Due Process, DMV Refusal Hearings, and the Duty to Enforce Subpoenas:
Commentary on Matter of Monaghan v. Schroeder

I. Introduction

In Matter of Monaghan v. Schroeder, 2025 NY Slip Op 06959 (Dec. 16, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals resolves a question it explicitly left open in Gray v. Adduci, 73 NY2d 741 (1988): whether due process is violated when the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revokes a driver’s license for refusing a chemical test, relying solely on officers’ written reports, after the motorist has subpoenaed the officers and they fail to appear.

Chief Judge Wilson, writing for a unanimous Court, holds that the procedural mechanism in CPLR 2308(b) for enforcing nonjudicial subpoenas supplies constitutionally sufficient process. Therefore, if a motorist does not attempt to enforce subpoenas through Supreme Court under CPLR 2308(b), due process does not require the DMV to:

exclude hearsay evidence (e.g., refusal reports), or
dismiss the refusal charge.

The decision has practical and doctrinal significance for New York DWI practice, administrative due process, and the interplay between DMV regulations and the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR).

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties and Setting

Petitioner/Appellant: John M. Monaghan, a motorist charged with Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) and with refusing to submit to a chemical test.
Respondents: Mark J.F. Schroeder (Commissioner of Motor Vehicles) and DMV officials.
Forum: New York State DMV administrative hearing; subsequent Article 78 review; Appellate Division, Third Department; then New York Court of Appeals (appeal as of right).

B. Factual Background

In February 2021, State Troopers Joseph Leggio and E. Strickland stopped Monaghan for traffic infractions. In sworn written documents (a “Report of Refusal” and a supporting deposition), the troopers reported:

Monaghan exhibited signs of intoxication (glassy, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, odor of alcohol).
He admitted consuming alcohol.
He failed a horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety test.
He refused to submit to a chemical breath test after being advised that refusal would lead to immediate suspension and subsequent revocation of his license.

The Report of Refusal states that:

Monaghan responded, “I refuse, I take the Fifth,” when first asked.
He said “no” when asked again.
He again referenced “taking the Fifth” on a third request.

The documents are slightly inconsistent: the Report of Refusal indicates Trooper Strickland read the required warnings; Trooper Leggio’s supporting deposition swears that he himself gave the warnings. Monaghan, in his testimony, denied receiving the warnings and claimed not to remember seeing Strickland.

C. DMV Hearing and Administrative Proceedings

Under Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) § 1194(2)(b)–(c), a chemical test refusal triggers:

an immediate 15-day suspension, and
a DMV hearing to determine whether to revoke the driver’s license.

To revoke a license for refusal, the DMV must prove four elements (VTL § 1194[2][c]):

The officer had reasonable grounds to believe the motorist drove in violation of VTL § 1192 (DWI or related offenses).
The motorist was lawfully arrested.
The motorist was warned, clearly and unequivocally, that refusal would lead to immediate suspension and subsequent revocation, whether or not guilty of DWI.
The motorist refused the chemical test.

The hearing was scheduled for April 16, 2021; both troopers were notified but did not appear, and the ALJ adjourned under 15 NYCRR 127.9(c). The hearing was rescheduled for June 4, 2021.

For the rescheduled hearing:

DMV notified both troopers again.
Monaghan’s counsel properly issued and served nonjudicial subpoenas to each trooper under CPLR 2302(a).

On June 4, 2021, neither trooper appeared again. Counsel presented proof of the subpoenas; the ALJ found them “valid” but announced that their non-compliance did not trigger “automatic dismissal” and that the hearing would proceed “as normally.”

Critically:

Monaghan did not request an adjournment to seek subpoena enforcement.
Instead, he moved to dismiss the refusal charge outright, relying on Gray v. Adduci.

Over due process objections, the ALJ:

accepted the Report of Refusal as evidence,
read portions of Trooper Leggio’s sworn deposition into the record, and
credited those sworn writings over Monaghan’s contrary testimony.

The ALJ found all four statutory elements satisfied and revoked Monaghan’s license.

D. Judicial Review

On administrative appeal, the DMV Appeals Board affirmed. Monaghan then commenced an Article 78 proceeding. Supreme Court transferred the case to the Appellate Division, Third Department, because the substantial evidence standard was implicated (CPLR 7804[g]).

