Affirmance on Alternative Grounds: No State Action Under § 1983, Time-Barred Claims, and Kentucky Venue Control Despite Rooker-Feldman Misstep

Introduction

In Alan Boyd Curtis v. Robyn Pauline Mislevy, et al., the Eleventh Circuit (non-argument calendar; unpublished) affirmed the Middle District of Florida’s sua sponte dismissal of a wide-ranging pro se complaint arising from two sets of state-court proceedings—one in Florida and one in Kentucky. Curtis alleged civil-rights violations and assorted state-law claims linked to a decade-long saga involving a Florida tort action and a Kentucky trust/property dispute.

On appeal, Curtis challenged the district court’s reliance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, asserted due process violations, disputed the statute-of-limitations ruling, and contested the court’s jurisdiction and venue determinations (including an argument that admiralty jurisdiction should apply). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the district court did not perform the claim-by-claim Rooker-Feldman analysis that Behr v. Campbell requires, but nevertheless affirmed on alternative grounds: the federal civil-rights claims failed as a matter of law (private actors; no conspiracy/state action), the key federal claim was time-barred, venue for the state-law trust/property claims lay in Kentucky, and admiralty jurisdiction did not apply.

Summary of the Opinion

Rooker-Feldman: The panel recognized the district court did not conduct the mandated claim-by-claim analysis, but affirmed anyway because the federal claims failed on independent grounds, invoking the “right for any reason” principle (Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic).
Section 1983/state action: The complaint targeted private parties (individuals, private attorneys, a trustee). Curtis did not contest the district court’s private-actor/state-action ruling on appeal and had conceded below that proceeding under § 1983 was improper. No plausible conspiracy to transform private conduct into state action was alleged.
Due process: Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, the record showed Kentucky Judge Easton afforded hearings, liberally construed filings, and allowed untimely motions—rendering additional procedures of no value. No procedural due process deprivation was shown.
Statute of limitations: Using Florida’s four-year residual personal-injury period for § 1983 claims and federal accrual rules (Rozar v. Mullis), Curtis’s challenge to events dating to 2010 was untimely when filed in 2022.
Jurisdiction and venue: Even assuming diversity, venue for the state-law trust/property claims was improper in Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The trust contained a governing-law clause, not a forum-selection/venue clause. The proper venue was Kentucky, where the property and proceedings were located.
Admiralty: The claims were fundamentally about state-court pleadings and a land trust/property in Kentucky—non-maritime. Curtis’s request for a jury trial also undercut any admiralty posture (admiralty claims are ordinarily tried without a jury).

Result: Affirmed in full; dismissal stands.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206 (11th Cir. 2021): Requires a claim-by-claim application of Rooker-Feldman rather than a complaint-wide gloss. The panel expressly noted the district court’s failure to follow Behr. But because other dispositive grounds supported dismissal, the court did not remand for a Behr-compliant analysis.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005): These cases establish and confine Rooker-Feldman, which bars lower federal court review of state-court judgments. The panel used them as background to explain the doctrine’s scope but deliberately resolved the appeal on other grounds.
Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010): Embodies the “right for any reason” rule—the appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Here, it permitted affirmance despite the district court’s Rooker-Feldman misstep because the § 1983 claims independently failed.
Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127 (11th Cir. 1992): Reiterate that § 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law. Private actors are not state actors absent narrow circumstances (e.g., pervasive entwinement, public function, or conspiracy with state officials). These authorities supported the dismissal of Curtis’s civil-rights claims.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014): If an appellant fails to challenge one of the independent grounds for dismissal, that issue is abandoned on appeal, and affirmance follows. Curtis did not contest the private-actor determination and conceded his § 1983 route was improper, effectively sealing the dismissal of his civil-rights counts.
Woldeab v. DeKalb County Board of Education, 885 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2018): While pro se litigants typically receive an opportunity to amend, leave is unnecessary where amendment would be futile or the plaintiff is clear he does not wish to amend. The panel held futility because Curtis could not cure the state-action defect or show a due process violation.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Establishes the three-factor balancing test for procedural due process. The court found that additional procedures would have had no meaningful value given multiple hearings, liberal construction of filings, and available appeals in the Kentucky court.
Doe as Next Friend of Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2022); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 1996); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3): Together, these authorities determine the timeliness of § 1983 claims. Florida’s four-year residual personal-injury period applies; accrual occurs when the plaintiff knows of the injury and the responsible actors. Curtis knew by 2010; filing in 2022 was late.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014); Algodonera de las Cabezas, S.A. v. American Suisse Capital, Inc., 432 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2005): Venue principles and standard of review for sua sponte venue dismissals. A “substantial part of the events” and the subject property were in Kentucky. The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting venue in Florida.
Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975), adopted in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Maritime claims are generally tried without a jury. The court used this to show the tension between Curtis’s jury demand and his invocation of admiralty, bolstering its conclusion that admiralty jurisdiction did not apply to these land/trust and state-court litigation disputes.
Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2019): Confirms de novo review of sua sponte dismissals for failure to state a claim, framing the appellate posture.

Legal Reasoning

1) Rooker-Feldman: Misapplied Below, but Harmless Here

Behr requires courts to analyze each claim individually to determine whether it invites federal review and rejection of a state-court judgment. The district court did not do this. But the panel avoided a remand by affirming on independent, non-jurisdictional grounds—chiefly that Curtis’s federal claims failed under § 1983 and due process, and were also time-barred. This approach is faithful to Alvarez’s “right for any reason” principle and preserves Behr’s claim-by-claim command without rewarding inefficiency where dismissal is otherwise inevitable.

