Francisco Vazquez-Rodriguez v. Pamela J. Bondi

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charging him with removability as an alien present in the United States without admission or parole. The notice included the wrong address for Vazquez-Rodriguez and omitted the date and time of his initial hearing. Vazquez-Rodriguez did not appear at his initial hearing, and the immigration judge ordered his removal in absentia. In 2013, Vazquez-Rodriguez moved to reopen the proceedings because the notice listed the wrong address. He did not raise the date-and-time issue. An immigration judge granted the motion. In these reopened proceedings Vazquez-Rodriguez conceded he was removable because he entered the United States from Mexico illegally. But he moved to cancel his deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), arguing that, if he was removed, his three U.S.-citizen children would face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Vazquez-Rodriguez said his family would have to accompany him to Mexico because he is the sole breadwinner. He said his children would struggle there because English is their primary language. He worried about their safety because of persistent crime, and their education because the town where he is from, and where his extended family lives, does not have a high school. Vazquez-Rodriguez worried especially about his middle child because she struggles with behavioral issues that had prompted a school social worker to refer the child to a psychologist.

The immigration judge held Vazquez-Rodriguez was not eligible for cancelation under section 1229b(b)(1)(D). The judge acknowledged that relocating Vazquez- Rodriguez's family would cause them hardship but concluded the hardship would not be "substantially beyond that which is typically experienced when a family is removed from the United States." Vazquez-Rodriguez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. There he argued for the first time that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because the original notice to appear did not include the time and date of the hearing. He also argued the immigration judge erred in finding he did not show exceptional and unusual hardship. The board disagreed and dismissed.

Discussion

Vazquez-Rodriguez argues the board erred in two ways by dismissing his appeal.

First, Vazquez-Rodriguez argues the board erred in holding the immigration judge had jurisdiction to deport him because his original notice to appear did not provide a date and time for his initial hearing. No party disputes the notice to appear omitted both the date and time of his initial hearing and that this violates 8 U.S.C.

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§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). But this non-jurisdictional error does not automatically divest an immigration judge of authority.

"Our case law is clear that the statutory requirement that a [notice to appear] include [date and time] information is a claim-processing rule, not a limit on our jurisdiction." Santiago Lopez v. Garland, 105 F.4th 907, 911 (7th Cir. 2024). Thus, "an objection to a violation of the rule can be forfeited if not raised in a timely manner." Id. (citing Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2019)). If a petitioner raises a timely objection we must dismiss, Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland, 34 F.4th 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2022), and the government must start removal proceedings anew (if it wishes to proceed with deportation and the petitioner remains deportable), see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). We will excuse a petitioner's tardy objection and dismiss anyway if the petitioner "provide[s] an excuse for the delay" and "show[s] prejudice from the lack of prompt information about time, place, or both." Arreola-Ochoa, 34 F.4th at 608 (citing Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 965). We have held that asserting the objection for the first time before the board is too late and results in forfeiture. Santiago Lopez, 105 F.4th at 911. Vazquez-Rodriguez says he objected to the defective notice before the immigration judge. But he cites nothing in the record showing that he raised this objection, and we have found nothing to support his assertion. Rather, it appears he raised this argument for the first time before the board, over a decade after proceedings began, rendering his objection untimely. Vazquez-Rodriguez does not attempt to excuse his untimeliness or explain whether he suffered prejudice from the defective notice. Accordingly, we hold the board did not err in concluding he forfeited this argument.

Second, Vazquez-Rodriguez argues the board erred on the merits. He urges us to hold he met his burden to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship or, alternatively, to remand for a new hardship hearing. Where, as here, the board agrees with the immigration judge's reasoning and adds its own, we review the immigration judge's decision "as supplemented by" the board's. Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2010).

We have limited jurisdiction over a petition for review of a board decision to deny cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But we do have jurisdiction to review questions of law, id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), including those Vazquez-Rodriguez raises:

whether the board (1) correctly concluded Vazquez-Rodriguez did not show sufficient hardship, Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212 (2024); (2) applied the wrong legal standard by failing to consider evidence in the aggregate, Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703

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F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir. 2012); and (3) ignored evidence, Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008).

That said, we do not apply de novo review to all these questions just because they are "questions of law" for jurisdictional purposes. We review whether the undisputed facts show "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"—a mixed question of law and fact—for clear and unmistakable error. Santos Mendoza v. Bondi, 151 F.4th 900, 905 (7th Cir. 2025). And we review whether the immigration judge applied the wrong standard or failed to consider evidence—pure legal questions—de novo. Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland, 114 F.4th 883, 888 (7th Cir. 2024).

The immigration judge did not clearly and unmistakably err in holding Vazquez- Rodriguez cannot show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. "The requisite hardship for this purpose must be 'substantially different from, or beyond, that which would be normally expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members in the United States.'" Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 975 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d at 995). No doubt, Vazquez-Rodriguez's family will suffer hardship resulting from his deportation. But we, like the immigration judge and the board, conclude it is hardship all too common for a family in removal proceedings. Santos Mendoza, 151 F.4th at 906.

Nor is Vazquez-Rodriguez entitled to a new hardship hearing. Contrary to his assertions, the immigration judge carefully reviewed all key evidence individually and cumulatively. An immigration judge does not err "every time an item of evidence is not explicitly considered or is described with imperfect accuracy[.]" Martinez-Baez, 986 F.3d at 976. Instead, we reverse only when "facts important to the subtle determination of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" have been "seriously mischaracterized[.]"

Id. (internal quotations omitted). The immigration judge did not mischaracterize key facts, let alone seriously. After carefully walking through the evidence and testimony, the judge considered it in the aggregate: "Even if not individually exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, circumstances taken together may satisfy [petitioner's] burden." The judge then considered the entire body of evidence and concluded Vazquez-Rodriguez did not meet his burden. We agree with the board that the immigration judge considered all key evidence and did so cumulatively. * * *

For these reasons, we DENY the petition for review.