purpose of section 115‑4(k):
  • Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): due process forbids conviction except on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • People v. Withers, 87 Ill. 2d 224 (1981), and People v. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d 905 (2001): directed‑verdict motions ask whether a reasonable mind could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the State’s evidence.
  • People v. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d 416 (2011): statutory silence should not be construed to defeat a statute’s purpose.
• Comparative procedural rules:
  • Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(b) and analogous state rules (Michigan, New York, West Virginia, District of Columbia) expressly authorize reservation of rulings on midtrial acquittal motions—and require the court to evaluate based on the record when the motion was made.
  • Johnson highlights that Illinois’ statute lacks such an express authorization; the absence supports the requirement of a contemporaneous ruling before the defense case proceeds. The court cites Johnson v. State, 158 A.3d 1005 (Md. 2017) for the view that, absent express authority, reservation is impermissible.

III. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The majority’s logic runs in three steps:

1. Statutory construction and purpose. Although section 115‑4(k) is silent on timing, its function is to provide a vehicle to test constitutional sufficiency both midtrial and at the close of all evidence. The midtrial setting uniquely implicates the defendant’s decision whether to present a case or testify. Letting the defense proceed without a ruling forces strategic choices that may “cure” constitutional insufficiency by filling gaps for the State. Reading the statute to require a ruling before the defense case gives effect to the legislature’s design and protects trial rights.
2. Practical administration. Deciding a directed‑verdict motion at midtrial does not unduly burden courts. The question is binary and legal: do the State’s proofs, taken in the light most favorable to the State, permit a conviction? If more time is needed, the court can recess; what it cannot do is proceed to the defense case without deciding.
3. Clarifying the law and rejecting contrary approaches. The court adopts the Trump/Rascher line and rejects Watkins to the extent it allowed deferral. It distinguishes Patrick/Averett because reservation there concerned motions in limine whose impact depends on whether and how the defendant testifies; by contrast, midtrial sufficiency depends entirely on the State’s closed record.

IV. Application and Disposition

The trial court clearly erred by reserving decision and moving forward. But Johnson did not object or ask the trial court to decide before resting, thereby forfeiting the issue under Enoch. The court nonetheless undertook plain‑error review:

• First prong (closely balanced evidence): The evidence of specific intent to kill was strong. The State’s proof showed that Johnson aimed a loaded gun at Bell’s head and fired; an unfired cartridge outside the passenger door suggested the gun had been racked, indicating purposeful preparation. Post‑shooting conduct—flight, clothing disposal, and discarding the weapon—reinforced intent. Johnson’s later self‑serving “accident” narrative, after multiple inconsistent statements, did not render the case close.
• Second prong (seriousness/integrity): The error is not structural and is ordinarily amenable to harmless‑error analysis if preserved. Because Johnson framed the claim as one the State could not prove harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (and structural errors are not subject to harmless‑error review), he failed to carry his burden to establish second‑prong plain error.

The court affirmed, declining to reach constitutional arguments (right to testify, right to counsel) under the avoidance canon because the statutory analysis disposed of the claim and the error was not reversible under plain‑error standards.

V. The Special Concurrence

Justice Cunningham, joined by Justices Theis and Rochford, agreed with affirmance but rejected the majority’s statutory holding. The concurrence’s key points:

• Section 115‑4(k) says nothing about timing; its purpose is to ensure no one is convicted on insufficient evidence. That purpose is served whether a ruling occurs midtrial, after all evidence, or even after the verdict.
• Imputing a timing requirement to protect a defendant’s decision whether to testify is a policy choice not grounded in the text. If the legislature intended such a precondition to a valid waiver of the right to testify, it would have said so.
• On these facts, the defendant received full admonishments and knowingly waived his right to testify. No fundamental unfairness occurred.

The concurrence thus would find no error and would not reach plain‑error analysis.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Immediate Effects on Illinois Trial Practice

• Trial judges must decide a defense motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the State’s case before allowing the defense to present evidence. If the court needs time, it should recess to consider and rule.
• The ruling resolves an appellate split and effectively abrogates Watkins, Ramirez, and similar cases to the extent they permitted reserved rulings on midtrial motions.
• Trial courts do not gain the federal flexibility of Rule 29(b); unless and until the legislature amends section 115‑4(k), reservation of midtrial rulings is impermissible in Illinois criminal trials.

