Airey v. Feliciano

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Airey v. Feliciano

PHYLLIS AIREY ET AL. v. GISELLE

FELICIANO ET AL.

(SC 21117)

McDonald, D'Auria, Ecker, Dannehy and Bright, Js. Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 9-329a (b) (3)), when a candidate who claims to be aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with a primary election files a complaint in the Superior Court, the court must hold a hearing, and, ''if [the court] finds any error in the ruling of the election official,'' it may ''order a new primary if [it] finds that but for the error . . . the result of [the] primary might have been different and [it] is unable to determine the result of such primary.''

The intervening defendants, a slate of candidates seeking to appear on the ballot for a primary election for the Democratic Town Committee for the seventh voting district of the city of Hartford, appealed from the decision of the trial court, which denied their motion for a new primary election on the ground that the court lacked authority to order a new primary. Previously, certain Hartford election officials had certified the intervening defendants' slate for the primary, as well as a competing slate consisting of the plaintiffs. A prior court determined that the intervening defendants were not qualified for the primary and canceled the primary. Thereafter, this court upheld the prior court's determination that the intervening defendants were not qualified for the primary and also concluded that the plaintiffs were not qualified. On appeal from the denial of the motion for a new primary election in the present case, the intervening defendants claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had incorrectly determined that it lacked authority to order a new primary election under § 9-329a (b) (3). Held:

The trial court correctly concluded that it lacked authority under § 9-329a

(b) (3) to order a new primary election under the circumstances of this case. The remedy afforded by § 9-329a (b) (3) for an error in an election official's ruling, namely, a new primary, contemplates a contested primary election that has been held or will be held, but, when the intervening defendants moved for a new primary in this case, the scheduled primary had been canceled, and neither slate was deemed to have qualified for the primary, thereby leaving no remaining qualified candidates.

Insofar as there were no qualified candidates remaining for the requested primary, the statute (§ 9-421) governing when primaries are not to be held for town committee members dictated that no primary would be held under these circumstances, and any vacancies were to be filled in accordance with the local party rules.

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Consequently, the intervening defendants were unable to establish that, but for erroneous decision of Hartford election officials to certify both slates of candidates, the result of the canceled primary might have been different. There was no merit to the intervening defendants' claim that the trial court's failure to order a new primary violated the fundamental rights of the Demo- cratic voters in the seventh voting district of Hartford, as the candidates, having failed to qualify for the primary, bore responsibility for the lack of a primary rather than the court.

This court declined the intervening defendants' invitation to overrule or narrow the imputed knowledge doctrine, which affords standing to candi- dates aggrieved by rulings of election officials.

The trial court properly applied the law when it concluded that both slates of candidates had standing pursuant to the imputed knowledge doctrine, and neither cogent reasons nor inescapable logic compelled this court to overrule its precedent on the doctrine or to abandon the doctrine altogether. Argued June 16—officially July 29, 2025

Procedural History

Action for a judgment declaring that certain signa-

tures on a petition sheet circulated by a slate of candi- dates seeking to appear on the ballot for a certain

primary election for the Democratic Town Committee

for the seventh district for the city of Hartford were invalid and that the slate was not qualified for nomina- tion due to a failure to file the necessary number of

signatures, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the

court, Noble, J., granted the motion filed by Kenneth

P. Green et al. to intervene as defendants; thereafter, the intervening defendants filed a counterclaim; subse- quently, the case was tried to the court, Noble, J.; judg- ment for the plaintiffs on their complaint and in part for the intervening defendants on their counterclaim,

and an order directing the named defendant et al. to

remove the names of the intervening defendants from

the ballot, from which the intervening defendants

appealed; thereafter, this court reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further

proceedings; subsequently, the court, Klau, J., denied

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the motion of the intervening defendants for a new primary election, and the intervening defendants appealed. Affirmed.

Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellants (interven- ing defendants).

