Classifying Criminal Contempt by the Most Analogous Federal Offense: A Commentary on United States v. Owens (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

United States v. Owens, No. 25‑5015 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025), addresses a recurring but under-theorized problem in federal sentencing: how to classify criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines when the contempt statute sets no explicit maximum term of imprisonment.

The Sixth Circuit—through Judge Kethledge’s majority opinion and Judge Cole’s concurrence—adopts and refines a “most analogous offense” approach. Instead of treating all § 401 contempts as felonies (as some circuits have) or as sui generis in a way that escapes meaningful guideline structure, the court holds that:

Whether contempt is treated as a felony or misdemeanor for Guidelines purposes must be determined on a case‑by‑case basis; and
That determination turns on whether the underlying contemptuous conduct is analogous to conduct that Congress has classified as a felony in the federal criminal code.

Applied to Stacy Owens, whose contempt consisted of failing to self‑surrender to serve a sentence, the court holds that her conduct is identical to the felony offense in 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (failure to appear or surrender for service of sentence). The panel therefore treats her contempt as a felony and applies Guideline § 2J1.6, affirming an 11‑month consecutive sentence.

Beyond the technical Guidelines question, the opinion also affirms the procedural and substantive reasonableness of Owens’s sentence, emphasizing deterrence and the need to vindicate judicial authority when a defendant fails to report to prison after receiving a substantial downward variance.

II. Background of the Case

A. Underlying drug-conspiracy conviction

Owens became involved in a large-scale drug conspiracy centered on mailing methamphetamine. Federal agents intercepted two parcels addressed to her residence containing nearly five kilograms of methamphetamine; postal records showed she had received seven similar parcels between March and June 2019. Her defined role in the conspiracy was limited but significant: she accepted the parcels and turned them over to other conspirators.

She pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. At sentencing in May 2024:

The district court calculated a Guideline range of 57–71 months.
The court gave weight to mitigating personal history: an abusive childhood, a drug‑ridden environment, her “remarkable resilience,” certification as a nursing assistant, and her caretaking of four biological children plus two adopted children from her sister.
Recognizing her family responsibilities and background, the court imposed a dramatically below‑Guidelines sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment.
The court also granted a 60‑day delay (later extended to 80 days) for self‑surrender, ultimately to August 24.

B. Failure to self-surrender and criminal contempt charge

Owens did not surrender as ordered on August 24. Accounts of the incident differed:

Her husband reported that, while driving to the designated Texas prison, Owens jumped out of the vehicle and fled.
Owens claimed that an argument led her husband to leave her by the roadside.

Regardless of whose account was accurate, she did not appear at the prison. The district court issued a warrant; she surrendered to U.S. Marshals in Arkansas on September 4, 2024.

The district court then:

Charged Owens with criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) for disobedience of its lawful order to report to prison,
Appointed an Assistant U.S. Attorney to prosecute the contempt under Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a), and
Set the matter for trial in December 2024.

Owens chose to plead guilty. At a combined plea and sentencing hearing on December 20:

The defense requested a 30‑day sentence.
The government sought four months.
The district court, after calculating a Guideline range of 6–12 months, imposed 11 months’ imprisonment for contempt, to run consecutively to the 12‑month conspiracy sentence.

C. Issues on appeal

Owens appealed, challenging:

Procedural reasonableness: She argued the district court miscalculated the Guidelines range by wrongly treating her contempt as a felony rather than a misdemeanor, which inflated her offense level.
Substantive reasonableness: She contended the 11‑month consecutive sentence over‑emphasized deterrence and undervalued other sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The Sixth Circuit affirmed on both fronts, reviewing the sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Robinson, 778 F.3d 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2015).

III. Summary of the Court’s Opinion

A. Majority opinion (Judge Kethledge)

The majority addresses two main questions:

Guideline classification of the contempt offense: Is Owens’s contempt a felony or misdemeanor for Guideline purposes, and what Guideline applies?
Reasonableness of the resulting sentence: Was the 11‑month consecutive sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable?

