Single Telecom Masts Generally Outside EIA “Urban Development” and Limits on Late Evidence in Judicial Review: Commentary on Doyle v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 725

1. Introduction

This commentary analyses the decision of Humphreys J in Doyle v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 725, a judicial review challenge to permission for a 21m telecommunications monopole at Laytown Railway Station, Co. Meath. The case was deliberately used as a “test case” for a suite of recurrent arguments being raised in mobile phone mast litigation.

The judgment is significant in at least four respects:

It consolidates and applies an “eight-fold path” for granting judicial review relief, with strong emphasis on onus of proof, workability, and harmless error.
It sets a clear procedural marker that applicants cannot “drip‑feed” new expert evidence by misusing replying affidavits once the case is case-managed under Order 103 RSC.
On EU law, it holds that a single telecom mast is, in general, not an “urban development project” under Annex II, point 10(b) of the EIA Directive / Schedule 5 Part 2 Class 10(b)(iv) of the 2001 Regulations, and therefore does not trigger EIA duties—subject only to exceptional fact patterns.
It confirms that general health concerns about telecoms masts are properly addressed via specialist EU and national regulatory regimes (ICNIRP, ComReg, etc.), and planning authorities may normally treat such health objections as having little or no weight, absent specific, exceptional circumstances.

The applicant sought to quash An Coimisiún Pleanála’s (“the Commission”; formerly An Bord Pleanála) grant of permission to On Tower Ireland Ltd. Grounds encompassed alleged invalidity of the planning application (drawings and site notices), misinterpretation of the 1996 Telecommunications Antennae Guidelines and the Meath County Development Plan, and an alleged failure to carry out Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on the basis that the mast was an “urban development project”.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed all grounds and refused to quash the permission. In outline:

Drawings and Plans (Art 23 PDR 2001): Any technical shortcomings were either not established or not material. The use of “ASL” (above sea level) levels was to be read as Ordnance Datum, and extensive photomontages and heritage reports cured any alleged deficiency regarding the protected structure.
Site Notices (Art 19 PDR 2001): The applicant failed to prove that the station car park constituted a “public road” within the statutory definition. Accordingly, the stricter requirement of a notice at every public-road entrance did not apply; the applicable standard (Art 19(2)) was satisfied.
Guidelines / Development Plan / Health: Laytown is not a “small town or village” in the Meath Development Plan hierarchy, so the “last resort” policy in the 1996 Antennae Guidelines for small towns did not apply. The Commission lawfully relied on technical justification and on ICNIRP-based health standards; it was entitled to give negligible weight to generalised health concerns.
EIA and “Urban Development”: A single telecom mast is not, in itself, an “urban development project” within Annex II, 10(b) EIA Directive / Schedule 5, Part 2, Class 10(b)(iv). The concept is inherently evaluative; the Commission was within its margin of appreciation in treating the mast as outside that category. No CJEU reference was warranted.
Late Evidence: Three substantial “reply” affidavits (including new expert evidence) sworn shortly before the hearing were ruled inadmissible. Replying affidavits are confined to true reply; an applicant cannot progressively re‑build or expand its evidential case in breach of directions.

The Court emphasised that judicial review is concerned with the legality, not the correctness, of planning judgments; that administrative decisions must be read “in the round”; and that immaterial or harmless errors do not justify certiorari.

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The Development

Proposed development: A 21m monopole telecommunications structure with antennas, dishes, cabinets and fencing, within the curtilage of Laytown Railway Station, itself a protected structure and within the curtilage of a listed stationmaster’s house and associated buildings.
Planning authority: Meath County Council, under the Meath County Development Plan 2021–2027 (CDP).
Process: Application (March 2023), further information (Natura screening report), decision to grant (July 2023), third‑party appeal by Protect East Meath and others (including the applicant) to the Commission, inspector’s report (January 2024), Board meeting (April 2024), Board direction (May 2024) and grant of permission with eight conditions (28 May 2024).

3.2 Judicial Review as “Test Case”

Proceedings commenced July 2024; leave granted September 2024.
The Commission sought to identify test cases on recurring telecom mast issues; the applicant’s case was selected as one such test case, with a full hearing fixed for 19 November 2025.
Opposition papers were filed in late 2025. The applicant then served three additional affidavits (including expert material), shortly before the hearing.