2) Section 1983 and the State-Action Barrier

The defendants were private individuals and private counsel, plus a trustee sued in her individual capacity. Under Griffin and Harvey, such defendants are not state actors unless they are performing a public function, acting in concert with the state, or otherwise entwined with state authority. Curtis did not plausibly allege such a connection and, indeed, conceded below that he could not establish state action. He also failed to challenge that dispositive ground on appeal (Sapuppo), which independently requires affirmance. Without state action, § 1983 fails as a matter of law.

3) Procedural Due Process: No Value in Additional Procedure

Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, the court weighed the private interest, the likely value of additional procedures, and the governmental burden. The record showed the Kentucky court:

Heard Curtis’s arguments multiple times, including via a hearing on an untimely motion;
Construed filings liberally, even without precise rules cited;
Noted Curtis’s awareness of, and access to, appellate avenues.

Under these circumstances, further process would not have reduced the risk of error. The due process claim therefore failed, and amendment could not cure this defect.

4) Timeliness: Florida’s Four-Year Period and Federal Accrual

Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues; state law supplies the limitations period. Florida’s four-year period applied. Curtis knew of the alleged injury and the actors by 2010 when he says he faced an improper Florida civil suit and litigation costs. He sued in 2022—well beyond the four years. The limitations ruling therefore stands.

5) Venue and the Inapplicability of Admiralty

The state-law claims concerning a trust and Kentucky property were tied to Kentucky events and proceedings. Under § 1391(b)(2), venue lies where a substantial part of the events occurred or where the property is located—here, Kentucky. The trust instrument contained a governing-law clause designating certain Florida laws, not a forum-selection/venue clause. Even if diversity existed, Florida venue was improper, and Curtis did not meaningfully challenge that determination on appeal (Sapuppo).

Admiralty jurisdiction does not reach disputes over land-based trusts and state-court pleading practices. The court added that Curtis’s jury demand undermined any admiralty posture, where claims are generally bench-tried. The admiralty argument, accordingly, failed.

Impact

Narrowing the use of Rooker-Feldman in practice: The decision underscores that district courts should perform Behr’s claim-by-claim analysis. Yet, it also signals the Eleventh Circuit’s willingness to affirm dismissals on alternative merits grounds where § 1983/state-action deficiencies, timeliness bars, or venue defects are dispositive—temperamentally steering trial courts toward ordinary merits tools over jurisdictional Rooker-Feldman dismissals.
Reinforcement of the state-action gatekeeping function: Litigants cannot transform private litigation conduct into a federal civil-rights claim absent plausible allegations of state involvement or conspiracy. This will deter attempts to federalize grievances with opposing parties or their private counsel through § 1983.
Timeliness clarity: The panel’s straightforward application of Florida’s four-year period and federal accrual principles reiterates that awareness of the injury and actors starts the clock. Plaintiffs should promptly bring § 1983 claims rather than waiting for the end of related state proceedings.
Venue discipline in trust/property disputes: Selecting a governing-law clause is not the same as selecting a venue. Where property and litigation are centered in another state, venue likely lies there—even if the trust references a different jurisdiction’s law.
Guarding against admiralty overreach: Maritime jurisdiction is not a catch-all. It will not bootstrap land-based trust disputes or state court litigation issues into federal admiralty, especially when a jury is demanded.
Pro se amendment limits: Courts must generally allow pro se amendment, but not when amendment would be futile or the plaintiff declines to propose a curative theory. That boundary is reaffirmed here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rooker-Feldman doctrine: A narrow rule preventing federal district courts from acting as appellate courts over state-court judgments. Behr requires courts to evaluate each claim to see if it seeks to overturn a state judgment; if not, Rooker-Feldman does not bar it.
“Right for any reason” affirmance: Even if the district court’s reasoning was imperfect, an appellate court may uphold the result if the record supports any valid ground for dismissal.
State action under § 1983: To sue under § 1983, the defendant must be a government actor or so closely aligned with the state that their conduct counts as state action. Private parties and their lawyers generally are not state actors unless there is a plausible and specific conspiracy with a state official or other recognized exception.
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing: Courts weigh (1) what’s at stake for the person, (2) whether added procedures would reduce errors, and (3) the government’s burden in providing more process. If extra steps would add little value, due process is satisfied with what was provided.
Accrual and limitations in § 1983: State law sets the time limit (here, four years in Florida), but federal law sets the start date: when a reasonable person would know they were injured and who did it.
Venue basics: Civil cases should be filed where defendants reside (if all in one state) or where a substantial part of the events occurred or the property is located. A governing-law clause in a trust or contract does not, by itself, pick a courthouse; a separate forum-selection clause is needed to do that.
Admiralty jurisdiction: Applies to maritime matters. Land trusts, real property disputes, and allegations about state-court pleadings are not maritime. Admiralty cases typically proceed without a jury; asking for a jury often signals you’re not in admiralty.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision affirms dismissal of Curtis’s complaint on solid, conventional grounds. Even though the district court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis did not track Behr’s claim-by-claim framework, the appellate court properly affirmed because:

The § 1983 claims failed for lack of state action, a point Curtis effectively conceded;
No procedural due process violation was shown under Mathews, making amendment futile;
Key federal claims were time-barred under Florida’s four-year limitations period and federal accrual rules; and
Venue for the state-law trust/property claims belonged in Kentucky, not Florida, and admiralty jurisdiction was inapposite.

For practitioners, the decision reinforces familiar but critical constraints: § 1983’s state-action requirement, the importance of timely filing, the primacy of venue where the property and events lie, and the limited scope of admiralty jurisdiction. For district courts, it signals caution in applying Rooker-Feldman while encouraging dismissal on straightforward merits and procedural grounds where appropriate. Although unpublished and non-precedential, the opinion offers a crisp roadmap for disposing of similar attempts to federalize private disputes or relitigate state proceedings without a viable federal foothold.