1. Classification of contempt and Guideline selection

The majority carefully unpacks the relevant Guidelines:

Guideline § 2J1.1 (“Contempt”) does not assign a specific base offense level; instead, it directs the court to apply § 2X5.1 (“Other Felony Offenses”).
Section 2X5.1 says: if the “offense is a felony for which no guideline expressly has been promulgated, apply the most analogous offense guideline.”
If the offense is not a felony, an application note tells courts to apply § 2X5.2 (“Class A Misdemeanors”), which sets a base offense level of 6.

Because § 401 lacks any maximum sentence, the panel rejects the government’s argument that contempt is always a felony capable of being punished up to life imprisonment. The majority observes that such a rule would be implausible given the trivial conduct that can support contempt (e.g., using a cell phone in court or interrupting the judge).

Instead, the court holds:

“[W]hether contempt amounts to a felony, for purposes of calculating a guidelines range, should be determined on a case-by-case basis, not across the board. And rather than make that legislative judgment ourselves, we will defer to Congress's judgment as to whether conduct is felonious. Specifically, to determine whether to treat contempt as a felony—for purposes of calculating a guidelines range—we examine whether the ‘misconduct constituting contempt’ is akin to conduct treated as felonious under the federal criminal code.”

Applying that principle, the court identifies Owens’s contempt as identical in conduct to the federal offense in 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (failure to appear or surrender for service of sentence). Under § 3146(b)(A)(i), given that Owens’s underlying drug conspiracy offense carried a possible life sentence, the maximum penalty for her failure to surrender would be up to ten years’ imprisonment. That is clearly a felony.

Because Congress has made this conduct a felony in § 3146, the Sixth Circuit treats the same conduct, charged as contempt under § 401, as a felony for Guideline purposes. This leads to:

Application of § 2X5.1 (felony “other offense”), and
Selection of § 2J1.6 (failure to appear or surrender) as the “most analogous offense guideline.”

The district court, which had relied on § 2J1.6 to arrive at a 6–12 month range, is therefore affirmed as having correctly calculated the Guidelines.

2. Reasonableness of the 11-month consecutive sentence

On substantive and procedural reasonableness, the majority emphasizes:

The district court had already discussed at length many § 3553(a) factors during the earlier conspiracy sentencing, only six months prior.
Under Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 118–19 (2018), an appellate court may consider the adequacy of a sentencing explanation in light of the total record of prior sentencing proceedings involving the same defendant.
The district court previously granted a major downward variance (57–71 months down to 12) and a generous self‑surrender date. Owens’s subsequent failure to report directly undermined the court’s prior leniency.

The panel finds it both rational and appropriate that:

The court placed weight on the “need to vindicate the authority of the court” (tracking Application Note 1 to § 2J1.1), and
The court emphasized general deterrence to prevent “chaos” if defendants felt free to treat report dates as optional.

The Sixth Circuit concludes the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors was “not deficient, but exemplary,” and it affirms the sentence.

B. Concurring opinion (Judge Cole)

Judge Cole concurs in the judgment and agrees that Owens’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. He writes separately to address more fully “the central question” of the case: whether criminal contempt should be “automatically classified as a felony.”

His concurrence:

Restates the procedural reasonableness framework under Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and United States v. Mack, 808 F.3d 1074 (6th Cir. 2015).
Explains the structure of § 2J1.1 and § 2X5.1, and their incorporation of 18 U.S.C. § 401 and § 3559(a).
Describes the existing circuit split on how to classify contempt under § 3559(a).
Endorses the Ninth Circuit’s “most analogous underlying offense” approach as best aligned with Supreme Court precedent and statutory structure.

Cole’s concurrence makes explicit what the majority implies: he rejects the First Circuit’s rule that all § 401 contempts are Class A felonies and favors a flexible, offense‑specific classification keyed to the statutory maximum of the most analogous substantive offense.

IV. Analysis of Precedents and Legal Reasoning

A. The Guidelines framework: § 2J1.1, § 2X5.1, and § 2X5.2

1. Section 2J1.1: “We have no specific Guideline for contempt”

Guideline § 2J1.1 (Contempt) is unusual: it does not assign a fixed base offense level. Instead, it states simply:

“Apply § 2X5.1 (Other Offenses).”