3.3 Draft Judgment Procedure

Humphreys J also recited his now-standard procedure of circulating a draft judgment to the parties for typographical/factual corrections and limited comments, stressing that:

Drafts are not public documents; disclosure is tightly constrained.
Comments cannot re‑argue the case; they are confined to clearly defined categories (errors, redactions, suggestions on wording, etc.).

This procedural exposition is of general interest but not controversial; it is increasingly common in complex judicial review matters.

4. The “Eight‑Fold Path” to Judicial Review Relief

Relying on his earlier decision in Reilly v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659, Humphreys J summarises an eight‑fold cumulative test that an applicant must satisfy before relief should be granted:

Jurisdiction: Time limits and general standing to bring proceedings.
Legal correctness and workability of the applicant’s point.
Proper pleading with adequate specificity.
Issue-specific standing (e.g. no ius tertii reliance on others’ rights).
Material before the decision‑maker: Sufficient material must have been before the authority to trigger a duty to consider the point (subject to limited exceptions).
Onus of proof: The applicant must prove all necessary facts.
Materiality / Harmless error: Any error must be more than harmless or technical, with real‑world consequences.
Discretion: The court must decide that, in all the circumstances, granting relief is appropriate and proportionate.

In this case, the judgment particularly engages with:

Workability – whether the interpretations urged by the applicant would impose unworkable obligations on planning authorities.
Onus of proof – repeatedly emphasised (e.g. on whether land adjoins a “public road”, whether Laytown is a “small town”, and whether a single mast exceeds the EIA “urban development” margin).
Harmless error and discretion – especially in relation to infelicities in wording, minor technical issues, or errors that make no difference to outcome.

5. Preliminary and Procedural Rulings

5.1 Late Affidavits and the Limits of Reply

Shortly before the substantive hearing the applicant served three further affidavits (her own, and two experts—Caroline Kearns Gethings and Dr Kent Chamberlin), containing extensive new evidence, including on heritage impacts and health effects of electromagnetic radiation.

The Commission and notice party objected that:

The affidavits were filed after the close of pleadings and outside the timetable fixed by the court.
They were not genuine “replying affidavits” within Order 103 RSC / Practice Direction HC126, but introduced a new evidential narrative rather than rebutting specific points raised in opposition.
They expanded the case in a way inconsistent with structured, case‑managed judicial review and with the principles in Reid v An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2021] IEHC 230 and Fahybeg Windfarm Opposition Group v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 310.

The applicant invoked Hayes v Environmental Protection Agency [2024] IECA 162, arguing that there is no rule barring new expert evidence after the eight‑week period, so long as grounds are not expanded.

The Court held:

Replying affidavits are confined to true reply. Where they seek to add new material that could have been filed earlier, they are inadmissible.
Hayes is not authority for a general right to drip‑feed evidence up to the last minute; it simply indicates that the eight‑week period for initiating proceedings does not itself bar later evidence, subject to compliance with case‑management directions and the normal rules on reply evidence.
The three affidavits dealt with issues known “from day one” and largely comprised opinion and advocacy, not narrowly-focused reply. There was no explanation why they could not have been prepared earlier.
The affidavits also breached directions and risked procedural chaos: uncertainty for respondents, potential need for further responsive affidavits, and jeopardising the fixed hearing date.
As to Dr Chamberlin in particular, the Court accepted objections that his qualifications and the scientific basis for his opinions were not properly set out and that his report strayed into legal argument; its reliability was questionable.

Accordingly, the Court refused to admit the three new “reply” affidavits. This is an important procedural marker: environmental applicants cannot rely on late, sprawling “reply” evidence to rescue gaps in their original case unless they clearly fall within recognised exceptions (e.g. truly reactive, or jurisdictional issues that could not reasonably be raised earlier).

5.2 Court’s Discretion Despite Pleadings: Ballyboden and O.103 r.28(4)

Humphreys J also revisits the impact of Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 4, and aligns it with the new Order 103 r.28(4) RSC. In essence:

The court itself must always be satisfied that relief is appropriate, even if respondents do not plead or argue particular discretionary points.
Order 103 r.28(4) now expressly provides that a failure by a respondent to plead a ground of opposition “shall not preclude” the court from refusing relief in its discretion.
This is not inconsistent with Holland J’s emphasis in Fernleigh Residents Association [2025] IEHC 655 that respondents should clearly plead discretionary points; it is a question of emphasis rather than conflict. Even if respondents fail to do so, the court is not bound to grant certiorari.

