Arizona Supreme Court Holds No Statute-Imposed Duty for Liquor Regulator to Prevent Overservice

Introduction

In Sanchez-Ravuelta v. Yavapai, decided May 19, 2025, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed whether the Arizona Department of Liquor Licenses and Control (the “Department”) owes a statute-based duty of care to victims injured by an intoxicated driver overserved at a licensed establishment. Plaintiffs Victor Sanchez-Ravuelta and Janette Dodge, on behalf of themselves and their minor children, sued the State of Arizona, Yavapai County, and the Town of Dewey-Humboldt after a multi-vehicle collision caused by a driver whose blood alcohol content was nearly four times the legal limit. Plaintiffs alleged the Department wrongfully renewed and failed to suspend or revoke the bar’s license despite repeated infractions. The Court also resolved two critical procedural questions: the timeliness of a cross-appeal under Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 9(b) and the effect of a pending motion for new trial on appellate jurisdiction under ARCAP 9(e)(2).

Summary of the Judgment

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. On the duty issue, the Court held that Arizona’s liquor statutes do not impose a legal duty on the Department to prevent an overserving licensee from creating hazardous conditions. Those statutes grant discretionary enforcement authority but do not require or prohibit specific performances, and therefore cannot form the basis of a tort duty. Procedurally, the Court determined that the Fourth Judgment—properly certified under Rule 54(c)—was the operative final judgment, making the Town of Dewey-Humboldt’s cross-appeal timely under ARCAP 9(b). Finally, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs had given sufficient notice of their pending motion for new trial in their notice of appeal, thereby suspending appellate jurisdiction under ARCAP 9(e)(2) and allowing the superior court to rule on that motion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Gipson v. Kasey: Defines when a statute creates a duty—requiring regulated parties to conform to certain conduct.
Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc.: Explains that a statute-based duty requires the plaintiff to fall within the protected class and the harm to be of the type the statute guards against.
CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Bostwick: Holds that discretionary statutes (those granting authority to act) do not impose enforceable duties.
Grand v. Nacchio and Osuna v. Wal-Mart: Address final-judgment appealability where remaining claims are voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
ARCAP 9(b) & 9(e)(2): Establish cross-appeal deadlines and suspension of appeals pending motions for new trial.

Legal Reasoning

Statutory Duty Analysis: The Court examined title 4 (Alcoholic Beverages) of the Arizona Revised Statutes. Provisions cited by Plaintiffs—such as the Department’s authority to revoke or suspend licenses and to impose civil penalties—are discretionary (“may” statutes). Discretionary statutes do not “require the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct” and thus cannot create a tort duty. Mandatory provisions relied on by Plaintiffs (e.g., establishing an investigations unit) were unrelated to the conduct at issue. In the absence of a clear legislative mandate, no duty arose.

Immunity Statute: Plaintiffs’ reliance on Arizona’s qualified immunity provision (§ 12-820.02(A)(5)) was rejected. Immunity statutes define when public entities are not liable; they do not create affirmative duties that could support negligence claims.

Final Judgment Rule (Rule 54): A judgment is appealable only if certified under Rule 54(b) (partial finality) or Rule 54(c) (complete finality). The Third Judgment was certified only as to certain claims, leaving the Minor Plaintiffs’ dismissals unfinalized. The Fourth Judgment, however, recited that no matters remained pending under Rule 54(c), making it the operative final judgment.

ARCAP 9(b) Cross-Appeal: With the Fourth Judgment as the operative decision, the Town’s notice of cross-appeal fell well within the 20- or 30-day window, giving the court of appeals jurisdiction.

ARCAP 9(e)(2) Motion for New Trial: Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal expressly referenced their unresolved motion for new trial, satisfying the rule’s notice requirement. The appeal was suspended until that motion was resolved, allowing the superior court to vacate its earlier judgment and rule on the motion for new trial without losing jurisdiction.

Impact

This ruling sharply limits tort claims against administrative agencies under discretionary licensing schemes. Only statutes imposing mandatory duties—not statutes granting discretionary authority—can serve as the basis for negligence liability. The decision preserves the separation between policy-making (the legislature’s role) and enforcement (the agency’s role), preventing courts from converting broad regulatory schemes into general liability traps. On appellate practice, the Court’s clarifications on Rules 54 and ARCAP 9 provide litigants with precise guidance on final judgment certification, cross-appeal timing, and the suspension of appeals during motions for new trial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Discretionary vs. Mandatory Statutes: A statute that says an agency “may” do something gives discretion; it does not create a legal duty. A statute that says an agency “shall” or “must” do something can impose an enforceable duty.

Rule 54(b) vs. Rule 54(c): Rule 54(b) allows final judgment on some claims only if the court finds “no just reason for delay.” Rule 54(c) makes a judgment final as to all claims when it recites that “no further matters remain pending.”

ARCAP 9(b) Cross-Appeal Deadlines: A cross-appeal must be filed within 20 days of the appellant’s notice or 30 days of the operative final judgment—whichever is later.

ARCAP 9(e)(2) Suspension of Appeal: If you appeal while a motion for new trial is pending, you must notify the appellate court. The appeal is then suspended until the motion is decided, preserving trial-court jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Sanchez-Ravuelta v. Yavapai reaffirms that discretionary regulatory schemes do not give rise to tort duties absent clear legislative commands. It ensures that the Department of Liquor Licenses and Control cannot be held liable for failing to revoke or suspend a license unless a statute explicitly mandates those actions. Additionally, the decision sharpens appellate procedure by confirming which judgments are final for appeal and how pending motions for new trial interact with appellate jurisdiction. Together, these holdings uphold both statutory limits on public-entity liability and the orderly progression of appeals.