The Third Department (Matter of Monaghan v. Schroeder, 223 AD3d 972 [3d Dept 2024]):

Held that Monaghan made a “tactical decision” not to seek enforcement under CPLR 2308(b) or request further adjournment.
Reaffirmed that “administrative determinations may be supported by hearsay alone.”
Found substantial evidence supported the revocation.

Monaghan sought leave to appeal; the Court of Appeals denied leave because an appeal as of right existed under CPLR 5601(b)(1), due to the constitutional due process question. The Court then affirmed the DMV’s determination.

III. Summary of the Court of Appeals’ Holding

A. Core Constitutional Holding

The Court articulates and resolves the key constitutional issue as follows:

CPLR 2308(b) provides a mechanism to enforce nonjudicial subpoenas in DMV administrative hearings.
This mechanism is constitutionally adequate process for ensuring the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Accordingly, when a motorist:
- properly subpoenas an officer, but
- does not seek enforcement under CPLR 2308(b), and
- the ALJ does not obstruct or penalize attempts to enforce,
due process does not require:
- exclusion of hearsay (the officers’ written reports), or
- dismissal of the refusal charge.

The Court explicitly states:

We hold that CPLR 2308(b)’s procedures for subpoena enforcement provide sufficient process; absent a motorist’s use of those procedures, due process does not require the exclusion of hearsay evidence or dismissal of the charge.

Because Monaghan did not seek enforcement and did not request an adjournment for that purpose, his due process claim fails.

B. Nonconstitutional Issues

The Court also rejects three nonconstitutional arguments:

Alleged departure from DMV precedent.
- Monaghan claimed DMV precedent (especially the Deyhle Appeals Board decision) required dismissal when subpoenaed officers failed to appear.
- The Court finds the record insufficient to prove a settled agency rule or uniform practice. Deyhle is a summary decision with no reasoning; counsel’s description of practice is unsworn and disputed by DMV’s counsel.
- Thus, the Field Delivery doctrine (requiring agencies to follow or explain departures from their precedents) is not triggered.
Substantial evidence.
- Despite inconsistencies about which trooper administered the warning, both documents agree that the warnings were given.
- Under the “substantial evidence” standard, a “reasonable mind” could accept the sworn reports as adequate to support the ultimate finding.
- Monaghan’s denial does not negate substantial evidence.
Statutory right to cross-examination under SAPA § 306.
- The Court finds this argument unpreserved; it was not properly raised below.
- Therefore, the Court does not reach the merits of the statutory SAPA claim, focusing instead on constitutional due process.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Legal Framework: Refusal Hearings and Subpoenas

1. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194

VTL § 1194 structures chemical test refusal cases:

Officers must complete a sworn “Report of Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test” (VTL § 1194[2][b][1]; 15 NYCRR 139.2[a]).
This sworn report triggers a DMV hearing focused on the four statutory elements listed earlier.
The driver’s license is:
- immediately suspended after arrest, and
- reinstated 15 days after arraignment pending the outcome of the refusal hearing (VTL § 1194[2][c]; see n.1 of the opinion).

2. DMV Hearing Regulations (15 NYCRR Part 127 and 139)

15 NYCRR Part 127 governs DMV hearing procedures. Key provision:

15 NYCRR 127.11(a): The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law are not binding upon the conduct of administrative hearings. Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section and section 127.6(b) of this Part, the provisions of the Civil Practice Law and Rules are not binding upon the conduct of administrative hearings. The provisions of those laws regarding forms of pleading, motion practice, discovery procedures, including demands for bills of particulars, and other matters are not applicable to hearings conducted in accordance with this Part.

15 NYCRR 127.11(b) provides a critical carve-out:

The provisions of section 2302 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, regarding the issuance of subpoenas, are applicable to hearings conducted in accordance with this Part.

The Court reads this framework as:

Rejecting the binding application of most CPLR provisions to the conduct of DMV hearings (e.g., pleadings, motion practice, discovery), but
Explicitly incorporating CPLR 2302(a) on subpoena issuance, and
Not precluding the use of CPLR 2308(b) for enforcement because enforcement proceeds in Supreme Court, outside the conduct of the administrative hearing itself.

