The Hegarty Doctrine: Supreme Court Affirms Commissioner’s Power to Invoke Section 14(2) After Completion of Garda Disciplinary Proceedings

Introduction

In Hegarty v The Commissioner of an Garda Síochána ([2025] IESC 36), the Supreme Court of Ireland delivered a landmark ruling on 17 July 2025 clarifying the relationship between:

the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 2007 (the 2007 Regulations), and
the Commissioner’s summary dismissal power under section 14(2) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 (now substantially re-enacted in s. 51 of the 2024 Act).

The case arose after Garda Raymond Hegarty had already undergone — and successfully appealed within — the disciplinary framework under the 2007 Regulations for sexual misconduct in Lismore Garda Station. Although the highest sanction ultimately imposed by the Appeal Board was a four-week pay reduction, the Commissioner then sought to dismiss him under s. 14(2) for the very same conduct, citing the need to maintain public confidence.

The High Court and Court of Appeal quashed the Commissioner’s attempt, holding it contrary to constitutional fairness (“double vexation”). The Supreme Court (Murray J., for a unanimous court) reversed those decisions, establishing what this commentary will call “the Hegarty Doctrine”: the Commissioner’s public-confidence dismissal power is autonomous and may be exercised after – and despite – completion of a disciplinary process, provided the stringent statutory conditions in s. 14(2) are met.

Summary of the Judgment

Distinct Legal Channels. Section 14(2) operates “notwithstanding anything in this Act or the Regulations”. It pursues a protective purpose (public confidence) whereas the Regulations pursue a disciplinary/punitive purpose.
No Implied Bar. Nothing in the Constitution, the 2007 Regulations or fairness principles bars the Commissioner from later invoking s. 14(2) even where the same conduct has been fully processed under the Regulations.
High Threshold Remains. The Court emphasised the “truly exceptional” nature of s. 14(2): dismissal must be necessary to maintain public confidence, and the factual basis must be undisputed or previously established.
Judicial Review Still Available. Decisions under s. 14(2) remain reviewable on ordinary public-law grounds; courts retain a discretion to refuse relief.
Appeal Allowed. The Supreme Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal and refused the relief previously granted to Garda Hegarty.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Irish Authorities

McEnery v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána ([2016] IESC 66) – Confirmed that Regulation 39 summary dismissal and s. 14(2) are “stand-alone”. Relied upon to stress distinct purposes.
Keane v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána ([2021] IEHC 577) – Heslin J.’s obiter suggested “double vexation” concerns; Supreme Court distinguished and limited this reasoning.
State (Jordan) v Commissioner ([1987] ILRM 107) & Ivers v Commissioner ([2022] IECA 206) – Recognised public confidence as a disciplinary objective but not as sole focus.
Eviston v DPP ([2002] 3 IR 260) – Relied upon below for the “expectation not to be re-prosecuted”; Supreme Court found analogy weak.
East Donegal Co-op v AG ([1970] IR 317) – Canon of constitutional-conform interpretation; Court held it did not justify rewriting s. 14(2).

UK / Comparative Authorities

R (Victor) v Chief Constable of West Mercia [2023] EWHC 2119
Barnes v Chief Constable of Thames Valley [2023] EWHC 2737
C v Chief Constable of Strathclyde [2013] CSOH 65

These English and Scottish cases upheld dismissals of probationary officers via management powers even after misconduct panels imposed lesser sanctions, reinforcing that parallel regimes with different purposes can validly coexist. The Supreme Court used them for comparative validation.

2. Core Legal Reasoning

Statutory Text Prevails. The phrase “Notwithstanding anything in this Act or the regulations” is unequivocal. Reading an implied limitation into s. 14(2) would contradict its plain wording and purpose.
Different Purposes → Different Proportionality Tests. Disciplinary proportionality weighs rehabilitation, mitigation and internal deterrence. Section 14(2) asks a narrower, systemic question: does public confidence demand removal?
No Constitutional Bar. The Constitution does not enshrine a general right never to face two state-sponsored processes over the same conduct. Examples: criminal acquittal followed by professional fitness inquiries (Shine; AA v Medical Council).
Subordinate Legislation Cannot Curtail Primary Statute. Regulation 37(5) (duty to implement Appeal Board findings) cannot override s. 14(2).

3. Projected Impact of the Decision

Policing Governance. Confirms the Commissioner’s ultimate responsibility for public confidence, a critical pillar in unarmed “policing by consent”.
Future Litigation. Expect more applications under s. 14(2)/s. 51, but with heightened emphasis on meeting the “exceptional” threshold and documenting the public-confidence rationale.
Regulatory Analogies. Other professional regulators may cite Hegarty to justify sequential or overlapping procedures where distinct statutory objectives exist.
Legislative Clarity. The judgment may deter attempts to read implied fairness limits into “notwithstanding” clauses, prompting Parliament/Oireachtas to spell out exclusivity where intended.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Double Jeopardy vs “Double Vexation”. Constitutional “double jeopardy” protects against criminal re-trial for the same offence. “Double vexation” is a looser fairness idea that one should not face multiple processes on identical facts. Hegarty clarifies the latter is not absolute in administrative law.
Section 14(2) Power. A summary dismissal mechanism allowing the Commissioner (with Policing Authority consent) to remove an officer whose continued presence would undermine public confidence. It is protective (society-facing), not merely punitive.
Disciplinary Regulations. A codified internal procedure to establish wrongdoing, impose proportionate sanctions, and deter future breaches – largely punitive/rehabilitative.
“Notwithstanding” Clause. Legislative shorthand meaning the provision applies even if inconsistent with other statutory or regulatory rules.
Judicial Review Grounds. Courts may quash decisions for illegality, irrationality, procedural unfairness or proportionality; discretionary relief may still be denied for delay, mootness, etc.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hegarty decisively delineates Ireland’s two complementary mechanisms for Garda accountability:

The disciplinary track (2007 Regulations) – primarily punitive and corrective, and
The public-confidence track (s. 14(2)/s. 51) – protective and reputational.

By holding that the latter survives the former, the Court has fortified the Commissioner’s capacity to safeguard the legitimacy of An Garda Síochána, while simultaneously warning that the power is “truly exceptional” and subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny. The “Hegarty Doctrine” will therefore resonate far beyond the Gardaí, providing a template for how overlapping statutory regimes can coexist without violating fundamental fairness when their purposes, criteria and safeguards are properly distinguished.