Substitution, Redacted Assignment Deeds, and Leave to Execute After Six Years
A Commentary on Everyday Finance DAC v Brennan [2025] IEHC 678

High Court (Ireland), Jackson J, 19 November 2025

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1. Introduction

Everyday Finance Designated Activity Company v Brennan concerns a familiar but increasingly complex scenario in Irish mortgage litigation: a residential mortgage originated by a mainstream bank, later securitised and sold through several assignments, with enforcement pursued by a non-bank purchaser years after the original possession order was made.

The case arises as an appeal from a Circuit Court order which:

• Affirmed an earlier order substituting Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC as plaintiff;
• Substituted Everyday Finance DAC (“Everyday”) as plaintiff in Pepper’s place, under Order 22 rule 4 of the Circuit Court Rules;
• Granted Everyday liberty to issue execution on foot of a 2016 Circuit Court order for possession; and
• Granted a six‑month stay on execution to allow the defendant to engage with a personal insolvency practitioner.

The High Court (Jackson J) had to decide whether Everyday had:

1. Proved a valid chain of title from the original lender, through Pepper, to itself, sufficient to justify substitution as plaintiff post‑judgment; and
2. Met the legal thresholds for liberty to execute on a possession order where more than six years had arguably elapsed since the original decree.

In doing so, the judgment consolidates and applies recent Court of Appeal authority on:

• Substitution after assignment of mortgage loans, including post‑judgment (Pepper Finance v O’Reilly [2025] IECA 140);
• The conclusiveness of the Land Registry folio in possession and execution applications (Tanager DAC v Kane [2018] IECA 352; Pepper Finance v Moloney [2023] IECA 161);
• The standard of proof and treatment of redacted global transfer deeds (Pepper Finance v Moynihan [2024] IEHC 625; Start Mortgages DAC v Ramseyer [2024] IEHC 329); and
• The discretion to grant leave to issue execution out of time (Smyth v Tunney [2004] IESC 24).

The decision is important for its clear guidance on:

• What an assignee must show to be substituted as plaintiff and to execute a possession order;
• How far redactions in assignment documentation will be tolerated; and
• How the six‑year limitation on execution is to be approached in mortgage possession appeals from the Circuit Court to the High Court.

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2. Summary of the Judgment

Jackson J dismissed the defendant’s appeal and affirmed the Circuit Court orders. In essence, she held:

1. Proper chain of title and substitution Everyday proved, on the balance of probabilities, that:
   • The original loan and mortgage were validly assigned first to Pepper and then by Pepper to Everyday;
   • The charge was duly transferred and registered via Form 56, and Everyday was now the registered owner of the charge on the folio; and
   • This justified substitution of Everyday as plaintiff post‑judgment under Order 22 rule 4 of the Circuit Court Rules, applying the principles in Pepper Finance v O’Reilly and Dellway v NAMA.
2. Redacted Global Deed of Transfer The Global Deed of Transfer (Pepper → Everyday), though partially redacted, was sufficiently unredacted in its operative parts to allow the court to understand its legal effect. The redactions were limited, justified (privacy of third‑party borrowers and commercial sensitivity) and did not prevent the court from determining that Everyday was the assignee. This was distinguished from the “heavily redacted” deeds in Pepper v Moynihan and Start v Ramseyer, where substitution failed.
3. Folio is conclusive; beneficial vs legal ownership Relying on Tanager DAC v Kane and Pepper v Moloney, the court reaffirmed that:
   • The folio is statutorily conclusive as to ownership of a registered charge; and
   • A borrower cannot defeat enforcement by arguing that a different entity (e.g. a securitisation vehicle such as Braunton Property Finance DAC) is the “beneficial” owner: the legal owner of the charge may enforce it for the benefit of the beneficial owner.
4. Timing of substitution and execution after six years Everyday still had to satisfy the court that it was entitled to execute and, if necessary, justify leave to execute after six years. Applying Pepper v Moloney and Smyth v Tunney:
   • An assignee must first prove that it is the party entitled to execute (chain of title, registration);
   • If more than six years have elapsed, the court has a discretion but only requires an explanation for delay, not exceptional reasons;
   • Here, any delay was largely explained by the defendant’s own appeals and subsequent assignments; and
   • On one view, the six‑year period runs from the High Court’s de novo order of 10 March 2020 (not from the 2016 Circuit Court decree), so execution may be in time in any event.
5. Defendant’s objections rejected The court rejected each of the defendant’s arguments: about redactions, headings such as “(EXCLUDING PROPERTY)”, alleged “splitting” of loan and mortgage, absence of a seal, and supposed non‑conclusiveness of the folio.

