Joshua Vinson, Sr. v. Jason DeBruin

that the officers were not liable for violating Vinson's rights. On appeal, Vinson argues that the district court made multiple errors before and during the trial. We affirm.

I

A. The Traffic Stop

Shortly after midnight on February 19, 2015, officers Justin Schmidt-Quist and Stephen Jaskowiak pulled over Vinson for driving a car with a suspended license plate. Schmidt-Quist approached Vinson's car on the driver's side, while Jaskowiak approached on the passenger's side. Vinson's behavior during the traffic stop—holding his license out of the window while the officers approached, staring blankly in response to Schmidt-Quist's questions, and repeatedly dropping his right hand towards his pants pocket—concerned Schmidt-Quist, and he decided to remove Vinson from the car to pat him down for weapons. But when Schmidt-Quist began to open the car door, Vinson grabbed the handle from the inside and tried to pull it shut. Schmidt-Quist and Vinson struggled until the inside door handle ripped off, and Schmidt-Quist was able to open the car door. Schmidt-Quist lunged into the vehicle on top of Vinson's lap to separate his hands from his pants pocket.

While Schmidt-Quist and Vinson struggled, Officer Jason DeBruin arrived and broke the rear driver-side window. Jaskowiak ran around the car to the broken window, leaned in, and tased Vinson on his lower left back. Because the taser was used from such a close distance, its probes were unable to separate, so the taser hurt Vinson but did not incapacitate him. Jaskowiak saw that Vinson was still trying to access his pocket, so he used the taser twice more on Vinson's back.

By that point, DeBruin had broken the front passenger-side window and opened the door. He leaned into the car and grabbed Vinson's hands as Vinson was struggling. Sergeant Steven Fish arrived and joined DeBruin to assist with holding Vinson's arms. DeBruin and Fish handcuffed Vinson's hands over his head and pulled Vinson out of the car through the passenger-side door.

B. Procedural History

Vinson sued, alleging that several police officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and allowed the claims to proceed. Vinson twice moved for recruitment of counsel, which the district court denied, and the officers

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moved for summary judgment. The court granted in part the officers' motion but concluded that Vinson could proceed to trial on two claims: (1) Schmidt-Quist, Jaskowiak, DeBruin, and Fish used excessive force against him; and (2) in carrying out the stop, Schmidt-Quist and Jaskowiak discriminated against him because he is Black. Considering the complexity of trying a case before a jury, the court recruited counsel to represent Vinson. But the attorney moved to withdraw because of a health condition and Vinson's unreasonable expectations. The court granted counsel's motion. The court then recruited a second attorney. That attorney moved to withdraw at Vinson's request, and the court granted the motion. Vinson then represented himself at trial, with the assistance of two attorneys recruited as standby counsel. The court empaneled a jury. Vinson raised a challenge to the officers' peremptory strike of a potential Black juror, and the officers explained that they saw the juror fall "sound asleep, twice." The court overruled Vinson's challenge, explaining that while it did not see the potential juror fall asleep, it did see that he was not paying attention and was drowsy, and therefore it was not surprised by the officers' assertion that the potential juror had fallen asleep.

Because Vinson was incarcerated at the time of the trial, he wore a "shock"

bracelet on his ankle and was escorted to the courtroom by officers from the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. Vinson objected to the correctional officers sitting directly behind him during the proceedings. He requested they move to the back of the courtroom so they would not affect the jury's perception of him. The court overruled the objection, deferring to the correctional officers' requirements for security, but it asked them to be as inconspicuous as possible.

During a break in the trial when the jurors left the courtroom, Vinson was escorted by security to the restroom in handcuffs. Vinson alerted the court that one of the jurors saw him in the hallway. When the court asked Vinson if the juror saw him in handcuffs, Vinson responded, "I don't think he [saw] the handcuffs." The court acknowledged Vinson's concern that this could prejudice the juror against him but concluded that because the juror did not see Vinson's restraints, there was no problem. In support of his case, Vinson tried to introduce several exhibits detailing the policies and procedures of the Racine Police Department. He argued that the documents were relevant because the officers were trained based on those procedures and they may not have acted in accordance with the policies. The district court excluded the

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exhibits because the minimal relevance they had was outweighed by the chance that they would confuse the jury.

At the close of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the officers on both counts.

II

Vinson appeals, arguing that the district court made several errors leading up to and during trial. First, Vinson contends that he should have been allowed to proceed on a claim against the City of Racine under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Vinson next asserts that the district court erred in not recruiting counsel earlier in the case and that the attorneys recruited to represent him at trial were deficient. Finally, Vinson argues that multiple errors made during his trial rendered it fundamentally unfair.