This reinforces the non‑mechanistic, non‑“hair trigger” nature of judicial review: the court’s discretion is not frozen by the parties’ pleadings.

6. Domestic Law Grounds

6.1 Ground 1 – Adequacy of Drawings (Article 23 PDR 2001)

6.1.1 The Complaint

The applicant alleged the planning application was invalid because:

The 1:500 site layout plan did not show all “features on, adjoining or in the vicinity” (Art 23(1)(a)).
Levels were indicated only as “ASL” (above sea level), not clearly as Ordnance Datum (Art 23(1)(c)), potentially complicating enforcement.
Elevation drawings did not show the main features of contiguous buildings, particularly the station building within the curtilage of a protected structure (Art 23(1)(d)).

The applicant emphasised that Article 23 is mandatory and that deficient drawings undermine public participation and future enforcement.

6.1.2 The Court’s Approach

The Court noted that:

Any specific complaint regarding lack of contours (Art 23(1)(c)) was ultimately withdrawn.
Article 23(1)(a): no particular missing “feature” was clearly identified and evidenced as omitted.
Article 23(1)(c): the reference to levels “ASL” should be read, where possible, as referring to Ordnance Datum (OD). Decisions and documents should be read in a way that makes sense and preserves validity if reasonably possible. The applicant’s own submissions effectively accepted this interpretation, undermining the alleged confusion.
Article 23(1)(d): while elevation drawings did not show all details of buildings within the protected curtilage, substantial additional material—including photomontages and conservation reports (from both the developer’s consultant and the Council’s conservation officer)—illustrated the relationship between the mast and the protected structures.

Crucially:

The phrase “materially affected” in Art 23(1)(d) involves an evaluative judgment. The Commission’s acceptance of the material implicitly indicated a conclusion that the protected structures were not materially affected in a way that triggered further elevation-detail obligations.
No planning professional (Council planners, conservation officer, or the inspector) felt inhibited in assessing visual or heritage impacts by alleged drawing deficiencies.
Even if there were some technical non‑compliance, any error was harmless given the wealth of other visual and heritage material available.

Ground 1 therefore failed. The judgment reinforces that Article 23 is not an invitation to quash permissions for minor or cured technical defects, especially where no real-world prejudice is shown.

6.2 Ground 2 – Site Notices and Public Participation (Articles 17 & 19 PDR 2001)

6.2.1 The Complaint

The applicant argued that the planning application was invalid because site notices were not erected at all public entrances to the station from a public road as required by Article 19(1)(c). In particular, no notice was placed at a south‑eastern pedestrian entrance used by many rail passengers, allegedly depriving them of awareness and participation rights.

6.2.2 Statutory Framework

Art 19(1)(c): where the site adjoins a public road, notices must be at or near the main entrance(s) from that public road.
Art 19(2): where the land does not adjoin a public road, a single notice in a conspicuous external position suffices.
“Public road” is not defined in the 2001 Regulations, so the definition in the Roads Act 1993 (via the Planning Act) applies: a road over which a public right of way exists and whose maintenance lies on a road authority.

6.2.3 The Court’s Analysis

Key points:

The burden was on the applicant to prove that the land to which the application relates “adjoins a public road”.
She did not produce evidence that the station car park entrance constituted such a public road within the technical definition (i.e. maintained by a road authority and over which a public right of way exists).
Absent proof of a “public road”, Article 19(1) was not engaged; instead, Article 19(2) applied, requiring only a conspicuous notice visible from outside the land, which was satisfied.

The applicant’s personal lack of awareness of the application could not substitute for proof of legal non-compliance. No notification system can guarantee universal awareness; the legal question is whether the regulatory standard was met, not whether any individual in fact saw a notice.

Accordingly, Ground 2 failed. The decision is a reminder that:

Applicants must prove the factual predicates (such as existence of a “public road”) for regulatory obligations they invoke.
Arguments based on alleged prejudice to other groups (e.g. local campaign groups) are generally barred as ius tertii.

