The Duty to Co‑Operate and to Await Timely Medical Evidence in Accelerated “Safe Country” Asylum Procedures: Commentary on EL (Georgia) v Chief International Protection Officer [2025] IEHC 690

The Duty to Co‑Operate and to Await Timely Medical Evidence in Accelerated “Safe Country” Asylum Procedures: Commentary on EL (Georgia) v Chief International Protection Officer [2025] IEHC 690

1. Introduction

This judgment of Barr J in the High Court of Ireland, EL (Georgia) v Chief International Protection Officer & Anor [2025] IEHC 690, addresses two interlocking issues of considerable importance in Irish international protection law:

  • the scope of the International Protection Office’s duty to co‑operate with applicants under s.28 of the International Protection Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) in the context of an accelerated “safe country of origin” procedure; and
  • the circumstances in which an applicant may bypass the statutory appeal to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT”) and instead seek judicial review of a first‑instance asylum decision.

The case arises from a Georgian national, a young gay woman (“the applicant”), who claimed international protection in Ireland, alleging persecution in Georgia on account of her sexual orientation. A central controversy was the Chief International Protection Officer’s decision to finalise the s.39 report refusing international protection without waiting for a psychiatric/psychological report, despite a clear and timely request from the applicant’s solicitor that the decision be deferred for a very short period to allow consideration of that report.

The judgment establishes and clarifies important principles on:

  • how the duty of co‑operation under s.28 must be applied, even in accelerated procedures for safe-country applicants;
  • the standard for materiality of evidence that was not considered (whether it might, rather than would, have changed the outcome); and
  • when a procedural defect at first instance is so serious that the applicant need not rely solely on the statutory appeal to IPAT but can obtain judicial review of the initial decision.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Applicant’s Circumstances

The applicant is a Georgian national and a gay woman. The first respondent (the Chief International Protection Officer, “CIPO”) accepted both of these facts (para. 17).

Her account included:

  • She worked as a nurse in a hospital in Georgia for eight years.
  • At a birthday celebration at the hospital in October 2023, her same‑sex partner attended, revealing their relationship.
  • Following this disclosure, she was dismissed from her employment.
  • When she informed her father about the reason for her dismissal, he beat and confined her, repeatedly assaulting her because of her sexual orientation.
  • Her father was an ex‑policeman; she believed reporting either the dismissal or the assaults to the authorities would have been futile or dangerous.
  • She ultimately fled Georgia on 16 February 2024, arriving in Ireland on 17 February 2024.

2.2 The International Protection Application

The applicant attended a substantive s.35 interview with the International Protection Office (“IPO”) on 4 March 2024. Her claim focused on:

  • persecution and discrimination against LGBTQ+ persons in Georgia; and
  • personal persecution from her family (particularly her father) following the disclosure of her sexual orientation.

Georgia was, at the relevant time, designated a safe country of origin. Under the 2015 Act, this designation meant the applicant’s claim was processed under accelerated procedures (para. 18). Nonetheless, she was entitled to a full and fair examination of her application.

2.3 The Psychiatric Report: Request and Timing

After the interview:

  • The applicant obtained legal aid, and her current solicitor was appointed on 26 March 2024.
  • Because legal aid funding for additional expert reports requires prior sanction by the Legal Aid Board, the solicitor first needed authorisation to instruct a psychologist (para. 28).
  • An appointment was secured with Dr Gillian Moore‑Groarke, Consultant Psychologist, for 17 April 2024 at 11:00 a.m.

By letter dated 8 April 2024, the solicitor:

  • made substantive representations in support of the applicant’s claim;
  • enclosed country-of-origin information on Georgia; and
  • explicitly notified the IPO of the upcoming psychological assessment and requested that no decision be made until the report could be furnished.

The relevant passage stated (para. 8):

“NB. The applicant is scheduled to be assessed by Dr Gillian Moore Groarke, Consultant Psychologist, Cork, on 17 April 2024 at 11.00am and we would expect to be in a position to furnish your office with a report from Dr Moore Groarke shortly thereafter and, in the circumstances, would ask that your office refrain from making any decision on client's application until you are furnished with same report.”

