Ambiguity in State Confidentiality Law Defeats “Clearly Established” Prong: Second Circuit Grants Qualified Immunity for VHRC Officials and Confirms the Commission’s Sovereign Immunity

Case: Leise v. Christie, 23-574-cv (L); 23-1180-cv (XAP), United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order, Aug. 27, 2025)

Panel: Circuit Judges Bianco, Menashi, and Lee

Disposition: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, appeal dismissed in part, and remanded

Note: This is a Summary Order and does not have precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1. It nevertheless offers important guidance on qualified immunity where state law is ambiguous, and on the “arm of the state” analysis for sovereign immunity.

Introduction

This case arises from a dispute over the public release of a Vermont Human Rights Commission (VHRC) investigative report that criticized a Vermont State Police trooper, Andrew Leise, as having engaged in discriminatory conduct during responses to repeated calls from complainant Dr. Lydia Clemmons. After the VHRC voted there were reasonable grounds of discrimination, VHRC officials Kevin Christie and Bor Yang allegedly provided the Commission’s Investigative Report to a local newspaper, Seven Days, which then reported on and published the document. Leise sued the VHRC, Christie, and Yang under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Vermont tort law, alleging, among other things, that the release violated Vermont’s confidentiality statute, was malicious, and destroyed his reputation and career.

The central questions on appeal were:

Whether Christie and Yang are entitled to federal qualified immunity on Leise’s substantive due process claim under § 1983 based on the allegedly unlawful release of the Investigative Report.
Whether the VHRC is an “arm of the state” entitled to sovereign immunity, thereby barring claims against the Commission and official-capacity claims against Christie and Yang.
Whether Christie and Yang are entitled to state qualified immunity on Leise’s defamation and invasion of privacy claims under Vermont law, and whether those state-law claims should remain in federal court after the federal claims were dismissed.

Summary of the Judgment

Qualified Immunity (Federal Substantive Due Process): Reversed. The court held that Christie and Yang are entitled to federal qualified immunity on Leise’s substantive due process claim. Because Vermont law is ambiguous as to whether a VHRC “Investigative Report” is confidential, the release did not violate a “clearly established” federal right. The Second Circuit exercised Pearson discretion to resolve the qualified immunity question at the “clearly established” prong without reaching whether a constitutional violation occurred.
Sovereign Immunity (VHRC and Official-Capacity Claims): Affirmed. Applying the Leitner factors, the court held the VHRC is an arm of the State of Vermont and thus enjoys sovereign immunity. The dismissal of all claims against the VHRC and against Christie and Yang in their official capacities was affirmed.
State-Law Defamation and Invasion of Privacy: Appeal dismissed to the extent it challenged the denial of the motion to dismiss. The Second Circuit declined to review the state qualified immunity issue at this stage because it requires additional analysis under Vermont law and is not coextensive with federal qualified immunity. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims, now that the federal claims are gone (28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2017, Vermont State Police troopers, including Trooper Leise, repeatedly responded to landlord-tenant disputes on Dr. Clemmons’s farm. Dr. Clemmons believed the troopers disregarded her complaints and filed a VHRC discrimination complaint alleging race and sex discrimination. After investigating, VHRC staff prepared an Investigative Report recommending a finding against the VSP; the commissioners voted that reasonable grounds existed. The report identified and criticized Trooper Leise by name. In 2021, the VHRC provided the Investigative Report to Seven Days, which published the report and an article about the VHRC’s findings.

Leise sued the VHRC, Christie, and Yang (individually and officially) for:

Federal claims: liberty-interest and property-interest procedural due process; substantive due process (§ 1983).
State claims: invasion of privacy, defamation, tortious interference with contract (the latter was dismissed and not appealed).

The district court dismissed all official-capacity claims and all claims against the VHRC as barred by sovereign immunity, and further dismissed individual-capacity claims to the extent they challenged the VHRC’s adjudicatory/investigative functions (absolute immunity). But it allowed claims to proceed against Christie and Yang regarding the release of the Investigative Report to the media. On reconsideration, the district court allowed the substantive due process claim to proceed (but dismissed the procedural due process claims). The officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity on the substantive due process claim and pressed state qualified immunity on the torts; Leise cross-appealed on sovereign immunity.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

