Haase v. Kankakee School District 111: Reaffirming Broad Immunity for Negligent School Supervision Under Section 3‑108 of the Tort Immunity Act

I. Introduction

In Haase v. Kankakee School District 111, 2025 IL 131420 (Ill. Nov. 20, 2025), the Supreme Court of Illinois addressed the scope of local governmental immunity for student injuries arising during school activities, specifically under section 3‑108 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the “Tort Immunity Act”), 745 ILCS 10/3‑108.

A seventh-grade student, Riley Haase, suffered a serious arm injury while playing soccer in gym class. He and his father sued the school district and the physical education teacher, alleging willful and wanton misconduct in failing to supervise the class and control another student (“Student A”), who allegedly had a history of violence. The case presented two central legal questions:

• When does deficient school supervision qualify as “willful and wanton conduct” sufficient to overcome the immunity provided by section 3‑108?
• Can plaintiffs defeat summary judgment by relying on an unpled theory of direct, willful and wanton conduct by the school district itself (here, a failure to disseminate disciplinary information about Student A)?

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, reinstating summary judgment for the district and the teacher. The decision clarifies that:

• Ordinary inattentive or negligent supervision—even if troubling—remains immunized under section 3‑108 unless accompanied by evidence of an “utter indifference to or conscious disregard” for student safety.
• Plaintiffs are confined to the theories pled in their complaint; unpled theories of direct district liability cannot be used to manufacture a factual dispute at the summary judgment stage.
• Uncontradicted sworn deposition testimony regarding a teacher’s lack of knowledge of a student’s disciplinary history must be taken as true for purposes of summary judgment absent countervailing evidence.

The case has significant implications for school litigation in Illinois and further solidifies the high bar plaintiffs must clear to pierce governmental immunity in student-injury cases arising from supervision.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The incident

On March 13, 2017, Riley Haase, then a seventh-grade student at Kankakee Junior High School, participated in a physical education class conducted by teacher Darren Wilbur Dayhoff. The class was a “recreational game day.” Students changed, completed warmups, and then self-selected into groups playing either soccer or basketball in the school gym.

Key facts about the gym period include:

• Riley chose to play soccer with approximately 8–10 other students; the remainder played basketball.
• Student A, who was not dressed in gym attire, was nonetheless allowed to participate in soccer.
• Riley and another student, Jacob Gilreath, testified that Student A ran in and out of the game, engaged in “unnecessarily rough” play, pushed other students, and kicked the ball very hard.
• Toward the end of the period, Riley went to retrieve a ball that had gone out of bounds; he remembers nothing immediately after picking it up. Jacob later helped Riley to the teacher and reported that Student A had tackled Riley into a wall, causing serious arm injuries and subsequent paralysis.

Riley testified that he had no prior personal problems with Student A and did not believe Student A personally targeted him; rather, Student A was “messing around too much.”

B. The claims: willful and wanton supervision and family expenses

The operative second amended complaint contained two counts:

1. Count I – Willful and wanton conduct.
   This count alleged that:
   • Dayhoff failed to supervise the class and Student A, allegedly sitting with his feet up in a corner using a phone or laptop instead of supervising.
   • Dayhoff knew Student A had a history of physical violence, battery, and unwanted aggression toward other students and required increased supervision.
   • Despite that knowledge, Dayhoff failed to remove Student A from the game or intervene when Student A engaged in aggressive conduct.
   The complaint alleged that the District’s liability was solely vicarious—i.e., based on respondeat superior—for Dayhoff’s conduct. It did not allege that the District itself committed independent, direct acts or omissions (such as failing to warn staff of Student A’s history).
2. Count II – Family Expense Act claim.
   Riley’s father, Kevin Haase, sought recovery for medical expenses he was obligated to pay under the Family Expense Act (750 ILCS 65/15), a classic derivative claim dependent on the underlying tort liability to Riley.

C. Evidence on summary judgment

The defendants moved for summary judgment, invoking:

• Section 2‑201 and 2‑109 (discretionary policy decisions and derivative entity immunity), and
• Section 3‑108 (immunity for negligent supervision absent willful and wanton conduct).

