Detaining a Probationer on a Post-Bond Hold Without a Prompt Morrissey Hearing Plausibly Violates Due Process; Jail Administrators May Be Liable for Continuing Unlawful Detention

Nonprecedential disposition from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Steven Miller Johnson v. Shana Tims, et al., No. 24-2805 (Oct. 27, 2025)

Introduction

In this nonprecedential but instructive order, the Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of a pro se § 1983 complaint and remanded for service and further proceedings. Steven Miller Johnson alleged that Wisconsin probation officials and the Milwaukee County jail superintendent detained him for over a year on a probation hold without affording him a preliminary probable-cause hearing on the alleged probation violation, even though a state judge had ordered him released on a signature bond on his new criminal case. The district court dismissed at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, but the appellate court concluded Johnson plausibly pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation and adequately linked each defendant to the alleged deprivation.

The case sits at the intersection of probation-revocation due process (Morrissey/Gagnon), the effect of bail orders on detention authority (Williams v. Dart), and supervisory and jail-official liability for continued detention after the legal basis to hold a person lapses (Martinez v. Santiago). Although injunctive relief was moot due to Johnson’s later conviction and sentence, his damages claims survive screening. The panel also flagged two issues for remand: whether his allegations also support a Fourth Amendment theory (Manuel v. City of Joliet) and whether sentence credit awarded on the criminal case may limit or defeat damages (Ewell v. Toney).

Summary of the Opinion

Johnson, an Illinois probationer supervised in Wisconsin under the Interstate Commission on Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS), was arrested in November 2023 for a new Wisconsin felony OWI. Five days later, a Wisconsin court released him on a signature bond. He remained jailed on a probation hold and, according to the complaint, never received a preliminary probable-cause hearing on the alleged probation violation. Over ensuing months, Johnson pressed for release and a hearing, contacting his agent (Shana Tims), the DCC regional chief (Nicole McDade), and the jail superintendent (Chantell Jewell). Tims wrote that they had “Administrator approval” to hold Johnson until at least his next court date while waiting for Illinois; Jewell never responded through her office.

The district court dismissed all claims at screening. On appeal, Johnson pursued only the constitutional claim for damages arising from detention without process after the bond order. The Seventh Circuit:

Held that Johnson plausibly alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation because a probationer held for revocation purposes is entitled to a prompt preliminary hearing (Morrissey/Gagnon), which he says he never received.
Accepted that he would not have been detained but for the probation hold because the court released him on bond.
Concluded he plausibly alleged personal involvement by Tims and McDade (the probation officials) and by Jewell (the jail superintendent) in causing or perpetuating the detention without process.
Declined to resolve absolute-immunity questions at screening, explaining that functional analysis requires a fuller record.
Observed that the district court may consider on remand whether the facts also state a Fourth Amendment claim and whether sentence credit on the later-imposed sentence affects damages.

Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissal, directed service, and remanded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973): These foundational cases establish that parolees and probationers possess a protected liberty interest in conditional release and suffer a “grievous loss” upon revocation. Due process requires a preliminary probable-cause hearing “as promptly as convenient after arrest” to determine whether a violation occurred. The panel applied these standards directly to Johnson’s claim that he was held on a probation hold without any preliminary hearing.
United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1976): Reinforces that probationers detained for revocation are entitled to a preliminary probable-cause hearing. It bolsters the panel’s conclusion that the lack of such a hearing can state a due process claim.
Williams v. Dart, 967 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2020): “Bail orders terminate law enforcement’s authority to seize on the same charges.” The panel used this principle to confirm that after Johnson’s release on a signature bond, detention had to rest on some other lawful authority. The purported authority was the probation hold—triggering Morrissey/Gagnon procedural protections.
Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753 (7th Cir. 2023); Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545 (7th Cir. 2023); Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331 (7th Cir. 2022): These cases articulate the Rule 12(b)(6)-style pleading standard at the § 1915A screening stage: a plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts to suggest a plausible claim, with reasonable inferences drawn in his favor.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973): The district court relied on Preiser to say that Johnson could seek release only via habeas. The panel clarified that, after the injunctive request became moot, Johnson’s damages claim under § 1983 for unconstitutional detention can proceed—a point consistent with later § 1983 jurisprudence.
Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017) and 903 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2018): Manuel recognizes that pretrial detention unsupported by probable cause can be actionable under the Fourth Amendment. The panel suggested the district court consider on remand whether Johnson’s allegations also fit a Fourth Amendment theory, in addition to the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
Martinez v. Santiago, 51 F.4th 258, 262 (7th Cir. 2022); Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 1992): These cases stand for the due-process principle that government officials cannot continue to hold a detainee after learning they lack authority to do so. The panel used this line of authority to sustain the claim against the jail superintendent, Jewell, given plausible allegations that she knew of the circumstances and failed to release Johnson when state law permitted release after missed deadlines.
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2015): Multiple complaints and communications can support a reasonable inference that a supervisory official knew of the issue. The panel relied on this to infer Jewell’s knowledge from complaints made to officers under her supervision and a promise to inform her.
Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2016): Cited by comparison for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment when officials fail to investigate prolonged detention; used to frame the concept of culpable inaction in unlawful-detention cases.
Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 649–51 (7th Cir. 2018): Address absolute immunity for probation officers performing quasi-judicial functions. The panel left immunity issues unresolved pending a fuller record for functional analysis.
Ghelf v. Town of Wheatland, 132 F.4th 456, 472 (7th Cir. 2025); Ollison v. Gossett, 136 F.4th 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2025): Recent circuit authority cited for personal-involvement pleading standards: a plaintiff must allege facts permitting an inference of a causal connection or affirmative link, and that supervisors may be liable if they “turn a blind eye” to constitutional violations by subordinates.
United States v. Shorter, 27 F.4th 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2022): Mootness of injunctive relief when circumstances change (here, Johnson’s later conviction and sentence).
Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017): Sentence credit may affect the availability or scope of damages for pretrial detention; the panel suggested the district court assess whether Johnson’s 423 days of sentence credit defeats or limits his damages claim.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in four main steps:

Plausible constitutional deprivation under the Fourteenth Amendment: Johnson alleged that, after the state court ordered his release on a signature bond, he remained jailed solely on a probation hold and never received a preliminary probable-cause hearing on the alleged violation. Under Morrissey/Gagnon and Seventh Circuit authority (Sciuto), that preliminary hearing must occur “as promptly as convenient after arrest.” Accepting Johnson’s factual allegations as true (Hess/Balle/Shaw), the prolonged absence of a preliminary revocation hearing states a plausible due process violation.
Effect of the bond order and the distinct legal basis for detention: Williams v. Dart teaches that a bail order ends law enforcement’s authority to detain on the same charges. Here, five days after arrest, the Wisconsin court ordered Johnson released on a signature bond. Thus, any continued detention had to rest on a different lawful ground. The asserted ground was the probation hold, which carries its own procedural safeguards. The court took judicial notice of the state docket confirming the bond order and accepted Johnson’s position that, but for the hold, he would have been released. The lack of a preliminary revocation hearing therefore matters constitutionally.
Personal involvement and causation: At the pleadings stage, Johnson had to allege facts allowing a reasonable inference of a causal link between each defendant and the deprivation. He did so:
- Agent Tims: She acknowledged “Administrator approval” to continue holding Johnson months after arrest, pending an update from Illinois, yet no preliminary revocation hearing occurred. The letter permits an inference that she helped perpetuate the detention without process.
- Regional Chief McDade: Johnson alleged that his multiple pleas to McDade went unanswered, and that she “turned a blind eye” to her subordinate’s failure to secure a hearing or seek release—sufficient at this stage to plead a supervisory causal link.
- Superintendent Jewell: While she did not conduct revocation hearings, the Due Process Clause prohibits continuing to hold a detainee after learning of a lack of authority. Johnson’s repeated complaints to jail staff, coupled with the promise to inform Jewell, support an inference of knowledge. Wisconsin law authorizes jail administrators to release probationers if statutory hearing deadlines are missed. Her alleged inaction, despite authority to remedy the detention, plausibly states a claim under Martinez/Sivard.
Defenses and limiting principles reserved: The panel declined to dismiss on immunity grounds at screening, noting that absolute immunity for probation officials is context-specific and limited to functions analogous to judging (Dawson/Tobey). It also flagged two issues for the district court: whether the facts also support a Fourth Amendment pretrial-detention claim (Manuel) and whether the award of 423 days of sentence credit toward Johnson’s 21-month sentence affects or defeats damages (Ewell).