3. CPLR 2302(a) and 2308(b): Issuance and Enforcement of Nonjudicial Subpoenas

CPLR 2302(a) authorizes issuance of subpoenas in administrative proceedings:

A subpoena . . . may be issued without a court order by . . . an attorney of record for a party to an . . . administrative proceeding.

CPLR 2308(b) governs enforcement of subpoenas that are not returnable in court:

Unless otherwise provided, if a person fails to comply with a subpoena which is not returnable to court, the issuer or the person on whose behalf the subpoena was issued may move in supreme court to compel compliance.

If Supreme Court finds the subpoena authorized, it:

must order compliance;
may impose costs up to $50;
authorizes the issuer to seek up to $50 in penalties plus damages for noncompliance; and
may issue a warrant directing a sheriff to bring the witness to the person/body requiring appearance.

The Court emphasizes that these enforcement tools apply equally to police officers who ignore DMV subpoenas.

B. Precedents and Their Influence

1. Gray v. Adduci, 73 NY2d 741 (1988)

Gray is the leading prior case on due process in refusal hearings:

In Gray, the officer repeatedly failed to appear; the motorist never subpoenaed him.
The ALJ eventually proceeded with the written refusal report alone and revoked the license.
The Court held that administrative determinations may be based on hearsay and that the motorist’s failure to subpoena was a “tactical decision.”
It concluded that, given the failure to subpoena, there was no due process violation.

However, Gray explicitly left unresolved whether:

a motorist’s issuance of a subpoena, standing alone, is sufficient to compel live testimony on due process grounds (i.e., whether failure of a properly subpoenaed officer to appear would require dismissal or exclusion of hearsay).

Monaghan answers that question: no, a subpoena alone is not enough; the motorist must also attempt enforcement under CPLR 2308(b).

2. Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Service, Inc., 66 NY2d 516 (1985)

Field Delivery stands for the principle that administrative agencies must either:

follow their own prior precedent, or
explain a departure from that precedent.

Otherwise, decisions are “arbitrary and capricious.” Monaghan invoked this rule, arguing DMV precedents (Deyhle, later Aktaruzzman) required dismissal when officers do not honor subpoenas.

The Court finds:

The record at the time of Monaghan’s 2021 hearing did not clearly establish such a binding rule or uniform practice.
Deyhle was summary; any supposed rule was inferred from the outcome and arguments, not from expressed reasoning.
The later 2025 Aktaruzzman Appeals Board decision is outside the relevant record and does not prove what the rule was in 2021.

Therefore, the Field Delivery doctrine does not invalidate the DMV’s action here, though the Court pointedly notes that nothing prevents DMV from adopting a more protective rule than due process requires going forward.

3. Due Process and Cross-Examination Cases

Matter of McBarnette v. Sobol, 83 NY2d 333 (1994) and Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 NY 347 (1947):
- These decisions confirm that cross-examination of adverse witnesses is an “essential element of a fair trial,” applicable in administrative proceedings.
- The Court quotes Friedel to reaffirm that the right is not weaker just because the forum is administrative rather than judicial.
Matter of Gordon v. Brown, 84 NY2d 574 (1994):
- Provides the framework for when due process requires production of specific witnesses for cross-examination.
- Factors: nature of the evidence, utility of confrontation in fact-finding, and burden of producing the witness.
- Monaghan’s case applies this logic, recognizing that the reporting officer’s testimony is central in a refusal hearing.
Matter of Miller v. DeBuono, 90 NY2d 783 (1997):
- Articulates New York’s adoption of the three-factor due process balancing (akin to Mathews v. Eldridge):
- (1) private interest; (2) risk of erroneous deprivation and value of additional safeguards; (3) government interest and burdens.
- The Court explicitly applies this framework to determine whether requiring subpoena enforcement is too burdensome.