The commentary (Application Note 1) explains why:

“Because misconduct constituting contempt varies significantly and the nature of the contemptuous conduct, the circumstances under which the contempt was committed, the effect the misconduct had on the administration of justice, and the need to vindicate the authority of the court are highly context-dependent, the Commission has not provided a specific guideline for this offense.”

The note then provides examples of analogous Guideline provisions:

In some cases, the conduct will be sufficiently like obstruction of justice for § 2J1.2 to apply.
For willful failure to pay court‑ordered child support, the most analogous Guideline is § 2B1.1 (theft, fraud, property offenses).
For violations of judicial orders enjoining fraudulent behavior, § 2B1.1 is again the most analogous Guideline.

In short, § 2J1.1 pushes courts to analogize the contemptuous behavior to existing offense structures rather than treat contempt as a monolith.

2. Section 2X5.1: Only for “felony” offenses

Section 2X5.1 is titled “Other Felony Offenses”; it provides:

“If the offense is a felony for which no guideline expressly has been promulgated, apply the most analogous offense guideline. If there is not a sufficiently analogous guideline, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 shall control, except that any guidelines and policy statements that can be applied meaningfully in the absence of a Chapter Two offense guideline shall remain applicable.”

Crucially, an application note to § 2X5.1 tells courts what to do if the offense is not a felony: apply § 2X5.2 (“Class A Misdemeanors”), which sets a base offense level of 6 for such misdemeanors.

This creates a fork in the road:

If contempt is a felony, § 2X5.1 applies, and the court looks for the most analogous Guideline (e.g., § 2J1.6 here).
If contempt is a misdemeanor, the court uses § 2X5.2 and a fixed base offense level of 6.

The classification therefore has a substantive effect on the Guideline range.

3. The unresolved puzzle before Owens

Whether an offense is a “felony” under federal law normally depends on whether the maximum authorized term of imprisonment exceeds one year. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6). But § 401 provides no explicit maximum at all, merely authorizing punishment “by fine or imprisonment, or both, at [the court’s] discretion” for specified categories of contempt.

Without a statutory maximum, applying § 3559(a) literally is difficult: there is no “maximum term” to plug into the classification scheme. This ambiguity created space for divergent circuit approaches and the need for a principled method in the Sixth Circuit.

B. Rejection of a blanket “all contempt is a felony” rule

The government argued that because § 401 provides no maximum, courts could impose a sentence up to life, so contempt should automatically be treated as a felony—and in some formulations, as akin to a Class A felony.

The majority characterizes this argument as “implausible”:

Some contempt involves trivial or relatively minor misconduct—such as improper use of a cellphone in court (United States v. Prince, 526 F. App’x 447 (6th Cir. 2013)) or a lawyer’s repeated interruptions of the judge (United States v. Moncier, 571 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2009)).
For such behavior, treating the offense as carrying a notional maximum up to life would be wildly disproportionate, and out of step with Congress’s criminal code.

The Sentencing Commission’s own commentary in § 2J1.1 recognizes the wide range of severity in contempt behavior, reinforcing the conclusion that a one‑size‑fits‑all felony classification is inappropriate.

Judge Cole’s concurrence reinforces this perspective by surveying other circuits:

The First Circuit in United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016), had taken precisely this “automatic Class A felony” view.
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, found such a literal reading “unreasonable,” refusing to “brand all contempts as serious and all contemnors as felons.” United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Broussard, 611 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Sixth Circuit aligns with the latter approach, rejecting the broad, government‑favored interpretation.

C. The Sixth Circuit’s adopted rule: Defer to Congress via the “most analogous federal offense”

The majority’s key doctrinal move is its choice to measure the seriousness (felony vs misdemeanor) of contempt indirectly, by analogy to how Congress has classified similar conduct elsewhere in the Code.

The articulated rule is:

“To determine whether to treat contempt as a felony—for purposes of calculating a guidelines range—we examine whether the ‘misconduct constituting contempt’ is akin to conduct treated as felonious under the federal criminal code.”

