Accrual Ends at the Last Denial: Seventh Circuit Confirms Wisconsin’s Split Limitations Regime and Rejects Continuing‑Violation Tolling for Lingering Pain in § 1983 Medical‑Indifference Claims

Introduction

In Montgomery E. Walker v. Charles M. Baynton, et al., No. 25-1056 (7th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal—at the screening stage—of a Wisconsin prisoner’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference suit as time‑barred. The case centers on the intersection of federal accrual rules for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, Wisconsin’s amended statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and the scope (and limits) of the continuing‑violation doctrine in prison medical‑care litigation.

Walker, who suffers from a leg‑length discrepancy causing chronic hip pain, alleged prolonged periods without orthopedic footwear and sued a former prison doctor (Dr. Charles Baynton), a later prison doctor (Dr. Joseph McLean), and a correctional sergeant (David Carinal) for deliberate indifference. The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, holding that each claim was untimely based on Wisconsin’s six‑year limitations period for pre‑April 5, 2018 injuries and its three‑year period for injuries thereafter, and the Seventh Circuit agreed.

Although designated a “Nonprecedential Disposition” under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, the opinion synthesizes recent circuit authority on accrual and the continuing‑violation doctrine, reinforcing a practical rule: for § 1983 medical‑indifference claims, the limitations clock against a particular provider begins with the last denial or last interaction, and ongoing pain resulting from that denial does not itself reset accrual.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit (Judges Easterbrook, Ripple, and Pryor) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Walker’s amended complaint as barred by the statute of limitations:

Claim against Dr. Baynton: Untimely. Baynton treated Walker until May 2015, after which another physician provided orthopedic shoes. Under Wisconsin’s six‑year pre‑2018 limitations period for personal injury actions, any claim tied to Baynton’s conduct had to be filed by 2021—well before Walker sued in June 2024.
Claim against Sergeant Carinal: Untimely. Carinal discarded Walker’s orthopedic shoes in February 2020. That discrete act triggered accrual then; Wisconsin’s three‑year post‑2018 period expired in February 2023, more than a year before suit.
Claim against Dr. McLean: Untimely. The last interaction was February 3, 2021, when McLean denied requests for orthopedic footwear, medication adjustments, and a lower bunk. The three‑year period ended in early February 2024. Walker filed in June 2024.

The court rejected Walker’s reliance on the continuing‑violation doctrine, explaining that continued pain flowing from a prior denial is a “continuation of injury,” which does not extend the limitations period. Because Walker pleaded facts that established untimeliness on the face of his complaint, dismissal at screening was proper. The court also upheld the denial of his post‑judgment request to file a second amended complaint because he had not first obtained relief from the judgment under Rule 59(e) or 60(b).