Qualified Immunity Framework:
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982): Officials are shielded unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
- Ricciuti v. Gyzenis, 834 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2016); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011): The two-prong analysis (violation and clearly established right).
- McKinney v. City of Middletown, 49 F.4th 730 (2d Cir. 2022); Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2025): A right is clearly established only if controlling authority or a robust consensus recognizes it.
- Guan v. City of New York, 37 F.4th 797 (2d Cir. 2022): Qualified immunity attaches if reasonable officials could disagree about legality in the specific factual context.
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): Courts may decide the “clearly established” prong first.
- Tooly v. Schwaller, 919 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2019): A violation of state law does not automatically establish a federal constitutional violation; the federal right must independently be clearly established.
- Ehrlich v. Town of Glastonbury, 348 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2003): Where state law is unclear, officials may reasonably believe their conduct is lawful, supporting qualified immunity.
Substantive Due Process Standard:
- Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005): Substantive due process protects against government action that is conscience-shocking or maliciously abusive of power with no legitimate purpose.
Appealability of Qualified Immunity Denials:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985): Denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable to the extent it turns on a question of law (collateral order doctrine).
- Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995); Brown v. Halpin, 885 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2018): If resolution requires factual determinations, interlocutory review is unavailable.
Sovereign Immunity (“Arm of the State”):
- Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997); Woods v. Rondout Valley CSD, 466 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2006): Sovereign immunity extends to arms of the state.
- Leitner v. Westchester Community College, 779 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2015): Four-factor test—(1) state’s responsibility for judgments, (2) state control, (3) how the creating documents describe the entity, and (4) whether functions are state or local.
- Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 1996): Focus on whether entity resembles a state agency, not its specific title.
- Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. 248 (2020); McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2001): General sovereign immunity principles.
Supplemental Jurisdiction:
- 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2003): District courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims over which they have original jurisdiction.

Legal Reasoning

1) Federal Qualified Immunity: Ambiguity in Vermont Law Made the Right Not “Clearly Established”

Leise’s substantive due process theory hinged on the assertion that releasing the VHRC “Investigative Report” violated Vermont’s confidentiality framework. The Second Circuit focused on whether any federal right prohibiting the release was “clearly established” in light of Vermont law at the time of the release. Finding ambiguity in state law, the court held it was reasonable for Christie and Yang to believe the release was lawful and therefore they were entitled to qualified immunity.

Key features of Vermont law driving the analysis:

Statutory text (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4555):
- Subsection (a)(1) provides that the VHRC’s “complaint files and investigative files shall be confidential” (subject to exceptions).
- Subsection (c) provides that when the VHRC determines reasonable grounds exist, “that determination and the names of the parties may be made public.”
- The statute does not mention “investigative report.”
VHRC rules (11-1 Vt. Code R. § 1.21, § 1.34, § 1.7):
- Define “Investigative Report” as a post-investigation document containing facts, analysis, and a recommendation to commissioners—distinct from “complaint” or “investigative file.”
- Define “investigative file” in a way that excludes certain analytical materials; and “complaint file” as allegations/complaints.

Because the statute protects “complaint files” and “investigative files,” but is silent about “investigative reports,” and because VHRC rules treat the report as distinct from the investigative file, state law was unclear on whether the specific document at issue was confidential. Given this ambiguity, reasonable officials could disagree about their legal obligations—precisely the setting in which federal qualified immunity applies.

Further, under Tooly v. Schwaller, even if state law were violated, the court would still need to find a clearly established federal right—particularly whether the conduct was conscience-shocking in violation of substantive due process. The panel exercised its discretion under Pearson v. Callahan to resolve the appeal on the “clearly established” prong alone, without definitively interpreting Vermont law or deciding whether releasing the report would shock the conscience.

2) State Qualified Immunity on the Tort Claims: Not Interlocutorily Reviewable and Not Coextensive with Federal Standard

Christie and Yang also sought qualified immunity under Vermont law on the defamation and invasion of privacy claims. The Second Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal of the denial of the motion to dismiss those claims because deciding state qualified immunity requires additional analysis under Vermont standards, which differ from the federal “clearly established” test. Under O’Connor v. Donovan, 48 A.3d 584 (Vt. 2012), Vermont’s test focuses on whether an official acted within scope, in good faith, and performed discretionary rather than ministerial acts. That analysis is fact-intensive and not typically amenable to interlocutory review where factual disputes remain.

Because the federal claims are now dismissed (as qualified immunity has been granted), the court remanded for the district court to consider whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under § 1367(c)(3) or to dismiss them without prejudice for resolution in state court.

3) Sovereign Immunity: VHRC Is an Arm of the State

Applying the Leitner four-factor test, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the VHRC is an arm of the State of Vermont and thus enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. Key points:

State’s responsibility for judgments (most important factor): The VHRC overwhelmingly relies on state appropriations (85–90% of budget). VHRC commissioners and staff are treated and compensated as state officers/employees. Vermont law obligates the State to defend and indemnify staff for acts within the scope of their duties. The State Liability Self-Insurance Fund covers judgments for state agencies and commissions. This factor strongly favors arm-of-the-state status.
Degree of state control: VHRC’s five commissioners are appointed by the Governor with Senate consent and serve at the Governor’s pleasure. The VHRC must submit annual reports and budget requests to the Legislature. These features reflect substantial state oversight and control.
How the entity is described: Although not labeled an “agency,” the VHRC is a state “commission,” statewide in scope, created by statute, and subject to gubernatorial appointment and legislative reporting. The focus is on functional resemblance to a state agency rather than its title; this factor favors arm-of-the-state treatment.
Nature of functions: The VHRC operates statewide to safeguard civil and human rights and may hold hearings anywhere in the state—archetypally statewide functions.