Despite this, the CIPO:

  • completed the s.39 report on 17 April 2024, the same day as the psychological assessment took place (para. 30);
  • did not await the report or refer to it in the decision.

Dr Moore‑Groarke issued her medical report on 19 April 2024, diagnosing the applicant with PTSD and “severe psychological trauma” (para. 10). The solicitor furnished the report to the CIPO by letter of 23 April 2024.

2.4 Content of the Psychological Report

The report was described in the judgment as concluding (para. 10):

“This young lady is suffering from severe psychological trauma. She is totally isolated and remains severally [sic] depressed and anxious. She has fitful and disturbed sleep which is best described as severe insomnia. She describes having nightmares, flashbacks and she is hypervigilant and feels that someone will kill her… Her diagnosis constitutes PTSD. She would benefit from seeing a psychiatrist to put some counselling support in place, and to return to taking her medication.”

The report therefore:

  • confirmed severe psychological trauma and isolation;
  • diagnosed Post‑Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); and
  • recommended psychiatric input and support.

The applicant argued this evidence was highly material to the assessment of her credibility and the plausibility of her account of persecution.

2.5 Positions of the Parties

2.5.1 Applicant’s submissions

The applicant contended (paras. 11–13):

  • The CIPO acted unlawfully and unreasonably in failing to await and consider the psychological report.
  • The report was “crucial” to her narrative; it corroborated her trauma and mental state and would significantly support her credibility.
  • Because the decision was taken without considering this key document, her claim was not fully or lawfully examined.
  • Regarding alternative remedy, she argued that an appeal to IPAT would not cure the defect:
    • the report would only be considered once (at appeal), depriving her of the benefit of consideration at both first instance and appeal; and
    • this constituted a significant injustice justifying judicial review.

2.5.2 Respondent’s submissions

The CIPO resisted the challenge on three main grounds (paras. 3 & 14–16):

  1. No unlawfulness in failing to consider later evidence: a decision cannot be quashed because of material that was not before the decision‑maker at the time. The psychologist’s report arrived after the s.39 report was completed.
  2. Accelerated “safe country” procedure: as Georgia is a designated safe country, the application was processed under accelerated procedures; it was said to be reasonable not to delay the decision to await the report.
  3. Adequate alternative remedy: even if it was wrong not to consider the report, the applicant had a full de novo appeal to IPAT, which was an adequate and appropriate remedy. Judicial review of the first instance decision should therefore be refused.

3. Summary of the High Court’s Judgment

3.1 Duty to Co‑Operate and Failure to Await the Medical Report

Barr J held that the CIPO’s failure to await the psychological report, in circumstances where:

  • the solicitor had promptly arranged the assessment;
  • had notified the IPO in advance; and
  • had requested a short, clearly defined deferral;

breached the duty of co‑operation under s.28 of the 2015 Act (paras. 31–33).

The court emphasised that:

  • the accelerated “safe country” procedure does not diminish the applicant’s right to have her application fully considered (paras. 25–27); and
  • the CIPO was required to co‑operate with the applicant in assembling and assessing all relevant elements of her claim, including timely requested medical evidence.

The decision to issue the s.39 report on the very day of the psychological assessment, without awaiting the report that followed two days later, was found to be unreasonable and contrary to s.28 (paras. 31–33).

3.2 Materiality: The “Might Have” Test

On the question of materiality, the court rejected the respondent’s argument that the report did not clearly link the PTSD diagnosis to the father’s abuse and therefore could not be shown to have altered the outcome (para. 34).

Instead, Barr J accepted the applicant’s contention that the correct test is whether the missing evidence:

“might have led to a different credibility finding being made” (para. 35).

The court found that the psychiatric report:

  • was “significant evidence” supporting the applicant’s narrative;
  • confirmed that she was a “significantly traumatised person” with a diagnosis of PTSD; and
  • could have led to a different conclusion on credibility (para. 35).

That was sufficient to render the failure to consider it a material error.