6.3 Ground 3 – Guidelines, Development Plan and Health Impacts

6.3.1 The 1996 Antennae Guidelines and the Meath CDP

Meath CDP policy INF POL 56 commits the planning authority to assessing telecommunications proposals in accordance with the 1996 Telecommunications Antennae and Support Structures Guidelines (as updated by Circular PL 07/12). The applicant argued that:

Laytown is a “small town” or “village” within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Within small towns/villages, masts should only be permitted as a “last resort” (after demonstrating that sharing/co‑location or other sites are not feasible).
The inspector and Commission allegedly misapplied or sidestepped the “last resort” requirement.

However, the CDP classifies Laytown/Bettystown/Mornington/Donacarney as a “Self‑Sustaining Town” with a 2016 population of 10,889—above the tier of “Towns and Villages” such as Athboy. Thus, Laytown is part of a mid‑tier town, not a “small town or village”.

Given that:

The onus of proof lay on the applicant to show that Laytown fell into the “small town/village” category; she did not.
The “last resort” policy was therefore not triggered by the Guidelines.
Even if one assumed it applied, the inspector’s report actually records that he accepted the developer’s technical justification, which set out why no suitable alternative sites existed and why co‑location was not feasible.

The Court observed that some of the applicant’s argument relied on misquoting or selectively quoting the inspector (for example, omitting the words “suitable alternative sites” from a key passage), thereby inverting its meaning. When properly read, the inspector’s conclusion was that there was no substantive evidence of any suitable alternative sites and that adequate technical justification had been provided.

Furthermore, the Court pointed out the inconsistency in the applicant’s framing: she insisted Laytown was a “small village” to engage the “last resort” test but simultaneously argued in the EIA ground that the project was “urban development”.

6.3.2 Health and Safety Concerns

The applicant also asserted that the Commission unlawfully declined jurisdiction to consider health and safety impacts of the mast, misreading the 1996 Guidelines and Circular PL 07/12, which state that health/safety are for other regimes, not planning conditions.

Humphreys J rejected the challenge, but with some nuance:

EU and national law create a specialist regulatory framework for electromagnetic fields (EMF):
- Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC on limitation of exposure of the general public to EMF, based on ICNIRP guidelines.
- European Union (Electronic Communications Code) Regulations 2022 (SI 444/2022), which reference those standards and require operators to comply.
- ComReg’s licensing and oversight, plus the ICNIRP compliance certification lodged with the planning application.
Circular PL 07/12 reiterates that planning authorities “should be primarily concerned with the appropriate location and design” of telecoms infrastructure and “do not have competence for health and safety matters” in relation to EMF; those are regulated by other codes.
It would be unworkable to require each planning decision-maker, in each mast case, to re‑litigate the entire scientific debate on EMF and health.
Nonetheless, he accepted that exceptional, site‑specific circumstances (e.g. unusual sensitivity of nearby medical equipment) could conceivably require attention to health impacts, and that the Commission’s language should recognise this rather than appear to announce an a priori rule in all possible cases.

Thus, the correct interpretation is:

In ordinary mast applications, planning bodies are entitled to rely on ICNIRP compliance and the specialist regulatory regime, and to give no real weight to generalised health fears.
Statements by inspectors that health is “not a matter for the Board” should be read as meaning that health concerns of the type raised are not matters of planning weight in that particular case, not as declaring an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
Any sub‑optimal wording in the inspector’s report was, at most, a harmless error with no bearing on the outcome, so could not justify certiorari.

On that basis, the health-related strand of Ground 3 failed.

7. EU Law Ground: Telecom Masts and the EIA “Urban Development” Category

7.1 Legal Framework

The EIA Directive (2011/92/EU as amended by 2014/52/EU) requires that:

Projects “likely to have significant effects on the environment” must undergo EIA if they fall within Annex I (mandatory EIA) or Annex II (subject to screening), as transposed domestically in Schedule 5 Parts 1 and 2 of the 2001 Regulations.
Annex II, 10(b) covers “Urban development projects, including the construction of shopping centres and car parks.”
Irish transposition: Schedule 5 Part 2 Class 10(b)(iv) covers “urban development” exceeding certain area thresholds (2ha in a business district, 10ha in other built‑up areas, 20ha elsewhere). It does not define “urban development” but sets size triggers.

The Commission considered the mast a “project” in the Article 1 sense but concluded it did not fall within any Annex I or II / Schedule 5 class; therefore no preliminary examination, screening or EIA was required.

