Sweeney v Friel [2025] IEHC 716: Aggravated and Exemplary Damages for Abuse of Process and Judicial Discretion Not to Apply Collins v Parm Reductions

1. Introduction

The High Court decision in Sweeney v Friel [2025] IEHC 716 (Reynolds J) is a significant judgment in Irish personal injuries and tort law. It arises out of a violent shooting incident between neighbouring farmers in County Donegal and deals with:

• assessment of general damages for serious physical and psychological injuries in a pre–Personal Injuries Guidelines case;
• the use of the Personal Injuries Guidelines as a framework for analysis, even where the Book of Quantum formally applies;
• the nature and justification of aggravated and exemplary (punitive) damages in civil assault cases;
• the impact of egregious litigation conduct on aggravated and exemplary damages; and
• the extent of judicial discretion not to apply the global reduction approach mandated by Collins v Parm [2024] IECA 150.

The case also illustrates the interface between criminal proceedings (including a suspended custodial sentence and a criminal compensation order) and subsequent civil proceedings, and it underlines the court’s strong disapproval of attempts to undermine the civil process through inconsistent defences and non-engagement.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The shooting incident

• In early 2015, the plaintiff, Gerard Sweeney, had recently purchased lands and an old dwellinghouse adjacent to the defendant’s, Mr Patrick J. Friel’s, farm.
• On 3 January 2015, the plaintiff drove his digger along a right-of-way leading to his lands. The defendant and his son blocked his passage.
• A serious confrontation ensued:
  • the plaintiff was threatened and verbally abused;
  • his digger was attacked with a steel nail bar; and
  • most gravely, the defendant produced a shotgun and fired multiple shots into the digger cab.
• Approximately fourteen shotgun pellets embedded in the plaintiff’s face and head. One pellet penetrated his eye.
• The defendant then turned the shotgun on a jeep driven by the plaintiff’s friend, Shaun Doherty, damaging that vehicle by further blasts.
• The Gardaí were called and the plaintiff was taken first to Letterkenny General Hospital and subsequently to Galway University Hospital for specialist treatment.

2.2 Criminal proceedings

The defendant was prosecuted and:

• pleaded guilty to:
  • assault causing harm (s.3 Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997); and
  • possession of a firearm without a certificate.
• Initially, the Circuit Court applied the Probation Act in respect of both counts (i.e. no formal conviction recorded).
• On appeal, the Court of Appeal quashed that outcome and imposed:
  • a three-year term of imprisonment, suspended for three years; and
  • a compensation order under s.6 Criminal Justice Act 1993 directing payment of €30,000 to the plaintiff within nine months; and
  • conditions relating to good behaviour and avoiding contact with the victim and his family.
• The defendant complied with the terms of the Court of Appeal’s order, including the payment of compensation.

2.3 Civil proceedings and litigation conduct

The plaintiff commenced High Court proceedings by plenary summons in November 2016. The procedural history was protracted and fraught with delay, largely attributable to the defendant:

• Service difficulties necessitated substituted service (March 2017).
• The defendant did not enter an appearance until August 2017 and did not deliver a defence until May 2018, following a motion for judgment in default of defence and a further indulgence of six weeks from the Court.
• Remarkably, despite his guilty plea in the criminal proceedings, the defence:
  • alleged criminal and unlawful conduct by the plaintiff;
  • pleaded self-defence; and
  • suggested an accidental discharge of the firearm.
• The defendant later changed solicitors; his second firm came off record in February 2022.
• He did not appear at the liability/quantum hearing or the subsequent costs hearing, despite evidence that he had been fully and properly notified.
• In January 2019 he swore an affidavit of verification asserting the truth of his defence, notwithstanding his earlier criminal plea and payment of criminal compensation.

By the time the judgment on liability and quantum issued (10 November 2025), nearly ten years had elapsed since the incident. The action had become, in the court’s words, an example of the defendant “embroiling” the plaintiff in “costly and lengthy” civil proceedings.

