“Good and Sufficient Reason” Re-Defined: When Public Interest in Systemic Bias Outweighs Planning Certainty – A Commentary on Thomson & anor v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESC 31

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Thomson & anor v. An Bord Pleanála re-sets the compass for late judicial reviews of planning permissions in Ireland. Peter and Doreen Thomson challenged an An Bord Pleanála (“the Board”) permission allowing Eircom to build a telecommunications mast near their home. Although they sued 24 weeks outside the statutory eight-week limit in s. 50(6) Planning and Development Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”), the Court ultimately permitted the action, emphasising the exceptional public interest in probing systemic bias within the Board. The appeal therefore centred on the correct interpretation of “good and sufficient reason” in s. 50(8)—a phrase that governs when courts may enlarge time.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Mr Justice Woulfe (for a unanimous five-judge panel) dismissed the Board’s appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s order extending time. Key holdings include:

• The “good and sufficient reason” test is a multi-factorial, discretionary assessment with no absolute rules.
• An exceptionally strong public interest in ventilating allegations of systemic bias within a planning authority can, in rare cases, outweigh the normally decisive interest in finality and commercial certainty.
• Applicants are not invariably barred because they fail to explain every day of delay; unexplained gaps are an important but non-determinative factor.
• Courts must weigh all relevant factors holistically, including (a) statutory purpose of strict limits, (b) prejudice to permit-holders, (c) gravity of the alleged illegality, (d) blameworthiness of the applicant, and (e) any demonstrated public interest.
• Merits may be considered only to identify cases lying at or near either extreme (hopeless or demonstrably strong); however, in this case the public-interest factor, not merits, was ultimately decisive.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Kelly v. Leitrim CoCo (2005) – Clarke J.’s non-exhaustive “factor list” remains the analytic template for extensions. The Supreme Court reiterates its relevance while cautioning against mechanical application.
• G.K. v. Minister for Justice (2002) – Hardiman J.’s observation that “good and sufficient reason” is broad and open-textured allowed the Court here to resist any rigid “explain every day” rule.
• M O’S v. RIRB (2019) – Finlay Geoghegan J. emphasised balancing all circumstances; Woulfe J. quotes this to underline the discretionary nature of the jurisdiction.
• Irish Skydiving (2016) – Baker J.’s strict approach to the eight-week limit provided the appellant’s main ammunition; the Supreme Court distinguished it by underscoring the absence of systemic-bias allegations there.
• Arthropharm (2022) & Heaney (2022) – Authoritative warnings against converting an extension application into a merits trial; the Court adopted this caution while acknowledging the prima facie strength of the applicant’s case.
• Dunne (2023) & Fotovoltaic (2018) – Provided modern syntheses of relevant factors; Woulfe J. used them to structure the holistic assessment.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step 1 – Identify the statutory framework. Section 50(6) sets a rigid eight-week limit; s. 50(8) is the safety-valve, triggered only on proof of “good and sufficient reason” and circumstances outside the applicant’s control.

Step 2 – Clarify the meaning of “good and sufficient reason.” Relying on G.K. and M O’S, the Court held the phrase confers a broad discretion. “Good” reasons may nonetheless be “insufficient” when counter-vailing factors (e.g., prejudice) dominate.

Step 3 – Apply the holistic, multi-factor test.

1. Public Interest: Allegations that 42 of 49 mast-appeal files were allocated to one Board member (Mr Hyde) with a 79 % overturn rate raised “exceptional” systemic-bias questions. The Court deemed public confidence in planning integrity to be a weighty societal interest.
2. Prejudice to Eircom: While some prejudice is inherent whenever a permission is reopened, Eircom gave no evidence of concrete loss and had not commenced works. Prejudice therefore carried limited weight.
3. Applicant Delay/Blameworthiness: The Thomsons hesitated (media engagement, info requests, waiting for an internal report). Although gaps existed, they were actively pursuing information crucial to a responsible bias claim. Their delay was “significant but not disqualifying.”
4. Statutory Objective of Finality: Acknowledged as “normally decisive,” but here overridden by the gravity of alleged systemic illegality.
5. Merits: Appeared strong based on uncontested statistics; however, the Court stressed that its decision “was not dependent” on this preliminary appraisal.

Step 4 – Balance and outcome. Taking all strands together, the Court found the public-interest factor “not outweighed” by prejudice or delay. Therefore, an extension was just and equitable despite a 16-week overshoot beyond the eight-week limit.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Planning litigation: Opens the door—albeit narrowly—for applicants to secure extensions where they can show credible, systemic wrongdoing within a planning body.
• Administrative law generally: Re-affirms that statutory time-limits, even strict ones, are not immovable when exceptional public interest is at stake.
• Merits assessment: Confirms courts may glance at merits only to spot “extremes,” limiting any temptation to conduct mini-trials during time-extension motions.
• An Bord Pleanála operations: Expect greater scrutiny of file-allocation procedures and renewed calls for transparency in Board member participation.
• Future applicants: Must still explain delay but can argue that societal interest in exposing illegality may outweigh commercial certainty, provided allegations are serious, evidenced, and systemic—not parochial or speculative.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Judicial Review: A court process where a judge reviews the legality (not the merits) of decisions made by public bodies.
• Extension of Time: Permission from the court to start a case after the statutory deadline has expired.
• Objective Bias: The appearance of bias; whether a reasonable observer would think the decision-maker might not be impartial—even if no actual bias exists.
• Good and Sufficient Reason: A flexible legal standard requiring applicants to show convincing justification for delay; courts weigh multiple factors to decide if justice demands an extension.
• Holistic Approach: Instead of rigid rules, judges look at all circumstances and balance competing considerations.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court in Thomson has carved out an exceptional, but real pathway for late challenges to planning decisions where the legitimacy of the planning system itself is questioned. While reaffirming the importance of swift litigation and commercial certainty, the Court signals that these values do not enjoy absolute primacy. When allegations of systemic procedural bias emerge—supported by credible evidence—courts may deem the public interest in transparency and integrity to be “good and sufficient reason” to unlock the courthouse doors, even well beyond the statutory time-limit. Lawyers, planners, and public bodies must now navigate this recalibrated balance between certainty and accountability.