B. Preservation, Objections, and Strategy

• Defense counsel must object if a court attempts to reserve a midtrial ruling and should explicitly request a decision before the client chooses whether to testify or rest. Without an objection and a posttrial motion, the issue will be forfeited.
• If a court declines to rule, defense counsel should make a clear record that the ruling is crucial to the defendant’s decision whether to testify and to the defense strategy. This both preserves the issue and demonstrates prejudice.
• Prosecutors should expect contemporaneous rulings and be prepared to argue sufficiency based solely on the State’s case‑in‑chief.

C. Appellate Review Going Forward

• Claims that a trial court deferred ruling midtrial will now present clear or obvious error. Relief, however, will depend on preservation or on satisfying plain‑error standards.
• The error is not structural; when preserved, it will be reviewed for harmless error. When forfeited, defendants must show either closely balanced evidence (first prong) or an error undermining the integrity of the process (second prong).
• Patrick/Averett does not bar review where a defendant declined to testify; those cases are confined to motions in limine and do not govern midtrial sufficiency rulings.

D. Legislative and Rulemaking Considerations

Johnson emphasizes that other jurisdictions allow reservation only by express rule or statute (e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b)). The General Assembly could amend section 115‑4(k) to authorize reservation and specify the record to be considered if it wishes to emulate the federal model. Absent such action, Illinois courts must rule before the defense proceeds.

E. Substantive Criminal Law Implications

The court’s closely‑balanced analysis underscores several evidentiary themes relevant to intent in attempted murder:

• Pointing and firing a gun at a victim’s head allows an inference of intent to kill.
• Physical evidence consistent with racking a firearm (e.g., an unfired cartridge ejected outside the car) can support a finding of purposeful preparation inconsistent with accident.
• Post‑offense conduct (flight, concealment, destruction of evidence) may corroborate intent.
• Multiple inconsistent accounts can diminish the weight of later “accident” explanations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Motion for a directed verdict (judgment of acquittal): A request that the judge enter a not‑guilty judgment because, even viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is legally insufficient on one or more elements.
• Midtrial motion: A directed‑verdict motion made at the close of the State’s case‑in‑chief (before the defense presents evidence).
• Section 115‑4(k) (725 ILCS 5/115‑4(k)): Illinois statute authorizing directed‑verdict motions at the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence and requiring entry of acquittal when the evidence is insufficient.
• Plain‑error doctrine: Allows review of unpreserved error if (1) the evidence is closely balanced such that the error could have tipped the scales, or (2) the error is so serious it undermines the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. The defendant bears the burden after identifying a clear and obvious error.
• Structural error: A very small class of fundamental errors (e.g., denial of counsel, biased judge) that defy harmless‑error analysis and require automatic reversal. Johnson clarifies that a deferred midtrial ruling is not structural.
• Reservation of ruling: Postponing a decision on a motion. Federal courts can do this midtrial under Rule 29(b); Illinois courts cannot under section 115‑4(k) as interpreted in Johnson.

Conclusion

People v. Johnson definitively answers a recurring procedural question in Illinois criminal trials: a trial court must decide a defendant’s midtrial directed‑verdict motion before the defense presents evidence. In reaching this conclusion, the court harmonized statutory purpose with the defendant’s trial rights and resolved a split among the districts by adopting the Trump/Rascher view and disapproving Watkins to the extent it allowed deferral. At the same time, Johnson underscores the centrality of preservation: failing to object can forfeit even clear error, leaving a defendant to the demanding plain‑error route.

Practically, the decision will reshape trial rhythms. Judges must recess if needed to decide; defendants gain a definitive sufficiency ruling before choosing whether to testify; and prosecutors must be ready to defend the State’s case as it stands at midtrial. Doctrinally, Johnson confines Patrick/Averett to their context and confirms that delayed rulings in the midtrial sufficiency setting are reviewable, though not structural. While the concurrence questions the majority’s purposive reading, the court’s rule now governs Illinois criminal practice unless and until the legislature enacts an express reservation mechanism akin to Federal Rule 29(b).

Ultimately, Johnson strengthens the integrity of the sufficiency safeguard in section 115‑4(k) without disturbing settled rules on preservation and harmless error. Defense counsel should seize the clarified right by requesting rulings before the defense case; trial courts should deliver them; and appellate courts now have a clear benchmark for identifying error and assessing prejudice.