Depositions and records produced on the motion included:

1. Student testimony (Riley and Jacob)

• Both confirmed that during gym class, Dayhoff often sat with a laptop or phone, including on the day in question.
• Both described Student A as playing aggressively, pushing, and being “unnecessarily rough.”
• Jacob testified he saw Student A hit Riley into the wall but also agreed that earlier contact by Student A in attempting to get the ball looked like typical soccer contact.
• Neither suggested that Student A had personally targeted Riley or that Riley had prior conflicts with Student A.

2. Teacher testimony (Dayhoff)

• He described it as a recreational game day with about 30 boys in the class.
• He denied sitting in the corner the entire class period; he claimed to observe from a corner and periodically walk the gym to supervise.
• He allowed Student A to play despite not being dressed but testified that he did not observe aggressive or prohibited conduct from Student A; he viewed the incident as a “normal scrum for a soccer ball” that ended with Riley on the floor.
• Crucially, he testified he had no knowledge that Student A had a history of physical aggression, had received no warnings or notes from administration about Student A, and had never checked Student A’s disciplinary file.

3. Administrators and counselor (Hensley, Walz, Lenfield)

• Principal Hensley testified:
  • The incident was deemed an accident.
  • There was no policy requiring teachers to monitor disciplinary reports or behavioral histories in the school’s computer system.
• Assistant principal Walz (in charge of discipline) testified:
  • Student A had multiple referrals but she did not recall specifics.
  • She had informed staff that Student A required increased supervision for wandering, not that he was physically aggressive.
  • No policy required administrators to inform teachers of a particular student’s disciplinary history; such communication was discretionary.
• Counselor Lenfield testified:
  • She worked with Student A on peer relationships and socialization.
  • She did not regard Student A as physically aggressive; he was sometimes in fights but often as a target rather than the initiator.
  • She had not received concerns from teachers about physical aggression by Student A.

4. Student A’s disciplinary record

Student A’s record showed 29 referrals between August 2016 and March 2017, including:

• Three referrals for physical aggression,
• Four for fighting, and
• Various others for cutting class, unauthorized area, insubordination, and profanity.

Five of the seven physical aggression/fighting referrals occurred in the first half of the school year. However, the record contained no direct proof that this disciplinary history had ever been communicated to Dayhoff.

D. Decisions in the lower courts

1. Circuit court

The circuit court granted summary judgment to both defendants. It held:

• Section 2‑201 (discretionary policy immunity) protected Dayhoff’s decisions regarding:
  • Holding a recreational game day,
  • Allowing Student A to participate, and
  • Choosing when or whether to intervene during play.
• Section 2‑109 extended the same immunity to the District as the employer.
• The complaint’s allegations did not rise to willful and wanton conduct; at most, they showed inadvertence or inattentiveness, which are insufficient as a matter of law under section 3‑108.
• The Family Expense Act claim (Count II) failed because it was derivative of Riley’s claim.

2. Appellate court majority

The appellate court reversed and remanded. Its key conclusions:

• Section 2‑201 immunity was not appropriate at summary judgment because factual disputes existed over whether Dayhoff actually exercised policy-level discretion.
• Under section 3‑108, genuine issues of material fact existed concerning:
  • Student A’s reputation and level of aggression,
  • The District’s knowledge of his disciplinary history, and
  • The District’s alleged failure to inform teachers—potentially a willful and wanton omission if Student A was dangerous and the District knew it.
• Those factual disputes precluded summary judgment on willful and wanton conduct, and thus also on the derivative Family Expense Act claim.

3. Appellate dissent (Justice Hettel)

The dissent aligned closely with what the Supreme Court later adopted. Justice Hettel emphasized:

• Illinois courts have “repeatedly held that allegations against school staff for inadequate supervision are insufficient as a matter of law to establish willful and wanton conduct.”
• The facts might support negligence but did not show that Dayhoff knew or should have known that lack of supervision created “a high probability of serious harm” to Riley (quoting Jackson v. Chicago Board of Education, 192 Ill. App. 3d 1093 (1989)).

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Cunningham, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the appellate court and reinstated the circuit court’s summary judgment for the defendants.

