Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant applied for an extension of time (61 days) to renew an application for leave to appeal a receivership order under section 65 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ("PoCA 2002") after that application had been refused by a Single Judge. She also sought permission to rely on fresh evidence under Article 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Appeals Under Part 2) Order 2003. The Appellant had earlier been given the opportunity to attend and make brief oral submissions by video link but subsequently sent an email indicating she could not proceed because of mental health difficulties and asked the judge to dismiss her application.

The court had already read the material the Appellant had placed before it and formed a preliminary view on the merits, but decided to give judgment despite the Appellant's stated wish to withdraw, in case it might later be suggested she had been deprived of a fair opportunity to pursue a meritorious appeal.

The receivership order the Appellant sought to challenge had been made by Judge Bury at the City Crown Court on 7 February 2024. The underlying factual context was that the Defendant had been convicted in 2018 of offences connected with mortgage transactions. The Crown pursued confiscation proceedings under section 6 PoCA 2002, during which several third parties claimed interests in assets: a couple (referred to in the source as the Strettons), another third party who had died, and the Appellant.

Prior proceedings resolved the Strettons' claim (they effectively acquired out the Defendant's interest in a parcel of land, hereinafter referred to as "Property A"). The confiscation hearing was conducted before Judge Kelbrick (sitting as Recorder) on 5–6 June 2024. The Appellant participated by video link, gave evidence and was cross‑examined. The Recorder rejected all of the Appellant’s third‑party claims (including in relation to a diamond ring, Property A proceeds, and a deposit for another property referred to here as "Property B") and made a confiscation order against the Defendant on 7 June 2024, with funds to be paid to Bank A.

The Appellant later sought to appeal under section 31 PoCA 2002 but that application was held to have lapsed under section 31(8) when the prosecutor applied for appointment of an enforcement receiver under section 50. The Appellant then sought leave to renew her application for leave to appeal but the Single Judge refused. The Appellant applied to renew and for leave to rely on fresh evidence; the court considered both extension and merits and refused leave to appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether an extension of time should be granted to the Appellant to renew her application for leave to appeal against the receivership order under section 65 PoCA 2002.
2. Whether the Appellant should be granted leave to rely on fresh evidence under Article 7 of the 2003 Order (analogous to section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).
3. Whether the Appellant had been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations in the proceedings to appoint a receiver under section 50 and, relatedly, whether an appeal under section 31 PoCA 2002 remained available or had been extinguished by section 31(8).
4. Whether, even if the Appellant had a procedural basis to appeal, the appeal was reasonably arguable on the merits (in particular as to the Recorder's findings about the diamond ring and other assets).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant sought an extension of time to renew her application for leave to appeal and permission to adduce fresh evidence.
• She argued she had not had a reasonable opportunity to make representations at the receivership hearing because she was medically unfit to attend; she provided medical evidence in support.
• Her Notice of Appeal focused on the Recorder's finding about the diamond ring, and also contained wider complaints that the Recorder's rulings (including on Property A and Property B) were wrong.
• She advanced fresh statements (from a named third party) which she said bore on the circumstances of the Defendant's conviction and the proceedings against him.

Prosecution / Respondent Arguments (as reflected in the judgment)

• The prosecution pointed out that the Appellant's right to appeal under section 31 had been extinguished by the prosecutor's application to appoint an enforcement receiver, such that section 31(8) applied.
• The court was invited to treat the Appellant as having had a reasonable opportunity to make representations earlier (before Judge Kelbrick) and that her proposed further representations at the receivership hearing were either repetitive or precluded by section 51(8)(b) PoCA 2002.
• The statements tendered as fresh evidence were submissions of opinion about the Defendant's conviction and did not provide a basis for allowing the appeal or admitting fresh evidence under Article 7 of the 2003 Order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal stages: first considering whether to grant the extension of time and to consider the application on its merits; and second conducting a merits analysis including whether fresh evidence should be admitted.

On extension of time: the court accepted the Appellant's personal circumstances (the death of her brother) could amount to a good reason for extension and would probably have granted the extension. Accordingly, the court proceeded to consider the merits of the application for leave.

On the legal availability of an appeal: the court analysed the interaction of the relevant statutory provisions. A determination under section 10A PoCA 2002 may be appealed under section 31 by a person who may hold an interest in the property if the person was not given a reasonable opportunity to make representations when the determination was made, or if giving effect to the determination would result in a serious risk of injustice.

The court emphasised that section 31(8) prevents an appeal where the prosecutor has applied for appointment of a receiver. That provision was the basis upon which the Appellant's earlier section 31 appeal had lapsed. Separately, where a receiver appointment is sought under section 50, section 51(8) requires that persons with interests be given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, but section 51(8)(b) excludes representations inconsistent with a prior section 10A determination unless (a) the person had not previously had a reasonable opportunity and had not appealed, or (b) there would be a serious risk of injustice if the court were bound by the prior determination.

Applying those principles, the court found:

• The Appellant had made full representations (including oral evidence and cross‑examination) before Judge Kelbrick (the Recorder). The Recorder had considered her evidence, accepted aspects of it, and gave careful reasons for rejecting her claims. There was no arguable legal error in the Recorder's decision.
• Because the Appellant had already had a reasonable opportunity to make representations under the section 10A determination, she was not entitled to repeat materially the same submissions at the receivership hearing unless she could show a substantial risk of injustice — which she did not.
• The medical evidence as to incapacity to attend the receivership hearing was limited; even if an adjournment had been considered, it would have been of no practical value because her proposed representations were either repetitive of those already considered by the Recorder or were precluded by section 51(8)(b).
• The fresh statements tendered (from the third party identified in the source material) were essentially expressions of opinion about the Defendant's conviction and did not provide new, admissible evidence that would alter the court's view. The court agreed with the Single Judge that the appeal was not reasonably arguable and that the new material would not afford grounds for allowing the appeal.

The court therefore concluded that the refusal of leave by the Single Judge was correct on the merits. It also noted that arguments attempting to reopen matters already decided in High Court proceedings (concerning Property A) were not properly before this appeal because those High Court proceedings had resolved ownership issues and the Appellant had not sought to be joined to those proceedings.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL REFUSED.

Direct consequences:

• The Appellant's application for leave to appeal against the receivership order was refused.
• The court declined to admit the fresh evidence proffered under Article 7 of the 2003 Order because it did not provide an arguable basis to allow the appeal and was largely opinion about the Defendant's conviction.
• The prior section 10A determination and the Recorder's findings (including those concerning the diamond ring and the proceeds of Property A and Property B) remain authoritative for the purposes of these enforcement proceedings.

Broader implications:

The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal precedent. Its practical effect is confined to the parties: the Appellant's attempts to reopen the Recorder's factual and legal findings failed, and the receivership/ enforcement process proceeds on the basis of the existing determinations.