Stewart v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1484: Finality of Third‑Party Determinations and the Limits of Receivership Appeals under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Stewart v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1484, a judgment which clarifies the interaction between:

third‑party determinations under s.10A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”);
third‑party appeals under s.31 POCA;
the extinguishment of that appeal right when a receiver is sought under s.50 (s.31(8)); and
the tightly constrained scope for third‑party representations at the receivership stage under s.51(8).

The case also illustrates the Court’s approach to:

what amounts to a “reasonable opportunity to make representations” for third parties;
the high threshold of “serious risk of injustice” required to re‑open a s.10A determination; and
the limited role of “fresh evidence” in appeals arising out of confiscation and enforcement proceedings, under Article 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Appeals Under Part 2) Order 2003.

Although the applicant, Jacqueline Stewart, ultimately sought to withdraw her renewed application for leave to appeal, the Court opted to give a reasoned judgment in order to forestall any suggestion that she had been denied a fair opportunity to pursue a potentially meritorious appeal. The decision therefore serves as an important precedent on the finality and procedural structure of third‑party challenges within POCA confiscation and enforcement.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The underlying criminal proceedings

The applicant, Ms Jacqueline Stewart, was the former partner and business associate of Arthur Wilder. As she told the Crown Court, Mr Wilder effectively controlled their business affairs and often acted without her knowledge.

On 19 June 2018, Mr Wilder was convicted of mortgage‑related fraud offences: attempting to obtain a money transfer by deception, fraud, and converting criminal property. His applications for leave to appeal his conviction were refused by both the Single Judge and the full Court of Appeal, as recorded in R v Wilder [2022] EWCA Crim 842 (para 4).

2.2 Confiscation and third‑party claims

Following conviction, the Crown sought a confiscation order under s.6 POCA. Various third parties came forward asserting interests in assets apparently held by or for the benefit of Mr Wilder (para 5), including:

Mr and Mrs Stretton (relating to “Ash Lane” land/property);
Sarah Lingard (since deceased, with a purported assignment to Mr Ian Yarwood); and
Ms Stewart (the applicant).

The Ash Lane dispute was resolved in separate High Court proceedings, with the Strettons “effectively buying out” Wilder’s interest (para 5). Ms Stewart had been served with those proceedings but did not seek to be joined as a party (para 21).

At the confiscation hearing, held on 5–6 June 2024 before Recorder Kelbrick (para 6), the following was noted:

Wilder was represented but did not attend.
The Strettons’ claim had been resolved in the High Court.
Ms Lingard had died; Mr Yarwood claimed an assigned interest, but the Recorder found he lacked standing.
Ms Stewart attended by video link; her claim was fully considered.

Ms Stewart claimed interests in:

a diamond ring;
cash arising from Ash Lane, and a deposit related to another property known as “The Arcade”; and
a “cherished” number plate (later sold and dropped from consideration: para 7).

The Recorder heard her evidence and submissions and made determinations under s.10A POCA, concluding that all of her claims failed (paras 7–8). He found in particular that:

the diamond ring was bought from a Citibank account funded by fraudulently obtained mortgage monies; whatever her contribution, Ms Stewart had “no claim in law to all or any part of that ring”;
as to Ash Lane, the High Court’s declaration of beneficial entitlement in favour of Wilder meant she had no claim to the property or its proceeds;
regarding “The Arcade”, the company through which title was claimed (Haywood) could not assert ownership because the transfer was executed fraudulently; as shareholder, Ms Stewart therefore had no direct proprietary claim in the property or its proceeds; the 2016 and 2017 agreements gave her, at best, a creditor’s claim, not a proprietary interest (para 8).

The Recorder expressed sympathy, noting that she had been “cruelly misused by a professional criminal fraudster” but that her legal claims failed (para 8).

2.3 The confiscation order

On 7 June 2024, following the s.10A determinations, a confiscation order was made against Wilder (para 9), assessing:

benefit: more than £1.4 million; and
available amount: £497,108.11.