4. CPLR 2308(b) and Administrative Agencies

The Court relies on earlier authority holding that CPLR 2308(b) applies to administrative proceedings unless an agency has adopted its own complete subpoena regime:

Matter of Irwin v. Board of Regents, 27 NY2d 292 (1970)
Matter of Moon v. New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 207 AD2d 103 (3d Dept 1995)
Matter of Whalen v. John P., 72 AD2d 961 (4th Dept 1979)
Matter of Moore v. Sunshine, 126 Misc 2d 284 (Sup Ct, NY County 1984)

These cases collectively support the proposition that:

CPLR 2308(b) applies “unless otherwise provided” by the administrative scheme; here, DMV has not created its own subpoena enforcement mechanism.

5. Other Administrative Due Process Cases on Subpoena Enforcement

In support of its conclusion that failure to seek enforcement undermines a due process claim, the Court cites appellate decisions from analogous contexts:

Matter of Martell, 179 AD3d 1227 (3d Dept 2020) (unemployment insurance)
Matter of Anderson v. Bane, 199 AD2d 708 (3d Dept 1993) (social services)
Dowling v. Gardner, 198 AD3d 1056 (3d Dept 2021) (Comptroller)
Silverman v. State Liq. Auth., 47 AD2d 226 (2d Dept 1975) (liquor authority)

All of these decisions reject due process claims where:

a party obtained a subpoena, but
did not move in court to compel compliance, and
asserted a denial of fair hearing because the witness did not appear.

Monaghan aligns DMV refusal hearings with that established line of cases.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Recognition of a Due Process Right to Cross-Examine the Reporting Officer

Importantly, the Court does not minimize the underlying right:

It affirms that the officer’s allegations are “core” to the hearing’s outcome, given VTL § 1194’s structure.
It expressly states that Monaghan “had a right to cross-examine the Troopers as a matter of procedural due process.”

Thus, the case is not decided on the premise that cross-examination is optional or unimportant; instead, it focuses on the procedural steps necessary to vindicate that right.

2. The Key Question: Is Enforcement Under CPLR 2308(b) Required?

The core interpretive question is whether:

serving a subpoena alone, followed by the witness’s nonappearance, triggers a due process requirement to dismiss or exclude hearsay, or
due process requires the party seeking the testimony also to use available enforcement tools.

The Court answers that the latter is required: a litigant who fails to attempt enforcement under 2308(b) cannot claim a due process deprivation on the ground that a subpoenaed witness did not appear.

3. Interpreting 15 NYCRR 127.11 and CPLR 2308(b)

Monaghan argued that DMV’s regulations limit the applicability of the CPLR, including “motion practice,” and thus preclude the use of CPLR 2308(b) (which requires moving in Supreme Court).

The Court rejects that reading:

15 NYCRR 127.11(a) concerns what procedures are binding on the conduct of administrative hearings.
Subpoena enforcement under CPLR 2308(b) is a judicial process in Supreme Court and does not regulate how the ALJ runs the hearing itself.
15 NYCRR 127.11(b) specifically incorporates CPLR 2302 on issuing subpoenas, and it would be “illogical” to allow issuance without a means of enforcement.

Combined with precedent interpreting “unless otherwise provided” narrowly, the Court concludes that DMV has not “otherwise provided” its own full subpoena enforcement mechanism. As a result, CPLR 2308(b) is available to motorists.

4. Due Process Balancing Under Miller v. DeBuono

Applying the three-factor test:

Private interest.
- The Court recognizes a “significant” private interest in the ability to drive.
- However, Monaghan’s license was reinstated 15 days after arraignment pending the hearing, softening the immediate impact.
Risk of erroneous deprivation and value of added safeguards.
- Requiring the reporting officer to testify would plainly reduce the risk of error, particularly when there are discrepancies (like the identity of the officer who warned the motorist).
- However, the Court focuses on whether requiring a motion to enforce is so burdensome that it undermines due process.
- It holds that making a motion in Supreme Court under 2308(b) is not “unduly burdensome.”
Government interest and burdens.
- The government has a strong interest in highway safety and efficient enforcement of DWI laws.
- Imposing an automatic-dismissal rule whenever a subpoenaed officer fails to appear—even where enforcement is possible—could significantly undermine that interest.

Balancing these factors, the Court finds the existing framework—subpoena power plus judicial enforcement—constitutionally sufficient. Due process does not entitle a motorist to per se dismissal or exclusion of hearsay merely because the officer did not show up the first (or second) time.

