Estate of Lepp: Finality, Timeliness, and Rule 54(b) in Unsupervised Probate Appeals

I. Introduction

The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in Estate of Lepp, 2025 ND 216, is a jurisdictional opinion that never reaches the substantive family and property disputes underlying the case. Instead, it delivers an important procedural message:

• Appeals in unsupervised probate administrations are tightly constrained by rules of finality, timeliness, and Rule 54(b) certification.
• Orders removing and appointing personal representatives are independently appealable, but only if appealed within the Rule 4 deadline, which can be triggered by the appellant’s actual knowledge, even without formal notice of entry.
• Other probate orders that resolve “some, but not all” of a party’s disputes in the estate are not appealable absent Rule 54(b) certification where other claims remain pending.

The dispute arose out of the estate of Marvin C. Lepp and extensive intra-family conflict:

• Murray J. Lepp and Michael L. Lepp were initially co-personal representatives.
• Various heirs, especially Maureen J. Lepp, challenged Murray’s conduct, including a contract for deed on “Section 6” farmland and alleged unpaid or misallocated rents.
• The district court ultimately removed both co-personal representatives and appointed Dacotah Bank as successor personal representative, and also issued a series of orders adverse to Murray on contract-for-deed and rent issues.

Murray appealed a broad cluster of orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety, holding:

1. The appeal from the order appointing Dacotah Bank as successor personal representative was untimely under N.D.R.App.P. 4.
2. The remaining orders were non-final for purposes of appeal in an unsupervised probate because multiple claims and disputes involving Murray remained unresolved and there was no N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Disposition

The Supreme Court:

• Dismissed the appeal in full for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

B. Core Holdings

1. Untimely appeal of appointment of successor personal representative.
   
   • The proceeding to remove the former personal representatives and appoint Dacotah Bank was a formal proceeding in an unsupervised administration and produced a concluding order on that petition.
   • That order was independently appealable, but Murray failed to appeal within 60 days of his actual knowledge of the order, as required by N.D.R.App.P. 4.
2. Non-appealability of other orders absent Rule 54(b).
   
   • In an unsupervised probate, while each “proceeding” is in principle independent, an order that adjudicates only some of one party’s claims or disputes is not immediately appealable unless the district court grants Rule 54(b) certification.
   • Murray’s disputes with the estate—especially involving rent, distribution, and asserted claims against the estate—remained unresolved when he appealed.
   • No party requested, and the district court did not issue, a Rule 54(b) certification; thus the orders concerning:
     • cancellation of the contract for deed,
     • summary judgment rulings,
     • rent determinations and forfeitures,
     • denial of reconsideration, and
     • attorney’s fees
     were not presently appealable.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Estate Administration

• Marvin C. Lepp died intestate. An application for informal appointment of a personal representative was filed June 2, 2017.
• On June 5, 2017, the district court issued a statement of informal appointment and letters of administration appointing sons Murray and Michael as co-personal representatives.
• The administration proceeded as an unsupervised administration under the Uniform Probate Code as adopted in North Dakota.

B. Growing Disputes and Motions to Remove Personal Representatives

• On February 2, 2023, Murray moved to remove Michael as co-personal representative.
• Maureen responded:
  • She did not oppose Michael’s removal, but
  • She requested removal of both co-personal representatives and appointment of an independent professional personal representative, with an accounting.
• Michael joined Maureen’s request to remove both co-personal representatives.
• After a July 19, 2023 hearing, the district court:
  • Removed both Murray and Michael as co-personal representatives; and
  • Allowed the heirs thirty days to nominate a professional successor.
  • Ultimately appointed Dacotah Bank as successor personal representative in an order entered October 16, 2023.

C. Contract for Deed on “Section 6” and Related Litigation

• On May 26, 2023, Maureen, “as an interested person as an heir,” filed a petition to cancel Murray’s contract for deed on Section 6 property owned by the estate.
• On July 18, 2023, Murray paid $100,000 to the estate account as a purported payoff of the contract balance.
• On August 16, 2023, Murray moved to dismiss Maureen’s petition, arguing she lacked standing.
• After an October 10, 2023 hearing, the district court denied Murray’s motion to dismiss.
• On June 18, 2024, both Murray and Maureen filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the petition to cancel the contract for deed.
• On September 5, 2024, the district court:
  • Granted Maureen’s motion for summary judgment, holding Murray had defaulted on the contract for deed;
  • Cancelled Murray’s interest in the contract for deed; and
  • Found Murray’s $100,000 payoff payment was voidable.