A. Section 3‑108 immunity is dispositive; no need to reach sections 2‑201 and 2‑109

The Court concluded that:

• The case is properly resolved under section 3‑108, which grants immunity to local public entities and employees for negligent supervision of activities on public property, absent willful and wanton conduct.
• Because the plaintiffs’ evidence did not support a triable claim of willful and wanton conduct, section 3‑108 immunizes both the District and Dayhoff.
• Given that holding, the Court expressly declined to decide whether sections 2‑201 and 2‑109 also applied.

B. Plaintiffs are bound by their pleadings; no independent district-level willful and wanton theory

The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s focus on the District’s alleged failure to disseminate Student A’s disciplinary history, because:

• Count I asserted only vicarious liability against the District—i.e., that the District was liable for Dayhoff’s acts under respondeat superior.
• The complaint did not allege that the District itself owed and breached a distinct duty (such as a duty to notify teachers of Student A’s history) or committed separate willful and wanton acts.
• Under Illinois law, a plaintiff “is bound by the allegations in the complaint” when opposing summary judgment and may not raise new theories not pled (Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453; 800 South Wells Commercial LLC v. Cadden, 2018 IL App (1st) 162882).

Therefore, whether the District willfully and wantonly failed to warn teachers of Student A’s history was “not a genuine issue of material fact” in this case, and could not be used to defeat summary judgment.

C. No factual dispute over Dayhoff’s knowledge of Student A’s history

The Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Dayhoff’s knowledge of Student A’s disciplinary history because:

• Dayhoff testified, under oath, that he did not know of any history of violent behavior by Student A, had never been informed of it, and had not reviewed Student A’s disciplinary records.
• The plaintiffs produced no counter-affidavit, deposition, or documentary evidence contradicting that testimony.
• Under Illinois summary judgment principles, uncontradicted deposition testimony must be accepted as true for purposes of the motion (Cnota v. Palatine Area Football Ass’n, 227 Ill. App. 3d 640 (1992); Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229 (1986)).
• The cited emails did not show prior notice of physical aggression to Dayhoff; one, in August 2016, simply referenced Student A’s goals around anger and peer conflict without marking him as physically violent, and the other was dated in January 2018—after the incident.

Thus, as a matter of summary judgment law, the record established that Dayhoff did not know of any violent disciplinary history for Student A.

D. No evidence that Dayhoff “should have known” of the history

The Court likewise rejected the assertion that Dayhoff “should have known” of Student A’s disciplinary history:

• There was no policy requiring teachers to review disciplinary records.
• There was no policy mandating administrators to inform teachers of particular students’ behavioral issues.
• Walz chose not to notify staff about physical aggression because she did not regard Student A as physically aggressive.

With no evidence to contradict this administrative framework, the claim that Dayhoff “should have known” was deemed a “mere conclusion” insufficient to create a triable issue (Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Argubright, 151 Ill. App. 3d 324 (1986)).

E. Supervision was, at most, negligent; not willful and wanton as a matter of law

Turning to the core of section 3‑108, the Court analyzed whether the conduct could reasonably be found to be willful and wanton:

• Section 1‑210 of the Act defines “willful and wanton conduct” as:

  a course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.

• While willful and wanton is usually a jury question, courts may decide it as a matter of law on summary judgment where the undisputed facts cannot support such a finding (Barr v. Cunningham, 2017 IL 120751; Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (2007); Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996)).

The Court emphasized several key points:

1. The activity—indoor soccer—was not inherently dangerous.
   There was no evidence that playing indoor soccer with ordinary equipment posed a well-known risk of severe injury akin to:
   • Use of a mini-trampoline without safety measures (Murray), or
   • Hammering scrap metal through an anvil in an industrial arts class (Hadley v. Witt Unit School District 66, 123 Ill. App. 3d 19 (1984)).
   The Court likened this case to Barr, where no evidence showed that floor hockey with plastic sticks and soft balls is “obviously dangerous.”
2. No specific, known threat to Riley existed.
   In contrast to:
   • Doe v. Chicago Board of Education, 213 Ill. 2d 19 (2004), where a student with a “deviant sexual history” was subject to a written protective plan requiring constant supervision, yet was left unsupervised and sexually assaulted another child; or
   • Gammon v. Edwardsville Community Unit School District No. 7, 82 Ill. App. 3d 586 (1980), where a counselor was warned of a specific student’s threats to another and then negligently dismissed them together;
   there was no evidence that Dayhoff knew—or should have known—Student A posed a specific, heightened danger to Riley or other classmates. As in Jackson, where a student was injured by a thrown chalkboard clip during an unsupervised interval, the conduct may have been negligently supervised but did not meet the statutory standard of “utter indifference.”
3. At most, the evidence supported negligent supervision.
   Even taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs—that Dayhoff sat in the corner using his laptop while Student A played roughly—the Court held this showed no intentional harm, nor the level of “utter indifference” required by section 1‑210. It was classic negligent failure to supervise, squarely within the immunity afforded by section 3‑108.

The Court also acknowledged what many observers might feel instinctively—that better supervision is clearly desirable—but stressed that it is bound by the legislature’s policy choice to immunize negligent supervision by schools:

We acknowledge that, in an ideal school situation, it is reasonable to expect teachers, such as Dayhoff, to be attentive to their students when they are participating in physical activities during gym class. Dayhoff clearly was not. However, the legislature unambiguously intended to immunize Illinois school districts from liability for the type of negligent conduct alleged in this case.

F. Disposition of the Family Expense Act claim

Because the underlying claim for Riley’s injury failed as a matter of law under section 3‑108, the derivative Family Expense Act claim in Count II necessarily failed. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed summary judgment against both plaintiffs on all counts.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Structure and purpose of the Tort Immunity Act

• Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, 2019 IL 124283: Explains that the Tort Immunity Act was enacted after Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959), abolished common-law sovereign immunity for local governments.
• The core principle: local public entities are liable “to the same extent as a private party” unless a specific immunity applies, and the Act must be construed strictly against the entity seeking immunity.

B. Summary judgment standards

• 735 ILCS 5/2‑1005(c): Allows summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064; Mashal v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112341; Carney v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2016 IL 118984; Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432: Identify:
  • Summary judgment as a “drastic” remedy,
  • The need to construe the record strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the non-movant, and
  • The standard of de novo review.

C. Willful and wanton conduct under the Tort Immunity Act

• Statutory definition: 745 ILCS 10/1‑210.
• Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (2007): Confirms that section 1‑210’s definition applies whenever “willful and wanton” appears in the Act, and that the language is “clear and unambiguous.”
• Cohen v. Chicago Park District, 2017 IL 121800; Barr v. Cunningham, 2017 IL 120751; Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996): Recognize that willful and wanton is usually a jury question but may be resolved as a matter of law when facts cannot sustain it.

D. Student supervision and activity cases

• Murray: Willful and wanton where children used a mini-trampoline without safety guidelines despite known risks of severe injury.
• Hadley v. Witt Unit School District 66, 123 Ill. App. 3d 19 (1984): Willful and wanton where a teacher ignored obviously dangerous student behavior with tools and metal in an industrial arts class.
• Barr, 2017 IL 120751: No willful and wanton conduct where students played floor hockey with plastic sticks and soft balls; no evidence that the activity was obviously dangerous.
• Doe v. Chicago Board of Education, 213 Ill. 2d 19 (2004): Willful and wanton where a student with a documented deviant sexual history and a protective plan was left unsupervised with younger students.
• Gammon v. Edwardsville Community Unit School District No. 7, 82 Ill. App. 3d 586 (1980): Willful and wanton where a counselor, despite explicit warnings of specific threats, dismissed antagonistic students together, leading to an immediate assault.
• Jackson v. Chicago Board of Education, 192 Ill. App. 3d 1093 (1989): No willful and wanton conduct where a teacher left class unsupervised and a student was injured by another’s thrown object; often cited to show that unsupervised intervals generally reflect negligence, not willful and wanton conduct.