3.3 Alternative Remedy and the “Rare and Exceptional” Exception

On the alternative remedy issue, the court:

  • acknowledged the general rule that where a statutory appeal exists (here, the de novo appeal to IPAT), judicial review is “rare and exceptional” (paras. 37–38); but
  • held that in this specific case, the procedural unfairness at first instance was so serious that it justified a judicial review challenge, applying the principles from Stefan, ESO, AE and MM (paras. 38–49).

The key point was that:

“If the applicant is refused relief … and is forced to proceed by way of an appeal, it will mean that this significant document will only be considered on one occasion, being on the appeal to IPAT. That will deprive the applicant of the significant benefit of having the medical report considered at first instance as well.” (para. 47)

The omission was likened to the missing material in Stefan and the omitted documentation in AE v CIPO (para. 48). Given the potential impact of the report on credibility, the court found that:

  • the integrity of the first‑instance process was undermined; and
  • this was an exceptional case where judicial review should be allowed despite the available IPAT appeal (para. 49).

3.4 Orders Proposed

The court proposed the following orders (paras. 51–54):

  • Grant certiorari quashing the s.39 report of 17 April 2024.
  • Remit the matter to the CIPO for fresh consideration, this time taking account of the psychiatric report.
  • As the Minister’s subsequent decision (the second respondent’s decision) had considered the medical report but was predicated on a refusal of international protection, the court would hear the parties on the appropriate form of order in respect of that decision.
  • The judgment was delivered electronically; brief written submissions on final orders and costs were invited within four weeks, with a mention date fixed for 27 January 2026.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 The Statutory and EU Law Framework

4.1.1 Section 28 of the International Protection Act 2015

Section 28 transposes Article 4 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC (“the Qualification Directive”) into Irish law (paras. 22–24). It requires that an International Protection Officer:

  • “shall in cooperation with the applicant assess the relevant elements of the application” (para. 23); and
  • must consider:
    • the applicant’s statements;
    • all submitted documents on identity, background, nationality, prior residence, travel routes, prior asylum claims, and reasons for protection; and
    • the applicant’s personal circumstances and all relevant country of origin information (para. 24).

The assessment is required to be individualised, holistic, and co‑operative. The shared responsibility between applicant and decision‑maker is central: the IPO cannot treat the applicant as solely bearing the burden of proof without any supportive role.

4.1.2 The Qualification Directive and Procedures Directive

Article 4 of the Qualification Directive stresses a joint assessment of evidence, not a purely adversarial model. The Procedures Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC) governs asylum procedures. Article 23 allows Member States to prioritise or accelerate certain categories of cases (e.g. safe‑country claims) but this must not undermine fundamental procedural guarantees.

The CJEU in HID, BA v Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors, Case C‑175/11, interpreted these provisions. Barr J relied on this judgment (para. 26) to hold that:

  • prioritised or accelerated procedures cannot deprive applicants of the safeguards required by Article 23 of the Procedures Directive; and
  • applicants must have sufficient time to gather and present evidence so that the determining authority can conduct a fair and comprehensive examination (para. 26).

4.2 The Duty to Co‑Operate in Accelerated “Safe Country” Procedures

4.2.1 Accelerated procedure does not dilute rights

The respondents argued that, because Georgia is designated a safe country, the claim had to be processed quickly and that this justified proceeding without waiting for the psychiatric report. Barr J firmly rejected any suggestion that the accelerated procedure activates a lower standard of fairness or a reduced duty to consider evidence.

The court stated (para. 25):

“I hold that the fact that the applicant has fled from a designated safe country and therefore that her application was being dealt with under the accelerated procedures provided for under the 2015 Act, does not mean that her right to have her application fully considered was taken away or abridged.”

Relying on HID, BA, he held that while procedures may be prioritised or accelerated, they must still:

  • respect all procedural guarantees; and
  • allow applicants sufficient time to assemble supporting material (para. 26).

Thus, “accelerated” means faster where possible, not at the expense of procedural fairness.