D. Accounting by Dacotah Bank and Motion to Reconsider

• On October 3, 2024, Dacotah Bank filed an accounting (dated September 11, 2024) showing it had:
  • Moved $279,565 in principal cash from the original estate account—including Murray’s $100,000 payment—to the Bank’s estate account; and
  • Spent those funds.
• Murray moved to reconsider the order cancelling the contract for deed, arguing the estate’s acceptance and expenditure of the payment undermined the basis for cancellation.
• The district court denied reconsideration on November 6, 2024.

E. Rent and Forfeiture Order

• The district court addressed:
  • Murray’s petition against Michael for rent owing,
  • Questions about a Hometown Credit Union account, and
  • Unpaid rent that Murray allegedly owed the estate.
• On October 10, 2024, it issued an Order Regarding Rent:
  • Held that Murray’s payments to his father for 2011–2015 were forfeited;
  • Held that Murray owed rent to the estate for 2016–2024 with interest;
  • Calculated Murray’s liability as $179,493, minus:
    • The $100,000 contract-for-deed payment; and
    • $14,617 in taxes he had paid;
  • Denied Murray any credit for improvements he made to the Section 6 property.

F. Attorney’s Fees and Pending Matters

• Murray filed a notice of appeal on November 8, 2024.
• Maureen moved in the district court for an award of attorney’s fees; after a hearing, the court ordered fees to be paid by the estate (order dated February 7, 2025).
• Murray filed an amended notice of appeal on February 11, 2025, appealing eight separate orders, including:
  • Appointment of Dacotah Bank,
  • Denial of his motion to dismiss Maureen’s petition,
  • Denial of his motion to amend,
  • Second amended scheduling order,
  • Summary judgment orders (and motion to strike),
  • Rent order,
  • Denial of reconsideration, and
  • Attorney’s fee award.

Crucially, when the appeal was taken, several matters remained pending in the district court, including:

• Settlement and determination of back rent by Michael and Myron;
• Petitions concerning the sale of farm equipment and sale and partial distribution of real property to Michael;
• Unresolved claims by Murray himself that the estate owed him money (e.g., Texas property expenses, attorney’s fees for his time as personal representative, and fees for opposing Maureen’s petition); and
• No final accounting or final distribution had been approved; the estate remained open.

IV. Doctrinal Framework: Probate Administration and Appealability

A. Formal vs. Informal Proceedings

North Dakota’s probate code distinguishes between formal and informal proceedings:

• Informal proceedings (N.D.C.C. § 30.1‑01‑06(26)):
  • Handled by court personnel without notice to interested persons;
  • Limited to:
    • Admission of wills to probate, and
    • Appointment of personal representatives.
  • Do not involve adversarial adjudication.
• Formal proceedings (N.D.C.C. § 30.1‑01‑06(21)):
  • Proceedings “conducted before a judge with notice to interested persons”;
  • Include disputes over appointment, removal, accountings, contract enforcement, rent claims, etc.;
  • Are adjudicatory in nature.

The Court in Lepp emphasizes, following Estate of Ketterling and Estate of Finstrom, that although the estate began with an informal appointment in 2017, the later motions, hearings, and contested proceedings (removal of co-personal representatives; cancellation of contract for deed; rent order; attorney’s fees) were formal proceedings because they involved notice, hearings, and adjudication.

B. Supervised vs. Unsupervised Administration

The code also distinguishes:

• Supervised administration (N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1‑16):
  • A single, continuous, in rem judicial proceeding;
  • The court exercises ongoing supervisory authority over all aspects of estate administration from opening to final distribution;
  • Finality for appeal purposes usually hinges on a final distribution order and discharge of the personal representative.
• Unsupervised administration (N.D.C.C. § 30.1‑12‑07):
  • Default posture unless someone petitions for supervised administration (N.D.C.C. § 30.1‑16‑02);
  • Each “proceeding before the court is independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate,” unless it is converted to supervised;
  • Formal and informal proceedings may be combined as needed to obtain “authority and protection” for administration (Editorial Board Comment to § 30.1‑12‑07).

In Lepp, no party ever petitioned for supervised administration. The case remained an unsupervised administration, but with a series of formal proceedings layered onto the initial informal appointment.

