O R D E R
Montgomery Walker, a Wisconsin prisoner who suffers from hip pain because of a leg-length discrepancy, suffered prolonged periods without orthopedic footwear. He sued, alleging that his doctors and a prison officer were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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district court screened Walker's complaint and dismissed it, concluding that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations. We agree and affirm. Walker's right leg is shorter than his left, so before his incarceration, he wore orthopedic shoes to manage chronic hip pain. After arriving at Dodge Correctional Institution in August 2012 without a pair of orthopedic shoes, Walker requested a new pair from Dr. Charles Baynton. Dr. Baynton denied the request and eventually stopped treating Walker in May 2015. Another physician at the prison provided Walker with orthopedic shoes in July 2015.
In February 2020, Walker was transferred to Racine Correctional Institution. Upon Walker's arrival, Sergeant David Carinal discarded Walker's orthopedic shoes, despite knowing Walker needed them to manage his medical condition. One month later, Walker reported to a nurse that without the orthopedic shoes, his hip pain had returned. Dr. Joseph McLean examined him a week later, and Walker requested new orthopedic shoes. But Dr. McLean did not order shoes and instead prescribed only pain medication. Walker suffered from chronic hip pain throughout the remainder of 2020. In January 2021, a nurse told Dr. McLean that Walker wanted orthopedic shoes, pain medication, and a lower-bunk accommodation. On February 3, 2021, Dr. McLean examined Walker again but did not approve his requests. Walker says that he "never saw [Dr.] McLean again," but that he continued to suffer hip pain without orthopedic shoes.
Walker began seeing a different doctor at the prison in November 2021 after suffering injuries from a fall. The new doctor ordered orthopedic shoes, which Walker received in March 2022. Approximately one year later, an off-site specialist determined that Walker needed a left hip replacement.
In June 2024, Walker sued Dr. Baynton, Dr. McLean, Sergeant Carinal, and three other defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his need for orthopedic footwear, which led to the worsening of his hip pain, caused his fall, and resulted in the need for surgical intervention.
The district court screened Walker's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The court granted Walker leave to amend but warned him that his claims appeared to be barred by the statute of limitations.
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Walker amended the complaint, suing only Dr. Baynton, Dr. McLean, and Sergeant Carinal. The court dismissed it with prejudice, concluding that the claims were indeed time-barred. The court explained that for the alleged injuries that occurred before April 5, 2018, Wisconsin's six-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions applied. W IS. STAT. § 893.53 (2016). Given an amendment in Wisconsin law, for injuries that occurred after that date, a three-year period of limitations applied. Id. (eff. Apr. 5, 2018); see Cielak v. Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., 112 F.4th 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2024). The court concluded that by the time Walker filed his complaint in June 2024, the six- year period of limitations expired as to Dr. Baynton's treatment between August 2012 and May 2015. And the three-year period of limitations expired as to the claim against Sergeant Carinal for his conduct in February 2020. As for Dr. McLean, the district court concluded, he "ceased to be" Walker's care provider after the February 2021 visit, so any claim against him likewise was untimely. The district court rejected Walker's argument that the continuing violation doctrine delayed accrual of the claims where his allegations involved ongoing inaction by the defendants.
We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail,
666 F.3d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 2012). And we take Walker's allegations to be true. Id. On appeal, Walker generally argues that his claims should not have been dismissed as time-barred.
"Claims under § 1983 borrow the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the cause of action arose." Cielak, 112 F.4th at 477. But federal law governs the accrual of § 1983 claims. Ghelf v. Town of Wheatland, 132 F.4th 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2025). A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff "knows his injury and its cause … even if the full extent or severity of the injury is not yet known." Devbrow v. Kalu,
705 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation modified); see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). The continuing violation doctrine is "a special accrual rule under which a claim accrues not just once but repeatedly as a defendant continually wrongs a plaintiff."
Milchtein v. Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th 814, 823 (7th Cir. 2022). We agree with the district court that Walker's claims against Dr. Baynton and Dr. McLean are time-barred. Dr. Baynton treated Walker until May 2015, when Walker says his care was transferred to a different physician who ordered orthopedic shoes. Because Walker has admitted that Dr. Baynton had no authority over his care and did not treat him after May 2015, the claim filed in June 2024 falls well outside the six-year limitations period. See Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 932 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 2019). Likewise, Walker says that he last interacted with Dr. McLean in February 2021,
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when Dr. McLean denied his request for orthopedic footwear. Based on that accrual date, the three-year statute of limitations expired four months before Walker initiated this suit.
To the extent that Walker invokes the continuing violation doctrine to argue that his claim against Dr. McLean did not accrue until at least November 2021, when Walker began seeing a different doctor, he is mistaken. The continuing violation doctrine
"treats new acts, or ongoing inaction, as new violations" and "[t]he period of limitations runs from each independently unlawful act or failure to act." Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); see Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 318-19 (7th Cir. 2001). But Walker admits that his last interaction with Dr. McLean occurred in February 2021. Walker says that he next complained about his pain and need for shoes to a different doctor in November 2021 after his fall. Walker also says that Dr. McLean's failure to provide orthopedic shoes in February 2021 caused him to suffer continuing pain and resulted in a fall. But "a continuation of injury does not extend the period of limitations." See Turley, 729 F.3d at 654 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-15 (2002) and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628 (2007)). Because Walker pleaded facts establishing that his claim against Dr. McLean is time-barred, the district court's dismissal was appropriate. See O'Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015) ("[I]f a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to establish a statute of limitations defense, the district court may dismiss the complaint on that ground.").
We also agree that the district court correctly dismissed as time-barred Walker's claim against Sergeant Carinal. Walker asserts that Sergeant Carinal was deliberately indifferent when he discarded Walker's orthopedic shoes in February 2020. The claim based on this discrete act thus accrued in February 2020, and the three-year period of limitations expired before Walker filed this suit in June 2024.
Finally, Walker argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. See Adams v. City of Indianapolis,
742 F.3d 720, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2014). But the district court received the motion after final judgment had been entered. So amendment would have been permissible only if the judgment had been set aside under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b), and it had not. See Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 943 (7th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED
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