Several points are embedded in this approach:

Case-by-case classification: Not all contempts are felonies; classification depends on the nature of the misconduct in the individual case.
Deference to legislative judgments: Rather than make an independent judicial assessment of “felony severity,” the court borrows Congress’s choices in codifying similar behavior (e.g., failure to appear, obstruction, fraud, etc.).
Harmony with Guideline design: This fits § 2J1.1’s directive to analogize contempt to existing offense categories and § 2X5.1’s focus on “felony” status.

This framework both resolves the statutory ambiguity and integrates contempt seamlessly into the Guidelines structure without ignoring its sui generis features.

D. Application to Owens: Felony contempt via 18 U.S.C. § 3146 and Guideline § 2J1.6

With the rule in place, the application is straightforward:

Identify the misconduct: Owens’s contempt is the “failure to report to prison as ordered” to begin serving a sentence.
Find the most analogous substantive offense in the federal criminal code: That conduct is “not only akin, but identical” to 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2), which prohibits knowingly failing “to surrender for service of sentence pursuant to a court order.”
Determine how Congress has classified that offense: Under § 3146(b)(A)(i), where the underlying offense (here, the drug conspiracy) is punishable by death or life imprisonment, failure to surrender is punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Under § 3559(a), an offense punishable by 10 to 20 years is a Class C felony.
Conclude that contempt is a felony for Guideline purposes: Because Congress treats this conduct as a felony in § 3146, the Sixth Circuit treats Owens’s contempt as a felony when applying § 2J1.1 and § 2X5.1.
Choose the most analogous Guideline: § 2J1.6: That Guideline directly covers “Failure to Appear by Defendant” and implements § 3146; given the identity of conduct, it is the obvious choice.

The result is that the district court’s chosen Guideline (§ 2J1.6) and its derived range (6–12 months, based on offense level 9 and criminal history category II) were correctly calculated.

Judge Cole’s concurrence articulates the same path in slightly more formal statutory terms, tying:

Section 2J1.1 to § 401,
§ 401’s punishment to § 3559(a)’s classification scheme, and
§ 3559(a) to the statutory maximum of the most analogous offense (here § 3146(a)(2)).

E. Reasonableness review and the § 3553(a) factors

1. Procedural reasonableness

Under Gall and Nunley / Mack, a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court:

Fails to calculate (or miscalculates) the Guidelines range,
Treats the Guidelines as mandatory,
Fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
Relies on clearly erroneous facts, or
Fails to adequately explain the chosen sentence.

Owens’s principal procedural challenge focused on the alleged misclassification of her contempt as a felony, which the Sixth Circuit rejects for the reasons just discussed. With the Guideline calculation validated, the core of her procedural attack falls away.

On the adequacy of explanation, the majority relies on Chavez-Meza to look beyond the specific contempt sentencing hearing and consider the district court’s earlier, detailed explanation in the drug‑conspiracy sentencing. Because that earlier proceeding covered Owens’s history, characteristics, culpability, and personal circumstances comprehensively, the court finds that the shorter explanation at the contempt hearing was sufficient in context.

2. Substantive reasonableness

Substantive reasonableness concerns whether the sentence is reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors, not just whether the court adequately articulated those considerations.

The Sixth Circuit emphasizes that:

Owens had already received significant leniency: a large downward variance and delayed self‑surrender.
Her subsequent failure to report undermined the purposes of sentencing in the original case, especially respect for the law and deterrence.
The district court explicitly noted the “need to vindicate the authority of the court,” a core consideration in contempt sentencing, and the risk of “chaos” if defendants treated report dates as optional.

Given the modest length of the sentence (11 months within a 6–12 month range, and well below the 10‑year statutory maximum for the analogous § 3146 offense), and its consecutive nature to ensure some incremental punishment for a separate wrong, the Sixth Circuit finds the sentence comfortably within the bounds of reasonableness.

F. Role of cited precedents

1. United States v. Hendrickson, 822 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2016)

The majority cites Hendrickson for the uncontroversial proposition that courts should apply “the most analogous offense guideline” when § 2X5.1 is triggered. This anchors the Sixth Circuit’s choice of § 2J1.6 as the appropriate analog once Owens’s contempt is classified as a felony.

2. United States v. Prince and United States v. Moncier

These prior contempt cases are cited primarily for illustrative purposes:

Prince: Contempt based on improper cell phone use in the courtroom.
Moncier: Contempt based on an attorney’s repeated interruptions of the trial judge.