C. Appealability Framework

Appeals in North Dakota are wholly statutory:

• Only final judgments and certain enumerated orders are appealable (N.D.C.C. § 28‑27‑02).
• Under § 28‑27‑02(5), an order is appealable if it “involves the merits of an action or some part thereof.”
• N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) restricts appeals in multi-claim or multi-party actions where fewer than all claims or parties are adjudicated; in such cases:
  • An appeal is permitted only if:
    • The district court expressly directs entry of judgment as to fewer than all claims/parties; and
    • Expressly determines there is “no just reason for delay.”

The key tension in probate is how to apply these civil-appeal rules to an unsupervised administration where “each proceeding” is theoretically independent, yet multiple, overlapping disputes among the same parties may arise. Estate of Starcher, Estate of Ketterling, Estate of Kish, and now Estate of Lepp address that interaction.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Estate of Lepp

A. Characterization of the Proceedings

The Court begins by classifying the nature of the probate administration:

1. Initial phase – Informal, unsupervised administration.
   The estate was opened in 2017 by informal appointment under N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1‑14. That “proceeding for appointment” concluded with the June 5, 2017 statement of informal appointment and letters of administration.
2. Later phase – Formal proceedings within unsupervised administration.
   Beginning with Murray’s 2023 motion to remove Michael (filed under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2, which by rule applies to formal proceedings under the Uniform Probate Code), the case took on the characteristics of a formal probate. But crucially, no one ever petitioned for supervised administration under N.D.C.C. § 30.1‑16‑02. Thus the proceedings remained formal but unsupervised.

That classification matters because:

• In supervised administration, appealability usually turns on the final wrap-up of the estate (e.g., final distribution and discharge).
• In unsupervised administration, each proceeding is independent, so some orders in particular proceedings can be final and appealable even while the estate remains open.

B. Untimely Appeal of the Order Appointing Dacotah Bank

Dacotah Bank argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the October 16, 2023 order appointing it as successor personal representative because the notice of appeal was not timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4. The Court agreed.

1. Independent and Concluding Order

The Court, relying on Jarmin v. Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children, 450 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1990), and Estate of Kjorvestad, 304 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1981):

• Recognized that the proceeding to remove and appoint personal representatives is independent of other issues such as final accountings;
• Held that the order removing personal representatives and appointing Dacotah Bank was a concluding order on the petition for appointment/removal and thus was independently appealable when entered.

2. Timeliness and “Actual Knowledge”

Under N.D.R.App.P. 4:

• A party must file a notice of appeal within 60 days after service of notice of entry of judgment or order.
• In the absence of formal service of notice of entry, the 60-day period is triggered by the appealing party’s “actual knowledge” of the order, if that actual knowledge is evidenced on the record by the party’s action. (Estate of Vendsel, 2017 ND 71, ¶ 6).

Applying that standard, the Court found:

• The order appointing Dacotah Bank was entered October 16, 2023.
• No party served a notice of entry of that order.
• However, Murray filed documents in the estate proceedings by July 25, 2024, explicitly acknowledging Dacotah Bank’s appointment.
• Those filings evidenced his actual knowledge of the order as of that date.
• Murray’s initial notice of appeal was filed November 8, 2024, more than 60 days after July 25.

Accordingly, the appeal of the appointment order was untimely, and the Court lacked jurisdiction to review it.

C. Appealability of Remaining Orders: Rule 54(b) and Unresolved Claims

The more intricate part of the opinion concerns whether the other challenged orders (contract-for-deed cancellation, rent order, summary judgment rulings, denial of reconsideration, attorney’s fees) were appealable at this stage of the unsupervised probate.

1. Independence of Proceedings in Unsupervised Administration

The Court reiterates the statutory principle in N.D.C.C. § 30.1‑12‑07 and prior caselaw:

• “In an unsupervised administration, each proceeding before the court is independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate.” (Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 1989)).
• Thus, “there needs to be finality, for purposes of appealability, only for the proceeding being appealed.” (Estate of Kish, 2024 ND 76, ¶ 8; Estate of Ketterling, 2016 ND 190, ¶ 7).

However, the Court immediately adds a significant qualifier, drawn from Ketterling:

“In an unsupervised probate, an order or judgment determining some, but not all, of one person's claims or disputes in an estate is not appealable without a Rule 54(b) certification.” (Estate of Ketterling, 2016 ND 190, ¶ 9).

In other words:

• Each petition or proceeding in unsupervised probate may be independent, but
• Where a single party has multiple, interrelated claims or disputes in the estate, an order resolving only some of those disputes is not inherently final as to that party.
• Appeal in that multi-claim context requires Rule 54(b) certification.