Factual and Procedural Background

August 2012: Walker arrives at Dodge Correctional Institution without orthopedic shoes and requests them from Dr. Charles Baynton; request denied. Baynton stops treating Walker in May 2015. Another physician provides shoes in July 2015.
February 2020: Upon transfer to Racine Correctional Institution, Sergeant David Carinal discards Walker’s orthopedic shoes despite knowledge of his need. Walker reports return of hip pain. Dr. Joseph McLean examines him and prescribes only pain medication, denying footwear.
January–February 2021: Walker again requests orthopedic shoes, medication, and a lower‑bunk pass. McLean denies on February 3, 2021. Walker alleges ongoing pain and later a fall.
November 2021–March 2022: A different prison doctor takes over in November 2021 and orders orthopedic shoes; Walker receives them in March 2022. About a year later, an outside specialist recommends left hip replacement.
June 2024: Walker files suit under § 1983 against Baynton, McLean, Carinal, and others. The district court screens and dismisses the original complaint; it then dismisses the amended complaint with prejudice as time‑barred.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Cielak v. Nicolet Union High School District, 112 F.4th 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2024). The court relied on Cielak to state Wisconsin’s governing limitations periods: six years for personal injury claims arising from injuries occurring before April 5, 2018, and three years for those occurring after that date, reflecting the 2018 amendment to Wis. Stat. § 893.53.
Ghelf v. Town of Wheatland, 132 F.4th 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2025). Cited for the foundational proposition that while § 1983 borrows the forum state’s limitations period, federal law governs accrual—i.e., when the claim begins to run.
Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2014); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). These cases establish the federal accrual rule: a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows (or should know) of his injury and its cause, even if the injury’s full extent is not yet apparent.
Milchtein v. Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th 814, 823 (7th Cir. 2022). Provides the court’s modern articulation of the continuing‑violation doctrine as a “special accrual rule,” under which a claim may accrue repeatedly when a defendant continually wrongs the plaintiff.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–15 (2002); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628 (2007). Together, these authorities explain that the limitations period runs from each independently unlawful act or omission, and that a continuation of injury—without a new wrongful act—does not extend the limitations period. The court invokes this line to reject Walker’s continuing‑violation theory based solely on lingering pain.
Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 318–19 (7th Cir. 2001). Often cited by prisoners to argue that ongoing denial of medical care can be a continuing violation. The court distinguishes that concept here by noting that Walker’s last interaction with Dr. McLean was in February 2021; once treatment responsibility shifted, there was no ongoing inaction by McLean to extend accrual as to him.
Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 932 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 2019). Supports anchoring accrual to the period when a particular healthcare provider had authority over the patient’s care; once that authority ends, so does any continuing‑violation exposure for that provider.
O’Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015). Permits dismissal at the pleading stage where the complaint itself alleges facts establishing a statute‑of‑limitations defense.
Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2014); Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 943 (7th Cir. 2010). Address post‑judgment amendment: once judgment enters, a plaintiff may amend only after obtaining relief from judgment under Rule 59(e) or 60(b).

Legal Reasoning

Borrowing Wisconsin’s limitations period, applying federal accrual: The court reiterated that § 1983 uses the state’s general personal‑injury limitations statute (here, Wis. Stat. § 893.53), which is six years for injuries before April 5, 2018 and three years thereafter, while federal law determines when the clock starts (Cielak; Ghelf; Devbrow; Wallace).
Accrual tied to the defendant and the last denial: As to each defendant, the court asked when Walker knew of his injury and its cause from that defendant’s act or omission. For healthcare providers, the relevant date was the last interaction or denial while the provider had responsibility for the inmate’s care (Wilson).
- Dr. Baynton: Last treated Walker in May 2015; limitations expired by May 2021 (six‑year period). Suing in June 2024 was too late.
- Dr. McLean: Last denial on February 3, 2021; limitations expired by early February 2024 (three‑year period). Filing in June 2024 was untimely.
- Sergeant Carinal: Discrete act of discarding shoes in February 2020; limitations expired February 2023 (three‑year period).
Rejecting continuing‑violation tolling based on continuing injury: Walker argued that his continuing pain (and later fall) made the violation “continuing” until a new doctor intervened in November 2021. The court disagreed, emphasizing that the doctrine “treats new acts, or ongoing inaction, as new violations,” and the limitations period runs from each independently unlawful act or failure to act (Turley, Milchtein). There was no ongoing inaction by McLean after February 2021 because Walker alleged no further interactions with him and his care transferred to another physician. Continuing consequences of a past denial do not reset accrual (Morgan; Ledbetter; Turley concurrence).
Pleading‑stage dismissal based on the complaint’s own dates: Because Walker’s allegations themselves fixed the relevant dates and showed the claims fell outside the applicable periods, dismissal at screening under § 1915A was proper (O’Gorman).
Post‑judgment amendment: The district court denied Walker’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint because it was filed after final judgment, and he had not moved to alter or set aside the judgment under Rule 59(e) or 60(b). The Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion (Adams; Abcarian).

Impact and Practical Implications

Even though nonprecedential, the decision has concrete guidance for prisoners, practitioners, correctional healthcare providers, and district courts in the Seventh Circuit:

Calendar by defendant: In § 1983 medical‑care cases, the accrual clock for each individual defendant generally runs from that defendant’s last act or omission within the scope of their responsibility. Claims against different actors will have different clocks, and a plaintiff must file within each actor’s applicable window.
Wisconsin’s split limitations regime matters: For injuries before April 5, 2018, a six‑year period applies; for injuries after, a three‑year period applies (Cielak). Plaintiffs should segment claims accordingly when events straddle 2018.
Continuing injury is not a continuing violation: Lingering pain or downstream consequences (like a later fall or surgical recommendation) do not extend limitations absent a new, independently wrongful act by the same defendant within the limitations period.
Transfers end accrual against prior providers: When care responsibility transfers to a different provider, continuing‑violation exposure as to the prior provider typically ends. New providers’ denials are new, discrete acts subject to their own accrual dates and limitations periods.
Screening dismissals for untimeliness: District courts may dismiss at § 1915A screening when the complaint itself establishes a statute‑of‑limitations bar, reducing litigation costs for plainly untimely claims.
Post‑judgment amendment is limited: After a final judgment, plaintiffs cannot simply amend; they must first obtain relief from the judgment under Rule 59(e) or 60(b).

The decision therefore encourages precise attention to dates, especially:

the last treatment or denial by each provider,
any discrete acts by non‑medical staff (such as confiscation or destruction of medical devices), and
whether there was any continued inaction by the same actor within the limitations period.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Borrowing the statute of limitations: Section 1983 does not have its own limitations period. Courts “borrow” the forum state’s general personal‑injury limitations period (here, Wisconsin’s six‑year pre‑2018 and three‑year post‑2018 periods).
Accrual (when the clock starts): Federal law controls. A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, both the injury and its cause. You need not know how bad the injury will become; awareness of the injury and causation is enough.
Continuing violation vs. continuing injury:
- Continuing violation: The defendant repeatedly engages in unlawful conduct (e.g., day‑after‑day refusal of treatment by the same provider while responsible for care). Each day can be a new violation with its own accrual.
- Continuing injury: The harmful effects of a past act persist (e.g., ongoing pain after a one‑time denial). This does not create new accrual dates.
Screening under § 1915A: Courts must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss those that fail to state a claim. If dates in the complaint show claims are time‑barred, dismissal can occur at screening without discovery.
Post‑judgment amendment: Once judgment is entered, a plaintiff cannot amend as of right or by routine leave. They must first reopen the case via Rule 59(e) (alter or amend) or Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment), and only then can the court consider amendment.

Case‑Specific Application

Dr. Baynton: No involvement after May 2015; six‑year period expired in 2021. Filing in 2024 is untimely.
Sergeant Carinal: Discarded shoes in February 2020; three‑year period expired in February 2023. Filing in 2024 is untimely.
Dr. McLean: Last denial February 3, 2021; three‑year period expired in early February 2024. Filing in June 2024 is untimely. There was no ongoing inaction by McLean after February 2021 because Walker saw a different provider starting November 2021.

Broader Significance

The opinion underscores the importance of identifying the correct accrual date for each defendant in § 1983 medical‑indifference litigation and confirms that Wisconsin’s 2018 amendment to § 893.53 has practical bite: prisoners must now bring claims based on post‑April 5, 2018 injuries within three years. It also clarifies, in line with Seventh Circuit precedent, that the continuing‑violation doctrine does not rescue claims premised on lingering symptoms where the defendant’s involvement ended before the limitations period.

For practitioners, the takeaways are concrete:

Build a defendant‑by‑defendant timeline and calendar deadlines conservatively.
Do not rely on worsening conditions or later medical recommendations to reset accrual.
If relying on a continuing‑violation theory, plead facts showing ongoing responsibility and inaction by the same actor within the limitations window.
After judgment, pair any proposed amendment with a motion under Rule 59(e) or 60(b).

Conclusion

Walker v. Baynton confirms three interlocking rules for § 1983 medical‑care claims in Wisconsin: (1) accrual is governed by federal law and generally occurs at the last denial by the defendant while responsible for the plaintiff’s care; (2) Wisconsin’s limitations periods now operate on a split basis—six years for pre‑April 5, 2018 injuries and three years for injuries thereafter; and (3) the continuing‑violation doctrine does not extend limitations where only the consequences of a past denial persist. The decision also reiterates that courts may dismiss time‑barred claims at screening when untimeliness appears on the face of the complaint, and that post‑judgment amendments require first setting aside the judgment. Though nonprecedential, the opinion offers clear, practical guidance that will influence how prisoner medical‑care claims are pled, timed, and defended in the Seventh Circuit.

Note: The court issued a nonprecedential disposition pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, and the case was decided without oral argument under Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).