3. Issues Before the High Court

Because the proceedings were ultimately undefended at hearing and liability was incontrovertible (in light of the criminal plea and unchallenged evidence), the primary issues for determination were:

1. Quantum of general damages:
   • for physical injuries (shotgun wounds, eye perforation, retained pellets, surgery, and pain); and
   • for psychiatric/psychological injuries (post-traumatic stress reaction, anxiety, depression, and related sequelae).
2. Whether and to what extent aggravated damages should be awarded, having regard to the manner of the wrong and the defendant’s subsequent conduct, particularly in the civil proceedings.
3. Whether exemplary (punitive) damages should be awarded to mark the court’s disapproval of the defendant’s behaviour and to deter such conduct.
4. Assessment of special damages (out-of-pocket expenses, vehicle repair costs, PIAB fee, and medical/travel expenses).
5. Whether a “global” reduction in general damages was required under Collins v Parm, given the presence of multiple injuries of different types.

4. Summary of the Judgment

Reynolds J, sitting in the High Court, held as follows:

• Physical injuries: The plaintiff’s serious but well-healed eye and facial injuries justified €35,000 in general damages.
• Psychiatric injury: The psychological sequelae, characterised primarily as post-traumatic in nature with mixed anxiety and depression, and treated by counselling and intermittent medication, were the “dominant injury” and attracted €45,000 in general damages.
• No Collins v Parm reduction: Although Collins v Parm would ordinarily require the court to ensure that the total award (for multiple injuries) remains proportionate and may justify a downward adjustment, the judge declined to apply any reduction, citing:
  • the injustice that would be caused to the plaintiff, particularly given the age of the claim and the defendant’s role in delay; and
  • the risk of conferring an “advantage” on the defendant in light of his egregious behaviour.
• Aggravated and exemplary damages: Drawing on Conway v INTO and McIntyre v Lewis, the court held that:
  • all three limbs of the Conway test for aggravated damages were “conclusively” satisfied; and
  • the defendant’s conduct, including his abusive use of the civil process, justified an award of exemplary damages.
  A composite sum of €30,000 was awarded under the headings of aggravated and exemplary damages.
• Special damages: The plaintiff was awarded €18,005.80 in special damages, covering:
  • repairs to both damaged vehicles (owned by the plaintiff);
  • the PIAB solicitor’s fee; and
  • medical and travel expenses.
• Total award: The court awarded €128,005.80 in total, subject to final orders after giving the defendant a further opportunity to be heard.
• Costs: At a subsequent hearing (9 December 2025), with no appearance by the defendant and satisfactory proof of notice, the court awarded the plaintiff his costs (including reserved and discovery costs), to be adjudicated in default of agreement.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Treatment of General Damages: Physical and Psychological Injuries

5.1.1 Physical injuries

The plaintiff’s injuries were severe in the immediate aftermath:

• multiple shotgun pellet wounds to the face and head;
• a penetrating scleral (eye wall) injury to the left eye;
• eye surgery including removal of pellets, repair of scleral perforation, and intravitreal antibiotics;
• subsequent infection and ongoing pain for several months; and
• retained lead pellets in the head and peri-ocular region as a permanent reminder of the assault.

By the final ophthalmic review, the plaintiff had normal visual acuity in both eyes and “no evidence of any ocular abnormality,” with only a residual small risk of later cataract or retinal detachment. On that basis, the court characterised the physical injury as:

• serious and intensely painful in the short to medium term (approximately 12 months); but
• with a good functional recovery and modest ongoing risk, albeit with some permanent foreign bodies in situ.

Within this framework, €35,000 is a moderate-to-significant but not high-end figure for an eye injury with normal long-term vision, in a pre-Guidelines context. The court explicitly found that the Book of Quantum did not fully capture:

• the complexity of pellet injuries (rather than a single penetrating injury);
• the need for surgery and subsequent infection; and
• the ongoing presence of foreign bodies and associated psychological impact as a constant reminder.

5.1.2 Psychiatric injury as the “dominant” injury

Psychiatrically, the plaintiff experienced:

• post-traumatic phenomena (hyper‑arousal, hypervigilance, re-experiencing);
• insomnia, chest pains, anxiety, low mood, and social withdrawal;
• loss of interest in farming and social activities (including loss of participation in his shooting club);
• anxiety regarding his and his family’s safety; and
• a significant exacerbation of symptoms due to the drawn-out criminal process (concluding only in May 2018) and the defendant’s civil litigation conduct.

Key medical evidence:

• Consultant Psychiatrist (Dr C.J. Haley):
  • confirmed a post-traumatic reaction evolving into mixed anxiety and depression;
  • noted good response to counselling and a positive prognosis, with minimal risk of future mental illness;
  • emphasised that the plaintiff’s mental health consequences were “significant”.
• GP and counsellor reports corroborated distress, insomnia, stress-related symptoms, and functional impairment.

