Alan Boyd Curtis v. Robyn Pauline Mislevy

24-12039 Opinion of the Court 3 a claim-by-claim approach is required when applying Rooker-Feld- man. Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2021) (explain- ing when assessing whether a complaint is barred by Rooker-Feld- man, "[t]he question isn't whether the whole complaint seems to challenge a previous state court judgment, but whether resolution of each individual claim requires review and rejection of a state court judgment").

The district court did not undertake the appropriate claim- by-claim Rooker-Feldman analysis. However, the district court made this determination as to Curtis's requests to void the judg- ment in a Florida tort action and to create a trust on the property in Kentucky. Because the district court also determined that Curtis failed to state a federal claim on which relief could be granted, we now turn to whether we can affirm the district court's decision for reasons different than those stated by the district court. See Alvarez

v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010). The district court did not err in dismissing Curtis's civil rights claims with prejudice as he was not and would not be able to show that any Defendant violated his civil rights or acted within a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]o prevail on a U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (quoting Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923)). In the same vein, the Feldman Court said that lower federal courts lacked ju- risdiction to review a decision by the District of Columbia's Court of Appeals denying a waiver of a court rule for bar applicants. Id. at 285 (quoting D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)).

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12039 civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law."). Curtis does not argue the district court erred in deter- mining his § 1983 claims were asserted against private actors for private conduct, nor does he assert he sufficiently alleged Defend- ants reached an understanding or agreement to deny him rights. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) ("When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed."); Harvey v. Har- vey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining only in rare circumstances can a private party be considered a state actor for § 1983 purposes). Curtis conceded before the district court that he could not establish that any Defendant acted under the color of state law and that proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was improper. Curtis's argument on appeal goes solely to the futility of his ability to amend his complaint, whether he would be able to show Defendants acted in conspiracy with Judge Easton of the Kentucky court to deprive Curtis of his due process rights. See Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2018) (When "a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a [pro se] plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with preju- dice," but a court need not grant leave to amend when the plaintiff is clear he does not want to amend the complaint or when a more carefully drafted complaint still would not state a claim (quotation

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24-12039 Opinion of the Court 5 marks omitted)). Curtis contends the court erred in finding he was afforded adequate process in state court proceedings as he did not have access to Kentucky law during those proceedings. To deter- mine whether process is adequate, courts generally look to three factors: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) the value of additional procedure in avoiding error; and

(3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub- stitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

The record reflects there would be no value in additional procedure before the Kentucky court as documents supplied by Curtis showed that he was able to raise the same issue multiple times before Judge Easton, where Judge Easton heard Curtis's ar- guments in his motion to amend in a hearing which consisted of issues that had already been addressed. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. Judge Easton also liberally construed Curtis's motion as a motion to amend or alter the judgment despite the fact Curtis did not cite to a specific rule or statute as the basis for the motion, with Judge Easton noting Curtis argued that he did not have access to Ken- tucky law materials. See id. Further, Judge Easton granted a hear- ing on that motion despite its untimeliness. Judge Easton also noted Curtis's appeal process and that he had multiple pending ap- peals. Thus, there was nothing more that Judge Easton could have done to afford Curtis more procedural due process and there was no value in Judge Easton affording Curtis additional procedure. Curtis could not amend his complaint to sufficiently state a civil

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-12039 rights claim in any count of his complaint. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335; Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291-92. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

B. Statute of Limitations

Curtis also asserts the court did not correctly determine when the statute of limitations of his § 1983 claim began. Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state's residual personal in- jury statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years. Doe as Next Friend of Doe #6 v. Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2022); see also Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3).

Despite the reference to state law for determination of the limitations period, federal law determines when a federal civil rights claim accrues. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996). "The general federal rule is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights." Id. at 561-62 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). A § 1983 cause of action accrues when a plaintiff should know (1) that he was injured, and (2) who inflicted the injury. Id. at 562. To analyze this issue, a court must first identify the injuries that the plaintiff allegedly suffered and then determine when the plaintiff could have sued for them. Id. The district court correctly determined that Curtis's consti- tutional challenge to Florida Statute § 794.03 was barred by the statute of limitations. See Doe, 51 F.4th at 1302 (reviewing de novo the district court's interpretation and application of statutes of

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24-12039 Opinion of the Court 7 limitations). Curtis knew he was injured as he asserted that he knew he was subject to an improper civil suit and subject to the costs of litigation in 2010. See Rozar, 85 F.3d at 562. Curtis also knew he could take legal action against Mislevy and Drechsel, as he knew Mislevy was "Jane Doe" based on his interactions with her on the boat which led to the civil action, and that Drechsel filed suit on Mislevy's behalf as a "Jane Doe" which Curtis contends was fic- titious. See id. Thus, Curtis had until 2014 to file suit against Mis- levy and Drechsel and did not do so until 2022, and his action is barred by the statute of limitations. Doe, 51 F.4th at 1302-03; Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3). Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue. C. Jurisdiction/Venue

Curtis challenges the district court's finding that it did not have diversity jurisdiction over his state law claims and argues the district court should have considered whether it had admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over his claims. The court determined that, even if Curtis sufficiently alleged diversity jurisdiction, it was not the proper venue for Curtis's state law claims, which occurred in Kentucky. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2) (stating the appropriate venue for a civil action is a "judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the dis- trict is located," or a "judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a sub- stantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated"). Curtis does not challenge the district court's venue finding, thus abandoning the issue on appeal. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680. Even

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-12039 liberally construing Curtis's argument as challenging the district court's venue finding, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding it was not the correct venue for the state law claims. Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014) ("We hold the allegations of a pro se complaint to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."). Curtis's state law claims involve accounting and breach of fiduciary duty claims as well as tortious interference with a contract. The contract at issue was the Trust which established ownership over the Prop- erty, which was in Kentucky and the proceedings to establish such ownership all took place in Kentucky. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Though Curtis repeatedly asserted the Trust agreement's venue clause specified all matters pertaining to the Trust be litigated in Florida, no such clause exists in the Trust agreement. Rather, it only states that certain Florida laws govern the Trust. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the venue was not proper for Curtis's state law claims, regardless of whether it had diversity jurisdiction to hear such claims. See Algodonera De Las Cab- ezas, S.A. v. Am. Suisse Cap., Inc., 432 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (reviewing the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a lawsuit for lack of venue for an abuse of discretion).

Further, the district court did not err in failing to discuss ad- miralty jurisdiction as, though Curtis repeatedly asserted that it ap- plied in his claims, he also demanded a jury trial, which would not have been available had admiralty jurisdiction applied. See Romero

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v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1975)³(noting general rule that admiralty claims are tried without a jury). The arguments before the district court are those of contended ficti- tious pleadings in Florida and Kentucky state courts, civil rights as related to these pleadings, and state law claims surrounding a Trust agreement and Property in Kentucky, to which admiralty and mar- itime jurisdiction does not apply. Thus, the district court did not err in finding the correct venue for Curtis's state law claims would be in Kentucky and Curtis's arguments on appeal are unavailing.

II. CONCLUSION

Though the district court did not undertake the required claim-by-claim Rooker-Feldman analysis, the district court did not err in determining that Curtis failed to make a federal claim and that venue in Florida is improper. Accordingly, we affirm the dis- trict court's dismissal of Curtis's complaint.

AFFIRMED.

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