Unified Offence in Section 75A: Clarifying Non-Fatal Strangulation and Suffocation

Introduction

The case of Jones, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 195) before the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) addresses a critical interpretation of section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015, as amended by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The central issue raised was whether section 75A creates one unified offence or two distinct offences – one for intentional strangulation and another for an act of suffocation (or battery affecting breathing).

The appellant, charged with multiple offences including alleged intentional strangulation on two separate occasions, contested the jury directions given at trial. The defence argued that the judge’s instruction conflated the different modes of committing the offence – specifically including elements of suffocation which were not separately charged – thereby rendering the convictions unsafe.

Represented by Miss Rodio for the appellant and Mr Gair for the prosecution, the dispute focused on the interpretation of the statutory language and whether Parliament intended to create two separate offences under the pertinent section. This commentary analyses the Judgment’s comprehensive approach to resolving this statutory interpretation quandary.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal held that section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015 creates a single offence of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation. The court explained that the offence is committed either by intentional strangulation or through an act—constituting battery—that affects the victim's ability to breathe. Importantly, while one route requires specific intent (the act of strangulation), the other may be committed recklessly.

The judgment clarified that if the jury, in the absence of explicit evidence of any chest-related application of force, finds the accused had applied force to the neck (the central allegation in both complainants’ testimony), then they could only be convicting on the basis of a single offence as charged.

Relying on the plain wording of the statute, the explanatory notes to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and the consistent treatment in section 75B, the court conclusively held that the defendant’s convictions on counts 2 and 6 (allegations of intentional strangulation) were safe and that the judge’s jury directions were proper. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

A key precedent discussed in this judgment is R v Hughes [2024] EWCA Crim 593. In Hughes, the court addressed similar issues regarding the interpretation of section 75A. The appellant in Hughes was convicted of intentional strangulation despite a jury determination using evidence that could, in theory, support an alternative basis for conviction.

The Court of Appeal in the present case, while fully considering the arguments arising from Hughes, upheld that the principles from that case were applicable. It was noted that although the facts in Hughes differed slightly—particularly in relation to the exact nature of the force—the underlying statutory interpretation found that the two modes of conduct (strangulation and suffocation as battery) fall under a single offence.

The court also referred to the explanatory notes attached to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which explicitly state that the offence encompasses non‐fatal strangulation or suffocation, reinforcing a unified reading of the provision.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning was grounded in a careful statutory interpretation of section 75A. The court highlighted that the section was deliberately framed to include two methods of commission – one involving the application of pressure to the neck (intentional strangulation) and the other involving any act that constitutes battery affecting the ability to breathe.

A central argument by the defence was that the two distinct modes (strangulation versus suffocation) should give rise to two distinct offences. However, the court countered this argument by noting that if Parliament had intended two distinct offences, it would have provided separate statutory headings or sections. Instead, the unified heading under “strangulation or suffocation” and the consistent interpretation of both sections 75A and 75B clearly indicated a singular offence. This reading was further bolstered by the explanatory notes in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which denote that the offence may be committed “by intentional strangulation or by an act… which affects [the victim’s] ability to breathe.”

In addition, the court stressed that the role of the jury is to make a fact-based determination based on whether they are sure an offence under either classification was committed. Requiring unanimity on the specific route (strangulation versus suffocation) would be unnecessarily rigid and contrary to the evidence presented.

Impact

This decision provides a clear precedent, affirming that under section 75A, the single offence can be charged regardless of the pathway (intentional or reckless act resulting in a battery affecting breathing). It simplifies future prosecutions by ensuring that both modes of conduct are treated uniformly under the same offence.

Importantly, by underscoring that it is the evidence before the jury—not the precise articulation of method—that is determinative, the ruling offers guidance to future courts and prosecutors in similar domestic abuse or violent offence cases. This approach is likely to promote consistency in jury instructions, reducing potential ambiguity and safeguarding against appeals based solely on the nuanced differences in the factual matrices of strangulation versus suffocation.

Furthermore, the decision signals to practitioners that clarity in charging decisions is paramount. Future indictments might adopt a consolidated form, such as "intentional strangulation or suffocation," to preclude any uncertainty about the nature of the offence presented to the jury.

Complex Concepts Simplified

The Judgment employs several legal concepts that may seem complex:

• Battery: In this context, it refers to the common law offence where any unlawful application of force results in harmful or offensive contact. Here, if an act (other than a direct strangulation) affects the ability to breathe and is recognized as a battery, it still falls under the ambit of section 75A.
• Intentional Strangulation: This involves a deliberate act of applying pressure to the neck with the aim of restricting breathing. The judge’s directions emphasized that the evidence indicated the force was applied to the neck, not the chest.
• Recklessness: This term is relevant for the mode of commission under subsection 1(b) where the offence can be committed without specific intent but by recklessly causing interference with breathing through a battery.
• Unified Offence Concept: Despite seemingly varying modes of conduction (intentional vs. reckless), the court’s interpretation unifies them under a single legislative offence, reflecting Parliament’s likely intent to capture any act that restricts breathing.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Jones, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 195) solidly establishes that section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015, as amended, creates a single offence encompassing both intentional strangulation and acts of suffocation through battery. The decision underscores that the necessity for unanimity among the jury on the exact route (strangulation versus suffocation) is not required, so long as the jury is sure that the accused’s conduct affected the complainant’s ability to breathe.

This ruling not only corrects the interpretational issues raised at trial but also aligns statutory interpretation with the plain language and legislative intent evidenced by both the Act’s text and its explanatory notes. Its impact is significant for future cases, as it provides clarity on how offences under section 75A should be construed and charged, ensuring that similar cases are adjudicated consistently and fairly.

In summary, the key takeaways from this Judgment revolve around the unified approach to non-fatal strangulation or suffocation. This ensures that evidence presented to the jury is evaluated on the ambit of whether force affected the victim’s ability to breathe, regardless of the precise method used—a significant clarification that will influence domestic abuse and violent offence prosecutions moving forward.