The court found that:

• psychological harm lasted for several years and was aggravated by the length and nature of the criminal and civil proceedings;
• the plaintiff’s functioning (work, family life, social engagement) was materially impacted, especially in the first 12–24 months; and
• the psychological injury was the “dominant” injury in the case, exceeding the physical injury in impact and duration.

Accordingly, €45,000 was awarded, with the court explicitly relying on the Personal Injuries Guidelines as to methodology (see below), despite this being a Book of Quantum case.

5.2 Use of the Personal Injuries Guidelines in a Book of Quantum Case

The accident occurred in 2015, long before the Personal Injuries Guidelines commenced. Therefore, as Reynolds J acknowledged, this is formally a Book of Quantum case. However:

• The Book of Quantum does not deal with psychiatric/psychological injuries.
• It provides only limited and mechanical ranges for physical injury, with no structured approach to assessing the impact of psychological sequelae.

To bridge this gap, the court turned to the Personal Injuries Guidelines, not for the monetary bands (which are not binding for pre-Guidelines accidents), but for the analytical factors that should guide assessment of psychological injury:

“the court has the benefit of the guidance set out in the Personal Injuries Guidelines as to how such injuries are to be approached and the considerations affecting the level of the award as follows:

(i) age.
(ii) interference with quality of life and education.
(iii) impact on work.
(iv) impact on interpersonal relationships.
(v) whether medical assistance has been sought.
(vi) nature, extent, and duration of treatment undertaken and/or medication prescribed.
(vii) success of treatment.
(viii) prognosis, to include any future vulnerability.
(ix) the extent and/or nature of any associated physical injuries.”

This is doctrinally important. It confirms and exemplifies that, even in pre-Guidelines cases:

• the Personal Injuries Guidelines can be used as a persuasive framework for reasoning;
• courts may deploy their criteria (if not necessarily their quantum ranges) when the Book of Quantum is silent or inadequate; and
• the Guidelines’ holistic, factor-based approach to psychological injury is seen as “best practice” in structuring judicial reasoning.

The judgment thus helps to smooth the transitional landscape between the Book of Quantum era and the post-Guidelines regime, particularly for psychiatric injuries that the Book never properly addressed.

5.3 Collins v Parm and Proportionality: Judicial Discretion to Decline a Reduction

Reynolds J refers to Collins v Parm [2024] IECA 150, a Court of Appeal authority which emphasises that in cases with multiple injuries:

• courts must consider the overall proportionality of the total award for pain and suffering; and
• they must avoid a purely “additive” approach whereby each injury is valued in isolation and then simply summed, which risks over-compensation.

Typically, Collins v Parm requires the trial judge, having assessed each injury individually, to step back and determine:

• whether the global figure is proportionate, just, and consistent with other awards; and
• whether a downward adjustment of the total is necessary to reflect the fact that injuries and suffering overlap in time and effect.

In Sweeney v Friel, Reynolds J expressly recognises this obligation:

“In the ordinary course and having regard to the jurisprudence in personal injury litigation, I am obliged to look at an appropriate reduction in the overall award in line with Collins v Parm…”

However, she then declines to apply any such reduction, giving two principal reasons:

1. Temporal and procedural fairness: The case “should have long since been finalised” but for the defendant’s conduct. Applying a novel reduction rule (from a 2024 decision) to a long-delayed 2015 incident would, in her view, “create an injustice to the plaintiff”.
2. Avoiding advantage to the wrongdoer: Any reduction “would be to the defendant’s advantage,” something the court “cannot countenance… considering his egregious behaviour.”

She further notes that:

• the physical and psychiatric injuries are “separate and distinct”, albeit with some temporal overlap; and
• each head of damages compensates for a different dimension of harm: physical suffering versus adverse mental health outcomes.

Doctrinally, this is a nuanced position:

• It acknowledges that Collins v Parm expresses a general principle of proportionality and holistic assessment, but
• It treats the requirement for a numerical reduction as not absolutely rigid where such a reduction would operate retrospectively and unfairly, or reward a defendant’s obstructive tactics.

In effect, the judgment clarifies that:

• Collins v Parm is not a mechanical rule requiring a mathematical discount in every multiple-injury case;
• trial judges retain discretion to conclude that the injuries are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate valuation without further global discount; and
• equitable considerations – such as extreme delay caused by the defendant and the timing of appellate guidance – can inform whether a further reduction would be just.