Because all four factors favored the State, the court affirmed sovereign immunity for the VHRC and for Christie and Yang in their official capacities. The cross-appeal was properly before the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), as the district court had entered partial final judgment for the VHRC.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Qualified Immunity in State-Law-Dependent § 1983 Claims: Where a plaintiff’s federal constitutional theory depends on the unlawfulness of conduct under state law, ambiguity in that state law will often defeat the “clearly established” prong, leading to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs should be prepared to show not merely a state-law violation, but clarity in state law sufficient to put reasonable officials on notice that their conduct would also violate federal rights.
Substantive Due Process is a High Bar: Even apart from state-law ambiguity, the “shocks the conscience” standard remains stringent. This decision underscores Pearson’s flexibility: appellate courts can resolve qualified immunity on the clearly established prong without opining on whether there was a substantive due process violation.
Document Taxonomy Matters: The outcome turned on the statutory and regulatory taxonomy of VHRC documents (complaint file, investigative file, investigative report). Agencies should ensure that statutory text aligns with their rules and dissemination practices; mismatches can create ambiguity that clinicians of the law may exploit.
Sovereign Immunity Baselines: The VHRC’s funding, appointment structure, reporting obligations, and statewide remit made it an arm of the state. Entities with similar traits should anticipate sovereign immunity protection and structure litigation strategies accordingly.
State Qualified Immunity Diverges from Federal: Vermont’s emphasis on good faith and discretionary acts may produce different outcomes from federal doctrine. Because of this divergence, and because the federal claims are gone, further litigation may shift to state courts if federal courts decline supplemental jurisdiction.
Litigation Strategy Notes:
- For defendants: Early qualified immunity motions remain powerful tools, especially where state-law ambiguity clouds notice. Preserve records of legal advice and statutory interpretations supporting good-faith beliefs.
- For plaintiffs: Consider seeking declaratory or injunctive relief in tandem with damages if appropriate; develop state-law clarity through authoritative sources (agency guidance, attorney general opinions, or state appellate decisions) to undercut ambiguity arguments.
- For agencies: Align internal rules with statutory text; make confidentiality policies explicit as to specific document types; implement training on permissible disclosures; consider redaction protocols when public interest warrants release.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity (Federal): A shield for officials sued for damages under § 1983. Even if the official’s action is unlawful, they are immune unless a reasonable official would have known that the conduct violated a clearly established federal right in the specific context.
“Clearly Established” Right: The law must be clear enough—through controlling precedent or a strong consensus—that every reasonable official would understand the conduct is unlawful. Ambiguity or reasonable disagreement favors immunity.
Substantive Due Process (“Shocks the Conscience”): Protects against egregious abuses of government power. It is not a catch-all for every wrongful act; the conduct must be so extreme that it offends fundamental fairness.
Sovereign Immunity (Arm of the State): States and their arms cannot be sued in federal court without consent. Whether an entity is an arm of the state depends on funding, control, how it is described, and whether its functions are statewide.
Collateral Order Doctrine: Allows immediate appeal of certain rulings (like denials of qualified immunity) that resolve important legal questions separate from the merits, but only to the extent no fact-finding is required.
Supplemental Jurisdiction: Federal courts can hear state claims related to federal claims in the same case. If the federal claims are dismissed early, courts have discretion to send the remaining state claims to state court.
Absolute vs. Qualified Immunity: Absolute immunity fully protects certain functions (e.g., adjudicatory or prosecutorial acts). Qualified immunity protects discretionary acts unless clearly established federal rights were violated. Here, the district court applied absolute immunity to VHRC’s investigative/adjudicative activities, but not to alleged extra-judicial dissemination to the media.
Vermont State Qualified Immunity: Under Vermont law, an official is immune if acting within scope, in good faith, and performing discretionary acts. This is distinct from the federal “clearly established” test and often requires factual development.

Conclusion

Leise v. Christie underscores a pragmatic and recurring theme in § 1983 litigation: when a federal claim is tethered to a disputed state-law premise, qualified immunity often turns on the clarity of that state law. Here, statutory silence on “investigative reports,” combined with VHRC rules distinguishing those reports from “investigative files,” created sufficient ambiguity to defeat the “clearly established” prong. Leveraging Pearson, the Second Circuit resolved the federal claim on that ground alone and granted qualified immunity to the individual VHRC defendants.

The court also reaffirmed robust sovereign immunity protections for state-level commissions meeting the Leitner criteria—like VHRC—thereby barring suits against the agency and its officials in their official capacities. With federal claims dismissed, the path forward is a state-law fight over alleged defamation and invasion of privacy, subject to Vermont’s distinct qualified immunity doctrine and the district court’s discretion whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction.

Key takeaways: clarity in state confidentiality regimes is pivotal; document taxonomy matters; and public officials can rely on reasonable interpretations of ambiguous state law without incurring federal damages liability. Agencies should align rulemaking with statutes, and litigants should calibrate strategies to the interplay between state-law ambiguity and federal qualified immunity’s demanding standards.