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3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The loan and security

• In 2008, IIB Homeloans Limited (later KBC Bank Ireland plc) advanced a loan to Mr Brennan, secured by a mortgage over registered property.
• The mortgage documentation (including the deed of mortgage and general loan conditions) expressly allowed the lender to transfer the mortgage and related security (clause 11(iii) was specifically relied on by Everyday).

3.2 Proceedings and possession order

• Possession proceedings commenced in July 2014.
• On 3 May 2016, the County Registrar (Louth) granted an order for possession.
• The defendant appealed to the Circuit Court, which on 24 July 2016 made a further order for possession, with a six‑month stay.
• The defendant appealed unsuccessfully to the High Court. On 10 March 2020, MacGrath J dismissed the appeal and granted a further six‑month stay.
• The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal on 10 May 2021.

Thus, by mid‑2021 the possession order was final in the sense that the appellate journey on the merits of possession had been exhausted.

3.3 Assignments and substitutions

The loan and security were assigned multiple times:

1. Original lender → Pepper
   • The first assignment was to Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC.
   • Pepper obtained an ex parte order on 7 November 2022 from the County Registrar substituting it as plaintiff (under Order 22 rule 4 CCR).
   • The defendant brought a motion dated 22 February 2024 to set aside that substitution, which remained extant at the time of Everyday’s substitution application.
2. Pepper → Everyday
   • A Global Deed of Transfer dated 30 May 2024 transferred to Everyday “all [Pepper’s] legal rights, title, interest, estate and entitlement (past and present) in and under the Facility, the Mortgaged Assets and each Finance Agreement”, with a schedule identifying the defendant’s loan (linked to “Braunton Property Finance DAC”).
   • A Form 56 was executed and lodged with Tailte Éireann, and the folio was updated so that Everyday was shown as the owner of the relevant burden (charge).
   • “Goodbye” letters from Pepper and corresponding “Hello” letters from Everyday, together with folio entries, supported the chain of title.

3.4 The Circuit Court orders under appeal

On 12 March 2025, the Circuit Court:

• Affirmed the County Registrar’s order substituting Pepper as plaintiff (7 November 2022);
• Substituted Everyday as plaintiff (motion of 7 February 2025);
• Granted liberty to execute the possession order under Order 36 CCR; and
• Granted a further six‑month stay for engagement with a personal insolvency practitioner.

The defendant appealed the entirety of that order to the High Court under s. 37 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936. Such appeals are heard de novo on the same evidence as in the Circuit Court unless the High Court grants leave to adduce further evidence. No such leave was sought.

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4. Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1 Tanager DAC v Kane [2018] IECA 352; [2019] 1 IR 385

Tanager v Kane is a central authority on possession of registered land. Baker J held that:

• A plaintiff seeking possession must prove, inter alia, that it is the registered owner of the charge;
• It is the registration that “triggers the entitlement” to seek possession; and
• Because of the statutory conclusiveness of the register (then s.31 Registration of Title Act 1964), a possession court “may not be asked to go behind the Register and consider whether the registration is, in some manner, defective” (para 67).

Jackson J relied heavily on this principle when rejecting Mr Brennan’s attempts to impeach the folio or to rely on alleged beneficial ownership by others.

4.2 Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v Moloney [2023] IECA 161

Moloney dealt with leave to issue execution on foot of an order for possession more than six years old. Allen J held that:

• To obtain leave to execute under Order 42 rule 24 RSC (the Superior Courts analogue of Order 36 CCR), a plaintiff who seeks to execute after six years must:
  1. First satisfy the court that it is the party entitled to execute the order for possession; and
  2. Then persuade the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to grant leave.
• The principle that a court cannot “go behind the folio” in possession applications (per Tanager) also applies in execution applications: the folio is conclusive as to the identity of the legal owner of the charge.
• A securitisation or separation of beneficial and legal interests does not invalidate the entitlement of the legal owner of the security to enforce it.