Practitioners can therefore cite Sweeney v Friel as authority that:

• the Collins v Parm step-back is about checking proportionality, not about automatically cutting the figure;
• a well-reasoned finding that physical and psychological injuries are fundamentally different types of harm, each deserving a full award, can justify no reduction; and
• a defendant should not benefit from his own egregious delay where that delay is the very reason why new jurisprudence would otherwise retrospectively reduce the plaintiff’s award.

5.4 Aggravated Damages: Application of Conway v INTO

The plaintiff sought aggravated damages on the basis that the defendant’s conduct aggravated his suffering. The leading authority is Conway v Irish National Teachers’ Organisation [1991] 2 IR 305, where Finlay CJ articulated the modern Irish test for aggravated damages:

“[A]ggravated damages… [are] compensatory damages increased by reason of:

a. the manner in which the wrong was committed, involving such elements as oppressiveness, arrogance or outrage, or
b. the conduct of the wrongdoer after the commission of the wrong, such as a refusal to apologise or to ameliorate the harm done or the making of threats to repeat the wrong, or
c. the conduct of the wrongdoer and/or his representatives in the defence of the claim of the wronged plaintiff, up to and including the trial of the action.”

Finlay CJ stressed that this list is non-exhaustive and that aggravated damages:

• recognise the added hurt or insult to the plaintiff; and
• also reflect the cavalier or outrageous conduct of the defendant.

Reynolds J found that all three limbs were satisfied “so conclusively as [in] the instant case”:

1. Manner of the wrong: The defendant’s conduct was “outrageous” – a deliberate, armed, close-range attack with a shotgun on a neighbour lawfully using a right-of-way, followed by further shots at a companion’s vehicle.
2. Post-wrong conduct (before civil proceedings): While the defendant did plead guilty and pay criminal compensation, he did not apologise in the civil context and instead pivoted to a contradictory defence alleging wrongdoing by the plaintiff.
3. Conduct in defending the civil claim:
   • He filed a defence entirely inconsistent with his guilty plea, alleging self-defence and accidental discharge.
   • He swore an affidavit of verification in 2019 vouching the truth of that defence.
   • He delayed the proceedings at every turn, changed solicitors, failed to engage meaningfully, and ultimately did not appear at the hearing.

The court stressed:

• the “reprehensible” nature of the defendant’s approach;
• the added distress caused by “costly and lengthy” litigation; and
• the denial to the plaintiff of the opportunity to move on from the trauma.

In doctrinal terms:

• Sweeney v Friel confirms that serious intentional torts (such as violent assaults) are paradigmatic cases for aggravated damages.
• It illustrates how litigation conduct – including inconsistent pleadings in the face of a criminal plea – can substantially enhance the award.
• It underscores that aggravated damages are still fundamentally compensatory: they are awarded because such conduct deepens the plaintiff’s suffering and sense of injustice.

5.5 Exemplary (Punitive) Damages: Deterrence and Abuse of the Civil Process

The plaintiff also sought exemplary damages. In Conway v INTO, the Supreme Court recognised that exemplary and punitive damages are essentially the same concept and are awarded:

“…to make an example of the wrongdoer so as to show others that such wrongdoing will not be tolerated and, more to the point, will not be relieved on payment of merely compensatory damages.”

In McIntyre v Lewis & Donal [1991] SC ITLR (22 April), the Supreme Court stated, in the context of exemplary damages:

“Everything which aggravates or mitigates the defendant’s conduct is relevant.”

Reynolds J applied these authorities by:

• recognising that aggravated damages compensate for the added hurt to the plaintiff, while exemplary damages serve to punish and deter particularly egregious conduct;
• emphasising that the defendant’s conduct amounted to an “insult… to the court process” as well as to the plaintiff; and
• highlighting:
  • the inconsistency between the criminal plea and the civil defence;
  • the swearing of an affidavit of verification in support of a defence that contradicted the admitted criminal conduct; and
  • the broader pattern of obstruction and non-engagement.

The court described the defendant’s conduct as “tantamount to a flagrant abuse of the court process” and concluded that:

• the defendant’s actions had exacerbated and prolonged the plaintiff’s suffering; and
• it was “incumbent on the court… to mark its disapproval at his deplorable behaviour by making an award of exemplary damages.”