4.2.2 Prompt conduct by the solicitor and reasonableness of waiting

The court was careful to examine the chronology, because reasonableness is highly context-dependent:

  • The solicitor was only appointed on 26 March 2024 and could not commission experts without Legal Aid Board sanction (para. 28).
  • He secured an assessment for 17 April 2024—a relatively rapid appointment.
  • He wrote to the IPO on 8 April 2024, ten days beforehand, explicitly notifying them of the appointment and asking them to defer the decision until the report could be furnished (paras. 8–9, 29).
  • The report issued on 19 April (two days after the appointment) and was sent to the IPO on 23 April (para. 30).

There was no unreasonable delay by the applicant or her solicitor. The request was narrow and time‑bound, not open‑ended. Barr J stated:

“I am satisfied that the applicant's solicitor acted promptly in obtaining an early examination by a suitably qualified expert.” (para. 29)

And on the CIPO’s conduct:

“In the circumstances which transpired, the first respondent did not do that. He proceeded to issue his final report on 17 April 2024, being the day that the applicant was medically examined by the psychologist… I hold that in failing to await production of the medical report, the first respondent acted in breach of the terms of s.28 of the 2015 Act. He did not cooperate with the applicant in the presentation and consideration of her application…” (paras. 30–31)

4.2.3 Unreasonableness and breach of s.28

The judgment linked two concepts:

  • illegality, in the sense of breach of a statutory duty (here, s.28 duty to co‑operate); and
  • unreasonableness, as a public law standard (often associated with irrationality or unfairness in administrative law).

By refusing to defer the decision for a matter of days and by failing to co‑operate so that the full picture of the applicant’s medical and psychological condition could be examined, the IPO:

  • acted contrary to the statutory duty of co‑operation; and
  • acted unreasonably, especially given the centrality of credibility and trauma to the claim (para. 32–33).

4.3 The Role and Materiality of Psychiatric Evidence in Credibility Assessment

A key plank of the respondent’s defence was that, even if the report had been considered, it would not necessarily have changed the adverse credibility finding. It did not expressly link PTSD to the father’s abuse, and therefore, they argued, its absence could not justify quashing the decision (para. 34).

Barr J resolutely rejected this approach to materiality. He accepted the applicant’s formulation that:

“it is only necessary to establish that the evidence which was not considered might have led to a different credibility finding being made.” (para. 35, emphasis added)

This is a critical clarification: the threshold is not whether the evidence would or probably would have changed the outcome, but whether it might have done so. Once the court is satisfied that:

  • the evidence is capable of affecting the credibility assessment; and
  • the decision should not have been taken without it;

the failure to consider it is a material error warranting intervention.

Barr J then applied that test:

  • The report confirmed that the applicant was “significantly traumatised” and diagnosed with PTSD (para. 35).
  • Such a diagnosis can:
    • explain memory gaps, inconsistencies or emotional presentation at interview;
    • lend weight to the plausibility of having suffered serious harm; and
    • support the overall narrative of persecution and flight.

He concluded:

“I am satisfied that when one has regard to the content of the medical report, which confirmed that the applicant was a significantly traumatised person who had a diagnosis of PTSD, that represented significant evidence which supported the credibility of her narrative. I am satisfied that had that report been considered, it might have led to a different conclusion on the credibility issue. That is sufficient for the present purposes…” (para. 35)

This emphasises the importance of trauma‑informed assessment of credibility in asylum procedures and confirms the legal significance of psychiatric and psychological evidence where mental health is in issue.

4.4 Alternative Remedy and Judicial Review: When Is an Appeal Not Enough?

4.4.1 The starting point: primacy of statutory appeals

A well‑established principle of Irish administrative law is that where a statutory appeal exists, courts are slow to grant judicial review unless there are exceptional circumstances. This is grounded in:

  • State (Abenglen Properties) v Dublin Corporation [1984] IR 381;
  • EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v Data Protection Commissioner [2013] 2 IR 669;
  • BNN v Minister for Justice [2009] 1 IR 719;
  • Chubb European Group SE v HIA [2022] 2 IR 686;
  • and, specifically in the international protection context:
    • ESO v International Protection Office [2023] IEHC 197;
    • AE v Chief International Protection Officer [2023] IEHC 695;
    • MM v The International Protection Office [2025] IEHC 118.