Jackson J applied these principles directly in determining:

• That Everyday had proved it was the party entitled to execute; and
• That the court could not entertain a challenge to the accuracy of the register, only to the chain of assignments leading to registration.

4.3 Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v O’Reilly [2025] IECA 140

O’Reilly is a recent and important Court of Appeal decision on substitution after assignment. Costello P:

• Restated the classic principle, drawn from Dellway v NAMA [2011] IESC 14, that an assignee of a mortgage “steps into the shoes” of the assignor. There is a “complete identity of interests” and the assignee becomes entitled to the benefit of any judgment obtained on the secured loan (para 30).
• Held that Order 17 rules 3 and 4 RSC (the Superior Courts equivalent of Order 22 CCR) apply equally to assignments and to transmission on death.
• Explained that substitution can appropriately occur post‑judgment, including pending appeal or execution, because the assignee merely replaces the assignor; the substantive interest remains unchanged (paras 31–32, 36).
• Noted that under Order 42 rule 24 RSC an assignee who seeks to execute a judgment must apply for leave, and at that stage the defendant can contest the validity of the assignment (para 38).

Jackson J imported this reasoning into the Circuit Court / High Court context:

• Confirming the permissibility of substitution post‑judgment and pre‑execution; and
• Emphasising that the execution stage is the defendant’s “final opportunity” to challenge the validity of the assignments.

4.4 Promontoria (Oyster) DAC v McCool [2025] IEHC 9

In McCool, Simons J, drawing on IBRC v Comer [2014] IEHC 671, reconfirmed the test for pre‑judgment substitution under Order 17 rule 4 RSC:

• At an interlocutory stage prior to trial, an applicant for substitution need only show prima facie evidence that:
  1. There has been a valid sale of the underlying assets;
  2. There has been a valid assignment of the chose in action; and
  3. Valid notice of assignment has been given.
• The court does not determine definitively the validity or efficacy of the assignment at that point; those matters are for trial.

Jackson J contrasted that pre‑trial, prima facie test with the post‑judgment situation in Brennan, where the court is effectively at the execution stage and must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the assignee is entitled to enforce.

4.5 Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v Moynihan [2024] IEHC 625 and Start Mortgages DAC v Ramseyer [2024] IEHC 329

Both cases (Simons J) dealt with heavily redacted assignment deeds and the evidential problems they caused:

• In Moynihan, about 18 of 26 pages of a “mortgage sale deed” were redacted, including most operative clauses. The court found it simply impossible to interpret the deed or its legal effect. Substitution failed.
• In Ramseyer, again, “whole swathes” of operative parts were obliterated, with no meaningful explanation. The court held that the limited material did not establish, even prima facie, that the debt had been transferred to the proposed plaintiff.

Simons J distinguished between:

• Minor and justified redactions to protect third‑party privacy or genuine commercial sensitivity; and
• Excessive redactions that prevent the court from understanding the legal effect of the deed at all.

Jackson J placed Everyday’s Global Deed of Transfer firmly in the former category: the operative parts were visible; the reasons for redaction were clearly explained on affidavit; and the material sufficed to prove the transfer.

4.6 Smyth v Tunney [2004] IESC 24

Smyth v Tunney is the leading Supreme Court authority on leave to issue execution out of time. Geoghegan J held that:

• It is not necessary to show “unusual, exceptional or very special reasons” for obtaining permission to execute after six years; and
• It is sufficient that there is “some explanation at least for the lapse of time”.

Jackson J applied this relatively low threshold, holding that the explanation for delay in Brennan—multiple appeals by the defendant and subsequent substitution processes after assignments—easily met the test.

4.7 Other cited authorities

• Dellway Investment Ltd v NAMA [2011] IESC 14: Finnegan J’s classic articulation of assignment law: the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor and is bound by the same equities.
• Farrell v Everyday Finance DAC [2024] IECA 16: cited indirectly in Ramseyer as an example where redactions may be legitimate to protect commercial sensitivity, supporting Jackson J’s approach to limited redactions.
• Pepper Finance v Hanlon (High Court, Ní Raifeartaigh J, 11 January 2018): relied on in Moloney for the proposition that a securitisation or separation of beneficial and legal interests does not affect the right of the legal holder of the security to enforce it.

