Airey v. Feliciano: The “No-Candidate, No-Primary” Rule – Connecticut Supreme Court Clarifies the Limits of § 9-329a(b)(3)

Introduction

On 29 July 2025 the Connecticut Supreme Court delivered its second and final opinion in Airey v. Feliciano, a protracted dispute over the validity of opposing slates of candidates vying for seats on the Democratic Town Committee for Hartford’s Seventh District. What began as a routine petition-signature challenge morphed into a wide-ranging debate about the Superior Court’s remedial powers under General Statutes § 9-329a(b). Ultimately, the Court announced a clear and categorical rule: when no slate of candidates legally qualifies for a primary, § 9-329a(b)(3) does not authorize a court to order a “do-over” primary. Vacancies must instead be filled pursuant to local party rules.

Summary of the Judgment

The intervening defendants (the “Green slate”) asked the trial court to order a new primary after both their slate and the plaintiffs’ slate (the “Airey slate”) had been disqualified by the Supreme Court on an earlier appeal. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it lacked statutory authority because no qualified candidates remained. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding:

Section 9-329a(b)(3) contemplates a contested primary that has occurred or will occur; it does not apply where the scheduled primary has been cancelled and no candidates qualify for the ballot.
Because neither slate met the petition-signature requirements, the statutory framework (§§ 9-421, 9-417, 9-429) commanded that no primary be held and vacancies be filled by party rules.
Failure to order a new primary did not infringe voters’ constitutional rights, as the absence of a primary resulted from candidate disqualification, not state action.
The Court declined to overrule its “imputed knowledge” doctrine, reaffirming that erroneous certifications by election officials constitute reviewable “rulings” under § 9-329a(a).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Airey v. Feliciano, 350 Conn. 162 (2024) – The first appeal where the Court found neither slate qualified. This factual predicate was essential to the present holding; with no qualified candidates, the statutory remedy of a new primary was unavailable.
Keeley v. Ayala, 328 Conn. 393 (2018) – Provided the mixed fact-law standard of review for election-contest remedies.
Lazar v. Ganim, 334 Conn. 73 (2019) – Warned against giving candidates a “mulligan” when they fail to qualify; quoted to reject the Green slate’s request for a second chance.
Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618 (2008) & Arciniega v. Feliciano, 329 Conn. 293 (2018) – Established and reaffirmed the “imputed knowledge doctrine”, invoked to confirm standing of both slates.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court undertook a strict textual analysis under General Statutes § 1-2z:

Textual Examination. Section 9-329a(b) authorizes three remedies – determining the result, changing the schedule, or ordering a new primary – but only “if [the court] finds any error … [and] is unable to determine the result of such primary.” The repeated reference to “such primary” signals that a contested primary must exist or be required.
Contextual Harmonization. Reading § 9-329a in conjunction with §§ 9-421 (threshold for holding primaries), 9-417 & 9-429 (automatic election when candidacies are insufficient) revealed a comprehensive legislative scheme: if no slate reaches the 25 % candidacy threshold, no primary is held.
Application to Facts. Once both slates were disqualified, there were zero qualified candidacies. Statutorily, the “result” was predetermined—no primary and vacancies to be filled internally. Therefore, the “but for” causation element in § 9-329a(b)(3) was unsatisfied; even without the officials’ error, outcome would have been the same.
Constitutional Claim. The Court dismissed the Green slate’s constitutional arguments because the deprivation of a primary stemmed from private actors’ failure to qualify, not governmental suppression of voting.
Doctrine of Imputed Knowledge. The Court defended stare decisis, maintaining that certifications contrary to mandatory statutes remain judicially reviewable “rulings”, preserving candidates’ standing but not enlarging their substantive rights.

3. Potential Impact of the Judgment

Clarifies Remedial Boundaries. Trial courts now have explicit guidance: they cannot resurrect a primary where no qualifying candidates remain. This prevents strategic litigation aimed at forcing new primaries after campaign missteps.
Strengthens Signature Requirements. Slates must vigilantly comply with petition thresholds; courts will not bail them out post-disqualification.
Reinforces Local Party Autonomy. By deferring to local party rules for filling vacancies, the decision respects internal political-party governance while maintaining statutory integrity.
Preserves Standing Doctrine. Retention of the imputed knowledge doctrine ensures aggrieved candidates retain access to judicial review of erroneous official actions, but without expanding available remedies.
Guidance Nationwide. Other jurisdictions with similar statutory schemes may cite the case to limit judicially ordered “do-over” elections where qualifying prerequisites were never satisfied.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 9-329a(b)(3) “but-for” Test. A court may order a new primary only if (a) an official’s error occurred, (b) that error could have changed the outcome, and (c) the court cannot otherwise determine who won. If disqualification of all candidates means there is no outcome to change, the test fails.
Imputed Knowledge Doctrine. Even if officials did not know that petitions were invalid, the law “imputes” knowledge of statutory mandates to them. An erroneous certification therefore counts as an “official ruling” for standing purposes.
25 % Threshold (General Statutes § 9-421). Town-committee primaries occur only if non-endorsed candidacies reach at least 25 % of available seats. Failure to meet the threshold cancels the primary automatically.
Vacancy Filling by Party Rules. When no primary is held, local party bylaws—filed publicly via § 9-374—govern how remaining seats are filled, typically by committee vote.

Conclusion

Airey v. Feliciano cements a straightforward but powerful principle: without legally qualified candidates, there can be no court-ordered new primary under § 9-329a(b)(3). The decision safeguards statutory design, discourages opportunistic litigation, and allocates responsibility squarely on candidates to satisfy threshold requirements. While preserving access to the courts through the imputed knowledge doctrine, the ruling delineates clear outer limits on judicial intervention in Connecticut’s electoral process. Going forward, political actors must heed the “No-Candidate, No-Primary” rule—compliance first, litigation second.