O R D E R
Steven Johnson appeals the dismissal of his complaint against two Wisconsin probation officers and a jail superintendent for violating his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson alleges the defendants detained him for over a year on a probation hold without a preliminary hearing. The * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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district court dismissed his complaint at screening for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. But because Johnson plausibly states a claim for a violation of his right to due process, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. At this stage in the proceedings, we accept as true Johnson's factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. See Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753, 756-57 (7th Cir. 2023). We may also take judicial notice of the court records from Johnson's related criminal case in Wisconsin, State v. Johnson, No. 2023CF005515 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2023). See F ED. R. EVID. 201.
After receiving a fourth conviction for driving under the influence in Illinois, Johnson was permitted to serve his probation in his home state of Wisconsin under the compact of the Interstate Commission on Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS). But while on probation in Wisconsin in November 2023, Johnson was arrested for and charged with a fifth operating while intoxicated offense, a felony. Five days after his arrest, a Wisconsin judge ordered him released on a signature bond. But Johnson remained in jail on a probation hold. Because Johnson was an out- of-state probationer, Johnson's probation agent, Shana Tims, told him she needed to inform Illinois of the new charge and determine if Illinois planned to retake him and revoke his probation. See ICAOS Rule 4.109.
After the ten-day deadline for Illinois to respond under the interstate compact passed, see id., Johnson began advocating for his release. He mailed a formal request for reinstatement of his probation to Nicole McDade, the regional chief of the Division of Community Corrections (DCC), in January 2024, see W IS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 328.26; had a friend call McDade in February; and contacted other correctional officials to no avail. In March, Tims wrote to Johnson that the DCC was waiting for an update from Illinois and had "Administrator approval" to detain him until at least his next court date. Eventually, a correctional official promised to inform the jail superintendent, Chantell Jewell, about Johnson's situation. Johnson never heard from Jewell's office. And Johnson never received a preliminary probable cause hearing on his alleged probation violation.
While in jail, Johnson filed this action alleging that the defendants violated Wisconsin state law, the interstate compact, and the Constitution. Specifically, he alleged the defendants detained him beyond statutory deadlines even though the
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Wisconsin trial court ordered him released on a signature bond.†He sought a preliminary injunction ordering Jewell to release him from jail and monetary damages from Tims, McDade, and Jewell.
After a thorough review of Johnson's complaint, the district court dismissed his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). First, the court concluded that Johnson could not state a claim under Wisconsin law because the interstate compact supersedes any conflicting state law. See W IS. STAT. § 304.16(14)(a)(2). The court also reasoned that Johnson could not state a claim under the interstate compact because compliance with the compact is a matter of state law and therefore not reviewable under § 1983. Disposing of Johnson's remaining constitutional claim, the court noted that Johnson could seek release from custody only through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). The court also explained that Johnson failed to allege personal involvement of the Wisconsin defendants in Illinois's delay in responding to his violation or beginning revocation proceedings and that any defendants involved in the decision to charge Johnson with violations of Wisconsin state law would be entitled to absolute immunity. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2018).
On appeal, Johnson pursues only the constitutional claim relating to his detention without process after receiving a signature bond. Because Johnson has now been convicted of the criminal charges in Wisconsin and sentenced to a term of confinement, his request for a preliminary injunction is moot. See United States v. Shorter,
27 F.4th 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2022). So we address only his request for damages. See Manuel
v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018). We review de novo the dismissal for failure to state a claim. Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 557 (7th Cir. 2023). At this stage in the proceedings, Johnson "'need only plead sufficient facts to suggest a plausible claim for relief,' which is 'not an exacting standard.'" Id. (quoting Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 333-34 (7th Cir. 2022)). After reviewing his complaint, we identify a plausible claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A probationer has a "valuable" liberty interest in probation. Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Because a probationer suffers "a grievous loss" when the state † Johnson said that the interstate compact gave Wisconsin authority to detain him for only 40 days. ICAOS Rule 4.109. Under Wisconsin law, a probationer subject to revocation must receive a preliminary hearing within 15 working days of being detained and a final revocation hearing within 50 days. WIS. STAT. § 302.335(2)(a), (b). If no hearing occurs, a jail administrator, like Jewell, may release the probationer. See id. § 302.355(3).