These authorities underline:

  • judicial review is discretionary;
  • where the Oireachtas has provided a specialist appeals mechanism (like IPAT), it should normally be used; and
  • judicial review should not become a parallel or substitute appellate system.

4.4.2 The exception: fundamental unfairness and the integrity of the process

However, there is a countervailing line of authority recognising that an appeal does not always cure serious procedural defects at first instance. The leading case is Stefan v Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2001] 4 IR 203.

In Stefan:

  • an important part of the applicant’s questionnaire was omitted and never put before the first‑instance decision‑maker;
  • the Supreme Court held this constituted a breach of fair procedures at first instance;
  • and crucially, it stated that a fair appeal does not “cure” an unfair first‑instance hearing.

Phelan J in ESO and AE distilled this into a practical test. In AE, she stated (quoted by Barr J at para. 42):

“It seems that key to a court's decision as to which side of the dividing line between granting and refusing relief a case may fall where an appeal is available is whether the failure to consider a document gives rise to such a fundamental unfairness in the process as to undermine the integrity of the process or, put otherwise, whether the substance of the excluded evidence is such that its exclusion so prejudices the assessment of the claim as to render the process so unsatisfactory as to undermine its integrity… This is determined by an assessment on the facts of a given case of whether the process has broken down in a manner which draws into question the overall reliability or trustworthiness of a decision to be taken on the fundamentally important issue of an entitlement to international protection.”

Barr J, in his earlier judgment in MM v IPO, similarly stated that only in “rare and exceptional” cases—where the first‑instance hearing is so deficient that it cannot be said that there was any proper consideration of a material issue—will a judicial review of the first instance decision be allowed despite an appeal (paras. 43–44 of the present judgment).

4.4.3 Application in EL (Georgia)

In the present case, the court applied these principles as follows:

  • The psychiatric report was a “significant document” that:
    • confirmed psychiatric trauma and a PTSD diagnosis; and
    • could substantially support the applicant’s narrative and credibility (para. 46).
  • If judicial review were refused, the report would only be considered once—at the IPAT appeal (para. 47). The applicant would be deprived of the benefit of:
    • having the report evaluated by the specialist first‑instance authority (CIPO); and
    • being able to challenge that initial evaluation in a further appeal if necessary.
  • This was “similar to the omitted material in the Stefan case and to the omitted documentation… in the AE case” (para. 48).

Thus, the failure to await and consider the psychiatric report was not a minor procedural misstep but a defect that:

  • struck at the heart of the fairness of the process; and
  • undermined its integrity and reliability on the crucial issue of credibility.

Accordingly, this was one of the “rare and exceptional” cases where an appeal is not an adequate alternative remedy:

“Given that I am satisfied that this document provides significant support to the applicant's narrative and therefore could result in a different conclusion being rendered when her credibility is properly assessed, in these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to allow the applicant to seek certiorari of the first instance decision, rather than compel her to pursue a remedy by way of appeal to IPAT.” (para. 49)

4.5 Interplay with Emerging Supreme Court Guidance: AB v CIPO

The judgment notes that the Supreme Court has granted leave in AB v CIPO [2025] IESCDET 110 to consider a question of general public importance (para. 45):

“Where an applicant for international protection under the International Protection Act 2015 is dissatisfied with a decision made at first instance on their application, in what circumstances may such an applicant seek judicial review of that decision given the availability of an appeal from that decision to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal under Part 6 of the International Protection Act 2015.”