The confiscation order was made in the available amount, payable to the Bank of Scotland as compensation (para 9).

2.4 Ms Stewart’s attempted appeal under s.31 POCA

On 3 July 2023 (there is a clear chronological inconsistency in the dates, but the sequence is not critical to the legal reasoning), Ms Stewart applied to appeal against the s.10A determination under s.31 POCA (para 10). Her application was not properly served.

On 27 July 2023, the prosecution notified the Criminal Appeal Office of its intention to apply for the appointment of an enforcement receiver under s.50 POCA (para 10). Under s.31(8), once such an application is made, a third party’s right to appeal under s.31 is extinguished. The Registrar therefore informed Ms Stewart on 11 August 2023 that her s.31 appeal had lapsed (para 10).

2.5 The receivership order under s.50 POCA

The prosecutor’s application to appoint an enforcement receiver came before HHJ (His Honour Judge) Bury on 7 February 2024 (para 11). Ms Stewart did not attend; she made written representations. HHJ Bury concluded that the points she raised merely repeated arguments already advanced either:

in Wilder’s earlier appeal proceedings; and/or
at the original confiscation hearing before Recorder Kelbrick.

He accordingly appointed a receiver under s.50. It was this receivership order that Ms Stewart sought to challenge under s.65 POCA (para 11).

2.6 The extension of time and the renewed application

A Single Judge refused Ms Stewart’s application for leave to appeal on 2 January 2025, and she was notified on 8 January 2025 (para 12). Her renewed application to the full Court was not lodged until 24 March 2025, 61 days out of time (para 1).

Ms Stewart explained that her brother had died on 7 January 2025, overshadowing all other matters (para 12). The Court accepted that this was probably a good reason for an extension and was prepared “in principle” to grant an extension of time (para 12), proceeding to consider the merits of the appeal.

Initially, the Court had arranged for Ms Stewart to attend by video link for short oral submissions (para 2). The night before the hearing she emailed the Court explaining that she was struggling to cope, referring to mental health issues, and asking that her application be dismissed (para 2). Because the Court had already examined the papers in detail and formed a provisional view on the merits, and mindful of her repeated complaints of being deprived of the chance to make representations, the Court decided to deliver a reasoned judgment rather than simply treat the application as withdrawn (para 3).

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal:

was prepared to grant an extension of time in light of Ms Stewart’s bereavement (para 12); but
refused leave to appeal on the basis that the proposed appeal against the receivership order was not reasonably arguable (paras 19–21).

The core conclusions were:

The third‑party determination under s.10A made by Recorder Kelbrick was legally sound (paras 17–18, 20). Ms Stewart had been given a full and fair opportunity to give evidence and to make representations. The Recorder’s conclusions—particularly regarding the diamond ring—were based on her own evidence and disclosed no error of law.
Once the prosecutor applied for the appointment of a receiver, Ms Stewart’s s.31 appeal against the s.10A determination was extinguished by s.31(8) POCA (para 15). She could not use an appeal against the receivership order to reopen those determinations indirectly.
Under s.51(8) POCA, Ms Stewart was entitled to a “reasonable opportunity” to make representations at the receivership stage; however:
- any representations that were inconsistent with the s.10A determination were barred by s.51(8)(b), unless she could show either lack of reasonable opportunity at the s.10A stage or a serious risk of injustice if the court were bound by the s.10A determination; and
- neither condition was satisfied on the facts (paras 16–18, 20).
Ms Stewart’s claimed inability to attend the receivership hearing on medical grounds did not render the receivership order unlawful, because:
- she had already had a full opportunity to be heard on her proprietary claims before Recorder Kelbrick; and
- any oral submissions at the receivership hearing would have been impermissible repetition of those arguments and would have been caught by s.51(8)(b) (para 20).
The “fresh evidence” Ms Stewart sought to rely upon—statements by Mr Ian Yarwood dating from February and April 2024—was essentially opinion evidence about Wilder’s conviction and the circumstances of his prosecution. It was irrelevant to Ms Stewart’s proprietary claims and did not satisfy the test for admission under Article 7 of the 2003 Order (paras 1, 19, 21).

Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal against the receivership order was refused (para 21).

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory framework

4.1.1 Section 10A POCA: third‑party determinations in confiscation

Section 10A allows the Crown Court, during confiscation proceedings, to determine the extent of any third party’s interest in property that might be subject to a confiscation order. It gives effect to the requirement that confiscation should not unjustly strip property from innocent third parties with legitimate proprietary rights.

In this case, Recorder Kelbrick exercised s.10A in relation to Ms Stewart’s claimed interests in:

the diamond ring;
the Ash Lane property or its proceeds; and
the property known as “The Arcade”.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that he:

heard Ms Stewart’s evidence;
subjected it to scrutiny; and
rejected her claims on legally orthodox grounds, notwithstanding clear sympathy for her situation (para 8).

4.1.2 Section 31 POCA: appeals by third parties against s.10A determinations

Section 31 provides a specific route of appeal for persons whose interests are determined under s.10A. However, that right is tightly circumscribed:

the Court of Appeal must think the applicant is or may be a person holding an interest in the property; and
one of two conditions must be satisfied (para 14):
- the person was not given a reasonable opportunity to make representations when the determination was made; or
- it appears arguable that giving effect to the determination would pose a serious risk of injustice to that person.

Critically, s.31(8) provides that no appeal lies under s.31 once a prosecutor has applied to appoint a receiver under s.50. That statutory extinguishment lay at the heart of Ms Stewart’s procedural difficulties (paras 10, 15).

4.1.3 Sections 50–51 POCA: enforcement receivers and third‑party representations

Under s.50, the Crown Court may appoint an enforcement receiver to manage, realise or otherwise deal with assets in order to satisfy a confiscation order.

Section 51(8) imposes procedural safeguards for third parties at the enforcement stage:

the court must not confer powers on a receiver to manage, realise or deal with property unless persons holding interests in the property have been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations (s.51(8));
but s.51(8)(b) sharply limits the content of such representations: third parties cannot advance representations that are inconsistent with a s.10A determination, unless:
- they lacked a reasonable opportunity to be heard when the s.10A determination was made and have not appealed; or
- there is a serious risk of injustice if the court is bound by the s.10A determination (para 17).

Thus, Parliament has drawn a clear line: s.10A determinations are intended to be substantively final, subject to a narrow appeal right under s.31. At the receivership stage, third parties are not given a second bite at the cherry, save where there is some fundamental flaw or serious risk of injustice.

4.1.4 Section 65 POCA and Article 7 of the 2003 Order: appeals and fresh evidence

Appeals relating to confiscation and enforcement orders under Part 2 of POCA (including receivership orders) are governed procedurally by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Appeals Under Part 2) Order 2003. Article 7 of that Order deals with “fresh evidence”, closely paralleling s.23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (para 1).

Although the judgment does not set out the exact test, Article 7, like s.23, essentially requires the Court to consider whether:

the evidence could have been adduced with reasonable diligence at the time; and
it is credible and would afford a ground for allowing the appeal; and
it is necessary or expedient in the interests of justice to receive it.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence Ms Stewart wished to adduce—statements from Mr Yarwood—was essentially opinion on Wilder’s conviction and prosecution, and therefore:

irrelevant to the determination of her proprietary interests; and
incapable of affording a ground for allowing the appeal (paras 19, 21).

Accordingly, the Court declined to admit the fresh evidence.

4.2 Precedent cited: R v Wilder [2022] EWCA Crim 842

The only prior case explicitly cited is the earlier appeal of the principal offender: R v Wilder [2022] EWCA Crim 842 (para 4). That case is relevant in several ways:

It confirmed the safety of Wilder’s conviction, thereby stabilising the factual and legal foundation for the confiscation proceedings.
The Court in the present case notes that arguments about the original complaint and the circumstances of Wilder’s prosecution had already been considered and rejected by a different constitution of the Court of Appeal when refusing his applications for leave to appeal (para 21).
This background supports the Court’s assessment that later opinions (for example, Mr Yarwood’s) attacking Wilder’s conviction are irrelevant to Ms Stewart’s proprietary claims and the receivership order.