2. Existence of Unresolved Claims and Disputes Involving Murray

The Court then canvasses the outstanding issues at the time of the appeal:

• Murray had filed a petition seeking rent from Michael owed to the estate;
• Subsequent to the initial appeal, Dacotah Bank and Michael reached an agreement settling Michael’s back rent, and the Bank filed further petitions regarding back rent allegedly owed by Michael and Myron;
• Dacotah Bank petitioned for:
  • Sale of farm equipment;
  • Sale of real property to Michael and partial distribution of the estate.
• The Bank had solicited claims for debts owed by the estate; Murray responded by asserting multiple items:
  • Expenses on Texas property;
  • Attorney’s fees incurred while he served as personal representative;
  • Addition attorney’s fees allegedly incurred in defending against Maureen’s “frivolous” petition.
• The petition for partial distribution, and these alleged debts, remained unresolved.
• No final accounting or final distribution had been approved; the estate remained open.

Taken together, these show that while some matters had been resolved against Murray (e.g., cancellation of his contract for deed, determination of his rental liability, attorney’s fee obligations), other claims involving him—both in his favor and potentially against him—remained pending.

3. Absence of Rule 54(b) Certification

The Court underscores that:

• No party requested Rule 54(b) certification regarding the orders appealed.
• The district court did not make the requisite 54(b) findings or direct entry of final judgment as to any subset of claims.

The Supreme Court notes a consistent line of North Dakota authorities dismissing appeals where:

• Multiple claims or parties remain; and
• No Rule 54(b) certification has been obtained.

Cases cited include, among others:

• Sickler v. Kirkwood, 1997 ND 40, 560 N.W.2d 532;
• Dixon v. Dixon, 2021 ND 94, 960 N.W.2d 764;
• Morales v. Weatherford U.S., L.P., 2024 ND 81, 6 N.W.3d 657;
• Pinks v. Kelsch, 2024 ND 15, 2 N.W.3d 704;
• Holverson v. Lundberg, 2015 ND 225, 869 N.W.2d 146;
• Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 463 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1990);
• Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1988).

The Court also highlights that parties in probate bear the burden of requesting Rule 54(b) certification if they wish to seek an interlocutory appeal. (Estate of Stuckle, 427 N.W.2d 96 (N.D. 1988)).

4. Resulting Jurisdictional Conclusion

The Court concludes:

• “Many but not all claims by and against Murray Lepp have been resolved.”
• “Even in an unsupervised probate, the unresolved claims by or against a party prevent immediate appellate review without N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification.”
• No such certification was sought or granted here.

Therefore, just as with the appointment order (which was untimely), the Court lacked jurisdiction over the remainder of the appealed orders because they were not yet final for purposes of appeal in this multi-claim, multi-party unsupervised estate.

VI. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Dixon v. Dixon, 2021 ND 94

Dixon is cited for the foundational proposition that appellate jurisdiction is statutory, and that:

• Only final judgments and specific orders enumerated by statute are appealable.
• Even if an order might be within an enumerated category, Rule 54(b) must be satisfied where applicable; otherwise the appellate court lacks jurisdiction.

This underscores the two-step analysis:

1. Does the order fit a statutory category of appealable orders (e.g., under § 28‑27‑02)?
2. If so, and the action involves multiple claims or parties, has Rule 54(b) been properly invoked and satisfied?

B. Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 1989)

Starcher is central to understanding formal vs informal proceedings and supervised vs unsupervised administration. It explains that:

• In supervised administration, the estate is managed through a single, continuous in rem proceeding until final distribution and discharge.
• In unsupervised administration, by contrast:
  • “Each proceeding before the court is independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate.”
  • Finality for appeal in unsupervised administration attaches to each concluding order on a particular petition, rather than to a single global order at the end of the estate.

Lepp relies on Starcher but reads it together with later decisions (Ketterling, Kish) to refine how “each proceeding” is defined when a single party is entangled in multiple related disputes.

C. Estate of Ketterling, 2016 ND 190, 885 N.W.2d 85

Ketterling contributes the key qualification that Lepp emphasizes:

• “When a judgment or order in an unsupervised probate does not settle all claims and disputes between the parties, but leaves open more litigation between the same litigants … and augers more appeals, the judgment or order is not appealable without a Rule 54(b) certification.”

Lepp adopts this principle and concretely applies it to Murray’s multiple unresolved disputes with the estate.

D. Estate of Kish, 2024 ND 76, 5 N.W.3d 814

Kish reaffirms that in unsupervised administration, “each proceeding is independent” and finality is evaluated at the proceeding level. Lepp quotes Kish but then emphasizes that, per Ketterling, Rule 54(b) still applies where some disputes involving a particular party remain unresolved.

