Upholding Ministerial Discretion under Article 17(1) Dublin III Regulation: Rationality Threshold for Judicial Review Clarified

Introduction

This commentary examines the High Court’s decision in A.H.H. v Minister for Justice & Anor ([2025] IEHC 298), delivered by Ms Justice Siobhán Phelan on 23 May 2025. The case concerns a challenge to (i) the Minister’s refusal, under Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (“Dublin III Regulation”), to exercise discretion to determine an international protection claim in Ireland, and (ii) the International Protection Appeals Tribunal’s (“IPAT”) earlier decision affirming transfer to Austria. The applicant, a 20-year-old Somali national, sought to remain in Ireland on humanitarian and rights grounds linked to severe trauma and mental health issues. Key issues include the standard for judicial review of Article 17 decisions, the scope of the Minister’s discretion, and the rationality threshold for overturning transfer orders.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court refused leave for judicial review on all grounds. It applied the “arguable grounds” threshold from G v Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 1 I.R. 374, requiring a prima facie case with reasonable prospects of success. The Court concluded:

The applicant failed to exhibit material previous decisions on two earlier Article 17 requests, creating an evidential gap.
The challenge to application of the Carltona principle to Article 17 decisions is bound to fail in light of R.G. v IPAT & Ors [2024] IEHC 579 (Bradley J.) and NVU v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2020] IESC 46.
The Minister’s 18-page decision evidenced detailed engagement with medical and country-of-origin information (COI), applying the Paposhvili threshold, CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence (e.g. C.K. & Ors v Republika Slovenija, C-578/16 PPU), and conducted a full proportionality/Article 8 analysis.
Neither the IPAT nor the Minister acted irrationally or unfairly; no systemic flaws in Austria’s asylum or reception regime were demonstrated to rebut the presumption of mutual trust in the Dublin system.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

G v DPP [1994] 1 I.R. 374: Established the “arguable grounds” screening test for judicial review.
S & Others v Minister for Justice [2013] IESC 4 and O.O. v Minister for Justice [2015] IESC 26: Elaborated on “prima facie legal argument” and “reasonable prospects” requirements.
NVU v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2020] IESC 46: Supreme Court held Article 17(1) discretionary power is vested solely in the Minister; Carltona applies.
R.G. v IPAT & Ors [2024] IEHC 579: Bradley J. reaffirmed Carltona’s application to Article 17 decisions and rejected that officials below Minister lacked authority.
C.K. & Ors v Republika Slovenija (C-578/16 PPU): Clarified “real and proven risk” of inhuman or degrading treatment linked to significant, permanent deterioration in health.
C-228/21, C-254/21, C-297/21, C-315/21 & C-328/21 (CZA): Confirm mutual trust presumption; exceptional circumstances needed to rebut systemic compliance.
MK (Albania) v Minister for Justice [2022] IESC 48: Endorsed standards for proportionality and fundamental rights in transfer contexts.
B.K. v Minister for Justice [2021] IEHC 717: Emphasized the breadth of Ministerial discretion under Article 17 and the high threshold for invoking humanitarian exceptions.

Legal Reasoning

The core legal reasoning unfolded in two strands:

Screening Test and Evidential Gaps: Applying the “arguable grounds” threshold, the Court noted that unexplained omissions of prior Article 17 decisions and an alleged May 2024 IPAT ruling left the applicant unable to establish the factual basis for irrationality. Without those documents the applicant could not show that the Minister failed to consider relevant evidence.
Rationality of Discretionary Decisions: The Minister’s decision was detailed, applying:

The Paposhvili framework to assess Article 3 ECHR/Article 4 CFR risk;
COI on Austria’s reception and healthcare systems (noting Austria’s adherence to the Reception Conditions Directive);
ECtHR/ECJ precedents on fundamental rights and mutual trust;
A full proportionality assessment under Article 8 ECHR/Article 7 CFR;
Medical reports from Dr Giller and Dr Visser, addressing PTSD, suicidal ideation, and ongoing treatment needs.

On each point, the Court concluded the conclusions were open on the material; no misreading of law nor irrational weighing of evidence occurred. The IPAT had similarly engaged rigorously with the medico-legal report and COI before rejecting a “real and proven risk” under the Dublin III framework.

Impact

This ruling has several important effects:

It reaffirms the high hurdle for judicial interference with Article 17(1) decisions: applicants must demonstrate systemic flaws or clear irrationality to succeed.
It cements Carltona’s application to Article 17 decisions, confirming that departmental officials validly exercise the Minister’s discretion.
It emphasizes the doctrine of mutual trust, making cross-border challenges to transfer orders more difficult absent evidence of systemic non-compliance in the receiving Member State.
Future judicial review applicants will need comprehensive documentary evidence of all prior requests and decisions to meet the “arguable grounds” screening test.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Carltona Principle: A ministerial power can be validly exercised by delegated officials within the department.
Article 17(1) Dublin III Regulation: Grants the Minister broad humanitarian discretion to retain or accept international protection applications outside the standard transfer rules.
Arguable Grounds Test: A preliminary filter requiring a reasonable prima facie case that, if uncontradicted, could succeed on full judicial review.
Rationality Review: Courts will only quash administrative decisions that no reasonable decision-maker could have made on the evidence.
Mutual Trust Principle: EU Member States are presumed to comply with asylum and human rights standards, barring systemic evidence to the contrary.

Conclusion

The High Court in A.H.H. v Minister for Justice & Anor has clarified and reinforced the breadth of ministerial discretion under Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation and set a stringent rationality standard for judicial review of transfer decisions. By upholding the Carltona principle and mutual trust doctrine, the Court has made it clear that challenges to transfers to other EU Member States will require strong evidence of systemic failings or clear irrationality in decision-making. This decision is a pivotal precedent guiding future applications for leave to seek judicial review in the Dublin regime and underscores the importance of thorough evidential presentation at the leave stage.