A. Monell Claim

Vinson first argues that the district court should have allowed him to bring a Monell claim against the City of Racine. Vinson had named the Racine Police Department in his original complaint. But at screening, the district court noted that the department was not a suable entity and construed the department as a placeholder for the as-yet unnamed police officers. We review a challenge to a screening order de novo. Sargeant v. Barfield, 87 F.4th 358, 361 (7th Cir. 2023).

Vinson contends that the district court should have understood him to be bringing a Monell claim. But simply naming a municipal entity as a defendant is not enough to state a Monell claim. The relevant inquiry is "whether the raw materials of [the] complaint—the facts—plausibly suggested" that the entity was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 362. Vinson's complaint did not include factual allegations concerning the police department's policies and customs or suggesting that the challenged conduct was attributable to the department. See Thomas

v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023) (requirements to plead a Monell claim).

Vinson also asserts that the district court should have allowed him to amend his complaint to expand his allegations related to municipal liability. But Vinson amended his complaint once, and he did not include any factual allegations about municipal policies, customs, or practices that caused his injuries. And his two additional motions for leave to amend did not allege facts that could be construed as a Monell claim.

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B. Recruited Counsel

Vinson also argues that the district court erred in not recruiting counsel earlier in the case. Vinson filed two motions for counsel before summary judgment, and the district court denied both. We review the denial of a motion to recruit counsel for abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In considering a motion to recruit counsel, the district court must evaluate whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate his case considering its difficulty. Id. at 654. Here, the district court applied the correct legal standard and evaluated appropriately Vinson's circumstances at the time of each motion. See Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2010). It denied the first motion because Vinson had personal knowledge of the facts and was able to litigate the case on his own, having submitted documents that were organized and easy to understand. It denied the second motion because Vinson's claims were straightforward and based on his memory of the events and his detailed and organized filings showed that he was able to represent himself through summary judgment. Vinson also contends that his recruited attorneys were deficient and made errors in preparing for trial. The court twice recruited attorneys for Vinson and both withdrew, citing conflicts with Vinson. But there is no right to counsel in civil cases. Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2018). So even if Vinson's recruited attorneys had erred, Vinson would not have been entitled to a new trial or a new attorney. See Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2017).

Vinson additionally asserts that, had he been represented by counsel at trial, he would have prevailed. But the court's earlier decisions to recruit counsel did not create a right to a lawyer or "an obligation for the court to search indefinitely for one." Austin

v. Hansen, 139 F.4th 604, 607 (7th Cir. 2025). The district court acted within its discretion to not recruit a third attorney for Vinson and instead recruit standby counsel.

C. Trial Errors

Vinson also argues that the district court made several errors during his trial that cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial. To prevail on such an argument, he must show that multiple errors occurred and that, "in the context of the entire trial," those errors "were so severe as to have rendered [the] trial fundamentally unfair." Christmas

v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Powell,

652 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2011)).

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1. Batson Challenge

Vinson contends that the officers' strike of a Black potential juror violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. See Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)). At trial, Vinson raised a Batson challenge to the officers' strike of Juror 10 from the venire panel. The officers responded that they saw the juror fall "sound asleep, twice." The court overruled the Batson challenge, stating: "I did notice that he seemed to be not paying attention and drowsy. I did not see him completely fall asleep, but that doesn't surprise me."

The Batson process requires three steps. First, the challenging party must object to a peremptory strike by making a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Lisle,

933 F.3d at 714. Second, the burden shifts to the striking party to provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. Third, and at issue here, the trial court must "make factual findings on the record regarding whether the striking party's proffered reason for the strike is pretextual." Carter v. City of Wauwatosa, 114 F.4th 866, 875 (7th Cir. 2024). We review whether a court properly conducted a Batson inquiry de novo and review the court's factual findings for clear error. Id.

Vinson argues that the district court failed to conduct properly the Batson inquiry because it did not complete the third step. "[W]hile the district [court] need not use any magic words in completing the step-three inquiry, [it] must do more than summarily deny the challenge or merely categorize the striking party's reason as race-neutral." Id. A remand is necessary where the district court is silent as to step three or its findings are insufficient because it "merely repeated the striking party's facially neutral reason for the strike." Id. at 876.

Here, the district court completed the third step of the Batson inquiry by weighing the credibility of the officers' race-neutral reason for striking Juror 10. The court explained that although it did not see Juror 10 completely fall asleep, it was not surprised by the officers' assertion that he was sound asleep. The court did more than just restate the officers' race-neutral reason for the strike: It "indicate[d] whether [it] believed the defense, whether [it] found them credible." Id. at 877. Although the court did not explicitly state that it had moved to the third step, it did make a finding about the officers' reason for the strike, which is enough to satisfy the requirement to conduct a three-step Batson analysis. Cf. United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2009) (remand necessary where district court made no findings as to whether it agreed with prosecutor's description of juror's demeanor and did not evaluate prosecutor's credibility).