E. Pleading theory and vicarious vs. direct liability

• Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 195 Ill. 2d 210 (2000); Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352 (2010): Distinguish between:
  • Respondeat superior claims (employer liable for employee’s tort), and
  • Direct negligence claims against an employer for its own acts or omissions.
• Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453; Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 895 (2007); 800 South Wells Commercial LLC v. Cadden, 2018 IL App (1st) 162882: Hold that summary judgment is confined to theories pled in the complaint; plaintiffs cannot spring new liability theories at the summary judgment stage.

F. Evidence and uncontradicted testimony at summary judgment

• Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229 (1986); Cnota v. Palatine Area Football Ass’n, 227 Ill. App. 3d 640 (1992): When deposition testimony submitted in support of or opposition to summary judgment is uncontradicted by counter-affidavits or depositions, it must be accepted as true.
• Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Argubright, 151 Ill. App. 3d 324 (1986): Mere conclusory assertions unsupported by evidence cannot create a genuine issue of material fact.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Limiting the case to the pleaded theory of vicarious liability

A central analytical move by the Court was to confine the case to the plaintiffs’ pleaded theory. Count I alleged:

• Willful and wanton misconduct by Dayhoff, and
• Respondeat superior liability for the District as his employer.

The complaint did not allege that the District itself:

• Had a duty to inform teachers about Student A’s history of aggression,
• Breach of such a duty by failing to disseminate the disciplinary history, or
• Any direct willful and wanton act separate from Dayhoff’s conduct.

The Supreme Court strictly enforced this limitation: plaintiffs “are bound by the allegations in the complaint” and cannot change or supplement their theory at summary judgment. As a result:

• The District’s alleged failure to warn teachers, even if potentially culpable in a different case, was legally irrelevant here.
• The only relevant “willful and wanton” inquiry concerned what Dayhoff knew and did, not what the District may have known in its administrative files.

B. Evaluating Dayhoff’s actual and constructive knowledge

Because the statutory definition of willful and wanton hinges strongly on the actor’s mental state (actual intent or conscious disregard), the Court scrutinized Dayhoff’s knowledge:

1. Actual knowledge.
   The complaint alleged that Dayhoff “knew” Student A had a violent history and required increased supervision. But:
   • Dayhoff swore that he never received any warning or documentation about physical aggression and never reviewed Student A’s disciplinary record.
   • The plaintiffs did not counter this testimony with any evidence—no emails to him referencing aggression, no witnesses testifying to such a warning.
   Under established summary judgment law, this uncontradicted testimony was taken as true.
2. Constructive knowledge (“should have known”).
   Plaintiffs argued Dayhoff “should have known” of Student A’s history. But constructive knowledge here would require some basis for expecting a teacher to discover such history—for example, a:
   • Policy requiring teachers to review disciplinary files, or
   • Practice of administrators routinely flagging high-risk students to staff.
   The record showed the opposite:
   • No policy requiring teachers to check records,
   • No obligation for administrators to push out disciplinary histories, and
   • Walz and Lenfield expressly did not view Student A as a physically aggressive initiator.
   With no predicate duty or institutional practice, the “should have known” assertion remained speculative.

Absent any actual or constructive knowledge of heightened risk, Dayhoff’s decision to allow Student A to play and his failure to intervene sooner could not reasonably be characterized as conduct taken in conscious disregard of a known danger.

C. Applying the statutory willful and wanton standard

The Court next applied section 1‑210’s definition of willful and wanton conduct:

• No evidence suggested deliberate intent to harm Riley.
• The case thus turned on whether Dayhoff’s conduct reflected “utter indifference” or “conscious disregard” for student safety.

The Court’s reasoning hinged on two dimensions:

1. The nature of the activity.
   Playing soccer in a gym, with no atypical equipment or hazardous conditions, is a common, everyday school activity. Unlike the mini-trampoline in Murray or the hammer-and-anvil experiment in Hadley, there was no evidence that indoor soccer is “obviously dangerous.” This aligned more closely with Barr (floor hockey) and Jackson (unsupervised classroom), where courts found negligence but not willful and wanton conduct.
2. The specificity and foreseeability of the risk.
   In cases finding willful and wanton conduct, the defendants often ignored:
   • Specific, documented warnings about an individual (as in Doe and Gammon), or
   • Well-known, serious risks inherent in particular activities without appropriate precautions (as in Murray).
   Here, the record revealed:
   • No specific complaints or warnings about Student A being a danger to others in the gym context,
   • No history of Student A targeting Riley, and
   • No evidence that Dayhoff had observed Student A engaging in overtly dangerous behavior prior to the collision.

