Valid Standing in Professional Negligence Claims: Requirement of Proper Appointment and Registration of Attorneys or Estate Rights

Valid Standing in Professional Negligence Claims: Requirement of Proper Appointment and Registration of Attorneys or Estate Rights

1. Introduction

McEvoy & Anor v Turner & Anor ([2025] IEHC 317) is a High Court decision in which the plaintiffs—Peter and Linda McEvoy—sought to hold two firms of solicitors professionally negligent for failing to serve personal-injury proceedings on behalf of their late mother, Mrs. Eileen McEvoy, and for failing to register an Enduring Power of Attorney executed in 2012. The defendants applied under Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to strike out the proceedings as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Justice Bolger granted the strike-out without addressing collateral motions.

Key issues:

  • Whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue as unregistered attorneys, executors or close relatives of the deceased;
  • Whether a claim for pain and suffering survives the death of the injured party;
  • Whether the proposed professional-negligence claim discloses any reasonable cause of action;
  • The effect of failing to register an Enduring Power of Attorney under the Powers of Attorney Act 1996.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Bolger held that the plaintiffs’ professional-negligence claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The plaintiffs were never validly appointed attorneys for Mrs. McEvoy because the Enduring Power of Attorney had never been registered. They had no standing as executors, and any claim on behalf of the estate was statute-barred. Further, under Section 7(2) of the Civil Liability Act 1961 and established authority (Doyle v. Dunne [2016] IESC 68), claims for pain and suffering do not survive the death of the injured party. Accordingly, the proceedings were struck out under O. 19, r. 28 and under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction as bound to fail, frivolous or vexatious.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Doyle v. Dunne [2016] IESC 68: The Supreme Court held that personal-injury claims for pain and suffering do not survive the death of the plaintiff. Justice Bolger relied on this authority to conclude that even if the McEvoys had standing, the core head of damage (pain, suffering, loss of expectation of life) was non-existent on the death of Mrs. McEvoy.
  • Civil Liability Act 1961, Section 7: Provides that most causes of action survive a person’s death for the benefit of the estate but expressly excludes exemplary damages and “damages for any pain or suffering or personal injury.” This statutory provision reinforced the Court’s view that no actionable head of damage subsisted.
  • Rules of the Superior Courts, Order 19, rule 28: Permits striking out proceedings which disclose no reasonable cause of action. The Court reaffirmed the established test—for a strike-out application, the pleadings must be assumed true but must still disclose a cause of action.
  • Inherent Jurisdiction to Prevent Abuse of Process: The Court confirmed that even if a cause of action might technically exist, proceedings can be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious or bound to fail under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Standing and Capacity: The plaintiffs claimed to sue (a) as attorneys under an Enduring Power of Attorney; (b) as executor/estate representative; and (c) as close relatives. None conferred a right of action:
    • The Enduring Power of Attorney was never registered under s. 10 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1996, so it conferred no legal authority on the plaintiffs.
    • Neither plaintiff pursued the claim on behalf of Mrs. McEvoy’s estate; any estate claim is statute-barred because the limitation period expired.
    • The mere relationship of spouse/daughter does not give rise to a professional-negligence claim against solicitors who acted for the deceased.
  2. Statute of Limitations & Survival of Cause of Action: The underlying medical-negligence proceedings were never served and hence never perfected. Even if they had been, the limitation period would have run or the claim died with the patient’s death, with only estate actions surviving—and those exclude personal injury.
  3. Failure to Disclose a Reasonable Cause of Action: On the pleadings, no head of damage existed; the claim for special damages (e.g. home adaptations) was unparticularised and unsupported by any evidence of expense incurred. The professional-negligence claim was bound to fail.
  4. Abuse of Process & Vexatious Litigation: The Court indicated that the plaintiffs’ real complaint was delay and frustration in prosecuting the mother’s medical-negligence suit—an effort properly leant by a registered attorney or estate executor within the limitation period.

3.3. Impact

This decision provides important guidance on three fronts:

  • Professional-Negligence Claims: Only those with proper legal status (valid registered attorneys, personal representatives, or direct clients) can maintain such actions against legal advisers.
  • Powers of Attorney: Emphasises the necessity of registering enduring powers if litigation or property management is to follow—a failure to register may fatally undermine later claims.
  • Limitation and Survival Rules: Reinforces that personal-injury heads of damage (pain, suffering) do not survive the plaintiff’s death, restricting estate actions to economic or property-based losses.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Order 19, Rule 28 (Strike-Out): A procedural mechanism allowing a defendant to have the plaintiff’s case dismissed at an early stage when the written pleadings, taken at their highest, disclose no legal basis for a remedy.
  • Inherent Jurisdiction: The Court’s power to prevent its processes from being misused—if a claim is bound to fail, frivolous or vexatious, the Court may dismiss it even absent a specific rule.
  • Enduring Power of Attorney: A statutory instrument under which one person appoints another to make decisions on their behalf. In Ireland, it must be registered under the Powers of Attorney Act 1996 to become operative once the grantor lacks capacity.
  • Survival of Causes of Action: While many claims survive a person’s death for the benefit of the estate, Irish law (and policy) excludes personal-injury heads of damage from that survival—only economic and property losses may be recovered post-mortem.

5. Conclusion

McEvoy & Anor v Turner & Anor clarifies that professional-negligence claims against solicitors require a plaintiff with a valid legal interest—either as the original client, as a duly appointed and registered attorney, or as a personal representative pursuing estate rights. Unregistered powers of attorney confer no standing, estate actions for personal injury do not survive the testator’s death, and delay or procedural failings cannot be cured by collateral claims. The judgment underscores the importance of early registration of enduring powers, careful preservation of limitation rights, and precise pleading of heads of damage supported by evidence. Future litigants and practitioners should ensure proper appointment, registration, and timely prosecution to avoid the fate of these proceedings.

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