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Vinson further argues that the district court erred in finding the officers' race-neutral reason credible because Vinson and the court did not see Juror 10 fall asleep, and to the contrary, Juror 10 was paying close attention. Vinson also refers to the comments of standby counsel. When the officers stated that Juror 10 fell asleep, standby counsel responded: "While we were here?" But the court credited the officers' assertions, commenting that it saw Juror 10 was not paying attention and drowsy, and these factual findings are "accorded great deference on appeal." Morgan v. City of Chicago, 822 F.3d 317, 327 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-65 (1991)). Moreover, whether the court saw Juror 10 fall asleep is immaterial:

"[W]e will not reject the explanation of a juror's drowsiness as a pretext for a discriminatory strike merely because the district [court] did not observe the juror asleep." United States v. Lovies, 16 F.4th 493, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

2. Juror Prejudice

Vinson next asserts that the jury was prejudiced against him for three reasons:

(1) the jury saw the "shock" bracelet he wore on his ankle during trial, (2) one juror saw him handcuffed in the hallway of the courthouse, and (3) correctional officers sat directly behind him during the trial.

Vinson waived two of these arguments. Vinson never raised the ankle-bracelet issue at trial, so it is waived. See Walker v. Groot, 867 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2017). Vinson also waived the argument that a juror was prejudiced because the juror saw Vinson wearing handcuffs. When the court asked Vinson about the incident, he said that he did not think the juror had seen the handcuffs. This statement and Vinson's choice not to pursue the matter any further in the district court foreclose any argument on appeal that the juror was prejudiced. See id. at 804.

Finally, we consider Vinson's argument that the jury was prejudiced against him because correctional officers were seated behind him during trial. Vinson argued that the officers' placement was unnecessary because he did not pose a security risk and did not have any "tickets" with the Department of Corrections. The district court overruled Vinson's objection, stating:

[The correctional officers are] here for security purposes. I will ask them to try to remain as sort of out of the way, innocuous as possible and not to make their presence known too much. But I defer to them with respect to security concerns. And if this is where they think they need to be, I'm going to allow them to stay there.

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We review the court's decision overruling Vinson's objection for abuse of discretion. See Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1993).

A prisoner who is a party in a civil case may be restrained "when it is 'necessary to maintain the security of the courtroom.'" Woods v. Thieret, 5 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Amaro, 816 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1987)). When the prisoner objects to the use of a security measure, the district court must balance the need for security against the risk of prejudice to the prisoner. Id. at 247-48. While the court has wide discretion to determine the minimal measures necessary to maintain security, it cannot delegate the discretion to another party. Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358; United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 502 (7th Cir. 1997).

Here, the district court did not weigh the need for the correctional officers' presence directly behind Vinson with the risk of prejudice. Instead, it "defer[red] to [the correctional officers] with respect to security concerns." But a court may not "delegate[] the decision to the Department of Corrections employees." Lemons, 985 F.2d at 358. This error was harmless, however, because it did not "result in actual prejudice"

to Vinson. Id. at 359. Vinson was not physically restrained in the presence of the jury, and although looming correctional officers can "create the [] impression of a dangerous" prisoner, they are a preferred alternative to restraints. Stephenson v. Wilson,

619 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the correctional officers' placement directly behind Vinson did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Lemons, 985 F.2d at 359 (quoting United States v. Beasley,

809 F.2d 1273, 1280 (7th Cir. 1987)). The video evidence of the traffic stop presented at trial corroborated the testimony of the defendant officers about the justification for their use of force against Vinson.

3. Exhibits of Police Policies

Vinson also argues that the district court erred in excluding his proposed evidence of the policies and procedures of the Racine Police Department. We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Arrington v. City of Chicago,

147 F.4th 691, 703 (7th Cir. 2025). The court excluded Vinson's exhibits, explaining that the issue at trial was whether the officers violated his constitutional rights, not whether they violated their department's policies. The court determined that the policies had minimal relevance to Vinson's claims and that any relevance was outweighed by the chance that the policies would confuse the jury.

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these exhibits. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. Vinson's claim that the officers used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment is "governed by constitutional principles, not police-department regulations." United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536-37 (7th Cir. 2017). Vinson attempted to introduce the exhibits to show that the officers did not comply with their department's policies and training, but "[a]n officer's compliance with or deviation from departmental policy doesn't determine whether he used excessive force." Id. at 537. Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the exhibits was outweighed by the risk they would confuse or mislead the jury about the standard for excessive-force claims. Cf. Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454-55 (7th Cir. 2006).

4. Cumulative Error

The district court erred only in deferring to the correctional officers' security assessment that they had to be seated behind Vinson during the trial but, in this case, we have determined that error was harmless. Accordingly, Vinson cannot show that a collection of errors rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.

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In closing, we note that Vinson waived any challenge to the district court's entry of summary judgment because he raised arguments about it only in his reply brief. See White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021).

AFFIRMED

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