The reference to R v Wilder therefore operates to:

preclude any collateral challenge to Wilder’s conviction within Ms Stewart’s appeal; and
demonstrate that the criminal foundation of the confiscation process had already undergone appellate scrutiny.

4.3 The Court’s legal reasoning

4.3.1 Extension of time and the Court’s decision to give judgment notwithstanding a withdrawal request

The Court’s approach to the 61‑day delay is pragmatic and humane. It accepted that the recent death of Ms Stewart’s brother could explain and justify the delay, and indicated that it would probably have granted the extension (para 12). This is consistent with established practice: time limits are important, but their strict enforcement is tempered by merits and by compelling personal circumstances.

Of more procedural significance is the Court’s decision to deliver a reasoned judgment even though Ms Stewart had effectively requested that her appeal be dismissed (para 2). Given:

her history of complaints that she had been denied a proper opportunity to be heard; and
the Court’s own prior investment of time in scrutinising the papers (para 3),

the Court decided to spell out its reasoning to forestall any later suggestion that she was prevented from pursuing a meritorious appeal. This underscores an important aspect of appellate practice: where broader fairness concerns may later be raised, the Court may elect to produce a substantive judgment rather than accept a late withdrawal at face value.

4.3.2 The scope of the appeal: formally about the ring, but functionally an attack on the entire s.10A determination

Although Ms Stewart’s Notice of Appeal purported to confine the challenge to the part of the receivership order relating to the diamond ring (para 13), her grounds in substance:

re‑attacked the Recorder’s findings more generally; and
reopened arguments about the Ash Lane property and The Arcade (para 13).

The Court recognised that she was, in reality, attempting to mount a collateral challenge to the s.10A determination and to revive a lapsed s.31 appeal through the medium of an appeal against the receivership order. This coloured the Court’s assessment of both the “reasonable opportunity” and “serious risk of injustice” tests under ss.31 and 51.

4.3.3 Was there a “reasonable opportunity to make representations” at the s.10A stage?

The Court’s reasoning on this point is clear:

Ms Stewart attended the confiscation hearing by video link (para 6);
she gave evidence on oath and was cross‑examined (para 7);
she also made submissions, and the Recorder’s ruling demonstrates careful engagement with her arguments and evidence (para 8);
the Recorder appears to have accepted her evidence on material points but concluded that it did not translate into legal ownership or proprietary interest (paras 7–8, 17, 20).

Against that backdrop, the Court of Appeal held that she had been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations at the s.10A stage. That conclusion is crucial because both s.31 (the appeal provision) and s.51(8)(b) (the receivership provision) pivot on whether the third party had such an opportunity.

The Court also rejected Ms Stewart’s suggestion that the Recorder had insufficient time to consider the papers (para 17). The tone and content of his judgment, recited at some length in para 8, contradict any claim that he dealt with the matter perfunctorily.

4.3.4 Serious risk of injustice and finality of the s.10A determination

Once satisfied that Ms Stewart had a fair opportunity to present her case, the Court then asked whether binding itself to the Recorder’s determination under s.10A would create a serious risk of injustice (paras 14, 17, 18, 20). It concluded it would not.

Key features of the Recorder’s decision support that conclusion:

The diamond ring: the Recorder accepted that she had raised approximately £5,000 from premium bonds, but those funds were:
- temporally separated from the purchase; and
- invested in or lent to a different company, never passing through the Citibank account used to purchase the ring (para 8).
The actual purchase funds came from a Citibank account fed by fraudulent mortgage funds. On those facts, he concluded she had no proprietary claim in law to the ring.
Ash Lane: a High Court declaration had already determined that the beneficial entitlement in the property belonged to Wilder. Ms Stewart, despite being served with those proceedings, did not seek to be joined. The Recorder properly treated the High Court determination as conclusive against her claim (para 8, 21).
The Arcade: because the transfer into the Haywood company had been executed fraudulently, the company could not assert ownership; and as a shareholder, Ms Stewart had no direct proprietary interest in the company’s assets. Any rights were mere creditor claims, defeated by the company’s lack of beneficial entitlement (para 8).