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5. Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1 Substitution: proving the chain of title

The first major issue was substitution of Everyday as plaintiff after judgment. Jackson J approached this in two stages:

1. Was Pepper validly substituted as plaintiff? The Circuit Court had already affirmed the County Registrar’s order substituting Pepper. Jackson J reviewed the evidence and found that the first assignment (original lender → Pepper) was properly proved (including “Goodbye” and “Hello” letters and folio entries) and that the appeal against Pepper’s substitution should be dismissed.
2. Was Everyday validly assigned the loan and mortgage from Pepper? Everyday relied on:
   • The Global Deed of Transfer (30 May 2024), transferring “Facilities” and “Mortgage Assets” (including the security and mortgages) to Everyday;
   • A Form 56 lodged with Tailte Éireann and the updated folio, showing Everyday as owner of the charge; and
   • “Goodbye” and “Hello” letters, which expressly referenced the transfer of “the legal ownership of your Loan(s) and any related facility letter(s), mortgages, guarantee(s), security documents and rights relating to your Loan(s)”—not just the bare loan.
   The affidavit of Andrew McCudden, Everyday’s legal manager, was detailed and uncontested: the defendant had filed no replying affidavit to the substitution motion of 7 February 2025.

Applying O’Reilly and Dellway, Jackson J accepted that an assignee of a mortgage steps into the shoes of the assignor, including as regards any existing judgment, and that substitution post‑judgment is appropriate and necessary where the original plaintiff has divested its interest.

5.2 Treatment of redacted deeds

A core defence argument was that the Global Deed of Transfer was too heavily redacted to prove that the mortgage (as distinct from the loan) had been transferred. The defendant highlighted:

• The notation “(EXCLUDING PROPERTY)” on the title page; and
• The label “Loans” on the title page to Schedule 1.

Jackson J rejected this argument for several reasons:

• The operative clause (clause 2) was entirely unredacted and clearly provided for the transfer of:
  • “Facilities” (the loans); and
  • “Mortgage Assets”, expressly defined to include the “Security” and “Mortgages”.
• The schedule was redacted only insofar as necessary to protect other borrowers’ data. The defendant’s own loan details were unredacted, tying him to the specific facility and security listed.
• McCudden’s affidavit explained precisely why and to what extent redaction had been applied. This was the “very very unredacted” kind of deed that Simons J contemplated would be acceptable in Ramseyer, not the “three‑quarters obliterated” document in Moynihan.
• The “Goodbye” letter from Pepper expressly confirmed that mortgages and related security documents had been transferred, contradicting the defendant’s contention that only the loan had moved.

Crucially, Jackson J aligned herself with the approach in Moynihan and Ramseyer: redactions are permissible where limited and justified; they become fatal only where they prevent the court from understanding the legal transaction. In Brennan, the operative clauses were intact and interpretable; no such difficulty arose.

5.3 Legal vs beneficial ownership and securitisation

The defendant argued that:

• Braunton Property Finance DAC owned the loan;
• Pepper was merely a “servicer”; and
• The loan and mortgage had been “split”, such that Everyday was not the “beneficial owner” and therefore lacked standing to enforce.

Jackson J’s response mirrored the reasoning in Moloney and Hanlon:

• The court is concerned with the legal owner of the charge as recorded on the register, not the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner in a securitisation structure.
• As Allen J summarised in Moloney, securitisation does not affect “the entitlement of the holder of a legal interest in the security to enforce that security for the benefit of the beneficial owner”.
• Even if a special purpose vehicle (such as Braunton) is the beneficial owner, that does not undermine the legal rights of the registered owner (Pepper, now Everyday) to pursue possession.

This reflects a consistent judicial approach: Irish courts will not allow borrowers to treat complex securitisation arrangements as a defence to enforcement where the legal title and registration clearly vest enforcement rights in the plaintiff.