7.2 The Applicant’s Case

The applicant contended that:

Telecom masts are “infrastructure projects” and form part of “urban development projects”, referring to:
- European Commission 2024 guidance Interpretation of definitions of project categories of annex I and II of the EIA Directive, which notes that “telecommunications/wireless communication deployment” could be included under Annex II, 10(b).
- Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/1307, encouraging Member States to apply SEA/EIA, where required, to connectivity infrastructure.
Irish case law allegedly diverged between Reid v An Bord Pleanála and Ryan v An Bord Pleanála on whether “urban development” turns on location or function; a CJEU reference was said to be necessary.
Given the mast’s visual impact and its role in a broader 5G network, it should be treated as an “urban development project” triggering EIA duties under Article 4 and Regulation 109.

7.3 The Court’s Analysis on “Urban Development”

(a) No Conflict Between Reid and Ryan

The Court rejected the alleged inconsistency between Reid and Ryan as “pure applicant’s fantasy”:

Reid did not address the “urbanisation” nuance considered in Ryan; different points were argued and decided.
Different factual contexts or arguments do not constitute conflicting jurisprudence.

(b) Commission v Spain (C‑332/04) and Commission Guidance

In Commission v Spain, the CJEU held it unlawful to exclude all urban development projects located in urban areas from EIA consideration. Spain had allowed EIA only for such projects on non‑urban land, which improperly applied location as the sole criterion and ignored nature and size.

However:

The case does not support the inverse proposition that all works in urban areas are “urban development projects”.
It simply prohibits a categorical locational exclusion.

The 2024 Commission guidance recognises that “urban development projects” should be interpreted with “wide scope and broad purpose”:

It lists examples: housing, stadiums, leisure centres, universities, cinemas, etc.
It notes that projects to which the terms “urban” and “infrastructure” can relate, including telecommunications/wireless communications deployment, could fall within that category.
But the Commission expressly acknowledges that Member States may in some cases treat such projects under other Annex II categories or not require EIA, provided that projects likely to have significant effects do not escape the Directive’s scope.

The crucial theme is that this is possibilistic rather than determinative: telecom deployment can, but need not, be an Annex II 10(b) project, depending on context.

(c) Evaluative Nature of “Urban Development” and Margin of Appreciation

Humphreys J stresses that:

“Urban development” is inherently nebulous and largely evaluative; the Directive does not precisely define it.
Not everything that happens within an urban area is “urban development”; as earlier Irish and UK case law (e.g. Reid; R (Condron) v Merthyr Tydfil CBC [2009] EWHC 1621) suggest, it must relate to development of land qua urban area or qua urbanising area.
The concept is informed by the examples in Annex II, 10(b) (“shopping centres and car parks”), which are inherently urbanising, large‑scale developments that change land use, increase traffic, and have broad-town impacts.
By contrast, a 21m monopole is a small, functionally necessary node in a wider, largely invisible network that exists just as much in rural as in urban landscapes.

Accordingly:

There is “nothing unlawful” about a planning authority forming the general evaluative judgment that one-off telecom masts are not ordinarily “urban development projects” within Annex II 10(b), subject to:
- Exceptional cases (e.g. multiple masts integrated in a large urban project, or a mast clearly forming part of a bigger Annex I/II project).
The applicant bore the burden of proving that this mast exceeded that margin of evaluation; she did not. There was no special feature elevating it to the scale or urbanising impact of the examples in Annex II 10(b).
The argument that all masts collectively form a nationwide network could not transform each mast into an EIA urban development project; otherwise virtually any individual connection point in an infrastructural grid would automatically trigger EIA, an unworkable and unintended result.

(d) Harmless Error and the Inspector’s Screening Language

The inspector had stated the development was “not one to which Schedule 5 applies”, and did not require EIA. The Board’s decision also recorded that the project was a “project” in Article 1 terms, but did not fall within any Schedule 5 class.

Humphreys J held that:

The important question is whether, in substance, the project actually falls within Annex I or II; minor infelicities in phrasing are irrelevant if it clearly does not.
Given the nature, scale and context of the mast, and in light of the Directive and guidance, any error in wording is at most harmless and incapable of affecting the outcome.