These findings rest squarely on mainstream principles of property, company, and restitution law (see below at 4.5). They disclose no arguable error of law and, importantly, no serious risk of injustice—particularly where the principal offender had been properly convicted and the fraudulent provenance of the assets was established.

4.3.5 The effect of s.31(8) and the attempt to reopen the s.10A determination via an appeal against the receivership order

The Court applied s.31(8) straightforwardly (paras 10, 15): once the prosecutor applied for the appointment of a receiver under s.50, Ms Stewart’s s.31 right of appeal against the s.10A determination was extinguished. That statutory mechanism reflects a policy of finality: enforcement should not be paralysed indefinitely by ongoing third‑party appeals.

Ms Stewart attempted to circumvent that extinguishment by:

appealing the receivership order under s.65; and
arguing that she had been denied a reasonable opportunity to make representations at the receivership hearing because she was medically unfit to attend (para 16).

The Court’s answer relies on s.51(8)–(8)(b):

At the receivership stage, the court is not an appeal court in relation to s.10A determinations.
The scope of legitimate representations is confined. They may not contradict a s.10A determination unless:
- the third party lacked a reasonable opportunity at the s.10A hearing and did not appeal; or
- binding the court to that determination would create a serious risk of injustice (para 17).

Given the Court’s earlier conclusion that:

Ms Stewart had been afforded a reasonable opportunity at the s.10A hearing; and
there was no serious risk of injustice in upholding the Recorder’s decision;

it followed that she could not, in law, use the receivership proceedings (or an appeal from them) to re‑argue what had already been determined under s.10A. In the Court’s words, her representations before HHJ Bury were “essentially repetition of what had been said before and represented no more than disagreement with the decision of the Recorder” (para 19).

4.3.6 Reasonable opportunity at the receivership stage and the effect of Ms Stewart’s medical difficulties

Ms Stewart contended that she had not had a “reasonable opportunity” to make representations in the receivership proceedings because she was medically unfit to attend (para 16). She presented medical evidence in support.

The Court effectively answered this in two steps:

Factual opportunity: even though she did not attend in person, she did submit written representations, which HHJ Bury considered (para 11). Hence, the question is not whether she literally appeared but whether she had a reasonable chance to put her case.
Legal utility: even if the court were to accept that she could not attend for medical reasons, any adjournment to enable her to appear would have been futile, because:
- the representations she wished to make simply restated her ownership claims already rejected by Recorder Kelbrick; and
- such representations would have been barred by s.51(8)(b) as inconsistent with a valid s.10A determination (para 20).

Thus, the medical evidence could not, in law, amount to a denial of a “reasonable opportunity” at the receivership stage where:

the applicant had already had a full opportunity on the same issues at the earlier s.10A determination; and
no new, legally relevant grounds of challenge were available.

4.3.7 Fresh evidence under Article 7 of the 2003 Order

The Court considered the “fresh evidence” in the form of two statements from Mr Yarwood (February and April 2024). These were described as “essentially statements of opinion relating to Mr Wilder’s conviction” (para 19).

Applying the usual principles (as reflected in s.23 CAA 1968 and mirrored by Article 7), the Court held:

The statements did not go to Ms Stewart’s proprietary interests in the ring, Ash Lane, or The Arcade.
They did not undermine the correctness of the confiscation order or the receivership order.
They were incapable of furnishing any ground upon which the appeal might be allowed (paras 19, 21).

On that basis, the Court concluded that, regardless of whether the formal criteria for admission of fresh evidence were met, it would be inappropriate to admit the Yarwood statements (para 21).

