Delegating Courtroom Security Decisions Is Error but Harmless Absent Prejudice; Departmental Policies Do Not Define Fourth Amendment Standards

Case: Joshua Lee Vinson, Sr. v. Jason DeBruin, et al. (No. 24-1188)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date: November 10, 2025

Disposition: Affirmed (Nonprecedential; citation limited by Fed. R. App. P. 32.1)

Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Joshua Lee Vinson, Sr., who alleged that Racine, Wisconsin police officers used excessive force during a 2015 traffic stop and discriminated against him based on race in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a jury returned a defense verdict on both the excessive force and equal protection claims, Vinson challenged several pretrial and trial rulings.

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order addresses: (1) pleading sufficiency for municipal liability under Monell; (2) denial and scope of recruited counsel in a civil case; (3) the adequacy of the trial court’s step-three findings under Batson; (4) courtroom security measures for an incarcerated civil litigant and the impropriety of delegating such decisions to corrections officials; (5) exclusion of police policy documents under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; and (6) whether cumulative error rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion provides a clear roadmap for trial courts and litigants on how to handle Batson inquiries, courtroom security for prisoner-litigants, and the evidentiary limits of police departmental policies in excessive-force litigation.

Summary of the Opinion

• Monell Pleading: Simply naming a municipal entity does not state a Monell claim; Vinson’s complaint lacked factual allegations that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged violation. De novo review affirmed the screening decision.
• Recruited Counsel: The district court reasonably denied early motions to recruit counsel under the Pruitt competency framework. There is no right to counsel in civil cases, and recruiting counsel twice did not obligate the court to continue searching after conflicts arose.
• Batson Challenge: The court conducted a sufficient step-three analysis by expressly crediting the officers’ race-neutral reason (juror drowsiness), even without “magic words.” No clear error in credibility findings.
• Courtroom Security: The district court erred by deferring to corrections officers on seating placement behind Vinson instead of balancing security needs against prejudice. The error was harmless because there was no actual prejudice and strong corroborative video evidence.
• Exclusion of Police Policies: Excluding departmental policies under Rule 403 was within discretion; Fourth Amendment standards are constitutional, not set by departmental regulations.
• Cumulative Error: Only one harmless error occurred; no fundamental unfairness.
• Waiver: Summary judgment challenges raised only in a reply brief were waived.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Monell Framework and Pleading:
  • Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Municipal liability attaches only where a municipal policy or custom is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
  • Sargeant v. Barfield, 87 F.4th 358 (7th Cir. 2023): On screening, courts ask whether the complaint’s factual “raw materials” plausibly suggest municipal policy causation; naming an entity is insufficient.
  • Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521 (7th Cir. 2023): Reinforces pleading requirements for Monell claims.
• Recruited Counsel:
  • Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc): District courts assess the litigant’s competence to handle the case given its difficulty when considering recruitment of counsel.
  • Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2010): Confirms application of the Pruitt standard.
  • Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2018); Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2017): No right to counsel in civil cases; even attorney error does not automatically warrant a new trial.
  • Austin v. Hansen, 139 F.4th 604 (7th Cir. 2025): Recruiting an attorney does not create a right to ongoing representation or an obligation to search indefinitely.
• Batson Challenges:
  • Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): Prohibits race-based peremptory strikes.
  • Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019): Restates the three-step Batson inquiry.
  • Carter v. City of Wauwatosa, 114 F.4th 866 (7th Cir. 2024): The trial court must make explicit step-three credibility findings; not required to use “magic words.”
  • Morgan v. City of Chicago, 822 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2016); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991): Demeanor-based credibility determinations receive great deference.
  • United States v. Lovies, 16 F.4th 493 (7th Cir. 2021): A drowsiness explanation need not be rejected merely because the court did not personally observe the juror asleep.
  • United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2009): Remand is required where the trial court makes no step-three findings.
• Courtroom Security for Prisoner-Litigants:
  • Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Amaro, 816 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1987): Restraints or security measures must be necessary to maintain courtroom security; courts must balance security needs against prejudice.
  • Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1997): Courts cannot delegate security decisions to corrections; failure to balance is error, but harmlessness turns on actual prejudice.
  • Stephenson v. Wilson, 619 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2010): Guards are a preferred alternative to visible restraints and can mitigate prejudice.
• Evidence of Departmental Policies:
  • Fed. R. Evid. 403: Permits exclusion where probative value is substantially outweighed by confusion or misleading the jury.
  • United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2017): Excessive-force claims turn on constitutional standards, not compliance with departmental regulations.
  • Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2006): Departmental policies risk confusing jurors about constitutional standards in excessive-force cases.
  • Arrington v. City of Chicago, 147 F.4th 691 (7th Cir. 2025): Confirms deferential review of evidentiary rulings.
• Cumulative Error and Waiver:
  • Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Powell, 652 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2011): Cumulative error requires multiple errors that render the trial fundamentally unfair.
  • White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547 (7th Cir. 2021): Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.