Therefore, the teacher’s inattentiveness, even if negligent, fell short of the statutory mental state—there was no conscious choice to ignore a known, serious risk to Riley or other students.

D. Section 3‑108 as the controlling immunity provision

After concluding that the facts did not constitute willful and wanton conduct, the Court held that section 3‑108’s immunity for negligent supervision applied:

• Subsection (a) shields entities and employees who “undertake to supervise” an activity from liability absent willful and wanton conduct in the supervision itself.
• Subsection (b) similarly covers “failure to supervise” where a duty to supervise exists, but still requires willful and wanton conduct to pierce immunity.

In Haase, Dayhoff plainly undertook to supervise gym activities; any deficiencies—such as sitting in the corner and focusing on a laptop—fell into the category of negligent, not willful and wanton, supervision. Thus, section 3‑108 fully shielded both the teacher and the District (via respondeat superior) from liability.

E. Deferring on sections 2‑201 and 2‑109

Because section 3‑108 was dispositive, the Court found no need to reach:

• Section 2‑201 (immunity for discretionary policy determinations by public employees), or
• Section 2‑109 (immunity for entities where the employee is not liable).

This restrained approach leaves the scope of 2‑201 in school supervision cases to be further developed in future litigation, while making clear that 3‑108 is a powerful and specific shield in supervision-based claims.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. The Tort Immunity Act and its key sections

• Section 3‑108 (Supervision immunity): Protects local public entities (like school districts) and their employees from liability for injuries caused by supervision (or failure to supervise) of activities on public property, unless their conduct is willful and wanton.
• Section 2‑201: Shields public employees from liability for injuries resulting from acts or omissions in determining policy and exercising discretion.
• Section 2‑109: Extends immunity to a local public entity when its employee is not liable.

B. Negligence vs. willful and wanton conduct

• Negligence is failing to use reasonable care—such as a teacher being inattentive or distracted when supervising a class.
• Willful and wanton conduct (under the Act) is much more serious: it requires either:
  • Intentional harm, or
  • A conscious decision to ignore a known, serious danger to others—beyond mere carelessness.
  Examples:
  • Ignoring a written directive that a particular student must never be left unsupervised with younger children.
  • Allowing students to use obviously dangerous equipment in ways known to cause serious injury without following any safety procedures.

C. Vicarious liability vs. direct liability

• Vicarious liability (respondeat superior): The employer (e.g., the school district) is liable for the wrongful acts of its employee (the teacher) committed within the scope of employment.
• Direct liability: The entity itself is alleged to have committed wrongful acts—such as negligent hiring, training, supervision, or policy failures.

In Haase, only vicarious liability was pled against the District; no distinct direct negligence theory was alleged.

D. Summary judgment and “genuine issue of material fact”

• Summary judgment ends a case without a trial when there is no real dispute about facts that matter to the outcome (“material facts”), and the law clearly favors one side.
• Parties must support their positions with evidence (depositions, affidavits, documents). Mere allegations in a complaint are not enough.
• If one side’s sworn evidence is uncontradicted, courts must accept it as true for purposes of the motion.

E. Depositions and affidavits

• Depositions: Sworn testimony taken out of court, typically transcribed, and used as evidence in motions and at trial.
• Affidavits: Written, sworn statements of fact filed in support of or opposition to motions.
• To create a factual dispute, the nonmoving party must counter the movant’s sworn evidence with its own credible sworn evidence—not just argument or speculation.

F. Derivative claims (Family Expense Act)

• The Family Expense Act allows a parent to recover medical expenses incurred for a minor child’s injuries.
• Such claims are derivative: if the child has no valid underlying tort claim (because of immunity or lack of proof), the parent’s claim fails as well.