E. Estate of Finstrom, 2020 ND 227, and Estate of Smith, 2021 ND 238

Both cases recognize that extensive litigation can “convert” what began as an informal proceeding into a formal probate proceeding. Lepp cites these cases to support its characterization of the later disputes (removal, rent, contract for deed) as formal proceedings, reinforcing that those orders embroil the estate in adversarial adjudication and are not mere ministerial acts.

F. Jarmin v. Shriners Hospitals, 450 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1990)

Jarmin supports the proposition that:

• An appeal from an order removing a personal representative is independent of appeals concerning final accountings, and
• Such removal/appointment orders can be directly appealed as concluding orders on that petition.

Lepp uses Jarmin to classify the October 16, 2023 order appointing Dacotah Bank as a final, independently appealable order—though ultimately untimely appealed.

G. Estate of Vendsel, 2017 ND 71

Vendsel is pivotal for the “actual knowledge” doctrine:

• Where no notice of entry is served, the time to appeal may still be triggered by actual knowledge evidenced on the record by action of the appealing party.

Lepp applies this doctrine to hold that Murray’s appeal clock started when he filed documents acknowledging Dacotah Bank’s appointment, not when he later decided to challenge the order.

H. Estate of Lutz, 1999 ND 121, 595 N.W.2d 590

Lutz is cited for the caution that Rule 54(b) certification should not be granted lightly in probate; even when requested, the Supreme Court may find certification improvident if substantial interrelated claims remain pending. Lepp references this to signal that, even if Murray had sought 54(b) certification, it might not necessarily have been appropriate given the unresolved web of claims.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Personal Representatives and Heirs

• Track appeal deadlines even without notice of entry. Once a party acts on an order (e.g., recognizes a new personal representative or complies with an order), that action can be used to prove “actual knowledge” and start the 60-day clock.
• Expect limited avenues for piecemeal appellate review. Where there are multiple unresolved disputes involving a particular heir or former personal representative, interlocutory appeals will typically be barred absent Rule 54(b) certification.
• Strategic decisions must account for finality. Parties should consider whether to:
  • Wait until more claims are resolved and the estate is closer to closure; or
  • Seek targeted Rule 54(b) certification for specific orders that present pressing or dispositive issues.

B. For Counsel in Probate Litigation

• Clarify the nature of each proceeding. Is a motion or petition part of an independent proceeding, or one of several interrelated disputes involving the same party?
• Advise on appeal windows. After significant orders (e.g., appointment/removal, summary judgment, fee awards), counsel must:
  • Determine the date of notice of entry or actual knowledge; and
  • Evaluate whether immediate appeal is important enough to justify seeking 54(b) certification.
• When appropriate, affirmatively seek Rule 54(b) certification. Without it, appeals will almost certainly be dismissed if other claims involving the same party are still pending.
• Be cautious in designing the litigation strategy. Aggressively multiplying petitions and cross-claims can:
  • Complicate the finality analysis;
  • Delay appealability of adverse rulings; and
  • Increase transaction costs for the estate.

C. For District Courts

• Recognize when formal proceedings are proliferating. Courts should be aware when an informal probate has effectively transformed into a complex formal litigation and ensure the record is clear about:
  • What petitions are pending;
  • What claims remain unresolved; and
  • Which orders completely dispose of a particular proceeding or claim.
• Use Rule 54(b) judiciously. Courts should grant 54(b) certification only where:
  • The adjudicated claims are truly separable from remaining claims; and
  • There is “no just reason for delay” in appellate review.

VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Informal” vs. “Formal” Probate Proceedings

• Informal probate is like an administrative process:
  • Used mainly to appoint a personal representative or admit a will;
  • Typically no hearing, no arguments, minimal court involvement;
  • Not designed for disputes.
• Formal probate is like a civil lawsuit:
  • There are petitions, motions, hearings, evidence, and argument;
  • The court makes adjudicatory decisions resolving disputes;
  • Orders have binding effect on the parties and can be appealed (subject to finality rules).

B. “Supervised” vs. “Unsupervised” Administration

• Supervised administration:
  • The court manages the estate from start to finish in one continuous proceeding;
  • Almost all significant acts by the personal representative require court approval;
  • Appeals usually focus on big-picture, end-of-case orders.
• Unsupervised administration:
  • The personal representative mostly acts without ongoing court approval;
  • Parties can bring separate petitions when disputes arise;
  • Each petition is its own “mini-case” for certain purposes—but not always for appeal, if claims for one party are spread across several such mini-cases.

