Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
See more information ...
Click here to read the full judgment
Jones, R. v
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was charged with multiple offences arising from incidents involving two complainants on different dates. The charges included assault occasioning actual bodily harm, intentional strangulation contrary to section 75A(1)(a) and (5) of the Serious Crime Act 2015, theft, attempted robbery, and other assaults. The appellant pleaded guilty to one count of theft but denied strangulation and claimed self-defence for the other charges. The case proceeded to trial before Her Honour Judge Peters and a jury at the Crown Court. The judge directed the jury on the law relating to intentional strangulation and suffocation under section 75A, initially instructing that the offence could be committed either by intentionally strangling or by applying any force affecting the victim's ability to breathe. After the jury sought clarification on whether force applied to the chest fell within the definition, the judge provided a further direction emphasizing that the evidence related solely to force applied to the neck. The jury convicted the appellant on all counts, and the judge imposed concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling four years' imprisonment. The appellant appealed on the ground that the jury was not properly directed on the elements of the offence charged.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015 creates one offence encompassing both strangulation and suffocation, or two distinct offences.
- Whether the trial judge erred in law by directing the jury that the offence could be committed through acts constituting suffocation when the appellant was only charged with intentional strangulation.
- Whether the convictions on counts of intentional strangulation are safe given the jury directions and the evidence presented.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 75A(1) creates two separate offences: intentional strangulation requiring intentional application of pressure to the neck, and suffocation which may be committed recklessly by an act constituting battery.
- The appellant was only charged with intentional strangulation; therefore, any jury conviction based on suffocation would be unsafe as it was not part of the charge.
- There was no evidence of pressure applied to the chest, and thus the jury should not have been directed that force affecting breathing generally could suffice.
- The trial judge’s directions were legally incorrect by conflating the two offences, potentially leading to an unsafe conviction.
- The appellant relied on the case of R v Hughes but argued it was distinguishable and submitted that this court should depart from that precedent.
Respondent's Arguments
- The prosecution consistently presented the case as one of intentional strangulation.
- Although the initial jury directions may have been imperfect, the judge’s final direction clarified the position and focused the jury on the evidence of force applied to the neck.
- Any imperfection in the directions did not cause unfairness to the appellant or render the convictions unsafe.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Hughes [2024] EWCA Crim 593 |
Clarification that section 75A creates a single offence committed either by intentional strangulation or by an act constituting a battery affecting breathing; the indictment need not specify both modes. |
The court endorsed Hughes as correctly deciding that section 75A creates one offence with two alternative modes of commission and held that the present appeal must follow that decision, rejecting the appellant’s submission to depart from it. |
| R v Chilvers [2021] EWCA Crim 1311 |
Identifies rare situations where jury agreement on the precise nature of the act is necessary. |
The court noted that none of those rare situations arose in the present case, supporting the conclusion that jury agreement on the exact mode of offence was not required here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by examining the statutory language of section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015, noting that the section criminalises a single offence of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation, which may be committed either by intentionally strangling another person or by committing another act that affects the victim’s ability to breathe and constitutes battery. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that these constitute two separate offences, reasoning that if Parliament had intended to create two distinct offences it would have done so by separate provisions.
The court found that the wording of section 75B, which refers to an offence under section 75A, supports the interpretation of a single offence with alternative modes of commission. The court also considered the explanatory notes to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which describe section 75A as creating one offence of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation.
Turning to the case of R v Hughes, the court agreed with its reasoning and outcome, endorsing the principle that the indictment may be limited to intentional strangulation but the jury may convict if the evidence justifies conviction on the alternative mode of battery affecting breathing, provided there is no unfairness to the defendant. The court held that in the present case, the jury was properly directed and focused on the evidence, which related solely to force applied to the neck. The court acknowledged that the initial jury directions could have been improved but concluded that they were not legally wrong and that the final directions eliminated any confusion.
The court further explained that it is generally unnecessary for the jury to agree on the precise mode by which the offence was committed, unless exceptional circumstances arise, which were not present here.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED the appellant’s appeal.
The court held that section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015 creates a single offence of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation, which can be committed by either intentionally strangling or by an act constituting a battery that affects the victim’s ability to breathe. The trial judge’s directions to the jury were not in error of law, and the convictions for intentional strangulation were safe. The decision confirms that indictments may charge only intentional strangulation without specifying suffocation, and juries may convict on either mode if the evidence supports it, provided there is no unfairness to the defendant. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming the interpretation in R v Hughes. The direct effect is that the appellant’s convictions and sentences stand unchanged.
Click here to read the full judgment