While the Supreme Court’s final ruling is not before us, Barr J’s approach in EL (Georgia) is likely to be part of the background against which the Supreme Court formulates its guidance. His judgment:

  • endorses and applies the analytical framework developed by Phelan J in ESO and AE and by the Supreme Court in Stefan;
  • stresses the high threshold (“rare and exceptional”); yet
  • confirms that where the first instance process is deprived of crucial evidence bearing on credibility, the appeal mechanism may not be an adequate remedy.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 HID, BA v Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors (C‑175/11)

This CJEU decision concerned a prioritised procedure for Nigerian asylum seekers. The Court held that:

  • prioritisation or acceleration must not deprive asylum seekers of the procedural guarantees in Article 23 of Directive 2005/85/EC; and
  • applicants must have sufficient time to gather and present evidence so that the examination is “fair and comprehensive” (para. 26 of EL (Georgia)).

Barr J used this authority to underpin the conclusion that accelerated “safe country” procedures cannot justify curtailing an applicant’s right to assemble key evidence—here, a psychiatric report. It anchored his interpretation of s.28 in EU law.

5.2 Stefan v Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2001] 4 IR 203

In Stefan, crucial questionnaire material was omitted from the first instance asylum decision. The Supreme Court held:

  • the omission amounted to a breach of fair procedures at first instance; and
  • a subsequent fair appeal does not cure an unfair first‑instance hearing.

Barr J relied on Stefan (via Phelan J’s discussion in ESO and AE) as direct support for the proposition that serious procedural unfairness at first instance—particularly, omission of significant evidence—can justify judicial review even where a statutory appeal exists (paras. 38–39, 48).

5.3 ESO v International Protection Office [2023] IEHC 197

In ESO, Phelan J reiterated that only in “clear and compelling” cases of injustice at first instance—incapable of being remedied on appeal—will judicial review be allowed despite an appeal (para. 40). She emphasised:

  • the centrality of the statutory appeal mechanism; and
  • the need to assess whether the identified defect could be cured by appeal without risk of injustice.

Barr J references this as part of the legal background (paras. 37–41), but distinguishes ESO on the basis that, unlike in that case, the omission here was of a fundamental piece of evidence directly bearing on credibility.

5.4 AE v Chief International Protection Officer [2023] IEHC 695

In AE, Phelan J had to decide whether failure to consider certain documentation justified judicial review despite the availability of an IPAT appeal. She articulated the “integrity of the process” test, quoted at length by Barr J (para. 42).

Barr J analogised the present case to AE (para. 48):

  • in both, crucial documents bearing on credibility and the substance of the claim were not considered at first instance; and
  • this undermined the integrity and reliability of the process.

5.5 MM v International Protection Office [2025] IEHC 118

In MM, Barr J himself considered the alternative remedy doctrine and emphasised that judicial review of a first instance asylum decision is permitted only where:

  • the hearing at first instance was so deficient or unfair that there was no proper consideration of a material issue; and
  • forcing the applicant to appeal would mean they effectively receive only one meaningful decision (the appeal decision) (paras. 43–44 of EL (Georgia)).

In EL (Georgia), he applies his own earlier framework and finds that this threshold is met because the omission of the psychiatric report removed a crucial element from the first instance credibility analysis.

5.6 Other Alternative Remedy Cases

Barr J also invokes:

  • State (Abenglen Properties) v Dublin Corporation [1984] IR 381;
  • EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v Data Protection Commissioner [2013] 2 IR 669;
  • BNN v Minister for Justice [2009] 1 IR 719;
  • Chubb European Group SE v HIA [2022] 2 IR 686.

These cases collectively reinforce the general reluctance of courts to entertain judicial review where a statutory appeal is available, except in unusual or exceptional circumstances. They provide the backdrop against which the “exceptionality” of EL (Georgia) is assessed.

6. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 International Protection, Asylum, Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection

“International protection” under the 2015 Act broadly covers:

  • Refugee status: for persons with a well‑founded fear of being persecuted for reasons such as race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group (e.g., LGBTQ+ persons).
  • Subsidiary protection: for persons facing a real risk of serious harm (e.g. death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or serious threat to life from indiscriminate violence in armed conflict) even if they do not meet the refugee definition.

6.2 “Safe Country of Origin” and Accelerated Procedures

A “safe country of origin” is one that the State has designated as generally respecting human rights and not typically producing refugees. Claims from such countries are:

  • processed under accelerated procedures; and
  • often presumed to be less likely to succeed, though the presumption is rebuttable.