John B. Kennelly, for the appellees (plaintiffs). Opinion

BRIGHT, J. This is the second appeal arising from a primary election dispute between two competing slates of candidates—the Airey slate, which includes the named plaintiff Phyllis Airey,¹

and the Green slate, which includes defendant Kenneth P. Green²—who sought to appear on the ballot for the March 5, 2024 primary election for the Democratic Town Committee for the seventh district of the city of Hartford. After the named defendant, the Democratic registrar of voters, Giselle Feliciano, and defendant city clerk, Noel McGregor, certified that both slates of candidates had qualified for the primary election, the Airey slate filed the underlying action pursuant to General Statutes § 9- 329a (a),³

seeking to disqualify the Green slate. See

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Airey v. Feliciano, 350 Conn. 162, 164-66, 323 A.3d 1037 (2024). The individual members of the Green slate intervened and filed a counterclaim seeking to disqual- ify the Airey slate. Id., 165-66. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that only the Airey slate had qualified for the primary and ordered Feliciano and McGregor to remove the Green slate from the ballot. Id., 167. As a result, the March 5 primary was canceled. Id., 168 n.3. The Green slate appealed; id., 165;⁴

and we reversed in part the judgment of the trial court. Id., 181-82. We concluded that neither the Green slate nor the Airey slate had qualified for the primary and remanded the case with direction to disqualify the Airey slate ''and for other proceedings according to law . . . .'' Id., 182. On remand, the trial court denied the Green slate's motion for a new primary election, reasoning that it lacked the authority to order a new election under § 9- 329a (b) (3) because neither slate had qualified for the primary. The Green slate appeals, claiming that (1) the trial court improperly failed to order a new primary election under § 9-329a (b) (3), and (2) the court's fail- ure to order a new primary election violated the funda- mental rights of the Democratic voters in Hartford's seventh district. As alternative relief, the Green slate asks this court ''to overturn or substantially narrow the overly broad 'imputed knowledge doctrine' that enabled this destructive litigation and threatens to undermine Connecticut democracy.'' We conclude that the court lacked the authority to order a new primary and that its failure to do so did not violate any voter's fundamen- tal right to vote. We also decline the Green slate's request that we overrule or narrow our imputed knowl- edge doctrine precedent. We therefore affirm the judg- ment of the trial court.

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The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. Following our remand order in Airey, the Hartford Democratic Town Committee posted a notice of its intent to fill the vacancies for the city's seventh district by committee appointment during a meeting scheduled for September 16, 2024.⁵

Three days before that meeting, the Green slate had moved for a temporary injunction barring the Hartford Democratic Town Committee from filling the vacancies for the sev- enth district and enjoining Feliciano and McGregor from accepting or recognizing any purported appoint- ments to the seventh district. The Green slate also moved for a new primary pursuant to § 9-329a (b) (3), which authorizes a court to ''order a new primary if [it] finds that but for the error in the ruling of the election official . . . or any violation of said sections, the result of such primary might have been different and [the court] is unable to determine the result of such pri- mary.'' The Green slate argued that the statutory criteria were met in the present case because (1) the error in the rulings of the election official likely affected the result of the primary, given that those rulings ''deter- mined which slates appeared on the ballot,'' and (2) the court was unable to determine the result of the election.

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On September 16, 2024, the parties agreed that Felici- ano and McGregor would ''hold any and all filings by the Hartford Democratic Town Committee regarding the membership of the seventh . . . district until there [was] a final decision'' in the matter, and the court accepted the parties' agreement. The Airey slate and Feliciano and McGregor subsequently filed briefs opposing the Green slate's motion for a new primary election, and the parties agreed that the court, Klau, J., would decide the matter without a hearing. On April 14, 2025, the court issued a decision denying the Green slate's motion for a new primary. The court reasoned that it lacked the authority to order a new primary under § 9-329a (b) (3) because ''no primary election ever occurred, and [this court had] determined that neither slate of candidates qualified to appear on the primary ballot.'' The court also observed that General Statutes § 9-417 (a)⁶

dictated that ''[t]he Airey slate— as the party-endorsed slate of candidates for the seventh district—'shall be deemed to have been lawfully elected to such positions . . . .' ''

The Green slate filed a motion to reconsider or rear- gue the court's decision, arguing that (1) the court mis- takenly identified the Airey slate as the party-endorsed slate and, therefore, wrongly concluded that § 9-417 (a) dictated the outcome of the present case, and (2) § 9- 329a (b) ''expressly empower[s] courts to order new

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primaries when statutory violations make the election result indeterminable.''