5.4 The conclusiveness of the folio and the limits of challenge

Relying on Tanager and Moloney, Jackson J reaffirmed that:

• The folio is conclusive as to the identity of the owner of a charge;
• In possession proceedings, and equally in applications for liberty to execute, the court cannot entertain arguments that the folio is incorrect or should be rectified;
• Challenges to the validity or rectification of registration must be pursued, if at all, via the statutory mechanisms under the registration of title regime, not as a collateral attack in possession or execution applications.

The defendant’s argument that the folio was not conclusive, or that the “real” beneficial owner was another entity, was directly at odds with this doctrine. Jackson J rejected it, emphasising that:

• The folio clearly recorded the original charge in KBC’s favour;
• It then recorded transfers of ownership of this charge, first to Pepper (now struck out) and then to Everyday; and
• The fact that the original charge remains recorded, with successive transfers of ownership, is ‘entirely appropriate’ and typical of Land Registry practice.

5.5 Leave to issue execution and the six‑year rule

The possession order dated back to 2016; more than six years had arguably elapsed. Order 36 rule 9 CCR provides:

• An execution order may be issued within six years from the date of the decree or judgment as of right;
• After six years, leave of the court is required, on motion with notice.

Order 36 rule 10 CCR addresses situations where there has been a change in the party entitled to execute (e.g. by assignment), requiring the party claiming entitlement to apply for leave to issue execution.

Jackson J approached the issue in two stages:

1. When does the six-year period run from? Everyday argued that the relevant date was not the 2016 County Registrar’s order but the High Court’s dismissal of the Circuit Court appeal on 10 March 2020, which, under the de novo appeal regime, amounted to a new possession order. Jackson J considered this “most likely correct”, in light of Costello P’s explanation in O’Reilly that:
   • In Circuit → High Court appeals, the High Court hears the appeal de novo and must be satisfied anew that the plaintiff is entitled to an order for possession; and
   • If it grants possession, it makes its own order, which is the one to be enforced.
   If this view is right, the six‑year clock for execution in this case began in March 2020, and the application for execution in 2025 was within six years.
2. If time did run from 2016, is leave out of time justified? Jackson J considered the alternative analysis in any event. Applying Smyth v Tunney, she held that:
   • The court requires an explanation for delay, not exceptional or extraordinary reasons;
   • The delay here was extensively explained:
     • Appeals from County Registrar to Circuit Court, and from Circuit Court to High Court;
     • Application for leave to the Supreme Court (refused May 2021); and
     • Two large‑scale assignments necessitating substitution applications and attendant appeals.
   • These factors amply justified granting leave, if such leave was needed.

In either approach, Everyday was entitled to execute. The judgment therefore confirms both:

• A strong indication that, in Circuit → High Court de novo appeals, the relevant “date of the decree or judgment” for Order 36 rule 9 purposes is the date of the High Court order; and
• The relatively low threshold for explaining delay where more than six years have passed.

5.6 The execution stage as a “final opportunity” to challenge assignments

Drawing on O’Reilly, Jackson J emphasised that the defendant’s proper procedural opportunity to challenge the assignments was at the execution stage (i.e. in opposition to the application for leave to execute), rather than seeking to impede substitution per se. At this stage:

• The court scrutinises the validity of the assignments and chain of title; and
• The defendant can raise any relevant arguments that would, if accepted, undermine the assignee’s right to execute.

In Brennan, those challenges were closely examined but ultimately rejected on the facts and law. Everyday was therefore permitted both to be substituted and to execute.

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6. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

6.1 Substitution of parties after assignment

When a mortgage lender sells its loan book, the buyer (assignee) needs to be able to continue any existing court proceedings in its own name. Substitution is the procedural mechanism that achieves this. Key points:

• Why substitution? The original plaintiff (e.g. KBC) no longer has any interest in the debt or security, so it cannot sensibly continue as plaintiff. The assignee (e.g. Everyday) must be substituted so it can pursue or enforce the claim.
• Post‑judgment substitution Substitution is not confined to pre‑trial stages. It can happen after judgment, during an appeal, or even where only execution is outstanding. The assignee “steps into the shoes” of the assignor and inherits whatever judgment has already issued, with no enlargement of rights.
• Different procedural rules, same idea
  • In the Circuit Court: Order 22 rules 4–6 CCR;
  • In the High Court: Order 17 rules 3–4 RSC.
  Both regimes deal with a “change or transmission of interest”, whether by death, bankruptcy, or assignment.