A single composite figure of €30,000 was awarded under the headings of aggravated and exemplary damages. Although the judgment does not break this down as two separate sums, that approach is consistent with Irish practice, where:

• the court identifies distinct rationales (compensatory and punitive); but
• arrives at one overall “uplift” intended both to recognise intensified suffering and to deter similar misconduct.

The key doctrinal points are:

• Abuse of the civil process can, in itself, justify exemplary damages, particularly where defences are blatantly inconsistent with a criminal conviction or guilty plea.
• Courts will use exemplary damages to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings and to signal that litigants cannot safely manipulate or disrespect the process.
• The same conduct can be relevant both to aggravated and exemplary damages, but their conceptual functions remain distinct:
  • aggravated damages – to recognise additional hurt to the plaintiff;
  • exemplary damages – to make an example of the defendant and deter others.

5.6 Special Damages and the Criminal Compensation Order

The court awarded special damages of €18,005.80, which included:

• cost of repairs to the two damaged vehicles (both owned by the plaintiff);
• the solicitors’ fee for the PIAB application; and
• medical and travel expenses.

The judgment does not analyse in detail the interaction between this civil award and the earlier criminal compensation order of €30,000. However, in Irish law:

• compensation paid under s.6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 is typically treated as part payment of the victim’s civil claim, not as a bar to further proceedings;
• to avoid double recovery, such compensation is usually taken into account, either:
  • by express set-off in the civil decree; or
  • by being addressed in separate enforcement/accounting arrangements.

Although the judgment does not expressly specify how the €30,000 criminal compensation interacts with the €128,005.80 civil award, practitioners should be alert to the general rule against double recovery and address it in final orders or subsequent enforcement stages.

6. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 Book of Quantum vs Personal Injuries Guidelines

• Book of Quantum: The pre-2021 reference document providing indicative ranges of damages for physical injuries. It was guidance, not binding law, and did not adequately deal with psychological injuries.
• Personal Injuries Guidelines: Adopted by the Judicial Council, they:
  • apply to accidents occurring after their commencement;
  • set out structured bands of damages for both physical and psychiatric injuries; and
  • emphasise factors such as age, impact on life, work, relationships, and prognosis.

Sweeney v Friel shows that, even in a Book of Quantum case, courts may legitimately use the Guidelines’ criteria as an aid to rational, transparent reasoning, particularly where the Book is silent (e.g., psychological injury).

6.2 Psychiatric Injury and PTSD-like Reactions

• Post-traumatic stress reaction: A psychological response to a traumatic event, including:
  • re-experiencing (flashbacks, intrusive memories);
  • hyper-arousal (exaggerated startle response, anxiety, insomnia); and
  • avoidance (social withdrawal, avoidance of reminders of the event).
• Mixed anxiety and depression: A more chronic pattern of low mood and heightened anxiety that can follow or overlap with acute PTSD symptoms.

The judgment demonstrates that:

• psychiatric injuries are stand-alone heads of loss, capable of exceeding physical injuries in seriousness;
• courts place weight on:
  • duration and intensity of symptoms;
  • extent of functional impairment;
  • treatment undergone and response; and
  • prognosis and residual vulnerability.

6.3 Aggravated vs Exemplary (Punitive) Damages

• Aggravated damages:
  • are compensatory in nature;
  • increase the award because of:
    • the offensive or outrageous way the wrong was done;
    • hurtful post-incident conduct; or
    • abusive conduct in defending the claim;
  • aim to recognise additional hurt, humiliation, or insult suffered by the plaintiff.
• Exemplary (punitive) damages:
  • are exceptional and non-compensatory in function;
  • aim to punish and deter particularly egregious wrongdoing;
  • are often awarded where:
    • the wrong is deliberate, wanton, or oppressive (e.g. violent assaults, malicious prosecutions, abuse of power); or
    • the defendant’s conduct shows contempt for the victim or the court process.

Sweeney v Friel is a textbook illustration of:

• both heads being available in a serious intentional tort; and
• the same factual matrix (violent attack plus abusive civil conduct) supporting both:
  • an aggravated uplift (extra hurt to the plaintiff); and
  • an exemplary element (deterrent message to the defendant and others).

6.4 Section 6 Criminal Justice Act 1993 Compensation Orders

• This provision allows a criminal court, on conviction, to order the offender to pay compensation to the victim for injury or loss.
• Such compensation:
  • does not bar a civil action; and
  • is generally treated as partial satisfaction of the civil claim to prevent double recovery.