They demonstrate the broad spectrum of contempt conduct and support the court’s claim that treating all contempts as potentially punishable by life would be inconsistent with the nature of many contemptuous acts.

3. Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109 (2018)

Chavez-Meza holds that the adequacy of a sentencing explanation can be evaluated in light of the overall record, including earlier sentencing proceedings involving the same defendant. The majority leans on this to uphold the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation at the contempt sentencing, given its prior, extensive discussion of Owens’s personal circumstances during the conspiracy sentencing.

4. Supreme Court and circuit cases cited in the concurrence

Judge Cole’s concurrence places the Sixth Circuit’s new rule squarely within the existing doctrinal landscape:

Supreme Court
- Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966): characterizes criminal contempt as an offense sui generis—unique, not easily assimilated to ordinary crimes.
- Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969): emphasizes the wide range of contempt, from “disrespect for the court” to acts that are independently criminal.
- Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958): underscores the breadth of sentencing discretion in contempt and the “special duty” of district courts to exercise that power responsibly; partially overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
First Circuit
- United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2016): treats § 401 contempts as Class A felonies by reading the absence of a statutory maximum as authorization of any term up to life.
Ninth Circuit
- United States v. Carpenter, 91 F.3d 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), and United States v. Broussard, 611 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010): reject automatic felony classification and instead tie the seriousness of contempt to the maximum for the “most analogous” underlying offense.
Eleventh Circuit
- United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2009): adopts a flexible, case‑by‑case approach to sentencing in contempt cases, avoiding a rigid felony designation.

Cole concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s analog‑based approach best reconciles the Supreme Court’s recognition of contempt’s unique character with the statutory scheme in § 3559(a), and he reads the majority as effectively adopting that approach.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What is criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401?

Section 401 gives federal courts inherent power to punish acts that directly defy or obstruct their authority. It covers:

Misbehavior in the court’s presence that obstructs the administration of justice,
Misbehavior of court officers in their official duties, and
Disobedience or resistance to lawful court orders or commands.

A criminal contempt conviction:

Is punitive (meant to punish past conduct),
Requires procedural protections like notice and an opportunity to be heard, and
Is distinct from civil contempt, which is coercive and aims to compel future compliance.

B. Why is contempt “sui generis”?

The Supreme Court’s label of contempt as sui generis means it does not fit neatly into typical crime categories. It is unique because:

It is an offense against the authority and dignity of the court itself.
Its scope is broad—from minor disrespect to serious obstruction or flight from justice.
Historically, courts exercised wide discretion to punish contempt without precise statutory limits.

This uniqueness explains why Congress did not specify a maximum penalty in § 401 and why the Sentencing Commission refrained from setting a single base offense level in § 2J1.1.

C. Felony vs. misdemeanor classification under § 3559(a)

Section 3559(a) classifies federal offenses by the maximum authorized term of imprisonment. Simplifying:

Felonies: offenses with maximum terms exceeding one year.
Misdemeanors: offenses with maximums of one year or less.

Various “Classes” (A–E for felonies; A–C for misdemeanors) depend on the precise length of the maximum. But when a statute like § 401 sets no maximum at all, determining its “class” is not straightforward, hence the need for the analog‑based method adopted in Owens.

D. The role of the Sentencing Guidelines and base offense levels

The federal Sentencing Guidelines provide:

A base offense level for each type of crime,
Adjustments for specific offense characteristics, criminal history, and other factors, and
A sentencing table converting offense levels and criminal history into an advisory range of months.

For contempt, there is no fixed base offense level in § 2J1.1. Instead, the court must:

Determine whether the contempt is treated as a felony or misdemeanor (here, via analogy to § 3146).
Apply § 2X5.1 (for felonies) or § 2X5.2 (for Class A misdemeanors).
Select the most analogous offense Guideline if § 2X5.1 applies (here, § 2J1.6 for failure to appear or surrender).

E. Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness in sentencing

Procedural reasonableness asks: Did the judge follow the proper process?
- Correctly calculated the Guideline range,
- Considered the § 3553(a) factors,
- Relied on accurate facts, and
- Explained the chosen sentence.
Substantive reasonableness asks: Is the sentence itself fair and reasonable given the facts and § 3553(a) factors?
- This is a deferential standard—an appellate court only reverses if the sentence is outside the range of reasonable choices.

In Owens, the classification of her contempt directly affects procedural reasonableness (proper Guideline calculation), and the ultimate length and consecutiveness of the sentence goes to substantive reasonableness.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Clarifying how to classify § 401 contempt in the Sixth Circuit

Owens is a significant precedential decision in the Sixth Circuit because it:

Rejects the view that all § 401 criminal contempts are inherently felonies,
Formally adopts a case‑by‑case, conduct‑based approach tied to the most analogous federal criminal offense, and
Confirms that for failure‑to‑surrender contempt, the proper reference point is 18 U.S.C. § 3146 and Guideline § 2J1.6.

Practically, this means:

Sentencing ranges for contempt in the Sixth Circuit will vary widely depending on the nature of the misconduct.
Defense counsel will have strong incentives to argue for analogy to misdemeanors or less serious felonies; prosecutors will argue the opposite.
District courts must engage in careful analogizing to the substantive criminal code whenever they impose sentences for criminal contempt.

B. Alignment with, and contribution to, the circuit split

By aligning with the Ninth Circuit’s analog‑based approach and rejecting the First Circuit’s automatic felony rule, the Sixth Circuit:

Deepens the existing circuit split on contempt classification under § 3559(a), and
Potentially positions the issue for eventual Supreme Court resolution.

At the same time, Owens provides a clear, reasoned template for other circuits considering how to reconcile contempt’s sui generis character with the structure of the criminal code and the Guidelines.

C. Reinforcing the authority of report dates and self-surrender orders

Beyond its technical Guideline holding, Owens sends a strong institutional message:

Self‑surrender dates are not aspirational; they are binding court orders.
Failure to report, even after a lenient sentence and generous delay, will be treated as a serious offense in its own right, likely punished consecutively.
District courts are justified in emphasizing general deterrence and vindication of judicial authority when sentencing for contempt arising from failure to surrender.

For defendants, the opinion underscores that accepting a below‑Guidelines sentence with a self‑surrender privilege carries a reciprocal duty of strict compliance.

D. Practical guidance for district courts and practitioners

After Owens, when facing a § 401 contempt case in the Sixth Circuit, the steps are:

Precisely define the contemptuous conduct (e.g., failure to appear, disobeying an injunction, disruptive courtroom behavior).
Identify the most analogous substantive offense in Title 18 or other relevant federal statutes.
Determine the statutory maximum for that analogous offense, thereby classifying it under § 3559(a) as a felony or misdemeanor.
Apply § 2X5.1 (for felonies) or § 2X5.2 (for Class A misdemeanors) and select the most analogous Guideline where required.
Articulate on the record both the analogy and the reasons for treating the contempt as a felony or misdemeanor to insulate the sentence from procedural challenges.

Defense counsel should be prepared with competing analogies (including to lower‑class offenses or misdemeanors), while prosecutors will argue for analogies to higher‑max felonies where appropriate.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Owens establishes an important and nuanced rule for the Sixth Circuit: criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 is not automatically a felony. Instead, the offense’s classification—and thus its treatment under the Sentencing Guidelines—turns on whether the contemptuous conduct is analogous to conduct that Congress has itself designated as felonious in the federal criminal code.

Applying that principle, the court holds that failure to self‑surrender to begin serving a federal sentence is conduct identical to the felony offense in 18 U.S.C. § 3146 and therefore warrants application of Guideline § 2J1.6. The resulting 11‑month consecutive sentence is upheld as both procedurally and substantively reasonable, with special emphasis on deterrence and the need to vindicate the authority of the court.

In doing so, the Sixth Circuit aligns itself with the Ninth Circuit’s flexible, analog‑based approach and rejects the First Circuit’s categorical Class A felony rule, contributing to an existing circuit split and clarifying sentencing practice within the Circuit. For practitioners and judges, Owens offers a structured, principled method for translating contempt’s sui generis character into concrete Guideline calculations while preserving the core judicial interest in enforcing compliance with court orders.