5. Limits and Open Questions

The Court’s holding is carefully cabined:

Monaghan did not seek enforcement, and there is no evidence the ALJ prevented him from doing so.
He did not even ask for an adjournment to pursue enforcement.
His license was reinstated after 15 days pending the hearing; there is no suggestion that an adjournment for enforcement would have triggered re-suspension.

The Court expressly declines to decide:

whether the outcome might differ if:
- a motorist did seek enforcement and the officer continued to defy court orders, or
- an ALJ threatened to revoke temporary reinstatement or otherwise penalize a request for adjournment to enforce subpoenas.

That leaves room for future litigation if, in practice, enforcement proves illusory or heavily penalized.

D. Impact and Practical Implications

1. For Defense Counsel and Motorists

Monaghan materially changes defense strategy in refusal hearings:

It is now clear that:
- Serving subpoenas on officers is not sufficient.
- Counsel must:
  1. issue subpoenas under CPLR 2302(a),
  2. if ignored, seek an adjournment, and
  3. promptly move in Supreme Court under CPLR 2308(b) to compel compliance.
If counsel does not pursue enforcement, a later due process argument about inability to cross-examine is unlikely to succeed.

Practically, this means:

More off-calendar Supreme Court motions in DWI refusal cases.
Potential delays in DMV proceedings, as adjournments are now strategically important to allow enforcement efforts.
Increased need for coordination between criminal defense and administrative counsel, especially early in the case.

2. For ALJs and DMV Practice

While Monaghan sets the constitutional floor, it does not forbid DMV from adopting more protective rules. The Court even notes that:

The DMV Appeals Board in a 2025 decision (Aktaruzzman) dismissed a refusal charge when subpoenaed officers did not appear, invoking Gray.
“Nothing in our decision today prevents [the Board] from adhering to or adopting a rule that is more favorable to motorists than what constitutional due process requires.”

Thus, DMV could, as a matter of internal policy:

Require dismissal after a certain number of nonappearances post-subpoena, or
Direct ALJs to grant adjournments routinely when enforcement is pursued, or
Develop a parallel enforcement mechanism short of requiring individual CPLR 2308(b) motions in every case.

3. For Law Enforcement Officers

The decision underscores that officers are not exempt from subpoena compliance:

CPLR 2308(b) applies fully to police officers subpoenaed to DMV hearings.
Supreme Court can order compliance, impose monetary penalties, award damages to the subpoenaing party, and even issue a warrant directing the sheriff to produce the officer.

If motorists and counsel begin actively using 2308(b), officers and agencies may:

face judicial orders compelling attendance at DMV hearings, and
adjust internal scheduling and training to prioritize compliance with subpoenas.

4. For the Courts and Administrative Law

Monaghan reinforces several important doctrinal points in New York administrative law:

Hearsay in administrative hearings.
- It reaffirms that hearsay alone can constitute “substantial evidence” in an administrative setting.
- Written refusal reports, sworn under penalty of perjury, can sustain revocation even without live testimony, provided the process is fair.
Due process as a balancing test.
- The Court endorses a flexible, context-sensitive due process analysis, weighing private and public interests against procedural burdens.
Role of CPLR in administrative practice.
- CPLR 2302 and 2308 remain key tools for litigants, even where regulations say the CPLR is not binding on hearing “conduct.”

More broadly, the case cements a general principle that applies across administrative contexts:

Where an enforcement mechanism for subpoenas exists (such as CPLR 2308[b]), due process typically does not require dismissal or exclusion of evidence solely because a subpoenaed witness fails to appear, unless the party seeking the testimony has first tried and failed to use that mechanism.

V. Complex Concepts Explained

A. “Substantial Evidence”

“Substantial evidence” is the standard courts use when reviewing factual findings of administrative agencies (like DMV) in Article 78 proceedings. It does not mean “beyond a reasonable doubt” or even “more likely than not.” Instead, it asks:

Could a reasonable mind accept the evidence as adequate to support the agency’s conclusion?

Evidence can be conflicting. As long as there is some reasonable evidentiary basis, courts will not re-weigh the proof. Here, even though the troopers’ documents conflicted on which officer warned Monaghan, they consistently asserted that someone did. That was enough to meet this low threshold, despite Monaghan’s contrary testimony.