VII. Likely Impact and Future Applications

A. Impact on school districts and public entities

Haase reinforces that section 3‑108 provides robust protection for public schools in ordinary supervision cases:

• Even egregious-seeming inattentiveness (e.g., a teacher on a laptop in the corner) is likely to be deemed negligent—and therefore immune—absent evidence of known, specific dangers or obviously hazardous activities.
• Districts benefit from the Court’s insistence that plaintiffs must plead and prove any alleged direct wrongdoing by the district itself; plaintiffs cannot retroactively recharacterize a vicarious claim as a direct one at the summary judgment stage.

Practically, public schools and their insurers will view this decision as:

• Lowering the litigation risk from typical gym-class and playground injuries when supervision lapses fall short of conscious disregard, and
• Encouraging reliance on section 3‑108 as a first line of defense, often obviating the need to litigate more complex discretionary immunity issues under section 2‑201.

B. Implications for plaintiffs and their counsel

For plaintiffs seeking to overcome immunity in student injury cases, Haase carries several lessons:

• Plead both vicarious and direct theories when appropriate. If there is a plausible claim that the district itself adopted dangerous policies or failed to warn staff about known risks, that must be alleged explicitly in the complaint.
• Develop concrete evidence of knowledge and specific risk. To reach a jury on willful and wanton conduct, plaintiffs must show:
  • Clear notice to staff of a student’s dangerous propensities, or
  • Involvement in an activity that is known to be highly dangerous when improperly supervised.
• Do not rely solely on generalized assertions of “aggressiveness.” Courts will scrutinize whether the supervising employee knew of that aggressiveness and whether it created a foreseeable, significant risk to the plaintiff, not just a risk of ordinary roughhousing injuries.
• Respond substantively at summary judgment. To avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must counter defense depositions with their own admissible evidence. Allegations and speculation are insufficient.

C. Guidance for courts in future section 3‑108 cases

Haase offers a clear framework for courts:

1. Identify whether the case concerns supervision of activity on public property (triggering section 3‑108).
2. Examine the pleadings to distinguish vicarious from direct liability and limit analysis to properly pled theories.
3. Assess evidence of:
   • The nature of the activity (ordinary vs. inherently or obviously dangerous),
   • The supervising employee’s knowledge of specific risks, and
   • Any prior warnings or protective plans.
4. Determine whether, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the conduct could be found to reflect “utter indifference” or “conscious disregard” rather than simple negligence.

Where the record resembles Haase or Jackson—ordinary activities, no specific warnings, inattentive but not deliberately indifferent supervision—courts are now on especially strong footing to resolve “willful and wanton” as a matter of law and grant summary judgment.

D. Policy and safety considerations

While the decision strengthens legal immunity, it does not validate lax supervision as a matter of educational policy. The Court explicitly recognized that attentive supervision is the ideal and that Dayhoff “clearly was not” as attentive as desirable. Nonetheless, it emphasized that:

• Illinois’ legislature made a policy choice to insulate public schools from liability for negligent supervision.
• Courts are obliged to enforce that choice, even where the facts evoke sympathy for injured students.

If stakeholders perceive that section 3‑108 creates too much insulation for negligent supervision, the remedy lies with the legislature—by amending the statute’s scope or the definition of willful and wanton conduct—not with the courts.

VIII. Conclusion

Haase v. Kankakee School District 111 stands as an important reaffirmation of the broad protection the Tort Immunity Act affords Illinois school districts and teachers for injuries arising from everyday school supervision. The Court held that:

• The plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence showed, at most, negligent supervision during a routine gym-class soccer game, not willful and wanton conduct.
• Section 3‑108 therefore immunized both the teacher and the District from liability.
• Unpled theories of district-level willful and wanton conduct—such as failure to disseminate disciplinary histories—cannot be used to defeat summary judgment.
• Uncontradicted deposition testimony regarding an employee’s lack of knowledge must be taken as true absent countervailing evidence.

In the broader legal landscape, Haase solidifies a line of Illinois precedent that reserves “willful and wanton” findings for cases involving clearly dangerous activities or known, specific threats, coupled with conscious disregard. Ordinary lapses in supervision—however regrettable—remain within the sphere of immunity. For litigants, it underscores the importance of careful pleading, robust evidentiary development, and a nuanced understanding of the Tort Immunity Act’s stringent requirements.