7.4 Refusal of CJEU Reference

The Court declined to make a reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU because:

Only issues of interpretation or validity of EU law, not its application to facts, require reference.
There was no “acute point of interpretation” on which doubt genuinely arose; the questions were essentially about factual evaluation against a settled legal framework, with a wide margin left to Member States.
Following An Taisce v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 8, courts should not refer where EU law is “acte clair” in its interpretative principles and the issue is simply their application to the particular project.

The judgment therefore stands for the proposition that, absent exceptional project‑specific features, a single telecom mast does not require EIA as an “urban development project”, and that this conclusion is within the Member State’s evaluative margin under Annex II.

8. Doctrinal Themes and Precedents

8.1 Reading Administrative Decisions “In the Round”

Humphreys J consolidates a strong line of authority (e.g. Sweeney v Fahy, M.R. (Bangladesh), O’Sullivan v HSE, St Margaret’s Recycling) that:

Decisions must be read in a sensible, contextual manner, not parsed word‑by‑word for possible infelicities.
If a document is reasonably capable of a valid reading, the court should not prefer an invalid one.
Isolated phrases in an inspector’s report (e.g. on health or alternatives) should be understood in the light of the whole reasoning and the statutory scheme.

8.2 Onus of Proof and Presumption of Validity

Echoing Meadows, O’Doherty, and multiple planning cases (e.g. Moran v ABP), the judgment emphasises:

Administrative decisions enjoy a presumption of validity.
The burden lies on the applicant to establish:
- Non-compliance with statutory requirements (e.g. that land adjoins a “public road”).
- That a project falls within an EIA category.
- That a given town falls into a certain hierarchical class (“small town”).
Assertions are not evidence; where the issue is technical or expert (e.g. health effects, environmental science), credible expert evidence is needed, provided in time and within procedural rules.

8.3 Harmless Error Doctrine and Discretion

Relying on Altrip (C‑72/12), Carrownagowan, Massey, and UK cases like Champion, the Court reiterates:

Not every legal or procedural defect, even in an EU law context, justifies quashing a decision.
An error that demonstrably makes no difference to the outcome, and does not materially impede public participation, is harmless.
Once an applicant shows an error, the onus shifts to the respondent/developer to show harmlessness, often via affidavit evidence. The court may rely on such evidence without thereby unlawfully “substituting” its decision for that of the authority.
Even where error is material, the court retains a structured discretion in purely domestic matters, guided by factors such as prejudice, proportionality, delay and the public interest.

This doctrine underpins the Court’s refusal to quash for alleged technical flaws in drawings, wording, or site notices where no substantive prejudice or different outcome is realistically suggested.

8.4 Workability of Legal Obligations

Citing Waltham Abbey, Kellystown and An Taisce (Kilkenny Cheese), the Court insists that statutory and EU law should be interpreted to produce workable, sensible obligations. In Doyle this principle is applied to:

Health and EMF: Requiring each planning decision-maker to second‑guess ICNIRP and the EU public‑health regime in each mast case would be “impossibly onerous and unworkable”.
EIA categorisation: Interpreting “urban development projects” so broadly that virtually every piece of urban infrastructure (regardless of scale or character) mandates EIA would collapse Annex II’s structure and overwhelm the system.

9. Complex Concepts Explained

9.1 EIA vs Appropriate Assessment (AA)

EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) is required for projects under Annex I (always) or Annex II (subject to screening) of the EIA Directive where they are likely to have significant effects on the environment.
AA (Appropriate Assessment) under the Habitats Directive focuses specifically on impacts on European sites (Natura 2000). It uses a “no reasonable scientific doubt” test about adverse effects on integrity.
In this case, AA was screened out; the challenge focused on EIA and whether the mast was an Annex II 10(b) “urban development project”.

9.2 “Urban Development Projects”

This term in Annex II is deliberately broad and undefined. In practice:

It covers major developments changing the urban fabric: large housing estates, shopping centres, big car parks, stadiums, university campuses, etc.
Authorities look at:
- Nature (what type of project is it?)
- Size (land-take, scale of buildings, intensity of use)
- Location (sensitivity of surroundings, e.g. historic city centres).
Not every small intervention (e.g. a mast, kiosk, or minor structure) is “urban development” in this sense, even if it is physically in a town.

9.3 Harmless Error

A “harmless error” is a mistake (e.g. a mis-stated legal test, an omitted detail) that:

Did not, and realistically could not, have changed the decision.
Did not materially compromise public participation.
Does not undermine the integrity of the environmental or planning assessment.