4.4 Impact and significance of the judgment

4.4.1 Consolidating the finality of s.10A determinations

The central legal message of Stewart v R is that third‑party determinations under s.10A are functionally final, subject only to:

a narrow and time‑sensitive right of appeal under s.31; and
exceptional reconsideration at the enforcement stage under s.51(8)(b) where serious risk of injustice is made out.

Third parties cannot:

ignore the s.31 route and then use receivership proceedings as an indirect appeal; or
revive a lapsed s.31 appeal by framing their challenge as an objection to a receivership order.

For practitioners, this underlines the importance of:

properly advising third parties at the confiscation stage;
ensuring that any appeal under s.31 is correctly served and pursued promptly; and
recognising that once an application is made under s.50, the window for s.31 appeals closes by statutory operation (s.31(8)).

4.4.2 Clarifying “reasonable opportunity” and “serious risk of injustice” in third‑party POCA appeals

The judgment contributes to the developing case law on the meaning of:

“reasonable opportunity to make representations” (ss.31 and 51), and
“serious risk of injustice”.

It confirms that:

Reasonable opportunity is assessed holistically: where the third party has been allowed to give evidence, be cross‑examined, and make submissions at the confiscation hearing, that opportunity will almost always be sufficient.
Later difficulties (for example, ill health preventing attendance at enforcement hearings) do not retroactively negate that earlier opportunity where no new, legally viable arguments exist.
Serious risk of injustice sets a high threshold; it is not met simply because the third party disagrees with the court’s assessment of their evidence or with the application of settled legal principles.

4.4.3 Third‑party vulnerability and statutory inflexibility

The Recorder’s remark that Ms Stewart had been “cruelly misused by a professional criminal fraudster” (para 8) highlights a recurrent tension in POCA:

the statutory scheme is designed to strip criminals of the benefits of crime swiftly and effectively; but
innocent associates, family members, or business partners may be closely entwined in the transactions.

The judgment illustrates that sympathy cannot substitute for proprietary entitlement. Where:

the asset is demonstrably purchased with criminal funds; and
the third party cannot establish a legally recognised proprietary interest,

the court is bound to treat the asset as available to satisfy the confiscation order, even if the third party was manipulated or deceived.

This case therefore serves as a cautionary tale:

third parties must meticulously document their contributions and ownership arrangements; and
those dealing closely with individuals engaged in serious financial crime face considerable risk of losing assets that, in moral terms, might feel “theirs”, but which the law regards as derived from crime and owned by the defendant.

4.4.4 Implications for future receivership appeals

Going forward, Stewart v R will likely be cited in:

appeals where third parties seek to challenge receivership orders mostly by re‑arguing ownership issues already decided under s.10A; and
cases where appellants argue that health or other personal difficulties at the enforcement stage deprived them of a fair hearing.

The decision confirms that:

receivership appeals cannot be used to re‑litigate s.10A determinations absent compelling reasons that fit within s.51(8)(b); and
even genuine personal hardship must be linked to a legally relevant and potentially outcome‑changing issue before it can ground an arguable appeal.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Confiscation, benefit, and available amount

In criminal confiscation:

Benefit is the value of the proceeds of the defendant’s criminal conduct (here, over £1.4 million: para 9).
Available amount is the value of the defendant’s realisable assets at the time of the order (here, £497,108.11: para 9).

The confiscation order is made in the available amount where it is less than the benefit figure. The enforcement receiver is then appointed to realise assets up to that amount.

5.2 Third‑party determinations (s.10A) versus receivership proceedings (ss.50–51)

There are two distinct stages:

Confiscation/third‑party stage (s.10A): The court decides what belongs to the defendant and what, if anything, belongs to third parties. This is where ownership is determined.
Enforcement/receivership stage (ss.50–51): A receiver is appointed to collect, manage, and sell the defendant’s assets to satisfy the confiscation order.

At the enforcement stage, the court does not normally re‑decide who owns what; it takes the s.10A determinations as given, subject only to the narrow exceptions in s.51(8)(b).