6.2 Assignment of loan vs transfer of charge: Global Deed vs Form 56

Two distinct but related legal steps are involved:

1. Assignment of loan and mortgage contract (Global Deed) The sale of the loan book is typically documented by a global or umbrella deed. This:
   • Transfers the lender’s contractual rights in the loan (the right to be repaid); and
   • Transfers the associated security rights (mortgages, guarantees, etc.) as between transferor and transferee.
2. Transfer and registration of the Land Registry charge (Form 56) The Land Registry charge securing the loan is a registrable interest. To give effect to the sale on the register:
   • The assignor and assignee execute a Form 56;
   • It is lodged with Tailte Éireann; and
   • The register (folio) is updated to show the assignee as owner of the charge.

The Global Deed therefore governs the underlying commercial transaction; the Form 56 and folio reflect the registered legal title to the charge. In Brennan, Peppe’s counsel correctly emphasised that the charge transfers, in registration terms, by Form 56 and consequent registration, even though the Global Deed sets the overall legal framework.

6.3 Legal vs beneficial ownership in securitisation

In securitisation:

• A bank may sell a bundle of loans to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) such as Braunton Property Finance DAC;
• The servicing of those loans (collection, litigation, etc.) is often carried out by a servicer entity (e.g. Pepper) on behalf of the SPV; and
• The SPV is usually the beneficial owner, while a different entity may hold the legal title (including as registered owner of the charge).

For the borrower, the key point is:

• The identity of the ultimate investor or beneficial owner does not undermine the right of the legal owner and registered charge‑holder to enforce the mortgage.

Courts therefore focus on:

• Who is shown on the folio as the owner of the charge; and
• Whether the chain of assignment from the original lender to that registered owner is properly proved.

6.4 “Conclusive” nature of the register

Under Irish land registration law, the registered title is conclusive, subject to limited statutory exceptions (e.g. rectification). This means that:

• A court hearing a possession or execution application must accept the folio as correct; and
• A borrower cannot argue in such proceedings that the register is wrong or that someone else is really the owner of the charge.

Any challenge to the correctness of the register must be made via:

• Proceedings under the Registration of Title legislation; or
• Rectification procedures before Tailte Éireann.

6.5 Leave to execute after six years

Irish procedural rules aim to avoid indefinite dormancy of judgments:

• Execution is allowed as of right within six years of judgment;
• After six years, leave of the court is needed. The court will look for an explanation of delay but does not demand extraordinary circumstances.

In mortgage cases involving appeals and assignments, delay often arises from:

• Appeals pursued by the borrower; and
• Time required to complete and register assignments and to process substitution applications.

Courts have been relatively pragmatic: where there is a coherent narrative of litigation and assignment activity explaining the lapse of time, leave is commonly granted.

6.6 De novo appeals from Circuit Court to High Court

Appeals from the Circuit Court to the High Court under s.37 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 are special:

• The High Court hears the matter afresh, not just a review of the Circuit Court decision;
• The High Court must be satisfied anew of the plaintiff’s entitlement to the relief (e.g. possession) and makes its own order if it finds in favour of the plaintiff;
• The High Court’s order then becomes the operative order for enforcement purposes.

This underpins Jackson J’s tentative conclusion that, for the six‑year execution period, the relevant “decree or judgment” is likely the High Court order (2020), not the original Circuit Court order (2016).

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7. Impact and Significance

7.1 For lenders, loan purchasers and servicers

The decision provides practical and doctrinal clarity for entities such as Everyday, Pepper, Start, Promontoria, and others actively enforcing acquired mortgage portfolios:

• Substitution post‑judgment affirmed The High Court endorses, in line with O’Reilly, that assignees can and should be substituted as plaintiffs even after judgment, including where only execution remains. This facilitates efficient enforcement where the original lender has exited.
• Guidance on documentation The judgment is a useful template for what must be put before the court:
  • A clearly legible and intelligible (albeit possibly partially redacted) global transfer deed;
  • Evidence of consent to transfer in the original mortgage documentation;
  • Form 56 and updated folio entries proving registration of the charge; and
  • “Goodbye”/“Hello” letters tying account numbers to the transfer schedules.
• Redaction parameters The decision sits alongside Moynihan and Ramseyer to draw a clearer line:
  • Limited, justified redactions (to protect third‑party privacy or genuine commercial sensitivity) will generally be accepted; but
  • Excessive, unexplained redactions of operative clauses remain unacceptable.
• Reliance on the folio Lenders and assignees can continue to rely heavily on updated folio entries as conclusive proof that they are the legal owners of the charge, thereby short‑circuiting many debtor arguments about beneficial ownership or securitisation structures.

