Defective Notice-to-Appear Time/Date Omissions Are Forfeitable Claim-Processing Errors; Hardship Denials Reviewed Under Clear-and-Unmistakable-Error Framework

Introduction

In Francisco Vazquez-Rodriguez v. Pamela J. Bondi, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing Francisco Vazquez-Rodriguez’s appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of cancellation of removal and rejecting his late-raised challenge to the immigration court’s authority based on a defective Notice to Appear (“NTA”).

The case arose after the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings in 2010 by issuing an NTA that (i) listed an incorrect address and (ii) omitted the date and time of the initial hearing. Vazquez-Rodriguez was ordered removed in absentia, later successfully moved to reopen based on the wrong address, and then sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), arguing his U.S.-citizen children would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if he were removed to Mexico.

The key issues before the Seventh Circuit were: (1) whether the NTA’s missing time/date deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction (or otherwise required dismissal), and (2) whether the agency committed reversible legal error in denying cancellation of removal for failure to prove the requisite hardship.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review. It held:

• The NTA’s omission of hearing date and time, while violating 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule. Objections can be forfeited if not raised timely. Vazquez-Rodriguez raised the argument for the first time before the BIA—over a decade into proceedings—without any excuse or showing of prejudice; thus, the argument was forfeited.
• On the merits of cancellation, the IJ and BIA did not commit reversible error in concluding Vazquez-Rodriguez failed to show “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” and the IJ considered the evidence cumulatively; no remand for a new hardship hearing was warranted.

The disposition is labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” but it consolidates and applies the circuit’s established framework for NTA defects and hardship review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is built on a line of Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court decisions that distinguish jurisdictional rules from claim-processing rules, define forfeiture standards for defective NTAs, and cabin judicial review of cancellation-of-removal hardship determinations.

Santiago Lopez v. Garland, 105 F.4th 907 (7th Cir. 2024)

The court quoted Santiago Lopez v. Garland for the central proposition that the statutory requirement that an NTA include the hearing date and time is “a claim-processing rule, not a limit on our jurisdiction,” and that violations may be forfeited if not raised timely. This precedent supplied the decisive answer to Vazquez-Rodriguez’s “jurisdiction” framing: even a concededly defective NTA does not automatically nullify the proceedings.

Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019)

Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr is the doctrinal anchor for treating certain NTA defects as non-jurisdictional and subject to forfeiture. It also supports the remedial structure the panel invoked: a timely objection can require dismissal; an untimely objection may be excused only with an adequate explanation for delay and a showing of prejudice.

Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland, 34 F.4th 603 (7th Cir. 2022)

Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland supplied the panel’s operational test: if an NTA-defect objection is timely, “we must dismiss,” and if untimely the petitioner must both “provide[s] an excuse for the delay” and “show[s] prejudice.” The opinion also reflects the practical consequence of dismissal: the government may start removal proceedings anew, assuming removability continues to exist.

Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2010)

Juarez v. Holder provided the review template: when the BIA agrees with the IJ and adds reasoning, the court reviews the IJ’s decision “as supplemented by” the BIA. This matters because Vazquez-Rodriguez challenged both the factual hardship assessment and the legal adequacy of the agency’s consideration of evidence.

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024)

Citing Wilkinson v. Garland, the panel reaffirmed that courts retain jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review legal questions implicated in hardship determinations, even though 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) generally restricts review of discretionary denials of cancellation of removal.

Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 2012)

Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder served two functions. First, it supports the legal requirement that hardship evidence be assessed “in the aggregate,” not in isolation. Second, it is part of the circuit’s articulation of the hardship benchmark: the hardship must be “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would be normally expected” from removal.

Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2008)

Iglesias v. Mukasey was invoked for the proposition that a legal question exists where the agency “ignored evidence,” a justiciable issue notwithstanding the limits on reviewing discretionary determinations.

Santos Mendoza v. Bondi, 151 F.4th 900 (7th Cir. 2025)

Santos Mendoza v. Bondi framed the standard of review for whether undisputed facts establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” as a mixed question reviewed for “clear and unmistakable error.” The panel used it again substantively to characterize the type of hardship described here as unfortunately common in removal cases, reinforcing the conclusion that the agency stayed within permissible bounds.

Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland, 114 F.4th 883 (7th Cir. 2024)

Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland was cited to distinguish pure legal issues—such as applying the wrong legal standard or failing to consider evidence—from the hardship mixed question. Those pure legal issues are reviewed de novo.

Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2021)

Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson supplied both the hardship definition and an important limitation on “ignored evidence” arguments: the agency need not explicitly discuss every item of evidence; reversal is reserved for serious mischaracterizations of facts important to the hardship determination.