After hearing argument on the motion for reconsider- ation, the court issued a decision in which it granted reconsideration and vacated its April 14 decision. The court acknowledged that it had mistakenly identified the Airey slate as the party-endorsed slate and agreed with the Green slate that § 9-417 (a) therefore does not control in the present case. The court, however, reached the same conclusion regarding its lack of authority to order a new primary election as it had in its prior deci- sion, reasoning that, ''[p]ursuant to § 9-329a (b), [it could] 'determine the result' of the primary under the present circumstances: no primary shall be held because neither slate qualified for the primary ballot. . . . [T]he current legal status quo is no different than if both slates had simply failed to collect the required number of signatures to qualify for the primary ballot. No pri- mary election would be held under such circumstances.'' This appeal followed.⁷

I

The Green slate claims that the trial court improperly failed to order a new primary election under § 9-329a

(b) (3). We disagree. We begin our analysis with the applicable standard of review. ''[T]he ultimate determination of whether

. . . a new election is called for . . . is a mixed ques- tion of fact and law that is subject to plenary review on appeal . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keeley v. Ayala, 328 Conn. 393, 404, 179 A.3d 1249 (2018). Whether the court correctly determined that it lacked the authority to order a new primary under § 9-

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329a (b) (3) involves an issue of statutory interpretation, which is also subject to our plenary review. See id. General Statutes § 1-2z requires that we first consider ''the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and consid- ering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the mean- ing of the statute shall not be considered.'' Thus, our analysis begins with the plain meaning of the statute, although we remain ''mindful that we do not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicial interpretations of [the statutory] language and the pur- pose of [the relevant] statute[s].'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stamford v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, Office of Public Hearings, 351 Conn. 298, 306, 330 A.3d 102 (2025).

Pursuant to § 9-329a (a), any candidate who is aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connec- tion with a primary may file a complaint in the Superior Court either before or after the primary. Section 9-329a

(b) requires that the trial court hold a hearing on the complaint and provides that the court ''may (1) deter- mine the result of such primary; (2) order a change in the existing primary schedule; or (3) order a new pri- mary if [the court] finds that but for the error in the ruling of the election official . . . the result of [the] primary might have been different and [the court] is unable to determine the result of such primary.'' Accordingly, the statute authorizes the court to order three distinct remedies if it ''finds any error in the ruling of the election official . . . .'' General Statutes § 9-329a (b). Each remedy contemplates a contested primary election that either was held; see General Statutes § 9- 329a (b) (1) and (3); or will be held. See General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (2).

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In the present case, the Airey slate initiated the under- lying action before the primary occurred, and the pri- mary was canceled after the trial court determined that the Green slate had failed to qualify for the primary. See General Statutes §§ 9-417 (b)⁸

and 9-429.⁹

We subse- quently held that the Airey slate also had failed to qualify for the primary, which left no qualified candidates for the primary. General Statutes § 9-421 expressly pro- vides that ''no primary shall be held by a party for the election of a member of a town committee unless candidacies for such election numbering at least twenty-five per cent of the number of town committee members to be elected by such party . . . are filed in conformity with the provisions of sections 9-400 to 9- 414, inclusive, by persons other than party-endorsed candidates.'' Accordingly, when the Green slate moved for a new primary on remand, no primary had been held, and, pursuant to § 9-421, no primary would be held. In these circumstances, § 9-329a (b) (3) does not authorize the court to order a new primary. Indeed, no primary could be held because neither slate qualified to appear on the primary ballot, which left vacancies

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on the Democratic Town Committee to be filled in accordance with the local party rules. See footnote 5 of this opinion. As a result, the Green slate was unable to establish that, but for the erroneous ruling of the election official—that is, the erroneous certification that both slates of candidates had qualified for the pri- mary—the result of the canceled primary ''might have been different . . . .'' General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (3). In other words, if the election officials had rejected both slates' petitions, as we concluded in Airey that they should have, no primary would have been held, which is exactly what happened.¹⁰

The court therefore correctly concluded that it lacked the statutory author- ity to order a new primary when no candidates had qualified to appear on the ballot.