However, as this judgment stresses, acceleration does not justify cutting procedural corners or denying applicants sufficient time to obtain and present crucial evidence.

6.3 Section 28 Duty to Co‑Operate and the Shared Burden of Proof

Under s.28 and Article 4 of the Qualification Directive:

  • the applicant must cooperate with the authorities and provide information and evidence about their claim; but
  • the authorities (IPO/CIPO) must also co‑operate, actively helping to assess all relevant elements and not simply sitting back as passive recipients.

This duty of co‑operation is especially important where applicants may be vulnerable, traumatised, or unfamiliar with legal systems.

6.4 Credibility in Asylum Law

“Credibility” refers to how believable an applicant’s account is. Decision‑makers assess:

  • consistency between statements and documents;
  • plausibility in light of country information; and
  • demeanour and explanations for any inconsistencies.

Trauma and mental health conditions like PTSD can affect memory, coherence and emotional presentation. This makes psychiatric or psychological evidence especially relevant to credibility assessments.

6.5 PTSD and Psychiatric Evidence

Post‑Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) can arise from exposure to severe trauma (violence, threats, persecution). In asylum cases, a PTSD diagnosis can:

  • support the applicant’s account of having experienced serious harm;
  • help explain inconsistent or fragmented recall;
  • show why an applicant may be avoidant or hesitant in recounting events.

Courts increasingly recognise that such evidence must be taken into account when judging credibility. In this case, the High Court treated the PTSD diagnosis as “significant” and potentially outcome‑altering evidence.

6.6 Judicial Review vs Statutory Appeal (IPAT)

Two distinct routes to challenge an asylum refusal are:

  • Statutory appeal (IPAT):
    • hears the case afresh (de novo);
    • can consider all evidence, including new evidence;
    • is the normal route to challenge the substance of a protection refusal.
  • Judicial review:
    • looks at the lawfulness of the decision‑making process (fairness, compliance with law), not the merits;
    • is discretionary and usually used only where serious procedural defects or legal errors occurred.

Where an appeal exists, courts usually insist that it be used, unless the first instance process is so flawed that an appeal cannot remedy the injustice.

6.7 “Certiorari” and “Remittal”

In this judgment:

  • Certiorari is the order quashing the s.39 report—legally cancelling it.
  • Remittal means sending the case back to the CIPO to be reconsidered from scratch (or from the relevant stage), this time taking proper account of the psychiatric report.

6.8 Alternative Remedy Doctrine and “Rare and Exceptional” Cases

This doctrine asks: should the court entertain judicial review, or should the applicant be required to use the appeal mechanism provided by statute?

  • General rule: use the appeal; judicial review is exceptional.
  • Exception: where the first instance hearing was so unfair that:
    • a key issue was not properly considered; and
    • an appeal would not cure the injustice (for example, because crucial evidence was never considered at all at first instance).

In such “rare and exceptional” cases, as in EL (Georgia), judicial review of the first instance decision may be allowed even though an appeal is available.

7. Impact and Future Significance

7.1 Implications for the International Protection Office / CIPO

This judgment sends several clear signals to the IPO and CIPO:

  • Accelerated procedures do not permit cutting corners: even for safe‑country applicants, the IPO must ensure that all reasonably obtainable, clearly identified and timely requested evidence—especially expert medical reports—is considered before a decision is made.
  • Active duty to co‑operate: when put on notice that a short‑term deferral is needed to obtain a core medical report, the IPO should:
    • assess the reasonableness of the request in light of its timing and necessity; and
    • ordinarily accommodate it where it will materially assist the examination.
  • Protocols for handling expert evidence:
    • internal guidance may need to emphasise that reports addressing trauma, mental health, or torture should rarely be ignored or sidelined;
    • timely notification by solicitors should normally trigger a short adjournment or holding of the file.