7.2 For borrowers and defence practitioners

For borrowers resisting possession or execution, the judgment underlines certain limits:

• Securitisation is not a defence Arguments that the loan has been securitised, or that someone else is the beneficial owner, will not negate the right of the registered owner of the charge to enforce.
• Scope of challenge at execution stage Borrowers do have a meaningful opportunity at the leave‑to‑execute stage to:
  • Scrutinise and challenge the chain of assignment; and
  • Contest whether the assignee has actually acquired the relevant loan and security.
  However, these challenges must be properly grounded in evidence and law; bare assertions about “splitting” of loan and mortgage will not suffice.
• Folio challenges are collateral and generally inadmissible Attack on the correctness of the Land Registry entry must be brought via registration/rectification proceedings, not raised collaterally in possession or execution applications.
• Delays driven by appeals may not bar execution Where much of the delay beyond six years is attributable to appeals pursued by the borrower, the courts are unlikely to treat the lapse of time as a reason to refuse execution, provided there is an adequate explanation.

7.3 For the development of Irish mortgage enforcement law

Doctrinally, Brennan consolidates recent appellate guidance and clarifies several interlocking points:

• It harmonises High Court practice with Court of Appeal authority on substitution after assignment and on the execution stage as the key checkpoint for contesting assignments;
• It confirms that the Tanager principle on the conclusiveness of the register now applies not only in possession applications but also in leave‑to‑execute applications (Moloney, affirmed);
• It provides a practical bridge between the high‑level doctrine in Dellway, O’Reilly, and Moloney and the daily reality of mortgage enforcement in the Circuit Court; and
• It signals (albeit not conclusively) that the six‑year execution clock may, in Circuit → High Court appeals, run from the High Court’s de novo order, a point of significant practical importance in long‑running repossession litigation.

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8. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Everyday Finance DAC v Brennan is best understood as a consolidating and clarifying decision rather than a radical departure. Its main contributions are:

• Substitution after assignment is fully available post‑judgment, including where only execution remains. The assignee steps into the assignor’s shoes and assumes the benefit (and burdens) of any existing judgment.
• Chain of title must be proved on the balance of probabilities At the execution stage, the assignee must present coherent, intelligible documentation (global deed, Form 56, folio, notification letters) establishing a clear chain from original lender to current registered charge‑holder.
• Redactions in transfer deeds are permissible but limited Courts will reject deeds so heavily redacted that their legal effect cannot be discerned, but will accept limited and explained redactions that do not obscure the operative provisions.
• The Land Registry folio is conclusive Possession and execution courts will not entertain collateral challenges to the correctness of registration. Borrowers cannot rely on securitisation structures or alleged beneficial ownership to defeat the enforcement rights of the registered legal owner.
• Execution after six years remains possible The six‑year rule is not an absolute bar. An explanation (not extraordinary justification) for delay is sufficient, particularly where delay is generated by appeals and routine transactional steps following assignments.
• Execution stage as final checkpoint Defendants retain a meaningful, though narrow, opportunity at the leave‑to‑execute stage to challenge whether the putative assignee has truly acquired their loan and mortgage. In Brennan, those challenges failed, but the procedural space to raise them was acknowledged.

In the broader context of Irish mortgage enforcement, Brennan strengthens the position of assignees who can demonstrate a transparent chain of assignment and proper registration, while simultaneously delineating the outer limits of viable borrower defences based on securitisation, redaction, and alleged beneficial ownership. It will be of practical utility to practitioners on both sides of mortgage litigation and will likely be cited alongside O’Reilly, Moloney, Tanager, and Moynihan in future disputes about substitution, execution and proof of title.