The Green slate's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. It argues that ordering a new primary under § 9-329a (b) (3) is authorized, even when the scheduled primary never occurred. According to the Green slate, ''[w]hen no primary occurs at all, every conceivable result 'might have been different' than the nonresult of no election.'' In so arguing, the Green slate seemingly ignores the fact that neither slate had qualified to appear on the primary ballot, and, thus, the candidates—not the election officials—bear responsibility for the canceled primary. The Green slate essentially argues that § 9- 329a (b) (3) provides candidates who failed to qualify for the scheduled primary with ''the electoral equivalent of a mulligan.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lazar v. Ganim, 334 Conn. 73, 94, 220 A.3d 18 (2019). To the contrary, § 9-329a (b) (3) does not authorize a trial court to order a new primary whenever candidates fail to qualify to appear on the ballot. Instead, § 9-329a

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(b) (3) authorizes the trial court to order a new primary only when the statutory requirements are met. In the present case, because neither slate of candidates quali- fied for the original primary, which never occurred, the Green slate was unable to establish that it was entitled to a new primary under the statute.¹¹

II

The Green slate next claims that the trial court's failure to order a new primary violated the fundamental rights of the Democratic voters in Hartford's seventh district. It recounts several provisions of the state and federal constitutions regarding the rights of citizens to vote in elections¹²

and argues that the court's decision denying its request for a new primary ''does not merely burden or restrict voting rights—it eliminates them entirely.'' This claim lacks merit.

In Airey, we concluded that neither the Green slate nor the Airey slate had qualified to appear on the pri- mary ballot. As we concluded in part I of this opinion, the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked the statutory authority to order a new primary when no slate of candidates had qualified for the primary in the

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first place. It follows, therefore, that the candidates— not the trial court—bear responsibility for the failed primary. Consequently, because the alleged restriction on voting rights arises from the failure of the candidates to qualify for the primary, and not from any state action, we reject the Green slate's claim that the trial court's decision violated the fundamental rights of Democratic voters in Hartford's seventh district.

III

Last, the Green slate claims that the Airey slate lacked standing to initiate the underlying action because the imputed knowledge doctrine, which grants standing to candidates aggrieved by the decisions of election offi- cials, although ''established by precedent, violates the plain language of'' § 9-329a (a). The Green slate con- cedes that this claim is unpreserved but contends that it is reviewable because it implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. We agree that the claim implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore reviewable. See, e.g., Arciniega v. Feliciano, 329 Conn. 293, 300-301 n.4, 184 A.3d 1202 (2018). We decline the invitation, however, to abandon the imputed knowledge doctrine in election cases.

Both the Airey slate and the Green slate asserted their respective claim and counterclaim pursuant to § 9- 329a (a) (1), which authorizes ''[a]ny . . . elector or candidate aggrieved by a ruling of an election official'' to bring an action in the Superior Court. Neither slate disputed that the other had standing, and the trial court, Noble, J., noted in its memorandum of decision that each slate had standing. Quoting from this court's deci- sion in Arciniega v. Feliciano, supra, 329 Conn. 303, the trial court recognized that § 9-329a (a) (1) affords standing only when there is '' 'a ruling of an election official' '' and that '' 'an official may render a ruling, even if the official is unaware that a person has committed

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a violation of the election laws, if the official would be required to take dispositive action if that violation were known to the official.' '' See also Caruso v. Bridgeport,

285 Conn. 618, 647, 941 A.2d 266 (2008) (''[w]hen an election statute mandates certain procedures, and the election official has failed to apply or to follow those procedures, such conduct implicitly constitutes an incorrect interpretation of the requirements of the stat- ute and, therefore, is a ruling'').¹³

Under this doctrine, the trial court determined that McGregor's certification that both slates of candidates had obtained sufficient signatures to qualify for the primary election was ''a ruling of an election official'' by which both slates of candidates were aggrieved.

The trial court properly applied the law, and we con- clude that neither cogent reasons nor inescapable logic compels us to overrule Caruso or Arciniega or to aban- don the imputed knowledge doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 170, 920 A.2d 236 (2007) (''[T]he doctrine of stare decisis counsels that a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it. . . . Stare decisis is justified because it allows for predict- ability in the ordering of conduct, it promotes the neces- sary perception that the law is relatively unchanging, it saves resources and it promotes judicial efficiency.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

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