B. “Hearsay” in Administrative Hearings

“Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it says (e.g., a written report used to prove that warnings were given). In criminal trials, hearsay is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies.

In administrative hearings, the rules are looser:

Hearsay is generally admissible.
A determination can rest entirely on hearsay, so long as it is reliable enough to constitute substantial evidence.

Monaghan reaffirms this rule: a DMV ALJ may rely solely on the officers’ sworn written reports to revoke a license, even without live testimony, so long as the hearing structure provides constitutionally adequate opportunity to challenge that evidence (e.g., through subpoena and enforcement).

C. Nonjudicial Subpoenas and CPLR 2308(b)

A “nonjudicial subpoena” is:

Issued by a lawyer or administrative body,
Returnable outside a court (e.g., at a DMV hearing), and
Not needing a judge’s prior approval.

When a person ignores such a subpoena, the remedy is not automatically dismissal of the case. Instead, CPLR 2308(b) provides a procedure:

The party or attorney who issued the subpoena files a motion in Supreme Court.
If the court finds the subpoena valid, it orders compliance and may impose fines, penalties, and even issue a warrant.

Monaghan makes clear that this is the expected route in DMV refusal cases when officers do not appear.

D. Due Process in Administrative vs. Criminal Proceedings

Due process is guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. But its exact protections depend on context:

In criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a Confrontation Clause right to face and cross-examine witnesses.
In civil and administrative cases, there is no Confrontation Clause, but due process still guarantees a fair opportunity to challenge adverse evidence.

In administrative hearings:

There is a recognized right to cross-examine adverse witnesses (as in McBarnette and Friedel).
However, that right may be shaped by reasonable procedural requirements—such as requiring parties to use available subpoena enforcement mechanisms.

Monaghan is firmly in this administrative due process framework, not the criminal Confrontation Clause framework.

E. Agency Precedent and the “Arbitrary and Capricious” Standard

Agencies must generally treat like cases alike. Under Field Delivery, an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency:

departs from its own established precedent in a materially similar case, and
fails to explain why.

Monaghan tried to show DMV had a prior practice (especially in Deyhle) of dismissing refusal charges when subpoenaed officers did not appear. The Court finds he did not establish that such a practice had the force of a binding precedent or uniform policy, so the Field Delivery doctrine does not apply here.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of Matter of Monaghan v. Schroeder

Monaghan is a pivotal decision in New York administrative and DWI law for several reasons:

It completes the doctrinal arc begun in Gray v. Adduci by resolving the question left open there: a motorist who subpoenas officers but does not seek subpoena enforcement under CPLR 2308(b) is not denied due process when the DMV relies on the officers’ written reports.
It clarifies that CPLR 2308(b)’s subpoena enforcement is available in DMV hearings notwithstanding 15 NYCRR 127.11’s limitation on CPLR applicability to the conduct of hearings, because enforcement occurs in Supreme Court, not before the ALJ.
It reaffirms:
- that motor vehicle refusal hearings implicate a real private interest and a genuine right to cross-examine officers, but
- that due process does not automatically require live testimony where a practical enforcement mechanism exists and has not been used.
It underscores that hearsay alone, including sworn refusal reports, may constitute substantial evidence sufficient to support license revocation in the administrative context.
It signals to litigants in administrative proceedings generally that failure to use available subpoena enforcement mechanisms (like CPLR 2308[b]) will seriously undermine later claims of due process violations based on witness nonappearance.
At the same time, it leaves room for DMV—and other agencies—to adopt more protective practices as a matter of policy or regulation, including possibly dismissing cases or granting adjournments when subpoenaed officers fail to appear without excuse.

In sum, Matter of Monaghan v. Schroeder sets an important statewide precedent: the constitutional minimum of due process in New York DMV refusal hearings is satisfied when motorists have, and fail to use, CPLR 2308(b) subpoena enforcement. The case shifts the focus from an automatic right to dismissal upon nonappearance of subpoenaed officers to an obligation on motorists and counsel to actively invoke judicial enforcement if they wish to insist on live cross-examination.

Due Process, DMV Refusal Hearings, and the Duty to Enforce Subpoenas: Commentary on Matter of Monaghan v. Schroeder