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revokes probation, the state must provide minimum due process. Id. (establishing minimum due process for parole revocation proceedings); see Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (applying the Morrissey standards to probation revocation proceedings). To that end, a detained probationer is entitled to a preliminary hearing
"as promptly as convenient after arrest" to determine if there is probable cause that a violation occurred. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485.
We accept Johnson's assertion that, but for the probation hold, he would not have been detained. As the state criminal docket confirms, the trial court ordered him released on a signature bond just five days after his initial arrest. See Williams v. Dart,
967 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2020) ("[B]ail orders terminate law enforcement's authority to seize on the same charges.").
As a probationer held in custody because of pending revocation proceedings, Johnson was entitled to a preliminary probable-cause hearing on the alleged violation of probation. See United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1976). Johnson asserts that he never received that hearing, so he has plausibly alleged a constitutional deprivation. To be sure, Johnson waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the new criminal charges, and the trial court found probable cause to bind Johnson over for trial. But Johnson maintains that his signature bond was not revoked at that time, and the defendants kept him in custody on a probation hold without a preliminary hearing on the alleged probation violation.
Because Johnson has plausibly alleged that he was detained without process, we must also consider whether the defendants are personally responsible. See Ghelf v. Town of Wheatland, 132 F.4th 456, 472 (7th Cir. 2025). Johnson must plead facts that permit us to reasonably infer "some causal connection or affirmative link" between the defendants and the violation. Id.; see Hess, 72 F.4th at 758.
Johnson has plausibly alleged that Tims and McDade, the probation officers, were involved in the violation. After Johnson was ordered released on a signature bond, Tims informed Illinois of the alleged violation. In March, three months after Johnson's arrest, she wrote to Johnson telling him that "we" had yet to hear from Illinois but that
"we" had "[a]dministrator approval" to hold him until at least his next court date. Likewise, Johnson plausibly alleges that McDade, the DCC regional chief, was involved in the decision to detain him. He says that when he elevated his concerns to McDade, she repeatedly ignored his complaints about his detention, "turn[ing] a blind eye" to her subordinate's failure to offer Johnson a hearing or request his release. Ollison v. Gossett, 136 F.4th 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2025).
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Johnson also states a claim against Jewell because he has plausibly alleged that she knew he was detained unconstitutionally and yet "consciously refused to prevent"
future harm. Martinez v. Santiago, 51 F.4th 258, 262 (7th Cir. 2022). Although Jewell was not responsible for offering Johnson a hearing, we have held that "the Due Process Clause does not allow government officials to continue holding a detainee after learning that they lack authority to do so." Id. at 262 (citing Sivard v. Pulaski Cnty., 959 F.2d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 1992) (complaint plausibly alleged sheriff "knew of [the plaintiff's] wrongful detention and continued to detain him in spite of that knowledge")); cf. Figgs
v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2016) (addressing deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment when prison official failed to investigate prisoner's claims of prolonged detention).
Johnson has plausibly alleged Jewell knew of his detention. Johnson complained to multiple correctional officers under her supervision, one of whom promised to inform Jewell of Johnson's complaints. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2015) (prisoner's multiple written complaints permitted inference the warden knew of his medical condition). Further, Johnson has alleged Jewell failed to release him when she could have done so. See W IS. STAT. § 302.355(3) (authorizing jail administrators to release detained probationers denied a timely hearing). The district court was right to consider whether these defendants are immune from suit because courts must dismiss claims seeking monetary damages from defendants immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). But we are not yet prepared to conclude that immunity bars Johnson's claims. Non-judicial officers, like probation agents, are entitled to absolute immunity for only those "limited functions"
sufficiently analogous to work performed by judges. Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Tobey, 890 F.3d at 649-50 (discussing tasks for which probation officers do and do not have absolute immunity). Without the benefit of the defendants' perspective on their involvement here, we cannot attempt this functional analysis.
We make two final observations. First, although Johnson focuses his complaint on the Fourteenth Amendment, on remand the district court may consider whether Johnson's factual allegations also plausibly state a claim for relief under the Fourth Amendment. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017). Second, as we noted above, Johnson has now been convicted of the new criminal charges in Wisconsin. The trial court imposed 21 months' initial confinement. It appears that Johnson was awarded 423 days' sentence credit. This credit might account for some or all of
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Johnson's pretrial custody. The district court may consider whether this award of credit defeats any claim for damages. See Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment, DIRECT service of the complaint on the defendants, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.
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