Legal Reasoning

1) Missing time/date in the NTA: non-jurisdictional, forfeitable, and prejudice-sensitive

The panel accepted that the NTA omitted the hearing’s date and time in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). The critical move, however, is categorizing the requirement as a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Under the circuit’s framework, the omission does not void the proceedings automatically; it creates an objection that must be raised promptly.

On forfeiture, the court focused on timing and procedural posture. Vazquez-Rodriguez did not raise the time/date defect when he moved to reopen in 2013 (he raised only the incorrect-address problem) and, according to the panel, raised the time/date argument for the first time before the BIA. Under Santiago Lopez v. Garland, that is “too late” and results in forfeiture. The court further explained that even a late objection can sometimes be excused, but only if the petitioner both explains the delay and demonstrates prejudice from the missing time/place information. Vazquez-Rodriguez did neither, so the BIA did not err in rejecting the argument.

2) “Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: constrained review and no legal error shown

The court then addressed cancellation of removal. It reiterated the jurisdictional boundary: while discretionary denials are largely insulated from review, courts may review legal questions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The panel treated three asserted issues as legal in nature for jurisdictional purposes—whether the hardship standard was met (per Wilkinson v. Garland), whether evidence was considered in the aggregate (per Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder), and whether evidence was ignored (per Iglesias v. Mukasey).

But the panel emphasized that “question of law” for jurisdiction does not necessarily mean de novo review. Applying Santos Mendoza v. Bondi, it reviewed the mixed question (whether the facts satisfy the hardship standard) for “clear and unmistakable error,” while it reviewed asserted legal-process errors (wrong standard; failure to consider evidence) de novo under Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland.

On the merits, the court concluded the agency’s hardship analysis fell within the accepted legal framework: hardships from relocation, language transition, crime concerns, educational disruption, and a child’s behavioral issues did not compel a finding of hardship “substantially beyond” what is ordinarily expected in removal cases, as articulated in Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson and Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder.

Finally, the panel rejected the claim that the IJ failed to consider evidence cumulatively. It relied on Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson to explain that the IJ need not mention every piece of evidence explicitly and that reversal requires serious mischaracterization of key facts. Here, the opinion notes that the IJ expressly acknowledged that circumstances “taken together may satisfy” the burden and then evaluated the entire evidentiary record in the aggregate—defeating the argument for a remand.

Impact

Although designated “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the decision is instructive in three practical ways for Seventh Circuit removal litigation:

• NTA-defect strategy: Time/date omissions must be raised promptly at the earliest feasible stage. Raising the issue for the first time before the BIA is treated as forfeited under existing circuit law, absent a developed record supporting excuse and prejudice.
• Record development for “excuse” and “prejudice”: The opinion underscores that late NTA objections are not merely “late”—they must be justified. Petitioners should be prepared to explain why the defect could not reasonably have been raised sooner and how the lack of prompt time/place information concretely harmed them.
• Hardship appeals focus on legal-process errors: Given the “clear and unmistakable error” lens for the mixed hardship question, successful petitions are more likely to turn on demonstrating a genuine legal error: failure to aggregate evidence, application of an incorrect standard, or serious mischaracterization/ignoring of key facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Notice to Appear (NTA): The charging document that starts removal proceedings and typically lists the alleged grounds for removal and hearing information.
• Claim-processing rule vs. jurisdiction: A jurisdictional rule limits a court/agency’s power to act at all; a claim-processing rule governs procedure and can be waived or forfeited if not timely invoked. Here, missing time/date in an NTA is treated as the latter.
• Forfeiture: Losing an argument because it was not raised in time. The court treated raising the time/date defect for the first time before the BIA as too late.
• Prejudice: A showing that the procedural defect actually caused harm—e.g., impaired ability to appear, prepare, or defend—rather than being a technical mistake with no practical consequence.
• Cancellation of removal and “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: A form of relief requiring a heightened showing that qualifying relatives (here, U.S.-citizen children) would face hardship substantially beyond what typically accompanies removal.
• Mixed question / “clear and unmistakable error” review: Even when courts may review the legal aspects of hardship, they will not reweigh evidence. They ask whether the agency made a clear and unmistakable mistake in applying the hardship standard to the (largely undisputed) facts.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision reinforces two operative rules in its immigration jurisprudence: (1) an NTA’s missing hearing date/time is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing defect that must be raised timely or it is forfeited, and late objections require both an excuse and a showing of prejudice; and (2) cancellation-of-removal hardship determinations are reviewable only within a constrained framework that distinguishes mixed hardship questions (reviewed for clear and unmistakable error) from genuine legal-process errors (reviewed de novo). Applied to Vazquez-Rodriguez’s record, those rules foreclosed both his late NTA challenge and his request to overturn—or relitigate—the agency’s hardship determination.