7.2 Guidance for Legal Practitioners

For practitioners representing protection applicants, the case highlights:

  • The importance of early, explicit communication:
    • notify IPO promptly of expert appointments and expected timelines;
    • make clear that the report is central to the international protection claim (not merely to ancillary matters like permission to remain).
  • Documenting the need for the report:
    • explain how the report relates to credibility, risk on return, or past persecution;
    • this can strengthen any future challenge if the IPO ignores the request.
  • Strategic use of judicial review:
    • challenges to first instance decisions should be reserved for cases where key evidence was unreasonably ignored or excluded;
    • routine errors or disagreements with reasoning remain matters for IPAT appeals.

7.3 Influence on IPAT Appeals and Jurisprudence

Although this case concerns the first instance decision rather than an appeal, it has indirect relevance for IPAT:

  • IPAT may need to scrutinise whether significant evidence was adequately considered at first instance, particularly where credibility is central.
  • The High Court’s acceptance of psychiatric evidence as “significant” support for credibility may influence how IPAT weighs such reports.

More broadly, this judgment contributes to a growing body of case law discussing:

  • what counts as a “fundamental unfairness” sufficient to permit judicial review despite an appeal; and
  • how mental health and trauma evidence should be integrated into credibility assessments.

7.4 Interaction with the Forthcoming Supreme Court Clarification in AB v CIPO

As the Supreme Court considers the general question of when judicial review is available in the presence of an IPAT appeal (AB v CIPO), judgments like EL (Georgia) will likely form part of the interpretive landscape.

If the Supreme Court endorses an approach similar to that of Stefan, AE, MM and EL, we can expect:

  • a continued high threshold for bypassing the appeal; but
  • clear acceptance that where key evidence (such as psychiatric reports) was unreasonably excluded at first instance, judicial review remains available as a safeguard.

7.5 Broader Human Rights and Policy Dimensions

This judgment also speaks to broader asylum and human rights concerns:

  • Protection of LGBTQ+ applicants:
    • the court accepts as uncontroversial that persecution of gay persons in Georgia may occur, both socially and within families;
    • the proper assessment of such claims often requires understanding of cultural stigma and trauma, for which expert evidence can be crucial.
  • Trauma‑informed procedures:
    • recognising PTSD and severe trauma as relevant to credibility aligns the Irish system with international best practice;
    • the decision encourages asylum authorities to adapt procedures in light of psychological vulnerabilities.

8. Conclusion

EL (Georgia) v Chief International Protection Officer [2025] IEHC 690 is a significant High Court judgment that refines and reinforces several important principles in Irish asylum law.

First, it affirms that the duty of co‑operation under s.28 of the 2015 Act requires the International Protection Office to await, within reason, crucial medical evidence where:

  • the applicant’s solicitor has acted promptly;
  • the appointment and report timeline are clearly indicated; and
  • the evidence is central to credibility and the substance of the claim.

This obligation persists even in accelerated “safe country of origin” procedures; speed cannot override the imperative of a fair and comprehensive examination.

Second, the judgment clarifies the materiality test for omitted evidence: the applicant need only show that the missing evidence might have led to a different finding—particularly on credibility—not that it would definitively have changed the outcome. Psychiatric and psychological evidence of trauma and PTSD can readily meet that threshold.

Third, it contributes to the developing jurisprudence on the alternative remedy doctrine in international protection cases. While reiterating that judicial review is normally precluded where an appeal to IPAT exists, the court holds that:

  • where the first instance process fails to consider a critical piece of evidence that could alter the assessment of the claim, and
  • forcing the applicant to rely solely on appeal would mean that this evidence is considered only once,

then the integrity of the process is undermined to such an extent that judicial review is justified as a “rare and exceptional” response.

Finally, the decision underscores a broader trajectory in Irish asylum law: towards procedures that are not only efficient but also trauma‑informed and respectful of the vulnerabilities of applicants, including LGBTQ+ persons and those with significant mental health issues. The IPO and practitioners alike must now calibrate their practices in light of this reinforced duty to co‑operate and to take seriously the role of timely medical and psychological evidence in international protection determinations.

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