5.3 “Proprietary interest” vs being a creditor or shareholder

The law draws a sharp line between:

Proprietary interest: a direct legal or equitable interest in specific property (e.g., being a joint owner of the ring, or having a beneficial interest in a property).
Personal or creditor interest: a right to be paid money by someone (e.g., a contractual right to repayment, or to receive a share of profits).

Only proprietary interests generally protect third parties against confiscation. In Ms Stewart’s case:

The 2016 and 2017 agreements gave her, at best, a right to be repaid—i.e. a creditor’s claim—not a proprietary stake in the underlying property (para 8).
As a shareholder in the Haywood company, she did not own the company’s properties directly. The company is a separate legal person; its assets are not the shareholder’s personal property. She owned shares, not “The Arcade” itself (para 8).

Because of this, even though she had legitimate financial expectations, she could not stop those properties being treated as the defendant’s assets for confiscation purposes.

5.4 “Reasonable opportunity to make representations”

This phrase appears in both:

s.31 (appeals against s.10A determinations); and
s.51(8) (appointment of enforcement receivers).

In simple terms, a person has a reasonable opportunity where they:

are informed of the proceedings;
are allowed to attend or participate (including by video link);
can present evidence and arguments; and
are heard by the court before it makes its determination.

It does not require:

that the court accept their submissions; or
that every possible procedural preference (e.g. in‑person attendance rather than video, or multiple adjournments) be accommodated.

5.5 “Serious risk of injustice”

This is a high bar. It is not enough that:

the outcome is harsh;
the applicant disagrees with the decision; or
the court might reasonably have decided differently.

“Serious risk of injustice” is reserved for situations where:

some material error of law or procedure undermines confidence in the decision; or
significant new facts emerge that would likely have led to a different decision; or
a manifestly unfair result would follow if the earlier determination were left untouched.

In Stewart v R, the Court found none of these features present.

5.6 Fresh evidence and relevance

Fresh evidence on appeal must be:

genuinely new (not reasonably available before);
credible; and
capable of affecting the outcome of the appeal.

Evidence that:

merely offers opinions about someone else’s conviction; or
does not bear on the legal issue in dispute (here, Ms Stewart’s ownership of specific assets),

will not qualify, even if sincerely held. The Yarwood statements failed on relevance: they did not address Ms Stewart’s proprietary rights and therefore could not provide a ground for allowing her appeal.

6. Conclusion

Stewart v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1484 is a significant reaffirmation of the finality and structure of third‑party participation in confiscation and enforcement proceedings under POCA.

Key takeaways include:

s.10A determinations are central and final, save for a narrow appeal under s.31. Once a s.50 receivership application is made, that appeal right is extinguished (s.31(8)).
At the receivership stage, s.51(8)(b) severely restricts third‑party representations that contradict a valid s.10A determination. The receivership court is not a forum for relitigating ownership.
Reasonable opportunity at the s.10A stage is satisfied where the third party participates, gives evidence, and is heard. Later non‑attendance at enforcement hearings, even for health reasons, does not retroactively nullify that earlier opportunity where no new, legally significant issues are available.
The threshold of serious risk of injustice is high and is not met by mere disagreement with the court’s evaluation of evidence or law.
Fresh evidence in confiscation appeals must be strictly relevant to the legal issues in play; opinion evidence attacking a settled conviction is insufficient.
Finally, the Court’s choice to give a reasoned judgment despite Ms Stewart’s late attempt to withdraw reinforces a commitment to transparency and to pre‑empting future allegations of unfairness.

The decision thus provides clear guidance to courts, prosecutors, defence practitioners, and third parties on the limited avenues for revisiting proprietary determinations once the confiscation and enforcement machinery of POCA has been set in motion. It highlights the importance of engaging effectively at the s.10A stage, the need for prompt and properly served appeals under s.31, and the strict boundaries on attempts to re‑open those issues through receivership appeals or late‑produced opinion evidence.

Stewart v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1484: Finality of Third‑Party Determinations and the Limits of Receivership Appeals under POCA