The existence of a criminal compensation order in Sweeney v Friel underscores that:

• victims of crime can and do pursue separate civil claims, especially where criminal compensation is limited relative to full civil damages; and
• civil proceedings serve broader purposes, including recognition of psychiatric injury and the opportunity to seek aggravated and exemplary damages.

7. Likely Impact and Future Significance

7.1 Recognition of Psychological Injury as a Dominant Head of Loss

The judgment reinforces the growing trend in Irish personal injuries law to:

• treat psychological injury as capable of being the primary or “dominant” injury; and
• award substantial sums where mental health sequelae overshadow physical harm.

In cases involving violent or terrifying incidents, especially intentional torts, practitioners can rely on Sweeney v Friel to argue that:

• mental anguish, PTSD-type symptoms, and social/occupational disruption justify strong awards; and
• the absence of long-term physical disability does not preclude a significant quantum for psychiatric harm.

7.2 Use of the Personal Injuries Guidelines as Analytic Tools in Pre-Guidelines Cases

The judgment is an instructive example of how the Personal Injuries Guidelines can be used:

• as a structured checklist of relevant factors in pre-Guidelines cases; and
• to enhance consistency and transparency in assessing psychological injuries.

This will be particularly influential in:

• legacy cases where the accident predates the Guidelines but is still being litigated; and
• areas (like psychiatric harm) where the Book of Quantum provides no meaningful guidance.

7.3 Clarifying the Flexibility of Collins v Parm

By declining to apply a Collins v Parm reduction in the particular circumstances, Reynolds J confirms that:

• the core duty is to ensure proportionality, not to perform an arithmetical discount in every multiple-injury case;
• trial judges may conclude that separate awards for distinct physical and psychological harms are justified without a further global reduction, especially where:
  • the injuries are of different kinds; and
  • there is no real risk of overlap or double-counting.
• fairness and the avoidance of injustice, including the risk of rewarding obstructive defendants, are legitimate considerations in deciding whether a reduction is necessary.

Future litigants may invoke Sweeney v Friel in resisting mechanistic application of Collins v Parm, particularly in:

• intentional tort cases; and
• long-running litigation where new appellate guidance emerges after most of the relevant events have occurred.

7.4 Strengthening the Jurisprudence on Aggravated and Exemplary Damages

The case will likely be cited for:

• the application of Conway v INTO and McIntyre v Lewis in modern intentional tort contexts;
• the proposition that all three limbs of the Conway aggravated damages test can be engaged simultaneously in egregious cases;
• the proposition that egregious litigation conduct, including a defence flatly contradicting a criminal plea and verified on affidavit, can justify both aggravated and exemplary awards; and
• the idea that exemplary damages may be used not only to punish the underlying wrong but also to denounce abuse of the court process.

It sends a clear signal that:

• civil defendants cannot safely plead wholly inconsistent versions of events to a civil court after admitting guilt in criminal proceedings; and
• non-engagement and obstructive tactics may significantly increase the ultimate cost of litigation for wrongdoers.

8. Conclusion

Sweeney v Friel is an important High Court decision with ramifications across several dimensions of Irish tort law.

• It underscores the seriousness with which the courts treat violent, intentional assaults, awarding substantial general, aggravated, and exemplary damages.
• It affirms the growing judicial recognition of psychiatric injury as a potentially dominant head of loss and uses the Personal Injuries Guidelines as a modern analytic framework even in pre-Guidelines cases.
• It clarifies that the Collins v Parm proportionality approach does not mandate a mechanical discount where this would be unjust or confer an unwarranted benefit on an egregious wrongdoer.
• It strengthens and modernises the application of Conway v INTO and McIntyre v Lewis in the context of aggravated and exemplary damages, particularly in relation to abusive litigation conduct and disrespect for the court process.

For practitioners, the case is a valuable authority on:

• framing and evidencing psychiatric injury claims;
• arguing for aggravated and exemplary damages in intentional torts with objectionable litigation conduct; and
• resisting simplistic applications of Collins v Parm where injuries are distinct and fairness calls for full compensation.

More broadly, Sweeney v Friel reflects the High Court’s willingness to use the tools of aggravated and exemplary damages, alongside careful quantum analysis, to vindicate victims of deliberate violence and to protect the integrity of the civil justice system.