In such cases, courts often refuse to quash the decision, especially where EU law does not require quashing for every defect.

9.4 The “Last Resort” Test in the 1996 Antennae Guidelines

The 1996 Guidelines indicate that:

In small towns and villages, freestanding masts should usually be approved only as a last resort, after exploring:
- Sharing existing masts/structures.
- Using less obtrusive options (rooftops, smaller poles, etc.).
This is a policy guide, not a rigid rule; its precise application depends on how the local Development Plan classifies settlements.
In Doyle, because Laytown is part of a “self‑sustaining town”, the Guidelines’ small‑town “last resort” policy did not apply.

9.5 “Public Road” vs Car Park

A “public road” is not every place open to the public; legally, it is:

A route over which the public has a right of way, and
Whose maintenance is the responsibility of a local roads authority.

A privately owned or railway‑managed car park, or internal access road, may not qualify, even if the public can drive in. That matters because site notice duties differ depending on whether the application land adjoins a “public road”.

10. Impact and Future Significance

10.1 For Telecom Mast Litigation

Doyle is likely to be cited extensively in future mast cases for the following propositions:

A single telecom mast will generally not be an “urban development project” under Annex II, 10(b) / Class 10(b)(iv); EIA obligations will not ordinarily arise on that basis alone.
To invoke the EIA Directive, challengers must show:
- Exceptional features (scale, integration with larger projects, highly sensitive location) that make the mast part of a broader “urban development” or another Annex I/II category.
- Real, evidence‑based likelihood of significant environmental effects.
Generalised health fears about EMF are to be addressed via the EU and national regulatory framework (ICNIRP, ComReg, spectrum licensing). Planning authorities may normally rely on those regimes and need not perform parallel scientific assessments.

10.2 For Judicial Review Practice in Planning / Environmental Cases

The judgment strengthens several trends:

Early, complete pleading and evidence: Applicants must put forward the core evidential case (including expert evidence) at the appropriate time and cannot treat reply affidavits as a safety‑valve to re‑design the case.
Eight‑fold path: Courts will systematically test JR cases against threshold issues (standing, workability, proof, materiality, discretion) before wielding certiorari.
Reading in the round: Attempts to build challenges out of isolated phrases in inspector’s reports or decisions are likely to fail if the overall reasoning is sound.

10.3 For Irish EIA Law and EU Relations

Doyle contributes to a more settled understanding that:

The EIA Directive leaves Member States a broad evaluative margin in applying generic categories like “urban development projects”.
Commission guidance is persuasive but does not convert every possible telecom project into Annex II, 10(b) development.
CJEU references will not be made unless a genuine, unresolved question of legal interpretation arises; factual application disputes are for national courts.

10.4 For the Role of Health in Land‑Use Planning

The decision reinforces a division of labour:

Public health impacts of EMF exposure are primarily for European and national regulatory codes, not individual planning applications.
Planning decisions focus on location, design, visual amenity, land use, heritage and similar factors.
Only in unusual, site‑specific contexts might health questions gain planning relevance, and even then, applicants would need credible, timely expert evidence.

11. Conclusion

Doyle v An Coimisiún Pleanála is a substantial and carefully reasoned planning and EU law judgment that:

Articulates and applies a rigorous eight‑fold framework for granting judicial review relief, with strong emphasis on workability, onus of proof and harmless error.
Clarifies that applicants cannot use “replying” affidavits to circumvent case‑management directions or to introduce wholesale new expert narratives at the eleventh hour.
Holds that single telecom masts are, in general, not EIA “urban development projects”, though exceptional cases remain possible, and that no CJEU reference is required on this point.
Confirms the legitimacy of relying on the ICNIRP-based EMF regime and planning circulars to treat general health concerns about masts as matters of low planning weight, absent specific evidence to the contrary.
Reaffirms that judicial review is not “politics by other means” nor a game of technicalities, but a legal supervision of administrative legality grounded in realism, proportionality and respect for institutional roles.

In the broader legal landscape, Doyle provides both substantive guidance on telecom infrastructure and EIA, and procedural discipline in environmental judicial review. It is likely to be a leading authority for courts, practitioners and planning authorities confronted with future mast challenges and other attempts to push the boundaries of Annex II “urban development” and of late-stage evidential expansion.