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential, this order provides concrete guidance for practitioners and lower courts in several recurring settings:

Probation holds after bond: When a criminal court orders release on bond, any continued detention must rest on an independent legal basis. If that basis is a probation hold, the probationer is owed a Morrissey/Gagnon preliminary probable-cause hearing “as promptly as convenient after arrest.” Prolonged detention without that hearing is plausibly unconstitutional.
“Waiting on the sending state” under ICAOS does not eclipse due process: The panel implicitly rebuffs the notion that a receiving state may hold an out-of-state probationer indefinitely while awaiting the sending state’s decision to retake or revoke under ICAOS. State officials must still honor federal due process minima and applicable state deadlines (e.g., Wis. Stat. § 302.335).
Liability of jail administrators: Jail leadership may incur liability for ongoing detention when they know (or can fairly be inferred to know) they lack authority to hold a person, especially where state law empowers release after missed hearing deadlines. Complaints routed through subordinates can establish knowledge at the pleading stage.
Supervisory liability via deliberate inaction: “Turning a blind eye” can suffice for personal involvement when supervisors ignore concrete notice that subordinates are perpetuating a constitutional violation.
Screening-stage guardrails: Courts should be cautious about resolving absolute-immunity defenses and causation disputes at § 1915A screening without a record suitable for functional analysis.
Fourth Amendment overlay: Manuel’s framework may supplement, not displace, due process theories in unlawful-detention cases arising from revocation holds post-bond. Expect litigants to plead both.
Damages measurement: Sentence credit can complicate damages for pretrial detention. Parties should develop the factual nexus between credit awarded and time allegedly attributable to unconstitutional detention.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probation Hold

A probation hold is an administrative custody status used to detain a probationer for alleged violations while revocation is considered. It is separate from detention on the new criminal charges. Even if a court sets bond on the new case, a probation hold can keep the person in custody—if it complies with constitutional and statutory procedures.

Preliminary Revocation (Morrissey/Gagnon) Hearing

Before revocation, a parolee/probationer is entitled to a prompt, informal preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a violation occurred. It provides notice of alleged violations and an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. It is distinct from the criminal case’s preliminary hearing.

Signature Bond

A signature bond is a release condition permitting a defendant to remain at liberty without posting cash, conditioned on appearing in court and following other rules. Once a bond order issues, detention on those same criminal charges generally ends unless another lawful basis exists.

ICAOS (Interstate Commission on Adult Offender Supervision)

ICAOS governs interstate supervision of probationers and parolees. The sending state retains ultimate authority to retake or revoke supervision; the receiving state supervises day-to-day compliance. While ICAOS sets timelines (e.g., for retaking decisions), it does not displace federal due process requirements owed to supervisees, and alleged violations of ICAOS itself typically sound in state law, not § 1983.

Absolute Immunity vs. Qualified Immunity

Some officials (including probation officers) can claim absolute immunity for functions closely tied to the judicial process (e.g., presenting violation reports to a tribunal), but not for administrative or investigative tasks. Determining the proper immunity requires looking at what the official actually did—the “functional” approach. Qualified immunity (not resolved here) shields officials unless they violate clearly established law.

Personal Involvement and Causation

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege that each defendant personally caused or contributed to the constitutional violation. This can include direct participation, knowingly approving or prolonging unlawful detention, or turning a blind eye to known violations by subordinates.

Mootness of Injunctive Relief and Availability of Damages

When the plaintiff’s custody status changes (e.g., conviction and sentence), requests for release or injunctive relief often become moot. But damages claims for past unconstitutional detention generally remain—and may be measured or limited by factors like sentence credit.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s order in Johnson v. Tims serves as a detailed reminder—albeit nonprecedential—that:

Probationers detained on revocation holds are entitled to a prompt preliminary probable-cause hearing under Morrissey/Gagnon.
A bond order on new charges ends detention authority on those charges; any continued custody must be independently justified and procedurally sound.
Probation officials and jail administrators can face § 1983 liability if they help maintain or knowingly tolerate detention when the necessary process has not been provided or the legal authority to hold has lapsed.
Absolute-immunity defenses for probation officers are narrow and function-specific, often unsuitable for resolution at screening without a factual record.
Fourth Amendment theories of unlawful pretrial detention may overlap with due process claims in probation-hold contexts.
Damages issues, including the effect of sentence credit, will likely be central on remand.

The decision vacates a screening-stage dismissal and directs service, ensuring development of the factual and legal record. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of promptly securing Morrissey hearings for detained probationers, carefully documenting knowledge and decision points within probation and jail administration, and assessing potential exposure where detention persists without lawful authority or required process.

Case details: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, No. 24-2805; panel of Circuit Judges Jackson-Akiwumi, Kolar, and Maldonado; submitted Oct. 21, 2025 (without oral argument); decided Oct. 27, 2025; nonprecedential disposition; appeal from the Eastern District of Wisconsin (No. 24-cv-496-bhl, Judge Brett H. Ludwig). Relief: vacated and remanded for service and further proceedings.

Detaining a Probationer on a Post-Bond Hold Without a Prompt Morrissey Hearing Plausibly Violates Due Process; Jail Administrators May Be Liable for Continuing Unlawful Detention (Johnson v. Tims, 7th Cir. 2025)