Summary of Judgment — High Court (Judge Barr) [2025]

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment concerns an application for judicial review by the Applicant challenging a decision of the first Respondent (the Chief International Protection Officer) refusing a declaration of asylum or international protection. The Applicant arrived in the State on 17 February 2024 and attended a substantive interview on 4 March 2024. The Applicant's account was that she is a young woman from Georgia who is gay; she said she was dismissed from her hospital employment after her relationship became known, that her father assaulted and confined her because of her sexual orientation, and that she fled Georgia on 16 February 2024.

The Applicant obtained legal aid and her solicitor arranged an expedited psychological assessment with a Consultant Psychologist on 17 April 2024. By letter dated 8 April 2024 the solicitor asked the first Respondent to refrain from making a decision until that report was produced. The first Respondent issued a s.39 report on 17 April 2024 (the same day as the assessment) without the Consultant Psychologist's report; that report was completed on 19 April 2024 and furnished to the first Respondent on 23 April 2024.

The Applicant sought judicial review on the basis that the first Respondent decided her international protection application without considering the Consultant Psychologist's report. The first Respondent resisted, relying principally on (a) the general proposition that a decision cannot be struck down for material not before the decision-maker, (b) that accelerated procedures under the International Protection Act 2015 applied because Georgia was designated a safe country, and (c) that the Applicant had an adequate alternative remedy by way of appeal to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (the Appeals Tribunal).

Judge Barr delivered judgment electronically on 5 December 2025. The court proposed to grant certiorari quashing the s.39 report of 17 April 2024 and to remit the matter to the first Respondent for fresh consideration; further directions were made about submissions and a mention to make final orders.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Was the first Respondent wrong (unlawful or unreasonable) to proceed to make his s.39 report and decision in the absence of the Consultant Psychologist's report, where the Applicant's solicitor had requested that the first Respondent await its production?
2. If the first Respondent was wrong to proceed without the Consultant Psychologist's report, does the Applicant have an adequate and effective alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Appeals Tribunal such that judicial review relief should be refused?
3. Relatedly, did the accelerated procedures applicable because Georgia was a designated safe country permit the first Respondent to decide without awaiting the medical report, or did the Applicant retain the right to full consideration under s.28 of the 2015 Act and relevant EU law?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The first Respondent acted unlawfully and unreasonably in not awaiting the Consultant Psychologist's report after the solicitor had expressly requested deferral pending that report.
• The Consultant Psychologist's report was a crucial document supporting the Applicant's narrative and would materially assist the credibility assessment; omission of that report resulted in the Applicant's application not being properly considered at first instance.
• An appeal to the Appeals Tribunal would not cure the defect because the medical report would only be considered on appeal, depriving the Applicant of the benefit of first-instance consideration of that document in addition to any appellate review.

Respondent's Arguments

• A decision cannot be struck down on the basis of material that was not before the decision-maker when the decision was taken.
• Because Georgia was a designated safe country, the Applicant's international protection application was subject to the accelerated procedures under the 2015 Act; the first Respondent was therefore not obliged to await the Consultant Psychologist's report before issuing the s.39 report.
• Alternatively, the Consultant Psychologist's report would not have materially affected the credibility finding and therefore would not have led to a different outcome.
• In any event, the Applicant has an adequate and effective alternative remedy by way of a full de novo appeal to the Appeals Tribunal; judicial review of a first instance decision should only be permitted in rare and exceptional cases.
• In the respondents' pleaded position it was also asserted (para. 7 of the statement of opposition) that no reasonable explanation was given for the delay in submitting the psychologist's report and that no specific submission had been advanced about the report's importance to the international protection application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following steps of analysis, based strictly on the material in the judgment:

1. The court accepted the essential factual elements pleaded by the Applicant: she is a national of Georgia and is a gay woman (para. 17).
2. It was undisputed that Georgia was designated a safe country and that the Applicant's claim was therefore being processed under the accelerated procedures in the International Protection Act 2015 (para. 18).
3. The court examined the statutory duties in s.28 of the 2015 Act, which require an International Protection Officer to cooperate with an applicant in assessing the application and to consider the applicant's statements and all documents submitted (para. 22–24).
4. The court reviewed the chronology: the solicitor arranged an expedited psychologist appointment (17 April 2024) and, by letter of 8 April 2024, asked the Respondent to await the forthcoming report; the Respondent issued the s.39 report on 17 April 2024 and only received the psychologist's report on 23 April 2024 (para. 28–31).
5. The court found that the solicitor acted promptly and that the request to await the report was limited and reasonable (para. 28–30). Given that the consultant's report was produced very shortly after the examination and forwarded immediately, the failure to await it was not attributable to undue delay by the Applicant (para. 68–72).
6. Applying s.28, the court held that the first Respondent breached the duty to cooperate with the Applicant and acted unreasonably in issuing the s.39 report without awaiting the medical report (para. 31–33).
7. On the materiality question, the court rejected the Respondent's proposed test (that the omitted report had to establish the causal nexus for PTSD arising from the alleged maltreatment). Instead the court accepted the Applicant's position (advanced by Attorney Conlon) that it is sufficient to show that the omitted evidence might have led to a different credibility finding (para. 34–35).
8. The court examined the Consultant Psychologist's report, which diagnosed severe psychological trauma and PTSD, described significant symptoms (nightmares, flashbacks, hypervigilance, severe insomnia) and recommended psychiatric input (para. 32–36). The court held that this constituted significant evidence supporting the Applicant's narrative and that, had it been considered, it might have led to a different credibility assessment (para. 35).
9. On the alternative remedy issue, the court reviewed the authorities establishing the general rule that judicial review of a first instance decision will only be permitted in rare and exceptional cases where an appeal exists, but also the circumstances in which an exception is appropriate (para. 36–45). The court applied the tests described in Stefan and in subsequent High Court authorities (including Judge Phelan's decisions) focusing on whether the exclusion of the document gave rise to fundamental unfairness undermining the integrity of the process (para. 37–44).
10. The court concluded that the Consultant Psychologist's report was a significant document comparable to the omitted material in prior cases where certiorari was permitted; forcing the Applicant to proceed by appeal would mean the report would only be considered once (on appeal), depriving the Applicant of first-instance consideration and risking injustice (para. 46–49, 101–102).
11. Accordingly, the court determined that it was appropriate in this case to allow the Applicant to seek certiorari quashing the s.39 report of 17 April 2024 and to remit the matter back to the first Respondent for fresh consideration (para. 51–52).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the first Respondent acted unlawfully and unreasonably in issuing the s.39 report of 17 April 2024 without awaiting and considering the Consultant Psychologist's report and that the omission was sufficiently material to justify judicial review of the first instance decision. The court proposed to GRANT CERTIORARI quashing the s.39 report dated 17 April 2024 and to remit the matter to the first Respondent for fresh consideration (para. 51).

Implications:

• Direct effect: the first Respondent's s.39 report of 17 April 2024 is to be quashed and the Applicant's case remitted for fresh consideration by the first Respondent with the Consultant Psychologist's report available to be considered at first instance.
• Scope: the court emphasised that accelerated procedures do not eliminate the obligation to permit full consideration of relevant material; an applicant processed under an accelerated procedure retains entitlement to procedural guarantees and cooperation under s.28 and applicable EU law (paras. 22–27, 61–63).
• On alternative remedies: the decision confirms that where an omission at first instance gives rise to fundamental unfairness (i.e. where excluded evidence might have materially affected the outcome), judicial review may be permitted even if a statutory appeal exists. The court considered the omission in this case to be such an exception (paras. 36–49).
• Administrative steps: the court directed that parties may file brief written submissions on the form of final orders and costs within four weeks and listed the matter for mention to make final orders (para. 53–54). The court noted it would hear parties on the appropriate order concerning the decision of the second Respondent, which had considered the medical report (para. 52).
• Precedential impact: the judgment applies existing authority on the rare-exception doctrine for judicial review in the presence of statutory appeals and applies EU law principles that accelerated procedures must preserve procedural guarantees; the court did not purport to create a novel test beyond those authorities.

This summary is confined to the material contained in the provided judgment and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.