C. “Concluding Order” in an Unsupervised Probate

A “concluding order” is an order that completely resolves a particular petition or proceeding. For example:

• If there is a petition to remove a personal representative, an order either:
  • removing them and appointing a successor; or
  • denying removal;
  is typically a concluding order on that petition and thus a candidate for appeal (subject to timeliness).

In Lepp, the appointment of Dacotah Bank was a concluding order on the removal/appointment proceeding.

D. Rule 54(b) Certification

Rule 54(b) is designed for cases with:

• Multiple claims; or
• Multiple parties; or
• Both.

When an order resolves fewer than all claims or parties, the court can allow an immediate appeal by:

1. Expressly directing entry of judgment as to the resolved claims; and
2. Making an express finding that “there is no just reason for delay.”

Without that certification:

• The order is treated as interlocutory (non-final); and
• No appeal lies until all remaining claims are resolved.

In Lepp, multiple disputes involving Murray remained pending. Without 54(b), the orders on contract for deed, rent, and fees could not be appealed.

E. “Actual Knowledge” for Appeal Deadlines

If a party is supposed to be served with “notice of entry” of an order but no such notice is actually served, the law does not allow the appeal deadline to be suspended indefinitely. Instead:

• Once the record shows that the party knows about the order and acts on that knowledge (for example, by filing documents that acknowledge the order), this counts as “actual knowledge.”
• The 60-day period to file a notice of appeal begins on the date actual knowledge is evidenced in the record.

In Lepp, Murray’s filings acknowledging Dacotah Bank as successor personal representative by July 25, 2024, started the 60-day clock, making his November 8 appeal untimely as to that order.

IX. Critical Evaluation and Broader Significance

A. Consolidation of Probate Appeal Doctrine

Estate of Lepp does not dramatically change North Dakota law, but it consolidates and clarifies a set of principles that had been emerging across prior decisions:

• Informal administrations can and often do evolve into complex, formal litigations without ever becoming supervised administrations.
• Even in unsupervised estates, Rule 54(b) is a critical gatekeeper when a single party’s disputes are fragmented across multiple petitions.
• The actual knowledge rule for appeal deadlines applies with full force to probate orders, preventing parties from “sitting on” knowledge of orders and then later attempting to appeal them as if newly discovered.

B. Practical Restraints on Piecemeal Appeals

The Court’s insistence on 54(b) certification for partial resolutions of a party’s claims serves several purposes:

• It prevents the Supreme Court from becoming entangled in serial, overlapping appeals from the same estate;
• It encourages consolidated and orderly resolution of probate disputes at the trial court level before appellate review; and
• It protects estates from the expense and delay associated with piecemeal appellate litigation.

From a litigant’s perspective, however, this can be frustrating: substantial adverse rulings (such as cancellation of valuable contract rights or large rent judgments) may be effectively unreviewable for a time, as other aspects of the estate are worked out.

C. Unresolved Substantive Issues

Because the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, it did not reach any of the potentially important substantive issues, such as:

• The scope of an heir’s standing to petition to cancel a contract for deed held by another heir;
• The effect of an estate’s acceptance and expenditure of a payment later deemed “voidable”;
• The proper treatment of a vendee’s improvements to estate property following contract cancellation; or
• The interplay between rent determinations and forfeiture of contract payments.

Those questions remain in the domain of the district court in this case, and may reach the Supreme Court in a later, properly certified and timely appeal.

X. Conclusion

Estate of Lepp, 2025 ND 216, is a procedural decision with significant implications for probate practice in North Dakota. Its key contributions are:

• Reaffirming that orders removing or appointing personal representatives in an unsupervised administration are independent, concluding orders—but they must be appealed within 60 days of actual knowledge under N.D.R.App.P. 4.
• Clarifying that, despite the independence of proceedings in unsupervised administration, an order that resolves only some of a party’s claims or disputes in the estate is not appealable absent Rule 54(b) certification when other claims remain.
• Emphasizing the responsibility of probate litigants to:
  • Monitor and act promptly on appeal deadlines; and
  • Seek 54(b) certification where necessary to obtain timely appellate review.

By dismissing Murray Lepp’s appeal in its entirety, the Court underscores a broader theme: in complex estate disputes, controlling procedure and timing is as critical as prevailing on the merits. Practitioners who do not carefully navigate finality, timeliness, and 54(b) risks may find that substantial substantive issues never reach appellate review at all.