Legal Reasoning

1) Monell Claim Was Properly Rejected at Screening

The court reviewed the screening order de novo and agreed that naming the “Racine Police Department” without factual allegations connecting a municipal policy or custom to the alleged violations does not state a Monell claim. The question is plausibility: do the complaint’s facts suggest the municipality was the moving force? Here, the complaint described officers’ conduct but did not plead policy, custom, practice, or failure-to-train facts. Vinson amended once without adding such allegations, and two later motions to amend still lacked Monell-type facts. That failure doomed municipal liability.

2) Denial and Scope of Recruited Counsel Were Within Discretion

Applying Pruitt, the district court evaluated Vinson’s competence against the case’s difficulty when denying early recruitment: Vinson had personal knowledge, organized filings, and straightforward claims suitable for pro se litigation through summary judgment. Though the court later recruited two trial attorneys who withdrew due to conflicts (one health-related, one client-driven), there is no civil right to counsel. The court need not search indefinitely for replacement counsel (Austin) and permissibly used standby counsel when Vinson chose to proceed pro se at trial. Even if recruited counsel erred, that would not entitle Vinson to a new trial.

3) Batson Step Three Was Satisfied by an On-the-Record Credibility Finding

Vinson challenged a peremptory strike of a Black venire member. The officers offered a race-neutral reason: the juror fell “sound asleep, twice.” Under Carter, trial courts must complete step three by making factual findings on pretext. Here, the judge expressly stated he observed the juror as drowsy and inattentive and credited the officers’ account even though he did not personally see the juror fully asleep. That suffices. Credibility determinations about demeanor are owed deference (Hernandez/Morgan), and a drowsiness explanation is not pretextual merely because the court did not itself observe the juror asleep (Lovies). No clear error occurred.

4) Courtroom Security: Error to Defer to Corrections, But Harmless

Vinson objected to corrections officers sitting directly behind him during trial, arguing prejudice. The district court stated it would defer to corrections regarding security placement. Under Lemons, a court must itself balance security against prejudice and may not delegate that decision. The Seventh Circuit found error but deemed it harmless: Vinson was not visibly restrained before the jury, stationed guards (as opposed to shackles) are a preferred alternative (Stephenson), and strong video evidence corroborating the officers’ account undermined any claim of actual prejudice or a “substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict (Lemons). Additional prejudice arguments were waived: Vinson never raised the ankle “shock” bracelet at trial, and he conceded the juror likely did not see his handcuffs during a hallway encounter.

5) Exclusion of Police Policies Was Proper Under Rule 403

The trial court excluded departmental policies that Vinson sought to use to show the officers deviated from training/policy. In excessive-force litigation, the constitutional standard—not internal policy— controls (Brown), and introducing policies risks misleading jurors about the governing law (Thompson). The district court found minimal probative value and significant danger of confusion, a classic Rule 403 balance. The Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion.

6) Cumulative Error and Waiver

Because only one error occurred and it was harmless, there is no cumulative error rendering the trial fundamentally unfair (Christmas, Powell). Vinson also waived challenges to the summary judgment rulings by raising them for the first time in his reply brief (White).

Impact and Implications

• For pleading municipal liability: The decision underscores that plaintiffs must plead specific facts tying a policy, custom, or practice to their injuries. Naming a department or municipality without facts is inadequate.
• For pro se prisoner-litigants: Courts will deny early recruitment of counsel where the case appears manageable and filings show competence; later recruitment does not create a continuing right to representation. Maintaining workable attorney–client relations is critical, especially on the eve of trial.
• For trial judges managing Batson challenges: An explicit, on-the-record credibility assessment at step three—however concise—will be sustained on appeal even without specific “step-three” phrasing, provided the findings show the court weighed pretext.
• For courtroom security decisions: Judges must make their own record-based balancing of security need versus prejudice and may not defer to corrections. Even so, visible restraints are more problematic than stationary guards, and harmless-error analysis will focus on actual prejudice in light of the case record (including video evidence).
• For evidentiary strategy in excessive-force cases: Departmental policies usually carry modest probative value on constitutional reasonableness and risk confusing juries. They may be more relevant to negligence or Monell claims, but plaintiffs must connect the dots and frame appropriate limiting instructions if seeking admission.
• For issue preservation: Timely, specific objections and requests for curative instructions are essential. Failure to raise issues (e.g., visible restraints or bracelet) or concessions (e.g., that a juror likely did not see handcuffs) will foreclose appellate review.
• Nonprecedential status: Although designated nonprecedential, the order reflects and applies controlling Seventh Circuit authority, offering persuasive guidance for district courts and practitioners within the circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Monell Liability: A city is liable under § 1983 only if a policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation. It is not enough that a city employs the officers.
• Pruitt Standard (Recruited Counsel): The court asks whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate the case in light of its difficulty. There is no automatic right to a lawyer in civil cases.
• Batson Challenge: Three steps: (1) object and make a prima facie showing of discrimination; (2) the striking party gives a race-neutral reason; (3) the judge decides whether the reason is genuine or a pretext for discrimination, making credibility findings on the record.
• Standards of Review:
  • De novo: No deference to the trial court (e.g., screening and pleading sufficiency).
  • Abuse of discretion: Deference to trial court’s judgment (e.g., evidentiary rulings, recruited counsel).
  • Clear error: Deferential review of factual findings (e.g., credibility at Batson step three).
• Rule 403: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if its value is substantially outweighed by risks like confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
• Harmless Error: An error that did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict does not warrant reversal.
• Cumulative Error: Multiple errors can require reversal only if, together, they made the trial fundamentally unfair.
• Waiver/Forfeiture: Issues not raised at the right time, or raised only in a reply brief, are generally not considered on appeal.
• Peremptory Strike: A party’s right to remove a juror without stating a cause—limited by the Constitution’s ban on race-based strikes.
• Standby Counsel: An attorney appointed to assist a pro se litigant at trial without taking over representation.

Practical Guidance for Future Cases

• Pleading Municipal Liability: Include concrete facts about policies, customs, or training deficiencies that plausibly caused the violation. Consider pattern evidence, prior incidents, official statements, or failure-to-discipline allegations.
• Preserving Trial Issues: Make timely objections to restraints or security arrangements; request the court to articulate its balancing on the record; seek curative or limiting instructions where appropriate.
• Batson Practice: When opposing a peremptory strike, press for explicit step-three findings. When defending a strike, provide a specific, verifiable, race-neutral reason and, where possible, point to the court’s own observations of the juror.
• Evidence of Policies: If offering departmental policies, tie them to a properly pleaded Monell claim or a nonconstitutional theory (e.g., negligence) and propose tailored limiting instructions to avoid jury confusion.
• Managing Counsel Recruitment: Document why counsel is necessary under Pruitt (e.g., complexity, evidentiary rules, expert testimony). Maintain constructive collaboration with recruited counsel to avoid withdrawals that jeopardize trial readiness.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the defense verdict, offering several instructive points. First, Monell liability demands factual allegations about municipal policy or custom; naming the department alone does not suffice. Second, there is no civil right to counsel, and courts have broad discretion in recruiting and replacing attorneys. Third, a trial court satisfies Batson step three by making a credibility determination on the record, even succinctly. Fourth, judges must not delegate courtroom security decisions to corrections but should balance security and prejudice; nevertheless, such an error is harmless absent actual prejudice. Fifth, departmental policies generally have limited probative value in Fourth Amendment excessive-force trials and may be excluded under Rule 403 to prevent juror confusion. Finally, without multiple, prejudicial errors, a cumulative error claim fails, and issues raised only in a reply brief are waived.

Although designated nonprecedential, the order cogently applies established Seventh Circuit law and provides practical guidance to litigants and courts on the interplay of pleading standards, trial management, juror selection, courtroom security, and evidentiary boundaries in § 1983 litigation.